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Abstract 
This thesis presents an analysis of slump in the U. K. economy, 
with the main attention given to the early 1980s. The slump is seen not 
as an isolated incident but as the culmination of a series of severe 
recessions; after the slump a prolonged phase of steady growth and rising 
employment is normal. This particular interpretation of slump is at the 
dentre of a re-examination of the concept of a 50 year Kondratieff cycle 
in the economy. Investigation of this cycle is based not on the usual 
method of trying to find broad empirical regularities. in economic time 
series, but rather on attempting to find what types of economic conditions 
logically follow on from other types of economic condition over a long 
time span. The attempt is made to reinterpret British economic history 
from 1815 to the present using this framework of analysis, a task 
involving synthesis and reinterpretation of existing accounts, supported 
by statistical material on national income, employment and unemployment. 
A closer examination is made of spatial patterns of employment 
change and of unemployment in Britain from the First World War to date, 
using primarily officially published annual statistics on employment, 
and monthly statistics on unemployment. Attention is concentrated mainly 
on phases of downswing in the long cycle (1918-1932,1966-1983), with 
detailed attention being given, with the help of unpublished Census of 
Employment statistics, to the period from 1971 to 1981, although there 
is also a comparative examination of spatial labour markets during periods 
of upswing, both with less than full employment (1932-39), and with full 
employment (1945-66). An attempt is also made to clarify the confused 
question of the geography of production and employment prior to 1914. 
In this "geographical" part of the work attention is given to a detailed 
unravelling of core-periphery distinctions in the British economy, at 
both the urban-rural scale and the north-south scale. It is hoped 
by concentrating attention on single year change to identify the precise 
economic conditions under which significant reorientations of the space 
economy take place (with, most importantly, a very sharp distinction 
being drawn between slump and post-slump periods) thereby avoiding 
overgeneralised pictures derived from the comparison of distant points in 
time. 
(Colin Crouch, 1989, The Economic Geography of Recession in the UK; 
the earZy 1980s and historicaZ perspectiVes; Durham University PhD 
thesis). 
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Chapter 8 The Census of Employment; 1978 and 11 
8.1 Introduction 
Throughout most of the duration of the research, heavy reliance 
has necessarily been placed on the monthly unemployment count in the 
analysis of labour market changes at the local and regional levels during 
the slump. Analysis of this type is undoubtedly useful, and indispensable 
in trying to provide a time-profile of slump, but provides no direct 
evidence of levels of employment change. The 1981 Census of Employment 
presents such evidence, but the length of the time interval between this 
Census and the previous Census in 1978 means that while detailed 
information at the minimum list heading level is available for employment 
levels in each county for June 1978 and September 1981, this information 
is not available for any intervening dates. The continuance of a 
commitment to an AnnuaZ Census of Employment, as took place between 1971 
and 1978, would have considerably enhanced the possibilities of uncovering 
the detailed mechanisms of slump, and the contrasts between various phases 
of slump. Even so, if it had been absolutely necessary to have Censuses 
of Employment only at three year intervals rather than at one year 
intervals, it would have been far more convenient if the Censuses had 
taken place in 1979,1982 and 1985 rather than in 1978,1981 and 1984. 
The period between 1979 and 1982 could be conveniently categorised as one 
of "slump", with no non-slump phases included, while the period between 
1982 and 1985 could be categorised as one of "late slump and early 
recovery", with probably a considerably modified economic geography when 
compared with the geography of slump. The dates actually available mean 
that the "geography of slump", as analysed below, incorporates also a 
year of non-slump (1978-79), which on occasions makes conclusions 
difficult to draw. It is assumed however that between 1978 and 1981 
the dominant economic geography is that of slump. It is quite likely, 
though, that the various elements which may be detected of expanded 
employment in the service sector may have been concentrated in the pre-slump 
year of 1978-9 rather than in the slump itself. 
Despite all these deficiencies, no serious geography of slump can 
be written without using this data source, provided of course that the 
data had been released at the time of writing. For this reason, the 
current discussion of slump has been extended to cover the results of 
the 1981 Census of Employment, even though it has only been at a relatively 
late stage in the preparation of this work (April 1984) that such 
information has become available at the county or local scale. The 
analysis of year by year patterns of employment change through the 1970so 
in chapter 6 above, was conducted at an even later stage, in order to 
broaden the historical context of the discussion of slump. For reasons 
of space, various previously examined topics in the geography of slump, 
such as an analysis of unemployment change by town across the slump as a 
whole, are omitted from this final presentation. Neither has any detailed 
use been made here of the 1984 Census of Employment, the results of which 
became available only at a very late stage of the preparation of the text; 
clearly there is scope for some updating. 
It should, in fairness to previous writers, be noted that the bulk 
of the existing surveys of the geography of slump, or aspects of the 
geography of slump, were written before the release of detailed figures 
for the 1981 Census of Employment. 
2 
Before examining in more detail the geographical aspects of slump, 
an attempt is made to present a revision of official estimates of the total 
number of employees in employment at various stages during the slump, on 
the basis of the 1981 Census of Employment. It is considered that the 
officially published figures are deficient in a number of respects, as 
discussed below. 
Between 1978 and 1981, a cumulative error of 737,000 jobs, 
representing an underestimate of true employment levels, had developed 
in the official estimates, which of course became revealed only when the 
Census of Employment results had been officially processed. Estimates 
for manufacturing employment may be taken as reasonably accurate, with a 
shortfall in the estimates of employment of only 52,000 in a period in 
which 1.2 million jobs were lost. It is only because such estimates for 
manufacturing may be taken, provisionally, as satisfactorily accurate that 
any reliance has been placed upon them in chapter 7 above. Estimates for 
service sector employment have been much less accurate, and are 
responsible for the bulk of the cumulatiVe error. 
3 It has been suggested 
in the Gazette 
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that the main problem in estimates in the service sector 
is that "whilst the information from the sample of establishments used 
in the provisional series provides a good guide to trends to employment 
in existing establishments, it is unable to provide an adequate basis for 
allowing for the creation of new establishments or the demise of existing 
onesil, the problem being accentuated by the large number of small 
businesses, and by implication the high birth and death rates of businesses, 
in the service sector. Attempts have been made to correct for 
underestimation of employment in the service sector subsequent to 19819 
but it would appear from Table 8.1 that the main method used to deal with 
the underestimation problem has been to divide the shortfall in the 
estimates as evenly as possible across time periods, so that a shortfall 
of 217,000 is attributed to the year 1978-79, a further 224,000 to 
- 
1979-80, and another 2120000 to 1980-81. Given the unevenness of economic 
conditions within this periodv such an allocation appears highly 
questionable. 
A set of alternative estimates is presented in Table 8.2 with no 
pretence at complete accuracy but rather with the more modest suggestion 
that these figures would be more reli , 
able than those officially presented. 
Changes in unemployment rates are used to calibrate the scale of 
employment change. 
Between June 1977 and June 1978 national unemployment fell by 
4,000, from 1,450,100 to 1,446,100 while employment rose from 22,619,000 
to 22,777,000, an increase of 0.7%. To have kept unemployment exactly 
the same numerically, employment in June 1978 would have been 22,773,000. 
The "natural rate" of growth of employment is thus taken as 22,773,000 + 
2296190000, that is 1.00681, or +0.68% per annum. The actual rate of 
growth of employment is estimated by adding the "natural rate" in 
percentage terms to the percentage point increase in unemployment. 
Estimates for 1979 and 1980 made on this basis are presented in Table 
8.2. A figure is also given, in brackets, for June 1981 but this is not 
to be taken as any sort of estimate of employment (which would actually 
have been about 300,000 lower than the figure given) since the severe 
slump conditions of the period 1980-81 led to rapid increases in both 
measured and concealed unemployment, and by using official unemployment 
figures the-change in the labour force accounted for by concealed 
unemployment is not incorporated into the calculations. The attempt to 
measure the level of concealed unemployment is itself a majgr problem 
(chapter 3.5), but the increase of concealed unemployment which is implied 
here is roughly in accordance with levels provided in the independent 
calculations of chapter 3. 
The author's estimates suggest a smaller growth in employment 
than given by official figures for 1978-9. and a smaller drop in employment 
for 1979-80, at the beginning of slump (-0.5% against -0.8%)* It would 
be tempting to try to provide separate employment estimates for each 
region for each year, but this would present considerable methodological 
difficulties in that it would imply assuming various relationships which 
it is being attempted to demonstrate. The discussion in chapter 7 above 
has tended to concentratev when regional employment levels are being 
considered, on changes of employment in production industries, which has 
largely eliminated the need to provide estimates, either overt or implicit* 
of changing levels of employment in the service sector. 
It would undoubtedly be possible to provide more accurate estimates 
than those given officially, at national and regional levels for given 
times, through successively more refined procedures. This is hardly 
-3 .- 
essential for the work in the current chapter. 
Table 8.3 shows levels of employment change by county between 1978 
and 1981, and shows a considerable diversity of experience. At one 
extreme, over 12% of existing jobs were lost in Clevelandq Mid Glamorgan 
and Tyne and Wear, and at the other extreme, employment increased by 
nearly 10% in the Grampian region of Scotland. While it is hardly 
surprising that most of the urban, industrial counties of the periphery 
had particularly large falls in employment, what is more surprising is 
the extent to which several counties actuaily showed increases in 
employment. 
5 Most of these counties were in Southern England, with the 
Scottish regions providing the remainder. The presence of employment 
increase during the 1978-81 period does not automatically provide proof 
that employment was increasing during the slump, since a year previous to 
the slump is also incorporated into the figures, but it is reasonable to 
assume that counties with particularly large increases of employment 
between 1978 and 1981 had increases of employment during the slump 
itself, as well as in 1978-79. 
Table 8.4 pursues the matter further. It is assumed, for the 
purposes of illustration, that the pattern of employment change in 
1978-79 was geographically similar to that in 1977-78, but slightly more 
favourable across the board. On the basis of Table 8.4, it would appear 
that employment was increasing during the slump in Hampshire, West Sussext 
East Sussex, Surrey and Buckinghamshire in Southern England, and in 
Highlands, Borders, Dumfries and Galloway, Grampian, and the Island Areas 
in Scotland. In the English cases, the tendency toward expansion carried 
over from the 1970s was strong enough to over-ride the depressive effects 
of slump. The Scottish case is more complicated, and will be discussed 
further in section 8.9 below. The impact of the North Sea. oil industry 
undoubtedly lay behind the large increases in employment in the Grampian 
region and the Island Areas, but other factors were involved in other 
parts of Scotland. Perhaps the most important generat point to make is 
that while a slump is a far-reaching national and international economic 
event, not all geographical areas, and indeed not all nation states* 
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show net declines in employment during a slump. 
The analysis of the economic geography of the 1970s in chapter 6, 
using the Annual Census of Employment, has tended to concentrate on the 
extremes of the range of employment change in any particular year, looking 
to see, for example, which regions and counties have been most affected 
by particular recessions (e. g. 1974-76) and which sectors within these 
counties are responsible for such extreme effects. This is the most 
efficient method for providing a brief survey of each year, which was all 
that was attempted in chapter 6, but for more detailed analysis of a 
-4- 
specific time period the whole range of experiences needs to be considered. 
To make the data manageable, some form of classification scheme is 
required, in order to be able to point more efficiently to significant 
aspects of similarity and contrast between counties. Any such 
classification scheme is not, or should not be, an end in itself, but 
rather is intended as a spring-board for deeper analysis. 
Table 8.3 provides the raw material for such a classification, 
tanking counties by percentage rates of employment change, and showing those 
components of this change which are attributable to the sectoral 
composition of the economy (structural shift) and those components which 
are attributable to performances in each sector which are better or worse 
than average (differential shift). Thus the job loss in Cleveland 
(-12.7%) may be divided into a national component (-5.2%) reflecting the 
rate of job loss nationally, a structural shift (-3.7%) reflecting the 
fact that Cleveland's industrial mix, and particularly a high concentration 
of employment in iron and steel, caused significant extra problems for 
the local economy, and a differential shift (-3.9%) reflecting extra 
severe problems caused by a faster than average rate of job loss within 
sectors in the local economy. It is important to recognise that, by 
definition, the average structural shift and the average differential 
shift are each zero, allowing ready appreciation of whether a particular 
county is relatively favoured or disfavoured in some respect. The use of 
shift share analysis has been criticised (e. g. Richardson 1978 pp. 203-206) 
and defended (notably in Fothergill and Gudgin 1979a). Richardson's 
criticism would appear however th say more about his own neo-classical 
methodological preferences than about the usefulness of shift-share 
analysis. He notes, for example, that 
"Several studies have suggested that the differential shift 
components are highly unstable over time, a death-bZow to the 
vaZue of the technique as a projection tool. Even worse,, the 
dissenting researchers found that the components were stable in 
some industries, but unstable in others, with little clue to 
determine which industries fell into which category a priori" 
(Richardson 1978, p. 205, emphasis added). 
There is an implicit assumption that employment change can be 
predicted, thus projected on the basis of a knowledge of past changes. 
Underlying this, or possibly following on from it, is the assumption that 
changes take place in mechanical and repetitive fashion. This network 
of assumptions may be described, according to context, as neo-classical or 
positivist. 
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Any detailed historical analysis of important patterns of 
economic change (e. g. chapters 4 to 8 here) will show that the most 
significant patterns of change are not mechanically repetitive but instead 
- 
may be highly disjointed, with considerable elements of irreversible 
structural change. If, in the example given above, the components of 
a shift-share analysis are stable in some industries, but unstable in 
others, this would suggest that the shift-share analysis has. uncovered 
important elements of possibly irreversible structural change in a 
regional economy, for example a phase of intense decline in a local 
industry. 
Economic change is highly uneven through time and spece. If a 
technique identifies that unevenness, that is a point in the technique's 
favour; it is not an adequate criticism to complain that shift-share 
techniques fail to product results which suggest smoothness of economic 
change through space and time. 
The use of shift-share analysis is of considerable help in 
understanding patterns of economic change. The problems of abuse are 
those of any other reputable but not foolproof technique, and arise for 
example when a researcher uses past data not to understand historical 
change but rather to provide projections, or when a researcher conflutes 
description and explanation. Shift-share analysis is used extensively 
in this section, and helps identify the link between patterns of aggregate 
change and patterns of causality. 
As far as the classification scheme below is concerned, the two 
main bases of the classification are the level of total change in 
employment and the pattern of shifts. The level of employment change is 
taken as the primary basis for classification,, and the pattern of shifts 
is taken as the secondary basis. 
- 
8.2 An Outline Classification of Counties Based on Response 
to Slump 
8.2(i) Method of Analysis 
There are various prominent breaks in the distribution of the rate 
of employment change shown in Table 8.3; the distribution is not 
continuous throughout the range. A recognition of these natural breaks 
in the distribution indicates that it could be useful, in studying the 
geography of slump, to produce an outline classification of counties 
based on response to slump. 
The classification of data is not, or should not be, an end in 
itself, but rather an intermediate stage in the analysis of a complicated 
data set, providing some initial order out of a chaotic mass of statistics. 
Once such a classification has been made, detailed analysis can proceed. 
Three main types of examination may be said to proceed directly from the 
classification system; elements of each type are used in the analysis 
below. These forms of examination are: 
(a) Within-group comparisons The degree of the degree of 
homogeneity or otherwise within the group; the (approximate) 
determination of the degree to which certain aspects of change in 
a local economy are due to local peculiarities, or to the general 
characteristics of the type of local economy which is present. 
(b) Between-group con7parisons What detailed features differentiate 
one group from another? In many respects, this is perhaps the 
most important question raised in any classification scheme. 
(c) Conparison of cZassifications For example, how an empirically 
derived classification varies from one based on a priori notions, 
such as a classification of employment change based on degrees of 
urbanisation. 
9A flexible classification scheme, as used here, 
allows questions of the relationship between degrees of 
urbanisation and patterns of economic change to be posed from a 
variety of perspectives; an a priori classification scheme often 
allows for only a limited degree of hypothesis testing and is 
liable to obscure much local detail. 
The taxonomic stage is thus a prelude to the explanatory stage. 
In furthering the analysis, a more detailed examination of local 
differences in industrial structure, and of local patterns of differential 
shifts, would be required. Some basic procedures are listed below. 
(1) Calculation of the proportional manufacturing shift in each 
county, that part of the structural shift accounted for by the proportion 
of the county's total employment in manufacturing at the earlier date, 
regardless of sector. 
- 
(2) Calculation of the'residual structural shift in manufacturing, 
and allocation of elements of that shift to individual MLHs. The residual 
structural shift is the total structural shift in manufacturing, minus 
the proportional structural shift, and indicates the extent to which the 
sectoral composition of the local manufacturing industry is an element of 
additional weakness. 
(3) If there is a significant non-zero differential shift in 
manufacturing, isolate sectors which account for that shift. It is 
generally important to consider whether a large negative differential 
shift in a county results from a pattern of isolated but very large job 
losses, resulting in the negative differential shift being concentrated 
in a few minimum list headings, or whether it results from generally poor 
local performance across a wide-range of industrial sectors, in which case 
a large number of minimum list headings would have moderately large 
negative differential shifts. 
(4) Differential shifts in services may be considered in much 
the same way as in (3). 
This basic set of procedures is applied to employment statistics 
for individual counties, but there is considerable scope for cross-county 
comparisons to be made, using-the framework provided by the classification 
scheme. 
In developing the classification schemes the most important step 
is to identify the main breaks in the distribution of rates of employment 
change shown in Table 8.3. This leads to the identification of five 
basic groups, which are highly unequal in size. The next stage in the 
classification would then be to sub-divide the larger of these groups, 
in order to provide small groups of about four or five counties which 
can be examined in more detail. Firstly, however, the main groups need 
to be established. 
Perhaps the most important break in the distribution in Table 8.3 
occurs between counties ranked 18 (Staffordshireg employment change 
-7.16%) and 19/20 (Cornwall and Dyfed, employment change -5.81%9 compared 
with a national average of -5.21%). There is thus a highly distinct 
group of counties with declines in employment considerably greater than 
the national average; this group may be termed group 1. The question of 
possible sub-division of group 1 is to be considered later. The spatial 
distribution of group 1 counties is of interest (Fig 8.1). All these 
counties except Northamptonshire are in Wales, the West Midlands, 
Northern England (N, NW9 YH) or Scotland. There is a continuous belt of 
major employment decline stretching from the West Midlands Metropolitan 
County, through Staffordshire and into what might be called the northern 
metropolitan industrial belt (Clwydo Cheshire, Merseysideq Greater 
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Manchester, West Yorkshire, Soýth Yorkshire and Humberside). Decline was 
also intense, indeed on the whole more intense, in the outer peripheral 
coalfield zones of South Wales (West Glamorgan, Mid Glamorgan, Gwent), 
North East England (Tyne and Wear, Durham, Cleveland, Northumberland) 
and West Central Scotland (Strathclyde), which also tended to be, along 
with Lancashire, the most depressed areas in the slump of the early 
1930s. As the map (Fig 8.1) shows, these were isolated peripheral zones 
of intense decline rather than part of the main belt of severe but more 
modest decline. 
A second group of counties may also be identified, with the rate 
of job loss running close to the national average. The break at the 
upper end of group 2 (between Dyfed and Staffordshire) has already been 
noted. There is also a clear break at the lower end of the distribution, 
between Fife (-4.46%) and Lincolnshire (-3.99%). The dominant feature 
of the economic performance of these counties is a worse than average 
sectoral composition of employment (negative structural shift) combined 
with better than average performance within sectors (positive differential 
shift). The positive and negative shifts largely cancel each other out, 
with the result that the rate of employment change remains close to the 
national average. This pattern occurs in eight out of the eleven counties 
ranked from 19 to 29, and thus is a distinct group feature. A ninth 
county, Shropshire, represents the onZy case of a county maintaining 
average changes in employment through both the structural and differential 
shift remaining neutral. Shropshire, for want of a more convenient 
alternative, is classed with group 2. -In Essex, the pattern of shifts 
is almost neutral, but the structural shift is slightly but distinctly 
positive, in contrast with the negative shifts in the remaining group 2 
counties. Closer examination of Table 8.3 suggests that in its pattern 
of shifts, Essex more closely resembles other East Coast counties such 
as Lincolnshire and Norfolk, in having a positive structural shift and 
a neutral differential shift, although the structural shift is less 
pronounced in Essex than in the other counties. This suggests that Essex 
should be regarded as an outlier from group 3 (to be discussed) rather 
than as part of group 2. Cornwall has a pattern of economic performance 
which is almost completely the reverse of that of other group 2 counties, 
with a strong positive structural shift and a strong negative differential 
shift. This suggests that Cornwall cannot legitimately be regarded as 
part of group 2, and is better grouped with the Isle of Wight and other 
counties in group 3. 
Group 2 may thus be regarded as comprising nine counties, as listed 
in Table 8.5. In general, these may be regarded as comprising those 
parts of the main urban industrial belts which did not suffer the heavy 
-9- 
I job losses of group 1. There is a prticularly strong East Midlands 
presence in this group, especially if Bedfordshire is regarded like its 
neighbour Northamptonshire as part of the southern East Midlands rather 
than as part of the outer South East. Later analysis (section 8.3) 
suggests that if the effects of the Corby steel closure were eliminated 
from the calculation, Northamptonshire would also fall into this group, 
not surprisingly given the geography of the group. For the most part 
group 2 may be regarded as being a group of industrial counties with 
medium levels of urbanisation outside the South and outside the main 
Northern metropolitan belt, with the East Midlands and East Scotland 
being well represented, and with Lancashire also being found in this 
group, 
Three more groups, 3,4 and 5, may also be distinguished on the 
patterns of shifts. Group 3 counties are in many respects the converse 
of group 2 counties in that they have large. positive 'itructuial shifts, 
along with differential shifts which are generally negative, but generally 
much weaker than the positive shifts, leading to a more favourable than 
average employment performances. The nine counties included are listed 
in Table 8.5. This group is exceptionally heterogenouss, it being hard 
to point to close similarities between Greater London and Gwynedd for 
example, but it can be suggested that three distinct and reasonably' 
homogeneous subgroups may be noted: 
(a) "Southern cities" (Greater London, Avon, South Glamorgan) 
M "Resort counties's (Gwynedd, Cornwall, Isle of Wight) 
and (c) the East Coast (Essex, Norfolk, Lincolnshire) 
Group 4 counties, of which there are five (Table 8.5), are 
characterised by negative structural shifts, yet very strong positive 
differential shifts, so that the rate of employment decline has been 
considerably below the national average. If group 2 may be regarded as 
the part of the manufacturing belt of medium urbanisation, group 4 may 
be regarded as the less urbanised part of the British manufacturing belt. 
Group 5 consists of counties with positive structural shifts 
(with two exceptions, Cambridgeshire and Borders) and also positive 
differential shifts, which in some cases are extremely strong. These 
counties have, by definition therefore, better than average employment 
performances, and in many cases have actually shown increases in 
employment during the slump. Southern Englandq outside the metropolis, 
dominates this large group, with various of the regions of Scotland also 
represented. 
Table 8.5 presents the preliminary classification of counties which 
has been described above. Table 8.6 shows the average shifts for each of 
the groups'and illustrates how distinct each group is. Groups 1,2 and 4, 
- ln - 
representing Britaints industrial beltv all have broadly similar 
structural shifts, but clearly distinct differential shifts. Groups 3 and 
5 also have broadly similar structural shifts and clearly distinct 
differential shifts. 
The validity of the classification is suggested by the ease with 
which it was made, and the relatively small degree of overlap. This 
classification can hardly be regarded as final in that firstly, the 
groups are too uneven in size, with groups 1 and 5 especially needing 
to be subdivided and secondly, some of the groups (1,3 and 5 especially) 
are far from homogeneous. Section 8.2(ii) below considers in more 
detail the second stage of the classification process, which leads to 
the sub-groups identified in Table 8.7, a table which represents the 
starting point for the county by county analysis later in this chapter. 
-11- 
8.2(ii) Detailed Structures in the Classification 
(a) Group 1 
Group 1 was divided into four sub-groups by inspection of Table 
8.3. The least favoured group, la, showed highly unfavourable structural 
shifts and also highly unfavourable differential shifts, particularly 
(as it turned out) in the tertiary sector. The five counties in this 
group all, except for Mid Glamorgan, suffered from concentrations of 
employment, and employment loss, in the iron and steel industry, and all 
are included in the seven counties with the worst percentage losses in 
employment over the period. The fact that not all counties in this group 
are steel closure counties, while various counties in group lc have had 
substantial steel closures, necessitates some form of inter-group 
comparisons to see why some steel closure counties differed in their 
economic performances from others. One initial point of comparison is 
that group la steel closure counties showed far less favourable 
differential shifts in the tertiary sector than steel closure counties in 
group lc (Northamptonshire, South Yorkshire, West Glamorgan, Gwent) 
even though the overall rate of job loss might have been fairly similar. 
In considering the question of negative differential shifts in the 
service sector in group la, the question of the local service sector 
multiplier is undoubtedly important. 
Group lb consists of counties with neutral structural shifts but 
extremely unfavourable differential shifts. In many respects this is 
the most distinctive and homogermus grouping in the whole classification 
scheme, consisting as it does of three conurbations (Tyne and Wear, 
Merseyside, Strathclyde) with particularly long-standing economic 
problems, and with records of heavy job loss considerably pre-dating the 
slump. 
10 
It should be emphasised perhaps that the severity of employment 
decline over the slump and the previous period has been in no sense due 
to an unfavourable sectoral composition of employment and has been almost 
entirely due to the unfavourable position of these highly urbanised 
peripheral centres in employment shifts within individual sectors and 
within individual corporations. Greater Manchesterg nominally placed in 
group ld, shares various common features with group lb counties, and in 
later discussion is considered alongside them. However, the large-scale 
presence of the cotton textile and clothing industries implies a certain 
degree of sectoral concentration of weaknesses, while the adverse 
differential shifts, although severe, were far less severe than in Tyne 
and Wear, Merseyside or Strathclyde. 
Group lc is a more varied group, consisting of counties with 
highly adverse structural shiftst which dominate differential shifts. 
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The sectoral composition of these adverse shifts varies considerably, 
although in all except two cases the iron and steel/automobile complex 
accounts for a large proportion of the adverse structural shift. The 
two exceptions are Staffordshire, with pottery (MLH 462) accounting for 
47% of the net structural shift (-4,600 out of -9,700). and West Yorkshire 
in which a variety of textile and clothing related industries explain the 
bulk of the negative structural shift. 
11 These two counties are centres 
of concentration in two industries particularly hard hit by recession. 
The general feature of all seven counties is that while they have 
had particularly'unfavourable industrial structures, their level of 
economic performance has been on the whole no worse than would be 
expected from their sectoral compositions. The West Midlands and West 
Glamorgan have had fairly large negative differential shifts, and indeed 
it was a marginal decision whether to allocate West Glamorgan to group la 
or 1c, but these shifts were still fairly low by group I standards. 
Most group lc counties indeed show positive differential shifts. 
Another point worth noting is that the conurbations in this group 
(West Yorkshire, South Yorkshire, West Midlands) show only a weak 
tendency towards negative differential shifts, in contrast with 
conurbations in group lb (Tyne and Wear, Merseyside, Strathclyde). 
This is another illustration (cf chapter 6 above) of the way that urban 
economic function rather than mere conurbational status needs to be 
considered in examining the decline of the peripheral conurbations. In 
one set (Merseyside, etc. ), the weakness of the conurbation is not 
explicable in terms of sectoral factors, but instead needs to be 
considered more in terms of the marginal position of employment in each 
of these conurbations in any corporate economic strategy. 
12 In the other 
set (West Yorkshire, etc. ) the weakness is seen as primarily due to the 
vulnerability of certain industriesq usually precisely those industries 
whose historical tendency to "agglomerate" 
13 in the same district during 
the 19th century was responsible for the early development of the 
peripheral conurbations. 
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This leaves group ld, a miscellaneous group of three counties 
(Northumberland, Greater Manchester, Cheshire) with moderately negative 
structural shifts and moderately negative differential shifts. 
Examination of Table 8.7 shows that this is an unusual combination; 
counties in group 1 show either strongly negative structural shifts 
(groups la, lc) or neutral structural shifts with very strong negative 
differential shifts. Counties with moderately negative structural shifts 
tend to have moderately positive differential shifts (group 2); these 
counties tend to be highly industrialised, but with a looser urban 
structure than the conurbations, and are thus moderately favoured by the 
- 13 - 
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general urban-rural shift in manufacturing industry. 
It has already been suggested that Greater Manchester has obvious 
affinities with the group lb counties (Tyne and Wear, Merseyside, 
Strathclyde). It would also appear that Cheshire has obvious affinities 
with group 2 counties (Lancashirev Leicestershire, Derbyshire, etc. ). 
Later, more detailed analysis (section 8.4 below) suggests that the large 
negative differential shift in the service sector in Cheshire, shown in 
Table 8.7, probably results from an under-recording of employment in 
education, rather than from any real job losses. This leaves Northumberland 
isolated in the classification scheme. Figures for employment change in 
Northumberland reflect the statistical aggregation of two different 
types of local economy; a relatively prosperous rural north and a. coalfield 
industrial belt in the south, subject to substantial industrial job 
losses (sections 8.4,8.9 below). 
Group ld may be a weak grouping, therefore, with little internal 
coherence, but groups la, lb and lc are much stronger groupings. 
Groups 2,3 and 4 
Group 2 consists of counties with a moderately low negative 
structural shift, implying a high degree of concentration of employment 
in manufacturing but not in its more vulnerable sectors, combined with a 
positive differential shift. The sub-division of group 2 is based on 
whether the differential shift is dominated by tertiary industries 
(group 2a), or whether it is dominated by manufacturing (group 2b). There 
seems no obvious reason at the present stage of the analysis why these 
two sub-groups whould split so neatly, with for example Tayside appearing 
in one group and neighbouring Fife in the other. Detailed discussion 
of group 2 is accordingly deferred until analysis at the level of 
individual sectors is presented (section 8.6 below). 
The outlines of the classification of sub-groups in group 3 has 
already been noted (Southern cities, resort counties, the East Coast). 
Group 3a might be regarded as the Southern antithesis to groups lb; 
London, Cardiff and Bristol versus Glasgow, Newcastle and Liverpool. 
The southern "city counties" all have the following features in common: 
a strong positive structural shift (neutral in group lb), a very slightly 
positive differential shift in manufacturing (strongly negative in group 
lb) and a strong negative differential shift in tertiary sectors 
(similarly in group lb). The positive structural shifts in these group 
3a counties is largely due to the high proportion of service employment 
in these cities; these are "service cities" rather than "industrial 
cities". The Lothian region (group 5ba Edinburgh and surrounds) also 
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shares these structural characteristics, but shows distinctly favoural 
differential shifts, rather than the unfavourable shifts of group 3a, 
the difference being noticeable both in manufacturing and services. 
The comparison between the Lothian region and the Southern service cities 
is discussed in more detail in section 8.5 below. 
A point which needs to be emphasised is that while these "service 
cities" had relatively low rates of job loss during the slump, this was 
not necessarily the case in the pre-slump years. The decline of 
employment in London during the 1970s has been much remarked on in chapter 
6, but it should be noted that South Glamorgan, the one part of urban 
South Wales relatively unprotected by regional policy, also had substantial 
industrial job losses in the 1970s with manufacturing employment falling 
by 12,400 (29.2%) and total employment falling by 10,100 (5.6%), between 
1971 and 1978. During the same period employment levels were stable in 
Avon and Lothian region. That London and South Glamorgan should show 
neutral differential shifts in manufacturing during the slump represents 
quite a substantial shift in the geography of recession. 
Group 3b should not in any sense be regarded as an artificial 
grouping despite the great distances of these counties from each other 
and despite the statistical indicators for Gwynedd in Table 8.7 more 
closely matching those for the East Coast counties than those for 
Cornwall and the Isle of Wight. These counties all show low degrees 
of urbanisation, remoteness from major centres of population, with this 
remoteness due either to extreme peripherality or to insularity, high 
degrees of dependence on tourism and a high seasonality of employment, 
shown clearly in Table AlO. The extent of the dependence on tourism is 
shown by percentages in employment in HLH 884 (hotels, other residential 
establishment) for June 1978. This is 10.0% on the Isle of Wight, and 
6.6% and 7.4% in Cornwall and Gwynedd respectively. These figures are 
of course considerable underestimates of the proportion of employment 
associated with tourism. Comparable figures for the less urbanised parts 
of the East Coast counties are 2.1% for Norfolk and 2.0% for Lincolnshire) 
indicating a much lower degree of dependence on tourism. It is quite 
possible that the coastal strips of counties other than those in group 3b 
would show similar statistical characteristics (strong positive structural 
shift, erratic but generally strongly negative differential shift), 
but it is only in counties which are in effect almost wholly coastal 
strips (Cornwall, Isle of Wight), or coastal strip plus National Park 
(Gwynedd) in which these characteristics emerge clearly at the county 
level. 
Group 3c represents a distinct geographical grouping, coastal 
East Anglia, despite the representation of three separate statistical 
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regions. The counties involved all have positive structural shifts, 
smaller in Essex, which is clearly within London's sphere of influence, 
than in the counties further north. They also all have neutral 
differential shifts. Suffolk (group 5aa2) showed a differential shift 
far-more favourable than the other East Coast counties. One might expect 
that. rates of employment change in East Suffolk would broadly conform to 
rates of employment change in Norfolk and Lincolnshire, while West 
Suffolk, on the edges of the Southern growth zone, would show more 
favourable employment trends. Analysis at the scale of the travel-to-work 
area supports this contention, with East Suffolk showing a decline of 
employment of 3.3%. and West Suffolk showing an increase in employment 
of 0.9%. 
16 
Group 4 consists of 5 counties with particularly favourable 
differential shifts against a background of an unfavourable sectoral 
composition (neutral in the case of. Powys). In all cases there is a 
strong positive differential shift in manufacturing and in three cases 
(Hereford and Worcester, Central Region, and Cumbria) a strong positive 
differential shift in services as well. Given the small number of 
counties in this group, a formal sub-division of this group seems 
unnecessary. In general, the group 4 counties represent the least urbanised 
parts of Britain's manufacturing belt, and are thus likely to be highly 
favoured by urban-rural shifts, despite unfavourable industrial 
structures, Warwickshire may perhaps be taken as a "special case", 
in that the post-1974 county is perhaps more accurately regarded as the 
outer, ruralised, part of the West Midlands industrial conurbation, rather 
than as an independent rural county. Patterns of economic change in 
the other-group 4 counties (Hereford and Worcester, Powys, Cumbria, 
Central) are not influenced by the changing spatial organisation of the 
conurbation. 
Group 5 
Group 5, a large group, consists of counties which have been 
relatively lightly affected by slump with usually strongly positive 
structural shifts and in most cases even more strongly positive 
differential shifts. All counties in this group are, except for North 
Yorkshire, either in Southern England or in Scotland. This suggests an 
obvious sub-division, between group 5a (Southern Englandq favoured 
counties) and group 5b (Scotland plus North Yorkshire, favoured counties). 
Group 5a is still an unmanageably large group, consisting of 16 
counties, covering a wide range of employment experience, from a fall in 
employment of 2.7% in Kent to a rise of 4.8% in Buckinghamshire. This 
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suggests a need for further suý-division, according to the rates of 
employment decline shown in Table 8.3. The largest of the sub-groups (5aa)-, 
of Southern counties with slight declines in employment, may itself be 
subdivided according to whether the favourable differential shift which is 
recorded takes place primarily in manufacturing (group 5aa or in 
tertiary industries (group 5aa 2)' 
The details of the sub-groupings are as follows: 
Group 5aa (8 counties) Declining employment during 1978-81 
sub-divided into 
Croup 5aa. 1 (4 counties) High positive differential shift 
in 
manufacturing; small differential shift in tertiary 
sectors, 
Group 5aa (4 counties) High positive differential shift in 2 
tertiary sectors; small differential shift in 
manufacturing. 
Group 5ab (3 counties) Slight rise (about 1%) in employment between 
1978 and 1981; employment probably fairly steady in 
the slump itself. 
Group 5ac (5 counties) Large rises (over 21%) in employment between 
1978 and 1981, probably associated with rising 
employment during the slump itself. 
Detailed comments about the geography of slump in the South of 
England are deferred to a later stage (section 8.8). It is noticeable, 
however, that there is a very strong zonation of patterns of employment 
change in the area around London. Greater London itself had a moderate 
rate of job loss, while counties to the south of London tended to show 
a high degree of employment growth, even during the slump itself. 
Counties to the west and north of London tended to have very stable 
levels of employment during the slump, but with a strong shift of 
employment from manufacturing to services, while counties to the east of 
London tended to show substantial job losses, but on a much smaller 
scale than counties outside Southern England. This pattern of zonation 
will be examined in more depth in section 8.8 below. 
Sumaary 
64 counties in England, Wales and Scotland have now been 
classified into 16 groups, detailed in Table 8.7. As far as is possiblef 
these groups are internally fairly homogeneous, even if the counties 
included are not necessarily adjacent to each other. Table 8.8 provides 
unweighted averages of the shift-share scores of each group of counties, 
and suggests various possibilities for further investigation. For 
example, groups 2a, 2b and 4 sýow closely comparable patterns of 
structural shifts, but contrasting patterns in their differential 
shifts. Much the same can be said about groups la and 1c. The explanation 
of this variation in the differential shifts is clearly an important task. 
It is also necessary to consider such questions as why group lb (neutral 
structural shift, severe negative differential shift) had a structure of 
employment change so clearly at variance with any other county or group 
of counties. 
This type of question will be considered in more detail in the 
sections which follow. Discussion of events in the Midlands and periphery 
will tend to focus on questions of industrial and urban structure, while 
discussions of events in Southern England will tend to focus more on the 
question of zonation, and in particular on the question of how location 
with respect to London, both in terms of distance and direction, has 
tended to affect rates of employment change during the slump. 
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8.3 Steel Counties of 6roups la and lc 
19 
Industrial Job Losses 
Employment fell by 10% or more between 1978 and 1981 in ten 
counties. Six of these counties (Humberside, Clwyd, Durham, Cleveland, 
West Glamorgan and Gwent) suffered from large scale job losses in the 
iron and steel industry. Northamptonshire and South Yorkshire also had 
high levels of job losses in iron and steel, which pushed the over-ý11 
rate of job loss in these counties well above the national averaget 
but without the 10% barrier being broken. 
The eight counties listed above may be described as the "steel 
counties" of groups la and 1c. Other counties with unusually high 
rates of job loss, such as Mid Glamorgan, Tyne and Wearo Merseyside and 
the West Midlands will be discussed in later sections. As a point of 
clarification, the use of the term "steel counties" is not meant to 
imply that at the start of the period iron and steel making dominated 
the employment structure of these counties (the peoportion of employment 
in MLHs 311,3129 313 and 341 ranging from 5.9% in Northamptonshire to 
12.4% in Cleveland, and 12.8% in Gwent) but rather that the concentration 
of this highly vulnerable industry in the counties concerned was high 
enough to dominate patterns of job loss. Table 8.9 shows, for example, 
that job losses in the iron and steel sector directly accounted for over 
half the total net job loss in Clwyd, West Glamorgan and Gwent, and over 
one third of the total net job loss in Durham and South Yorkshire. These 
figures disregard any indirect job losses resulting from the decline of 
production in iron and steel. 
As a rough guide to the problems that the decline of a local iron 
and steel industry might be expected to create for the local economy* 
every 4.1% of the total employment which was accounted for by MLH 311 
(iron and steel, general) in 1978 would have been responsible for a negative 
structural shift of 1%, and thus, all other things being equal, an extra 
percentage point on the total job loss figures between 1978 and 1981. 
The presence of the iron and steel sector in the eight counties being 
discussed here was responsible for a negative structural shift of between 
about 11% and 3%. 
Table 8.9 differentiates between job losses in the steel sector 
and job losses in other sectors, for each of the eight steel counties. 
It may readily be seen that outside the steel sector, four of these 
counties (Clwyd, Northamptonshire, West Glamorgan and Gwent) had rates of 
job loss very close to the national average of 5.2%. There is an 
implication that were it not for the problems of the steel industryp 
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each of these counties would have had an "average" rate of job loss during 
the slump. It might be argued that the figures for employment in non-steel 
sectors should not be interpreted this way, in that they neg'lect the 
point that calculations should be made replacing the iron and steel 
sector with an "average" manufacturing sector of the same size, so that a 
representative industry-services ratio is maintained. On such an 
argument, the figures for job losses in non-steel sectors understate the 
"underlying". (non-steel) degree of vulnerability to recession of a 
particular area. It is suggested, however, that this effect is cancelled 
out by the fact that the figures for employment change in non-steel 
sectors include a substantial element of job losses in local services 
which are an indirect result of severe job losses in the iron and steel 
sector. 
20 
It would seem that employment performances in the slump, and outside 
the iron and steel industry, were average in Gwent, West Glamorgan, 
Clwyd and Northamptonshire, slightly worse than average in South 
Yorkshire, and much worse than average in Durham, Humberside and 
Cleveland. Clearly, these last three counties showed considerable 
elements of industrial vulnerability outside the iron and steel industry, 
which need to be examined further. Attention concentrates here on the 
industrial sector; the question of service sector multipliers following 
a major industrial job loss will be considered later. 
In County Durham, the job losses in iron and steel were concentrated 
in a relatively small area, namely Consett. It is to be expected that 
the rest of the county would also have severe industrial problems during 
the slump, given the problems faced by County Durham and other coalfield 
development areas, during the recession of the mid-1970s, and afterwards. 
In Consett travel-to-work area, employment fell by 33.6% between 1978 
and 1981, compared with a fall of 10.2%, in Darlington and South West 
Durham TTWA, 8.0% in Central Durham and 5.1% in Peterlee TTWA. 
Employment decline was particularly severe in the textiles sector, with 
2,400 jobs, from a base figure of only 2,700, being lost in MLH 412 
(spinning, doubling; cotton, flax systems). These job losses would 
appear to have taken place in 1978-79, before the onset of slump, rather 
than in the slump itself. The Financial Timesi for example, notes the 
announcement of the running down and eventual closure of a Courtaulds 
textile factory at Spennymoor which employed 1ý30 people in 1978 
(Financial Times 28.10.78,20.1.79) and 560 jobs in nylon lost at the 
Monsanto factory in Crook (Financial Times 10.3.79). This would seem to 
represent a continuation of the 1970s "crisis of the branch plant 
factory" rather than any feature specific to the slump. 
Obviously, given the economic conditions of the time, there were 
substantial but smaller industrial job losses in sectors other than iron 
and steel and textiles. There is little need in an account of this type 
to present details of job losses in local industries with "average" 
rates of job losses, even though such job losses would undoubtedly have 
added to the unemployment figures. The dominant industrial job losses, 
which explain why Durham had an unusually high rate of total job losses, 
were in iron and steel, and textiles. 
In neighbouring Cleveland, a major centre of the iron and steel 
industry, the overall rate of job loss, at 12.7% between June 1978 and 
September 1981, was higher than in any other county, according to Table 
8.3. As shown later in this section, though, official figures probably 
understate the degree of severity of job loss in another steel county, 
West Glamorgan, and it is quite possible that West Glamorgan in fact had 
a slightly higher rate of job loss than Cleveland. It would be easy to 
assume that Cleveland's unenviable position,. which included having the 
highest unemployment rates in Great Britain, 
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was the result of an 
exceptionally heavy concentration of job losses in iron and steel. 
Table 8.9 shows, however, that such an assumption would oversimplify 
what was happening. There were severe job losses in the Cleveland iron 
and steel industry, but proportionally less severe than in other steel 
counties with comparable overall rates of job loss. In Cleveland, for 
example, 9,500 steel jobs were lost, a decline of 31.7%, compared with job 
losses of 10,500 (54.3%) in West Glamorgan and 9,600 (69.3%) in Durham. 
An important factor differentiating Cleveland from other depressed steel 
counties was not so much job loss within the steel sector, but rather job 
loss outside the steel sector. Even within the steel sector, job losses 
in Cleveland tended to be concentrated in industrial plant and steelwork*$-, 
the construction branch of the steel industry classified under mechanical 
engineering (MLH 341), rather than in the actual manufacture of iron 
and steel. Thus, 4,900 jobs were lost in NLH 311 (iron and steel, general) 
representing a decline of 23.6%, which although heavyt was much less than 
the national average (39.5%). In industrial plant and steelwork, 4,100 out 
of a total of 6,800 jobs (60.7%) were lost, indicating a very sharp 
pattern of local contraction. 
Outside the iron and steel industry, there were extremely heavy 
job losses in Cleveland in chemicals and construction. 5,500 chemicals 
jobs were losts representing a fall of 20.7%. 9,000 construction jobs 
were lost, a fall of 37.3%. Even under the conditions prevailing in 
1980 and 1981, such a severe decline of employment in construction is 
unusual, the more so in that various time lag effects meant that 
nationally much of the slump-induced decline of employment in construction 
took place after September 1981, and hence is not recorded in 1981 Census 
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of Employment figures. 
23 It w6uld seem likely that much of the large 
scale job losses recorded in the Cleveland construction industry 
resulted from the completion of specific large scale industrial 
construction projects. The reclamation of land for industrial purposes 
at Seal Sands, on the River Tees, was a major source of new employment 
in the early and mid 1970s, but it might well be the case that the 
effective completion of this project in the later 1970s would have been 
a major source of job loss. It might well also be the case that such 
an extreme measured drop in employment reflects data inaccuracies. 
It would seem that Cleveland's exceptionally severe industrial 
problems in the slump resulted not simply from a crisis in iron and steel, 
but rather a more general crisis in heavy industries, which affected iron 
and steel manufacture, industrial plant and steelwork, chemicals and 
construction. Cleveland's problems in this respect have been longstanding; 
any area whose economic growth has been so strongly dependent on heavy 
industries, and particularly on the processing of raw materials, will be 
highly vulnerable when such industries go into decline. Heavy industries 
often tend to be extremely cyclically volatile; the experiences of the 
1930s in steel and heavy engineering, including shipbuilding, illustrate 
this point (chapter 4 above). In the steel industry, large scale job 
losses in Cleveland can be traced throughout the late 1970s; the slump 
itself actually showed a decrease in the number of jobs lost per annum 
in this sector (chapter 6.8(iii) above). In the chemicals industry, 
dominated by a few large firms (notably ICI) operating extensive 
industrial complexes, the reasons for the unusual severity of employment 
decline in Cleveland, when compared with elsewhere, probably mirror the 
reasons for the unusual concentration of job losses in the vehicles 
industry in the West Midlands in the mid-1970s recession (chapter 6.7(ii) 
above). 
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It is much easier to reorganise and rationalise production in 
a large multi-function industrial complex than in a single purpose. unit; 
many more options are left open. In certain circumstances of recession, 
this leads to the rate of job loss being far higher in the multi-function 
complex than elsewhere. This factor worked to the disadvantage of 
employment levels in the Cleveland chemicals industry throughout much of 
the 1970s, as well as during the slump. 
Humberside also showed an unugually high rate of job loss outside 
the iron and steel industry (Table 8.9). A note of caution must 
instantly be added in that the Census of Employment indicates a fall of 
employment of 3,100 jobs (11.9%) in educational services, resulting in 
a differential shift of -1,900. This decline of employment may have 
taken place, but it seems anomalously large. It is more likely that the 
measured decline in employment in this sector was due to inconsistencies 
in the Census of Employment. Analysis of the complete run of Census of 
Employment statistics has shown that employment figures for education are 
much less reliable than for other sectors. It is quite possible to find, 
for example, instances in the 1970s in which employment in education in a 
particular county is recorded as increasing by a quarter in a particular 
year, and decreasing by a corres ponding amount in the following year, a 
time series which seems highly unlikely in a sector in which national 
cyclical variations in employment are relatively slight. In any 
particular year, there might be several anomalies in the figures for 
employment in education; the cases of West Glamorganp Cheshire, 
Buckinghamshire, etc. will be noted later. 
If a major anomaly is suspected, the obvious procedure would be to 
use a set of employment figures in which the differential shift for 
employment in education has been disregarded. If such a procedure is 
followed for Humberside, employment figures for the county in 1981 would 
need to be increased by 1,900, leaving the measured rate of job loss at 
10.6%. instead of 11.2% (all industries and services). For the series 
given in Table 8.9 (all industries and services excluding iron and steel) 
the measured rate of job loss would stand at 8.7% instead of 9.3% once 
this correction procedure has been carried out. The economy of 
Humberside was undoubtedly highly depressed during the slump, but the 
Census of Employment figures perhaps overstate slightly the extent of 
this depression. 
Turning to the question of "real" employment change in Humbersidev 
this county also suffered, as with Cleveland, from substantial job 
losses in chemicals and constructiong although the problem was on a 
slightly smaller scale. In addition to the 8,100 iron and steel jobs 
lost, employment declined by 2,100 (14.8%) in chemicals, representing a 
differential shift of -1,000, and by 40700 (21.0%) in construction, a 
differential shift of -2,900. There were also substantial job losses in 
MLH 214 (Bacon curing, meat and fish products), in which employment 
declined by 2,100 (22.2%), and in shipbuilding, where employment declined 
by 1,900 (47.3%), and motor vehicle manufacture, where employment 
declined by 1,700 (35.9%). The problems faced by Humberside were largely, 
but not exclusively, the problems of decline in heavy industries, such as 
steel, chemicals and shipbuilding, rather than in the light industriest 
such as the portbased food, drink and tobacco industry. Despite the 
job losses in HLH 214 indicated above, presumably related to difficulties 
in the fishing industry, 
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employment in other foodo drink and tobacco 
sectors on Humberside remained steady, falling by only 4. 
Durham, Cleveland and Humberside thus all showed substantial 
elements of industrial vulnerability outside the iron and steel sector. 
In Durham, the rate of decline of employment in iron and steel was 
sufficient to create a substantial negative differential shift (-9ý600; 
-4.4% of the 1978 workforce). The same also applied to Clwyd, which had 
a differential shift in iron and steel of -8,800, or 6.9% of the workforce. 
Differential shifts in iron and steel were broadly neutral in Humberside 
and Cleveland, but strong negative differential shifts in chemicals and 
construction led to the total differential shift being strongly negative. 
All four of these counties were thus classified in group la (strong 
negative structural shifts; strong negative differential shifts) rather 
than group lc (strong negative structural shifts; neutral differential 
shifts). 
The employment figures for West Glamorgan, which indicate a 
strong positive differential shift in the service sector (Table 8.7), 
give cause for suspicion, however. One would expect that a region with a 
very severe decline in manufacturing employment would show a strong 
negative differential shift in services (as noted in Humberside, Clwyd, 
Durham, Cleveland and Gwent) rather than a strong positive differential 
shift; the downward multiplier is an important factor during a time of 
recession. A closer examination shows that the Census of Employment 
assesses employment in education as having increased from 12,200 in 1978 
to 16,100 in 1981, representing a differential shift of +4,400, or +2.8% 
of the county's employment total. This is clearly an unrealistic figure, 
given the doubts already expressed about the accuracy of Census of 
Employment figures for education. Were one to disregard the measured 
differential shift in education, the differential shift in services in 
West Glamorgan would be assessed at -1.2% instead of +1.6%. a figure more 
in line with those of other steel counties, and the total differential 
shift would stand at -4.7% instead of -1.9% (Table 8.7). The total 
number of jobs lost would be recalculated to stand at 22,300 instead of 
17,900, a fall of 13.9% instead of 11.8% 
It would seem, therefore, that job loss during the slump was more 
severe in West Glamorgan than in any other county in Britain. Job loss 
in neighbouring Mid Glamorgan was also unusually severe, with employment 
declining by 12.5% between June 1978 and September 1981, while, further 
east,, job losses in the iron and steel industry were largely responsible 
for employment in Gwent falling by 10.0%. There was thus a belt of 
exceptionally severe employment decline running through the coalfields 
of South Wales. It was fortunate for South Wales that employment was 
relatively stable in the service-based economy of South Glamorgan 
(Cardiff, etc. ) otherwise unemployment by September 1981 would probably 
have been around 20% in these counties, instead of around 16%; Cleveland, 
without a relatively prosperous urban labour market in the vicinity, 
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had 19.2% unemployment in September 1981. 
The South Wales economy will be discussed in more detail later 
(section 8.4). For the present, it can be noted that job losses in West 
Glamorgan were severe, not only in iron and steel, but also in various 
"regional policy industries". Employment fell, for example, by 1,700 in 
toys, games, etc. (MLH 494), by 1,500 in motor vehicle manufacture, and 
by 1,200 in cans and metal boxes (NLH 395). 
A common feature of all the steel counties, except for South 
Yorkshire and Northamptonshire, is that they show strong negative 
differential shifts in the service sector. In South Yorkshire, a 
deliberate policy by the local authority of expanding the local economy 
26 
was undoubtedly largely responsible for this unexpectedly favourable 
performance in the service sector, with for example employment rising by 
3,400 in local government service (HLH 906) and 1,300 in road passenger 
transport (MLH 702), accounting for a differential shift of 7,300, or 
1.3% of the 1978 employment total. Job creation by local authorities 
can clearly have a statistically noticeable effect. In the case of 
Northamptonshire, adjacency to the Southern England zone of service sector 
growth (section 8.8 below) would undoubtedly be an important factor in 
counter-acting the depressive effects of steel job losses on the local 
service sector. 
(ii) Multiplier effects 
The information published in the Census of Employment makes it 
possible to make an estimate of service sector multipliers following major 
local industrial job loss. The general consensus is that a multiplier of 
around 1.2 to 1.4 is involved, 
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although clearly much depends on the 
time interval being used and on the size of the area examined. In 
addition it is often difficult to distinguish between "active" job loss 
and "passive" job loss resulting from the fall in local incomes created 
by active job loss. Construction plays an ambiguous role here, with 
it 
being arguable that some element of construction work is "basic" 
(e. g. factory building) and some "passive" (changes in housebuilding 
resulting from changes in income and employment). The analysis which 
follows tends to suggest that construction employment should be regarded 
as basic, as this leaves the multiplier relatively stable on 
cross-sectional comparisons; the causal relationship would appear to be 
that employment change in manufacturing and construction affects 
employment change in services rather than that employment change in 
manufacturing affects employment change in construction and services. 
Construction activity represents an autonomous element of investment and 
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production rather than simply a servicing of income, thus is a basic 
activity, Neither should it be forgotten that many of the early works 
on the multiplier, notably the classic paper by Kahn (1931), used 
construction activity funded publicly as the investment decision on which 
multiplier analysis was based, 
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There are clearly several possible reasons, often completely 
unconnected with industrial change, why employment levels in the service 
sector should change. For this reason attention needs to be concentrated 
on the extent to which employment change in the service sector is, 
through reasons of industrial job loss, faster than would otherwise be 
expected. This implies the need to use differential shifts, rather than 
total employment change, as the basis for calculation. In the 
manufacturing sector the differential shift must not be disaggregated; in 
calculating multipliers the relevant point is not whether. job loss in the 
steel industry was faster in town A than in town B. but rather the extent 
to which manufacturing jobs were being lost faster than the national 
average in town A. 
A note of caution also needs to be added, in that industry-service 
multipliers are legitimately calculable only if job losses in the 
manufacturing sector are sufficient to dominate the local labour market, 
such that even if thereare autonomous local shifts in service sector 
employment (for example, new government offices) these are likely to be 
relatively slight in comparison with autonomous employment shifts in the 
industrial sector. Clearly if a travel to work area showed a differential 
shift of -50 in manufacturing, it would be foolish to attempt to calculate 
an industry-service multiplier based solely on the experiences of this 
local area; a differential shift of say -5,000 provides a more secure 
basis for calculation. 
Table 8.10 lists differential shifts for manufacturingg construction 
and services for each of five steel towns or ex-steel towns with 
differential shifts in manufacturing of -2,000 or worse. Each of these 
towns, apart from Corby, is in the periphery, and so is virtually 
unaffected by decentralisation of Southern based service sector 
employment; this would tend to make the negative differential shift in 
the service sector slightly more severe, than would otherwise have been 
the case, thus inflating figures for the multiplier slightly. Perhaps 
surprisingly, Corby had a service sector multiplier closely aligned to 
those of the peripheral steel towns; there is little apparent sign of a 
favourable "Southern England effect. " 
Table 8.10 shows measured multipliers ranging from 1.19 in Consett 
and Scunthorpe to 1.35 on Teesside and 1.38 in Port Talbot. Shotton and 
Corby with multipliers of 1.30 and 1.28 respectively, are intermediate 
cases. These are not final multipliers* in the sense that service 
sector jobs might still be destroyedo or not createds in late 1981 and 
1982 as a result of industrial job losses in 1980 and early 1981. It 
is noticeable that the steel towns with the low multiplierss Consett and 
Scunthorpe (also Corby) are free-standing towns; they are relatively 
distant, and have a relatively low degree of dependence ont nearby large 
cities. In contrast, Port Talbot may be regarded as a satellite of 
Swansea while Shotton is, in service sector terms, in the shadow of both 
Merseyside and Chester. In either of these cases A "super-multiplier" 
effect might well be involved when service sector employers in deciding 
how best to cover a sub-regional market, concentrate their attentions on 
a relatively undepressed large town (Swansea, Chester) rather than an 
extremely depressed small industrial town (Port Talbotp Shotton). 
Teesside, the other steel closure town with a high employment multiplier, 
is in effect a small industrial conurbation, and through the late 1970s 
shared the same problems as other industrial conurbations, such as 
Tyneside, in terms of sharply falling industrial employment and declining 
population. The comparatively high multiplier on Teesside reflects the 
delayed impact of job losses in the late 1970s (which were severe; see 
chapter 6.8(viii)) as well as the impact of job losses in 1980 and early 
1981. It might well be the case that the Teesside multiplier of 1.35 
is closer to the final multiplier than the figures of about 1.2 in the 
free-standing steel towns. This is because Teesside figures represent 
both the "second round" effects of one generation of closures and the 
"first round" effects of another generation, while the figures for 
Consett and Scunthorpe represent merely the "first round" effects of 
the 1980 generation of closures. 
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Thus a long term industry-service multiplier of between 1.3 and 
1.5 would appear to be indicated. It needs to be emphasised that these 
multipliers incorporate not just named service sector jobs which are lost 
as a result of industrial contraction, ut also an allowance for jobs 
which might have been created in the event of "normal" rates of industrial 
job loss, but which were not in fact created as a result of the fall in 
local demand following industrial job losses. 
It also needs to be emphasised that a clear distinction is drawn 
between linkage effects and multiplier effects. Linkage effects refer 
essentially to contractions of local industrial employment resulting from 
a fall in payments to suppliers while multiplier effects refer to 
contractions in local service sector employment as a result of contractions 
in industrial wages. If linkage and multiplier effects are combined, 
a decline of employment in a major locai exporting industry at the head 
of the linkage chain would have to multiplied by perhaps st least 1.5* 
maybe rather morep to determine the total long term job loss. This is 
considerably in excess of the upper estimate of about 1.15 suggested by 
Brownrigg (1980), but is in line with earlier estimates. 
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One very 
important factor neglected by Brownrigg is that major industrial job 
losses can considerably affect the migration balance of a local labour 
market; between 1978 and 1981, for example, each extra percentage point 
of job loss in a county with rates of job loss higher than the national 
average resulted in an extra increase of unemployment of only about half 
a percentage point (chapter 7.2; Fig 7.3). This implies very substantial 
changes in the size of the local population as a result of major job 
losses; in effect, for every two additional jobs lost one person becomes 
unemployed locally and another person leaves the district. 
31 Given the 
importance of this effect, it is naive to assume, as Brownrigg does, that 
the loss of local income as a result of a major job loss incident would 
be merely the change in the number employed multiplied by the difference 
between wages and benefits. To this has to be added the number of induced 
migrants multiplied by the benefit level, and the expenditure per time 
period out of the accumulated savings of those who have left the local 
area. 
32 Brownrigg makes further questionable assumptions, notably that 
industrial job losses will increase rather than reduce the level of local 
public sector services; the erosion of the local tax base is surely the 
dominant factor here, leading to major negative differential shifts in 
"public administration and defence" in all the steel towns being 
considered. 
33 The most important omission, however, is neglect of the 
economic impact of recession-induced migration. 
This section has been largely exploratory, indicating that Census 
of Employment data can usefully be used to evaluate the multiplier effects 
of industrial, employment change. Analysis has concentrated on travel to 
work areas with major steel closures or cutbacks, yet analysis on a broader 
spatial scale is also possible. In the industrial regions (all regions 
except SE, EA. SW) manufacturing employment fell by 19.4% between 1978 
and 1981, compared with a national average fall of 16.8%; this represents 
a differential shift of -126,000. In construction the differential shift 
in the industrial regions was -20,000, with a fall in employment of 13.8% 
compared with a national average of 11.0%. In services, where employment 
nationally increased by 1.8%, employment in the industrial regions 
increased by 1.2%,, a differential shift of -39,000. This-implies-an 
industry-service multiplier of 1.279 almost identical to the average 
multiplier of 1.28 registered for the six steel towns in Table 8.10. 
This is a remarkable result suggesting that industrial multiplier effects 
lie behind many of the large-scale spatial differences in patterns of 
employment change in the service sector. 
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Table 8.11 carries the analysis a stage further, calculating 
multipliers on a region by region basis. These figures may be interpreted 
in two ways. In one sense the result is disappointing in that the 
regional multipliers are often highly unstable; for example Scotland had 
a differential shift in industry of -21,000 jobs but a differential shift 
in services of +22,000 jobs. In another sense, assuming that the 
calculated national multiplier is broadly correct (it applies for Southern 
England in total, the industrial regions in total, and major steel closure 
towns in total) the possibility arises of separating that part of the 
service sector differential shift due to multiplier factors from that part 
of the service sector differential shift due to other factors. It can 
be seen, for example, that the large positive differential shifts in 
the service sector in South East England (see also Table 8.7) are 
statistically explicable simply in terms of multiplier effects. In 
Scotland, however, service sector employment in 1981 was 28,000 higher 
than expected; the rise of the North Sea oil industry, representing 
primary production rather than manufacturing, is clearly an important 
factor creating its own service sector multiplier effects (section 8.9 
below). Service sector trends were worse than might have been expected, 
given the rate of industrial job loss, in Yorkshire and Humberside and 
the Northern Region, and to a lesser extent in the North West. It is 
quite possible that these represent "second round" multiplier effects 
from the job losses and population decline of major urban areas in the 
late 1970s. 34 
Changes in service sector employment levels are, in both theoretical 
and practical terms, extremely complex to deal with. In general, a loose 
labour market will tend to stimulate employment expansion in the service 
sector (chapter 6.9 above), but phases of active industrial recession will 
cut demand for services and thus slow down this expansion. Thus service 
sector employment rises substantially during a period of high unemploymentp 
but this expansion is faster in regions with relatively low unemployment 
than in regions of high unemployment and active industrial job loss. 
To understand the spatial dimension of employment change in the service 
sector it is necessary to consider multiplier effects. Two methodological 
points need to be considered. Firstly, to calculate multipliers from 
sectoral employment data it is essential to work in terms of differential 
shifts rather than in terms of total employment change. Secondly, 
population effects need to be considered. It is quite possible that the 
direct effects of industrial closure on local income and on secondary 
employment work their way through the system fairly quickly, but that 
the indirect effects resulting from recession-induced depopulation take 
considerably longer to work through the system. Two questions seem to 
need further research, firstly the stability or otherwise of the value 
of the multiplier under different economic conditions, and secondly the 
detailed time profile of induced job losses or gains following a major 
primary employment shift. 
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8.4 Groups 
. 
1a, lc and ld - non-steel counties. 
The iron and steel industry dominated job losses in several 
counties, notably in Wales and North East England. Thip industry was 
in especially-severe decline during the slump, but was not the only 
industry in recession deep enough to dominate job losses in certain 
counties. Table 8.7 shows, under group 1c, three counties with 
substantially , higher than average rates of job loss as a result primarily 
of sectoral composition. These are the West Midlands (Metropolitan 
County), West Yorkshire and Staffordshire. In additiong Mid Glamorgan, 
in group la, had both a highly unfavourable structural shift (adverse 
sectoral composition) and also a strongly unfavourable differential 
shift, indicating worse than average performances within sectors. Three 
counties in group ld (Northumberland, Greater Manchester and Cheshire) 
showed moderately unfavourable structural shifts and moderately-unfavourable 
differential shifts, although closer examination shows that the 
relatively poor performance indicated for Cheshire is illusory, being 
the result of inaccurate recording of employment levels in the education 
sector, 
The group lc counties are examined first. There is an obvious 
link-to be drawn between the West Midlands, West Yorkshire and the steel 
county of South Yorkshire. Each of these counties is highly urbanised, 
with a substantially higher than average rate of job loss during the slump. 
They are differentiated from other industrial conurbations, which also 
had higher than average rates of job loss, in that their vulnerability 
was primarily due to the large-scale presence of industries in severe 
decline (vehicles in the West Midlands, iron and steel in South Yorkshire, 
textiles and clothing in West Yorkshire) rather than to any process by 
which employment in a sector tends to decline more rapidly in 
conurbations than elsewhere. The conurbations of group lb (Tyne and Weart 
Merseyside, Strathclyde) represent the opposite type of conurbation, 
with neutral structural shifts but strongly adverse differential shifts; 
these conurbations will be discussed in section 8.5 below. Greater 
Manchester represents an intermediate case, with the major local presence 
of a textile and clothing industry leading to a moderately strong 
negative structural shift being present (as with West Yorkshire, etc. )$ 
but with fairly strongly adverse differential shifts also posing a 
problem (as with Merseyside, etc. ). 
This form of systematic differentiation between conurbations 
indicates that it would be misleading to suggest that the reason - 
conurbations have had fast rates of employment decline was simply because 
of their high degree of urbanisation. 
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There was more in common between 
the industrial performances during the slump of, for-examplet 
Staffordshire and South Yorkshire, or Gwent and the West Midlandsp than 
between West Yorkshire and Merseyside. 
The central feature requirifig attention when examining-job losses 
in the West Midlands conurbation, South Yorkshire and West Yorkshire 
concerns not so much the status of these areas as conurbations, but rather 
the status of these areas as specialised industrial areas. These areas 
came to be conurbations not through any abstract process of urbanisation, 
as implied for example in Robson (1973), but rather through the 
development of specific industries (chapter 9 below). A central feature 
of Britain's 19th century industrial geography was the strong tendency 
for expanding industries to "agglomerate" in particular coalfield 
locations. 35 This agglomerative tendency in particular industries was 
itself a major force behind, urban development, though neglected in 
Robson's (1973) discussion, and led to the development of a complicated 
urban structure, with conurbations and smaller settlement groupings 
developing according to the dynamic potential of their major industries. 
While the 19th century industries have tended to decline in relative 
importance during the 20th century, the old industrial specialisations 
can still be clearly detected in the employment structure of late 20th 
century towns, cities or conurbations, unless of course that industry 
had already declined to relative unimportan ce, 
Various consequences of this, as they concern the recent geography 
of recession, may be noted. Firstly, the industrial structure of many 
old industrial areas is still heavily weighted to older industries. 
This applies more to conurbations than to specialised coal production 
areas, such as County Durham, where the older industry has largely 
disappeared, leaving a "rejuvenated". but still vulnerable, industrial 
structure. Secondly, it would be unrealistic to expect older, 19th 
century-industries, to show rates of employment growth as favourable as 
those of younger, 20th century industries. The older industries are too 
far along the product life cycle for this to happen more than occasionally. 
In periods of decline, the older industries would be expected, in the 36 
long run, to show faster rates of job loss than the younger industries. 
As a result of the two tendencies noted above, there is the 
likelihood that various older industrial areas, which may or may not be 
conurbations, might have substantially faster than average rates of job 
loss during a, recession, as a result of the concentration of employment 
in older industries-with faster than average rates of decline. The case 
of South Yorkshire, with its traditional speciality in the fine steel 
industry, has already been briefly noted in section 8.3 above. It should 
perhaps be noted, however, that this county's job losses in the metal 
industry were expressed not just in the iron and steel sector, in which 
16,800 jobs were lost between 1978 and 1981 (Table 8.9)0 but also in the 
metal goods industries (thus, manufacture using metals) in which 14,800 
jobs were lost, a decline of 30.2%. representing a differential shift of 
-6,000, or -1.1% of total 1978 employment. 
In West Yorkshire, the clothing and textile industries were in 
substantial decline, as they had been through much of the 1970s. Table 
8.12, constructed on the same basis as Table 8.9. shows that about a 
quarter of total employment in the clothing and textile industries 
disappeared between 1978 and 1981. This sector accounted for about an 
eighth of the county's total employment in 1978. These magnitudes were 
sufficient to have a substantial impact on the total measured rate of 
employment change. Table 8.12 shows, however, the rate of job loss in 
sectors outside textiles and clothing was apparently more severe than the 
national average rate of job loss. Table 8,71ndicates a substantial 
negative differential shift (-1.7% of total 1978 employment) in the service 
sector, but the Census of Employment figures are open to question. In 
education, employment was recorded as falling by 13,100, or 18.6%, 
resulting in a differential shift of -10,000. This seems unrealistically 
high. Furthermore, one would wish to know in more detail whether a fall 
of employment of 6,300 (31.1%) in NLH899 (other services) represented 
a genuine fall in employment or not. If the employment figures for 
West Yorkshire are recalculated to exclude the negative differential 
shift in education (some of which, but not all, is probably genuine), 
the measured rate of employment loss in West Yorkshire falls from 9.5% 
to 8.4%, and in sectors outside clothing and textiles, from 7.3% to 6.2%, 
or 5.8% if the measured fall in employment in HLHs 899 and 998 (unclassified 
by industry) are disregarded. It seems that the measured differential 
shift in services in West Yorkshireq which appears as -1.7% of the county's 
1978 employment total, is highly unreliable; a figure of +0.4% would be 
produced if three sectors (MLHs 872,899 and 998) are removed from the 
calculation. 
Table 8.7 suggests at first as though West Yorkshire was hit 
unusually severely by the slump, with a measured job loss of 9.5%, 
compared with the national average of 5.2%. It would seem that this gap 
is exaggerated through imperfections in the data source. Undoubtedly 
West Yorkshire lost employment more quickly than the national average, 
but the main reason for this was not any large-scale urban-rural shift, 
but rather that West Yorkshire was handicapped by a significant 
concentration of employment in the declining wool textile and clothing 
industries as indicated by an unusually severe adverse structural shift 
in manufacturing. 
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Job losses in the slump were also exceptionally severe in the West 
Midlands conurbation, with a fall of employment of 11.8% in the 
Metropolitan County, a decline fully comparable with that found in the 
depressed steel counties (Table 8.7). If one accepts the case (chapter 
6.7(ii) above) that the administrative Metropolitan County, by being so 
strictly limited to the continuous built-up area, understates the true 
extent of the conurbation, and that the inclusion of Warwickshire 
(post-1974 county) would be required to provide a more satisfactory 
definition of the conurbation, a total loss of employment of 10.8% is 
indicated, which is still unusually high. The problem was primarily 
that. the sectoral composition of the West Midlands economy, with large 
concentrations of employment in vehicles, metal manufacture and other 
metal industries, was exceptionally vulnerable to slump. 
37 Table 8.7 
shows that only Gwent had an industrial structure as unfavourable in its 
sectoral composition as the West Midlands county;. by comparison, even 
Clwyd, Cleveland and West Yorkshire had favourable industrial structures. 
The West Midlands county also had a slightly unfavourable differential 
shift, most clearly marked in manufacturing. This perhaps can be 
explained by a conjunction of two factors; an unusually adverse sectoral 
composition of the industrial economy resulting in faster than average 
decline of-employment in capital goods industries and components 
manufactures (differential shifts totalled -5,600 in metal industries 
n. e. s. and -6,400 in mechanical engineering other than agricultural 
machinery), and a suburbanisation of industry from the Metropolitan 
County to the Warwickshire fringe of the conurbation. 
38 In manufacturingp 
the Metropolitan County had a differential shift of -13,000, compared 
with +7,900 in Warwickshire, a combination of figures suggesting that both 
tendencies were operative. In motor vehicle manufacturev the 
suburbanisation of production was at its most intense, with a differential 
shift of +100 in the Metropolitan County, 'and of +4,900 in Warwickshiret where 
employment increased from 11,400 to 13,200. Employment in the West 
Midlands vehicles industry actually decreased less quickly in percentage 
terms than in the rest of Britain during the slump; this is in sharp 
contrast with the experience of the 1974-76 recession, when the vehicles 
industry was still decentralising, with employment in the West Midlands 
falling significantly more quickly than elsewhere (chapter 6.7(ii) above). 
Three provincial conurbations, the West Midlands, West Yorkshire, 
and South Yorkshire, have been identified as having significantly higher 
than average rates of job loss during the slump, not because of any 
faster than average rate of decline within sectors (the urban-rural 
shift) but rather because these conurbations have, through their history, 
developed sizeable concentrations of employment in industries which were 
later to become vulnerable to recession and slump. This general picture 
does not apply to all conurbations, but: 'it applies to some. The 
structural shift in manufacturing may in principle be divided into two 
components; firstly, a proportional component based on the proportion 
of total employment accounted for by manufacturing in an area without 
regard to sector, and secondly, a sectoral component which measures the 
extent to which the manufacturing base is weighted to sectors with faster 
or slower than average rates of employment decline. The sectoral 
component of the manufacturing structural shift totalled -2.89% in the 
West Midlands, -2.73% in West Yorkshire, and -2.73% in South Yorkshire, 
on a base figure of 1978 total employment. Thus, in each of these 
counties, nearly 3% extra of the total 1978 employment base had been-lost 
by September 1981 simply as a result of the industrial structure of these 
conurbations being weighted to sectors of faster than average decline. 
Non-conurbations can also have similar problems. Many of the 
industrialised counties of medium urbanisation had rates of job loss in 
the slump at around the national average. These countiesq for example 
Lancashire, Derbyshire, Shropshire and Leicestershire, are discussed in 
section 8.6 below, which covers counties classified in group 2. Other 
counties, however, had significantly higher than average rates of job loss 
as a result, at least in part, of a concentration of employment in the 
less favoured industries. The question of the iron and steel industry 
has already been discussed, with respect to, for example, Northamptonshiret 
Gwent, Durham and Clwyd. In Staffordshire, the problem was mainly one 
of heavy job losses in the pottery industry, which, as chapter 6.7(vii) 
above has noted, was also deeply depressed just before-the slump. 
Between 1978 and 1981,10,200 jobs were lost in this sector, a fall of 
24.8%. About one ninth of the county's employment base accourited for over 
one third of the total net job losses. In other sectors, employment fell 
by 5.0%, at around the national average, and in line with neighbouring 
counties such as Shropshire and Derbyshire. 
The problem in Mid Glamorgan was in many respects more complext 
and certainly far more severe. Indeed the problem of employment decline 
throughout the South Wales "regional policy belt" was very severe. To 
say "extremely severe" would in historical terms be an exaggeration, 
since this zone suffered even more intense job loss during the 1929-32 
slump (chapter 4.3 above). It is important to examine why South Wales, 
and also North East Engl and, suffered unusually high rates of job loss in 
both slumps, despite prolonged phases, of accelerated industrial growtho 
encouraged by regional policy incentives, in the intervening period. 
The basic problem was that it was often the new, incoming 
industrial jobs that were vulnerable to recession. In the specialised 
coalfield areas, the decline of the coal industry, both before the war 
and from the late 1950s, left these industrial areas with only a very thin 
industrial base. New industries had to be encouraged. The iron and 
steel industry was an obvious candidate for expansion in the depressed 
areas in that, after the inter-war slump and during the long boom, it 
was a rapidly expanding industry but one for which each new plant would 
require a., large workforce, which would generally only be available in 
an industrial area with a slack labour market. 
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From the point of view 
of the depressed areas, a single industrial location decision could create 
thousands of jobs. Major new steelworks were opened at Ebbw Vale in the 
late 1930s and at Llanwern in 1958, in each case with a high degree of 
state involvement in the locational decision process. 
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The iron 
and steel industry is, however, extremely cyclically volatile, with a 
strong tendency for employment to decline sharply during recessions, and 
to increase substantially during upswings. This tendency was clearly 
noticeable in the sharp cyclical swings of the 1930s. Employment in the 
sector increased substantially during the long boomo but tended to decline 
sharply in the downswing, in part as a result of the normal accelerator 
mechanism (output fluctuating more sharply in capital goods than in 
consumer goods), but also, critically, because of the deteriorating 
international competitive position of the British steel industry. 
The steel factor explains much of the intensity of recession in 
Gwent and West Glamorgan, but not in Mid Glamorgan, where metal manufacture 
was relatively unimportant. The problem here, as in the mid-1970s, was 
the crisis of the branch plant factory. The economic record of the 1960s 
and 1970s shows a considerable influx of new employment in a variety of 
lighter industries in South Wales, and also in the coalfields of North 
East England (chapter 6 above). This influx was able, for a while, to 
absorb the bulk of the job losses resulting from the decline of coal 
mining. In the specialised coalfields (rapidly becoming ex-coalfields)o 
manufacturing employment increased through both prosperities and recessions, 
with growth being particularly rapid in the boom year of 1972-73. The 
recession of 1974-76 was particularly severe, howevert and as earlier 
discussion shows (chapter 6.7 above), had its most intense effects in 
the regional policy belts. Two factors seem particularly important; 
firstly, that within a national economy in severe industrial recession, 
job losses are more likely to take place at branch plant factories 
engaged essentially in routine production designed to meet upturns in 
demand than in core region factories which tend to fulfil a wider variety 
of functions, and secondly, that low wage locations in the third world 
were becoming increasingly attractive locations for routine production, 
once the technical conditions-were appropriate for this internationalisation 
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of production. 
The. crisis of the light industrial branch plant factory was 
probably no less significant in the slump than in the 1974-76 recession, 
but tended to dominate the geography of recession rather less. during the 
slump than in the earlier period. This is largely because the exceptional 
intensity of the slump created very intense problems in heavier. industrial 
sectors, most notably iron and steel, and vehicle manufacture, which 
themselves had a dominant effect on the geography of recession. If 
however the problems of the branch plant areas were not dominant features 
at the national scale, because of the intensity and generality of recession, 
they could certainly be highly important at the local scale, as the 
experience of Mid Glamorgan testifies. 
Mid Glamorgan represents perhaps the purest example at the county 
scale of a "branch plant economy", with the earlier industrial base being 
heavily dependent on the coal industry, and with poor internal 
communications, restricted by the topography of the valleys* meaning 
firstly' that service industries tend to be weakly developedo Cardiff 
being the main focal point for the service sector, and secondly that the 
area was more suited to the establishment of a large number of medium 
sized factories rather than a few large factories. 
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Table 8.14 shows 
that 115 manufacturing establishments were opened in Mid Glamorgan by 
firms new to the area between 1966 and 1975, with the creation of 12,000 
jobs. This figure, which does not include employment in branch plant 
factories of an earlier regional policy vintage, accounted for 6.5% of 
the 1978 total employment level in the county. There was also substantial 
branch plant employment, although not quite on the same scalet in Gwent 
and West Glamorgan. South Glamorgan (Cardiff, etc. ) having been far less 
depressed than the rest of South Wales, has traditionally been a low 
priority area in regional policy terms, has attracted far less of the 
incoming industrial employment, and has been far less prone to recession 
when the slump came (section 8.7 below). 
In Mid Glamorgan especially the new branch plant employment has 
been highly vulnerable. Given the industrial structure of the area, it is 
possible to point to a whole series of medium sized job losses (Table 8.13) 
but relatively few large-scale job losses. FinanciaZ Tims reports give 
only one instance of a plant shedding more than 4000 employees during 
the period, this being the Hoover electrical appliances factory at Merthyr 
Tydfil. The smaller scale job losses, however, had a substantial 
cumulative effect. 
The economy of South Wales was hit very severely during the slumPP 
both by large scale job losses in iron and steel, and also by a series of 
job losses in branch plant factories. North East England had much the 
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same profile in many respects, with the iron and steel factor being 
equally strong, although it would seem that the problems in the region's 
branch plants were not quite so severe as in South Wales. It has already 
been shown (section 8.3 above) that County Durham had a somewhat higher 
than average rate of job loss, even outside the iron and steel sector. 
Employment figures for Northumberland broadly match those for Durham, 
once the iron and steel sector has been allowed for. No further detailed 
comment for Northumberland is required, save to note that 1,400 out of 
1,600 jobs were lost in MLH 492 (linoleum, plastic floor-covering etc. ), 
presumably representing a branch plant factory, while 800 jobs were 
created in a local expansion in coal mining. 
Two counties from groups la, lc and ld remain to be discussed. 
These are Greater Manchester and Cheshire. Discussion of Greater Manchester 
is deferred to the next section, when comparisons are made with the group 
lb counties of Merseyside, Tyne and Wear, and Strathclyde. For Cheshire, 
there are data problems. It is perhaps surprising that Cheshire should 
be shown as having a significantly higher than average rate of job loss 
when other counties in the manufacturing heartland with a similar degree 
of urbanisation show rates of job loss clustered around the national 
average. Census of Employment figures, however, show a decline in 
employment in educational services from 29,900 to 18,500, representing a 
differential shift of -10,100, or 2.8% of the employment total. A 
measured drop in employment of over a third in this sector seems 
suspiciously high, given that nationally education was a highly stable 
sector in employment terms. It is likely that there was a substantial 
degree of local under-recording in this sector in 1981. If figures for 
the differential shift in education were to be removed from the 
calculations, Cheshire would have a rate of job loss of 5.5%, close to 
the national average, with a shift-share profile representative of 
group 2b counties. 
Clearly there is need for more attention to be given, when 
conducting future Censuses of Employment, to the question of the accuracy 
of figures in the education sector. Table 8.15 identifies the counties 
in 
which employment figures for education appear most likely to be inaccurate$ 
and recalculates overall rates of job loss, disregarding the differential 
shift in educational services. It would of course be possible to 
reconstruct the classification developed in Table 8.3, replacing 
questionable differential shifts in the education sector with neutral 
differential shifts. This would present a slight anachronism as the 
main data problems came to light only after the classification system 
had already been developed; Table 8.3 indicates the raw statistical 
material actually available to the author at the time of calculation. 
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It is found that some counties, for example Cheshi-rev are misclassified; 
such problems are best tackled in detailed group by group discussion. 
Minor data problems aside, the present section and the previous 
section show clearly that during the slump many industrial counties had 
much higher rates of job loss than the national average simply because 
their industrial employment base was weighted towards manufacturing 
industries with faster than average rates of job loss. Steel producing 
counties were the most conspicuous examples of this problem, yet counties 
with a high concentration of employment in vehicles (West Midlands 
Metropolitan County), textiles (West Yorkshire, Greater Manchester) and 
pottery (Staffordshire) had high rates of job loss as a result of 
sectoral vulnerability. These problems, though severe, were not quite as 
severe as in the 1930s slump, when insured employment in Glamorgan fell 
by 23.9% between 1929 and 1931, and in Durham by 20.2% (Beck 1951; see 
also Table 4.19) although the differences are not great if it is 
remembered that the inter-war Unemployment Insurance scheme was weighted 
towards the cyclically more vulnerable sectors. 
41 If particular industries 
are in any way vulnerable, the onset of slump will mercilessly expose 
the problems of those industries, and lead to large-scale destruction of 
employment in places where the Vulnerable industries are major employers. 
As a result, many counties lost around 10% of their employment between 
1979 and late 1981, and perhaps approaching 20% by mid-1983 (Table 8.16). 
At a more local scale there were plenty. of "towns that were murdered"42 
in the early 1980s. 
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8.5 Four Peripheral Conurbations: Merseyside, Tyne and Wear, 
Strathclyde and Greater Manchester* 
The "typical" case of an area with faster than average rates of 
employment decline during the slump would be that of an area with an 
unfavourable sectoral composition of employment, and an unfavourable 
or neutral differential shift. All the counties considered so far, in 
groups la, lc and ld come into this category. 
The three counties of group lb, however, conspicuously do not fit 
such a generalisation. These counties each had a much higher than 
average rate of job loss, over twice as high as the national average in 
two cases, yet none of these counties had a sectoral composition of 
employment which was unfavourable. The problem of each county was a 
considerably higher than average rate of job loss within sectors, both 
in manufacturing and in services. 
Group lb was a very straightforward group to identify during the 
classification process, and furthermore represents a highly distinctive 
set of counties. Each county is a conurbation lying in the "shadow" of 
the main Londorr-Manchester-Leeds urban belt. The problems that these 
counties faced was not simply that they were conurbations, but also that 
they were relatively remote conurbations. Even during the long boom, 
the Strathclyde, Tyne and Wear, and Merseyside conurbations had 
conspicuously higher unemployment rates than the more central conurbations 
(chapter 5.5 above). It is not simply the size of conurbations that 
matters; it is also a question of relative location. The more central 
of the provincial conurbations also had high rates of job loss during 
the slump, but this was due largely to the intensity of problems within 
vulnerable and locally dominant industrial sectors, rather than to any 
general anti-conurbation bias. 
In examining the question of the urban-rural shift during the 
slump, or in earlier periods, a three-fold classification of the 
conurbations is helpful, giving 
(1) Greater London 
(2) The "central" conurbations (West Midlands, Greater Manchesterv 
West Yorkshire, South Yorkshire) 
(3) The "shadow zone" conurbations (Merseysideq Strathclyde, 
Tyne and Wear). 
It would be hard to speak of a strong urbarr-rural shift against 
the central conurbations; when sectoral composition is taken into accounts 
these conurbations have tended to fare little worse than the national 
average. The main exception to this generalisation is that the West 
Midlands conurbation tended to have strong negative differential shifts 
in' 
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the vehicles sector through much of the 1970s, but this was due more to 
the decentralisation of car production, often to other conurbations, 
than to the-type of urban-rural shift outlined by Fothergill and Gudgin 
(1982). If one goes back further in time, the vehicles sector would 
have been responsible for a large structural shift in favour of the West 
Midlands; sometimes employment structure, including a high density of 
industrialisation, can work in favour of the conurbations. 
The question arises of whether the industrial employment decline of 
London and of the "shadow zone" conurbations, fits the theory of 
urban-rural shift developed by Fothergill-and Gudgin (1982,1983). This, 
it will be remembered, suggests that industrial development in the 
conurbations is inhibited by lack of space to expand, and that with a 
fixed amount of land available for manufacturing, and with a tendency 
for technical developments to lead to an increase of floor-space per 
worker, industrial employment will inevitably decline. As far as London 
is concerned, scepticism about this interpretation was expressed in 
chapter 6.6 above, it being argued that it was overheating of the London 
land economy, rather than simply physical shortage of land, that was 
squeezing London's industrial employment. This is perhaps a subtle 
difference, and in many respects the land shortage argument represents 
a useful first approximation to understanding London's long-standing and 
severe decline in industrial employment. on either interpretation, one 
of the main effects of slump was to reduce the pressure on industrial 
floor-space in London, allowing firms to conduct a higher-proportion of 
their total production activities in London than would otherwise have 
been the case. 
The situation in the "shadow zone" presented a strong contrast. 
Here the problem was not so much that there was a shortage of land, or of 
land at the right price, to carry out desired industrial expansion, 
although this would undoubtedly have been important in certain instances, 
but rather, and more simply, that these conurbations were in long-term 
industrial decline, and were losing many of their main traditional 
employers. The creation of new manufacturing employment in these 
peripheral conurbations has also been unusually slow when compared with 
other industrial counties (section 8.6 below) but this is to be explained 
more in terms of the general local climate of chronic industrial declinep 
which discourages new investment, than to land shortage. Furthermore 
the pace of such industrial decline intensified during the slump. To 
understand the intensity of employment decline in these conurbations 
uring the slump*it is necessary to consider aspects of their employment 
/history. 
Table 8.17 presents a summary shift-share analysis by conurbation 
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between 1971 and 1978. The same three-fold division of the conurbations 
highlighted for the 1978-81 period can be seen in the experiences of 
the earlier period. The central conurbations each had highly unfavourable 
structural shifts, but in more cases neutral or favourable differential 
shifts. Decentralisation in the car industry, however, led to the West 
Midlands having an unfavourable differential shift. The differential 
shift against the West Midlands in the 1970s should not be exaggerated 
though; in proportional terms it was far less severe than in London or 
Merseyside. London had a favourable structural shift, but a highly 
unfavourable differential shift. In the shadow zones Tyne and Wear, 
Strathclyde and Merseyside each had broadly neutral structural shifts, 
far less unfavourable than in the central conurbations, but strongly 
unfavourable differential shifts, which were, however, less marked on 
Tyne and Wear than in Strathclyde or Merseyside. Allowing for 
differences in time intervals in the shift-share analyses, the 
magnitudes of the structural and differential shifts for the provincial 
conurbations are for the most part not too dissimilar in the 1971-78 
period and the 1978-81 period. 
43 Patterns are less clear, however, 
prior to 1971 (Table 8.18). The Glasgow and Tyneside conurbations had 
highly unfavourable patterns of shifts between 1959 and 1971, but no 
more unfavourable than in the textile conurbations of Greater Manchester 
and West Yorkshire. Merseyside had moderately unfavourable shifts 
between 1959 and 1971, although it is possibly that this merely meant 
that a severe underlying weakness was being concealed by the large scale 
development of the car industry in the area. Keeble (1976 p. 183-185) 
notes that employment in the Merseyside motor vehicle industry increased 
from 1,500 in 1959 to 33,000 in 1971. If this increase were to be 
removed from the statistics, the differential shift for Merseyside during 
this period would stand at -9.4% (instead of -5.1%) and the total shift 
would stand at -8.1% (instead of -3.7%), fully in line with the 
performances of the other conurbations of the shadow zone. 
The Merseyside, Tyne and Wear, and Strathclyde conurbations have 
been economically vulnerable for a considerable time, despite regional 
policy assistance. In earlier years, both sectoral and locational factors 
have been responsible for this, but since the early 1970st the locational 
factor (position, urban status) has been more important. It is perhaps 
accidental that structural shifts have been neutral, rather than strongly 
negative, in these three conurbations, both during the 1970s and during 
the slump. Merseyside's most important industry, the food, drink and 
tobacco industry, is one in which the level of demand is highly resistant 
to the business cycle; even the unemployed still need to eat. During 
a period of large-scale industHal decline, a substantial food, drink and 
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tobacco industry is, in sectoral terms, a stabilising factor, even though 
there has been a general long-term drift away from Merseyside in this 
industry, noted in chapter 6.7(vi) above. 
In Strathclyde, and Tyne and Wear, the situation has been more 
that the basic heavy industries of these conurbations, notably coal 
(especially on Tyne and Wear) and shipbuilding were in severe decline up 
to the late 1960s, at a time in which employment in other industrial 
sectors had been basically stable, but that during the 1970s and early 
1980s, decline in these industries was actually less severe than in 
other industrial sectors. As a result, the structural shift in these 
conurbations moved from being strongly negative in 1959-71 to being 
broadly neutral thereafter. The presence of a substantial iron and steel 
industry in Strathclyde, employing 24,200 in 1978, meant, however, that 
the overall structural shift on Strathclyde was slightly negative in the 
1978-81 period, although to a far lesser extent than in the central 
conurbations. 
Patterns of job loss during the slump in these three conurbations 
need now to be considered more directly. Table 8.7 shows Tyne and Wear44 
as having suffered a 12.0% fall in employment between 1978 and 1981, with 
an exceptionally severe (-4.2%) adverse differential shift in the tertiary 
sector$ compared with a +0.9% differential shift between 1971 and 1978. 
During the 1970s, the Tyne and Wear economy was being largely propped up 
by expansion in the public sector services, while industrial trends were 
unfavourable, despite regional policy. In the three minimum list 
headings educational services, national government services and local 
government services, 16,200 jobs, or 3.2% of 1971 total employment, were 
created between 1971 and 1978, resulting in a differential shift of 
+6,600 or +1.3%. This expansion came to a halt in the slump, however, 
and was replaced by contraction. Census of Employment figures suggest 
a loss of 10,000 jobs (24.9%) in educational services, and 5,900 jobs 
(27.3%) in local government service, resulting in a combined differential 
shift of -11,000 jobs, or 2.2% of 1978 total employment. These figures 
should be regarded with extreme suspicion, especially as it has already 
been indicated (Fig 7.3) that Tyne and Wear had shown an unusually small 
increase in unemployment in relation to the size of the measured drop 
in employment. If these figures were to be disregarded, the measured 
fall in employment in Tyne and Wear would stand at 9.8% instead of 12.0%s 
and the differential shift in the tertiary sector would stand at -2.0%1 
instead of -4.2%. The measured fall of employment in NLH 886, public 
houses, also seems abnormally large, standing at -3,000 jobs or -32.0% 
It is probable that over half the measured negative differential 
shift in the tertiary sector in Tyne and Wear resulted from measurement 
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errors. The construction industry was responsible for much of the other 
half, with a fall in employment of 6,600 jobs (19.9%). resulting in a 
differential shift -0.8% of total 1978 employment. Employment also fell 
sharply in coal mining,, with 6,100 jobs (38.2%) being lost, a differential 
shift of -0.9%. In the manufacturing sector, the main adverse 
differential shifts were to be found in the various engineering sectors, 
with a differential shift of -5,100 in mechanical engineering (-1.0% of 
total 1978 employment), of -1,500 (-0.3%) in electrical engineering, and 
of -1,400 (-0.3%) in marine engineering. 
There is a strong suggestion here that a dominant factor behind the 
depth of industrial crisis in peripheral conurbationp, at least insofar 
as Tyne and Wear is concerned, is the decline of the importance of the 
conurbation as an engineering centre. In Tyne and Wearg this was 
particularly apparent during the slump in mechanical engineering, but 
between 1971 and 1978, the main problems had been in electrical 
engineering, with a total differential shift of -6,500, or -1.3% of total 
1971 employment. 
Strathclyde shows, in many respects, a similar type of problem. 
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Between 1978 and 1981, the differential shift in mechanical engineering 
was -10,700, or -1.1% of 1978 total employment. Between 1971 and 1978, 
Strathclyde had a differential shift of -4,500 (-0.4%) in mechanical 
engineering, and -6,000 (-0.6%) in electrical and instrument engineering. 
Although there are clear parallels here with Tyne and Wear, job losses in 
other manufacturing sectors in Strathclyde during the slump were in many 
cases much more severe than in Tyne and Wear. Most importantly, 8,500 
jobs were lost in iron and steel, although this actually represented a 
slight positive differential shift, and 9,400 jobs were lost in motor 
vehicle manufacture, a differential shift of -5,700, or -0.6%. 6,400 
jobs were 
' 
lost in chemicals, a differential shift of -0.4%, while 4,900 
jobs were lost in electrical engineering, a differential shift of -0.3%. 
The problems of the Clydeside conurbation and of Tyne and Wear 
can be seen in the context of the problems that an industrial conurbation 
at the heart of a depressed and peripheral industrial region would face. 
Employment figures for Strathclyde may be regarded as covering a whole 
industrial region (West Central Scotland) rather than simply its central 
conurbation. Employment figures for Tyne and Wearp however, cover only 
the central conurbation of the North Eastern industrial region; one also 
needs to consider southern Northumberland, County Durham and Cleveland. 
In order to understand what was happening in the slump in the 
Clydeside and Tyne and Wear conurbations, it is necessary to consider 
what had been happening in the surrounding industrial regions. If the 
dominant factor in the problems of these conurbations was a simple 
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urban-rural shift in the context of recession, one would expect 
considerably faster than average rates of job loss in the conurbation 
than in the surrounding region. If, however, the dominant factor was 
that a process of general industrial decline in a region was having a 
severe effect on the industrial "nerve centre" of the region, then more 
even patterns of employment change might be expected. Examination of 
the 1978 and 1981 employment figures suggest that, during the slump at 
least, the latter explanation is more appropriate. Allowing for probable 
inaccuracies, already noted, in employment figures in the service sector 
in Tyne and Wear, one can suggest that employment in Tyne and Wear fell 
by 9.8% between 1978 and 1981. This compared with larger declines of 
11.6% in Durham and 12.7% in Cleveland. In Strathclyde region, employment 
fell by 9.6% between 1978 and 1981. The decline of employment in Glasgow, 
at 9.1%, was considerably less than in outlying parts of the region; 
employment fell, for example, by 16.9% in Irvine, 15.7% in Paisley, 12.5% 
in Kilmarnock, 11.6% in Dumbarton and 10.5% in North Lanarkshire. One 
would probably wish to consider Paisley as part of the Clydeside 
conurbation, and perhaps other centres, but Ayrshire towns such as 
Kilmarnock and Irvine, while undoubtedly part of the West Central 
Scotland industrial region, are no more part of the Clydeside conurbation 
than Durham is part of the Tyneside conurbation. 
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Job losses on Clydeside and in Tyne and Wear were undoubtedly 
severe during the slump, but this was due not simply to the very high 
degree of urbanisation in these areas, but rather to the fact that these 
areas were at the heart of regions of industrial decline. In earlier 
periods, the main industries of these conurbations, notably shipbuilding 
and coal, were in severe decline, resulting in large-scale job losses. 
It can perhaps be regarded as accidental that these industries were not 
in especially severe decline nationally, when compared with other 
industries, during the slump; this "accident" led to the structural 
shifts in these conurbations being neutral in 1978-81, rather than 
strongly negative, as in earlier years. Differential shifts were strongly 
negative in Strathclyde and in Tyne and Wear. In. Tyne and Wear this 
would probably reflect in part a reduced demand in service industries 
in the main service centre of a region of industrial decline. Allowing 
for probable inaccuracies in figures for service sector employment in 
Tyne and Wear, the differential shift in the service sector in this 
county was in line with that registered for Durham and Cleveland. In 
the manufacturing sectors there were substantial negative differential 
shifts -in mechanical engineering. It has already been noted (chapter 
6.5(iii)(b)) that the central conurbation of an industrial region tends 
to have high proportions of employment in mechanical engineering, the 
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conurbation being perhaps the best centre to serve the regional market 
for capital goods. If, however, the region enters a spiral of severe 
industrial decline, this is likely to create considerable problems for 
the capital goods industries of the conurbation, problems which will be 
registered in a negative differential shift in the engineering industries. 
In Strathclyde, the situation was complicated by a substantial 
reorientation of production in the Scottish economy as a whole, with the 
balance shifting sharply from west to east. This general tendency will 
be discussed later, in section 8.9 below. Strong negative differential 
shifts in the engineering sectors suggest that Strathclyde's general 
industrial decline was reflected by worse than average performances in 
the capital goods sector. 
There are thus quite strong comparisons to be drawn between 
Strathclyde and Tyne and Wear. Aggregate statistics, as shown in 
Table 8.7, would appear to suggest that Merseyside, another conurbation 
in the shadow zone, had a broadly similar bype of economic performance 
during the slump. A closer examination, however, shows various underlying 
differences. The differential shift in manufacturing on Merseyside 
stood at -19,500 between 1978 and 1981, representing 3.1% of total 1978 
employment. This differential shift would be still less favourable 
were it not for a differential shift of +1,700 in motor vehicle 
manufacture. The recession on Merseyside was concentrated not so much 
in mechanical engineering, as in Tyne and Wear, and Strathclyde, but 
rather in electrical engineering, in which employment fell from 26,900 to 
17,900, a fall of 34.0% in a sector in which employment nationally 
declined by 10.1%. This represented a differential shift of -5,200, 
or 0.8% of 1978 total employment. Such a degree of job loss clearly 
implies a large number of factory closures, or near-closures; in five 
out of nine minimum list headings, employment fell by over 40%. 
Employment also fell sharply, by 5,400 or 32.0%, in the glass industry, 
with a differential shift of -2,200 (-0.4%). This, howeverg was a 
traditional industry of an outlying town in the conurbation (St. Helens)p 
rather than a branch plant industry in the city. Another traditional 
industry, shipbuilding, was undergoing severe decline in Merseyside with 
2,800 jobs (36.5%) being lost, a differential shift of -1,400 (-0.2%). 
Other large-scale job losses are clearly identifiable in individual 
minimum list headings, with for example 1,300 jobs being lost in man 
made fibres, - 1,500 jobs lost in printing and publishing of periodicals, 
2,400 jobs lost in packaging products, 1,700 jobs lost in rubberv and 
lesser losses in other sectors. In each case, the jobs were lost from 
a small employment base, and in some cases, notably man-made fibresp 
where 4 jobs remained in 1981, the sector was virtually eliminated 
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locally. It would seem, given the diverse nature of these sectors, 
and given the heavy level of employment decline in electrical engineering, 
that the exceptionally severe problems of manufacturing employment decline 
in Merseyside represented the crisis of the branch plant factory in 
the setting of a conurbation. 
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Merseyside's problem was not simply 
that it was a conurbation; other conurbations with a comparably high 
rate of job loss either had vulnerable sectoral compositions of 
employment (West Midlands, West Yorkshire) or were handicapped by being 
situated in a region of unusually severe industrial decline- (Clydeside, 
Tyne and Wear5. Neither of these cases applies with any strength to 
Merseyside. 
In broad terms, there are many points of resemblance between 
the Merseyside economy and, for example, the South Wales economy. At 
the simplest, vulnerable industrial economies were being propped up 
during the 1960s and 1970s by new incoming industries, which however, 
and virtually by definition,: tended to be branch plant factories rather 
than core factories. These newer industries themselves became highly 
vulnerable to recession at a later date, leading to a strong "echo" 
of earlier regional problems. When examined in more detail, the earlier 
problem in South Wales had been the decline in coal mining, and the 
solution attempted was to bring in a mixture of light industries to 
occupy labour across a large number of small mining towns. On 
Merseyside the problems in the long boom were more complex, with a 
combination of aspects of decline in older, port-based industries, a lack 
of indigenous development of newer industries (a problem characteristic 
of conurbations in peripheral areas) and a relatively high rate of 
unemployment due in part to a high natural demographic growth rate. 
The large labour reserves implicit in a city of higher than average 
unemployment, combined with high priority regional policy status, were a 
big attraction to large-scale industrial employers, notably in the car 
industry, but there was also considerable inward movement of medium 
sized employers. Throughout much of the 1970s and 1980s, however, the 
Merseyside economy was affected severely by the concentration of 
employment in large branch plant factories which were vulnerable to job 
loss, and by the low rate of indigenous growth. Obviously* the problem 
was not precisely the same as in Mid Glamorgan, but there are strong 
parallels. In some respects the parallels with Cleveland were closer. 
Greater Manchester, in group ld, is the only peripheral 
conurbation which has not yet been discussed. Table 8.7 shows a mildly 
unfavourable structural shift, and an unfavourable differential shift, 
especially in manufacturing. The aggregate shift-share figures for 
Greater Manchester fall half-way between, those of the group lb 
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conurbations (Merseyside, etc. ) where negative differential shifts 
dominate, and those of group lc conurbations (West Yorkshiret etc. ) 
where negative structural shifts dominate, and industry-specific 
weaknesses are of critical importance. The main factor behind the 
negative structural shift in Greater Manchester was, as might be 
expected, the high concentration of employment in textiles and clothing. 
In particular, the structural shift resulting from the presence of the 
cotton industry (MLHs 412,413), rather than an "average" manufacturing 
industry, stood at -0.7% of total 1978 employment and thus accounted for 
about half the county's negative structural shift. 
The patterns of differential shifts in Greater Manchester's 
manufacturing sector were perhaps more complicated. In explaining a 
differential shift of -23,500 jobs, or 2.0% of Greater Manchester's 
total 1978 employment, five main facets need to be noted. Firstly$, 
there was a differential shift of -6,400 (-0.6% of total 1978 employment) 
in the textiles and clothing sectors. The weaknesses of traditional 
Manchester industries, as shown both in structural shifts and in 
differential shifts, represented the main reason why Greater Manchester 
had a significantly higher than average rate of job loss during the 
slump, Secondly, as with other industrial conurbations set in a context 
of industrial decline, there was a large negative differential shift 
(-3,900, or -0.4%) in mechanical engineering. 
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Thirdly, fourthly and 
fifthly, there were substantial adverse differential shifts in food, drink 
and tobacco (-5,600 or -0.5%). chemicals (-3,000 or -0.3%) and motor 
vehicles (-2,700 or -0.3%). These five sectors between them account for 
Greater Manchester's negative differential shift in manufacturing. There 
is perhaps a trace of suspicion that the negative differential shift in 
chemicals is exaggerated, in that the negative differential shifts in 
MLHs 271 general chemicals (-2,000) and 272 pharmaceutical chemicals 
(-1,100) almost exactly match the positive differential shifts in these 
sectors (+1,900 and +1,300 respectively) in neighbouring Cheshire. This 
possibly indicates a'minor and unnotified change in the. boundaries of 
travel-to-work areas with a noticeable effect on aggregate county 
employment statistics; other instances of this phenomenon may also be 
detected. 
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Even allowing for this query, howevers Greater Manchester 
had substantial negative differential shifts in textiles and clothingt 
mechanical engineering, food, drink and tobaccop and motor vehicles. 
In summary, three out of the seven peripheral conurbations were 
severely affected by slump because of the vulnerability of their dominant 
industries; vehicles in the West Midlands, textiles and clothing in 
West Yorkshire, and iron and steel in South Yorkshire. Greater Manchester, 
with a high proportion of employment in textiles and clothing, also had 
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this problem to some extent. In Strathclyde and in Tyne and Wear the 
main traditional industries (shipbuilding, coal mining, various heavy 
engineering industries) had been in employment decline even during the 
later stages of the long boom, and this decline continued in the late 
1960s and early 1970s. After 1973, though, the national rate of job 
loss in other industries started to catch up with, and sometimes 
overtake, the rate of job loss in the older industries, removing much of 
the negative structural shifts of these conurbations. The main cities 
of these conurbations attracted relatively little branch plant movement, 
which instead was directed largely to new towns on the outer fringes of 
the conurbation (e. g. Washington, East Kilbride), or existing smaller 
towns outside, When the slump came the "crisis of the branch plant 
factory" was strongly marked in these satellite towns, while the problems 
faced by the main cities can to a large extent be traced to the effects 
of a decline in the demand for capital goods in the main engineering 
centre of each region as a result of intense industrial depression in 
the region as a whole. It is particularly noticeable that while strong 
negative differential shifts can readily be traced in each of Glasgow 
and Newcastle, each of these cities lost jobs less quickly than the 
surrounding industrial region. The basic problem of Merseyside was the 
problem of the branch plant economy on the scale of the conurbation, just 
as Mid Glamorgan's problem was the problem of the branch plant factory 
at the scale of the small town. In each case a different type of branch 
plant factory is involved, but the end effect remains one of severe 
decline. 
The urban dimension is of course present in the industrial decline 
of each of these conurbations, yet is expressed in often radically 
different ways. While all the industrial conurbations had high rates 
of job loss during the slump, this was more because they were densely 
industrialised than because they were densely urbanised. Indeed the 
most severe cases of industrial decline in the slump were often, though 
not always, to be found in smaller industrial townsq whether on the 
fringes of the conurbation, or at a remove. Furthermore, not all 
conurbations had high rates of job loss during the slump; London had a 
low rate of job loss, as did other major service centres such as Edinburgh 
and Cardiff. These service-based cities will be discussed in section 
8.7 below. Firstly though it is necessary to complete the survey of 
industrial Britain by examining those industrial counties which were 
relatively lightly affected by slump. 
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8.6 Group 2 and Group 4 Counties 
Between June 1978 and September 1981, employment in the UK 
declined by 5.21%. The decline of employment in 11 out of 63 counties 
was within one percentage point of this figure, with a fairly substantial 
gap between these counties and both the counties with higher rates of 
job loss and those with lower rates of job loss (Table 8.3). There would 
thus appear to be a fairly distinct group of counties with "average" 
degrees of response to recession. Had there been a more smoothly 
continuous statistical distribution of rates of employment changel and 
had the counties with even rates of employment change been evenly divided 
between North, Midlands and South, then perhaps there might be some 
justification for dealing with counties rather briefly, with possibly 
the implicit suggestion that there is little one can do with the average 
but to behold its averageness* 
In fact, counties with an "average" response to slump tended to be 
of a particular type. Nine out of eleven had unfavourable structural 
shifts and favourable differential shifts. If one accepts that Cheshire 
is recorded as having a higher than average rate of job loss merely because 
of misenumeration in the education sector (Table 8.15), this figure 
rises to ten out of twelve. In addition, Northamptonshire, Corby 
excepted, showed similar characteristics. 
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In a deindustrialising economy, whether in a cyclical upswing or 
a cyclical downswing, the main reason why an area is likely to have an 
unfavourable structural shift, even if only moderately unfavourable, is 
a high proportion of employment in production industries. Thus the nine 
group 2 counties with negative structural shifts and average rates of 
job loss are all part of what might be regarded as "industrial Britain"$ 
although marginally so in the case of Dyfed. While an industrial county 
will tend to have a negative structural shift, there is no automatic 
reason why such a county should also have a negative differential shift. 
A county with a negative-structural shift and a negative differential 
shift would by definition be a county of worse than average employment 
performance, and would be classified under group 1. A county with a 
negative differential shift and a moderately strong positive differential 
shift would have an average rate of job loss and be classified under 
group 2. Ift however, the positive differential shift were to be 
particularly strong, a lower than average rate of job losswould result; 
five counties of industrial Britain (Powys, Hereford and Worcesterv 
Warwickshire, Central and Cumbria) are classified under group 4. 
Thus groups 1.2 and 4 cover the basic range of experience of 
employment change in industrial Britain. Bedfordshire, with 27,000 
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employed in the motor vehicles industry in 1978, is the only county in 
the three Southern regions to be classified as part of industrial 
Britain in this respect. By far the major part of the Midlands and 
periphery is classified as part of industrial Britain though; the 
exceptions at the county scale are the service-based national capitals 
of South Glamorgan (Cardiff, etc. ) and Lothian (Edinburgh, etc. ) and 
also various less urbanised centres in Scotland (along with North 
Yorkshire), which in many cases showed employment growth during the slump. 
In non-industrial Britain, the only two counties to have exceeded or 
closely approached the national average rate of job loss were Cornwall 
and Essex. In Cornwall, the volatility of employment in the highly 
seasonal tourist industry is perhaps an important complicating factor. 
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In Essex, a relatively weak positive differential shift in the service 
sector, when comparison is made with other counties in Southern England, 
was partly responsible for the rate of job loss being only slightly 
below average. 
When discussing the geography of employment change during the 
slump, perhaps the main distinction to be drawn is between industrial 
Britain, concentrated mainly in the Midlands and periphery, with above 
average or average rates of job loss, and non-industrial Britain, 
chiefly in Southern England, with below average rates of job loss. When 
discussing the counties of group 2, it is not so much "average" counties 
which are being considered but rather t relatively less disfavoured 
parts of industrial Britain. 
Before considering further the patterns of employment change in 
group 2, a minor statistical point needs to be resolved. It appears 
from T able 8.7 that unlike all other group 2 counties, Shropshire had a 
neutral structural shift and a neutral differential shift9 rather than a 
strongly negative structural shift and a positive differential shift. 
This seems to be an artificial result. Nationally there were several 
instances of a reclassification of activity from other sectors into 
MLH 334 (industrial engines), which apparently, though not in reality, 
had rising employment during the slump. Shropshire already had 2,900 
jobs in this sector, resulting in an artificially created structural 
shift of +1,500, or +1.1% of 1978 employment. The registered differential 
shift in manufacturing needs to be correspondingly reduced. If one makes 
allowances for this, the real structural shift for Shropshire would 
probably be around -1.3% (-4.4% in manufacturing) and the differential 
shift around +1.0% (-0.7% in manufacturing). These figures are much 
more in line with those for other counties in group 2a. Caution is often 
required when interpreting official statistics- 
Turning to "real" economic features, the main distinction to be 
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drawn between group 2a counties and group 2b counties is that 2b 
counties (Nottinghamshireq Lancashire, Fifeq Leicestershire) have strong 
positive differential shifts in manufacturing but not in the tertiary 
sector, while 2a counties (Shropshire, Tayside, Dyfed, Bedfordshire, 
Derbyshire) have strong positive differential shifts in the tertiary 
sector but not in manufacturing. Counties with strong positive 
differential shifts in both manufacturing and tertiary industries, such 
as Hereford and Worcester, Central and Cumbria, would be classified under 
group 4. It is proposed to discuss each of these groups separate. 1y. 
(a) Group 2b counties; favourable differential shifts in 
manufacturing 
There is of course no automatic reason why a traditional industrial 
centre should have a negative differential shift in manufacturing 
employment, although in practive the long-term tendency for industries 
to develop faster in the South than in the North will tend to result 
in a bias towards negative differential shifts in the older industrial 
areas, especially when regional policy is not a strong factor. Thus, 
in the group 1 counties, only three out of seventeen (Cheshire excluded) 
had positive differential shifts in manufacturing. Twelve out of 
fifteen counties in groups 2 and 4 (Cheshire included) had positive 
differential shifts in manufacturing, but these tended to be numerically 
relatively slight when compared with the negative differential shifts 
in group 1 counties. 
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In group 2a, any negative differential shifts 
in manufacturing tend to be slight, the one exception being Bedfordshire, 
which had severe problems in the vehicles industry. 
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Thus group 2 and group 4 counties have more favourable differential 
shifts in manufacturing than group 1 counties. One way of proceeding 
with this analysis would be to isolate major negative differential 
shifts in individual sectors in each county, and to show that these 
tended to be smaller in group 2 counties and group 4 counties than in 
group 1 counties. This however provides only a partial picture. 
Chapter 6 above introduced the idea of splitting total employment change 
in manufacturing by county into components of job loss and components of 
employment increase. While it may be true that between 1978 and 1981 
employment nationally declined substantially in almost all manufacturing 
HLHs, and while almost all localities showed net employment decline 
across manufacturing as a whole, there was nevertheless considerable 
expansion in individual sectors in individual places. While this degree 
of expansion would of course be slight by historical standards, 
nevertheless such expansions would account in a three year period for an 
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increase of perhaps 2% in 1978 total employment levels in industrial 
counties. Given the intensity of depression in manufacturing during 
the slump, it is likely that any such increases in employment will tend 
to represent the maturing of pre-1979 investment decisions rather than 
any new investment originated in the slump years. Faced with a slump, 
firms may decide that it is preferable to bring new investment into 
production, and tcrap older vintages of investment, perhaps located 
elsewhere, rather than to halt all expansion plans and concentrate 
production at existing locations, using earlier investment. In that there 
is some new investment, and employment growth in particular localitiest 
during a period of overall job loss, one might be tempted to follow 
Massey and Meegan (1982) and describe this pattern as one of "technical 
change and job loss". This, however would probably be misleading; 
Massey and Meegan make no real distinction between ex ante intentions 
and ex post outcomes, and tend to infer intentions from data on outcomes; 
if there is employment growth in a particular locality during a period 
of general job loss, it is inferred that the decision to invest has 
been at least partially responsible for the job loss. It seems more 
likely, however, that investment decisions were takeng and at least 
partially operationalised, during the 1976-79 upswings without full 
foresight as to the severity of the forthcoming slump, and that when 
the slump came it necessitated large-scale job losses, with the 
geography of job loss being influenced by the varying degrees of 
efficiency of the production assets which were in existence at the time. 
Table 8.19 indicates elements of manufacturing employment growth 
in industrial Britain during the slump. The conurbations of group lb 
(Merseyside, Strathclyde and Tyne and Wear) each showed a remarkably 
low degree of job creation in manufacturing, which when compared with 
less urbanised industrial counties accounted for perhaps a percentage 
point in the negative differential shift in manufacturing. Other 
conurbations also had low rates of job creation in manufacturing, but 
not quite to the same extent. Outside the conurbations, there tended to 
be strong elements of job creation in group 4 counties (Powys, Central, 
Cumbria, Warwickshire, Hereford and Worcester) and moderately strong 
elements of job creation in non-conurbations in group 1 (e. g. Mid Glamorgang 
Gwent, Humberside, Northumberland), despite severe incidences of job 
loss, and in group 2b (Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire, Lancashire, 
Fife, Cheshire 
55 ).. This is in partial accordance with the type of 
urban-rural shift suggested by Fothergill and Gudgin (1982). but it is 
very much a secondary feature of the geography of slump, rather than a 
primary feature; indeed it was possibly no more than a secondary feature 
of the geography of earlier cyclical phases. 
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There would appear to be little systematic difference between 
the counties in group 2b (Leicestershire, Lancashire, etc. ) and the 
non-metropolitan counties of group 1 (Clwyd, Staffordshire, etc. ) in 
terms of employment creation in manufacturing. The main differentiating 
feature is in terms of jobs Zost. Three main components of this may be 
noted. Firstly, although group 2b counties had proportions of employment 
in industry which were comparable to those of the more depressed group 
la and lc counties, this manufacturing employment tended to be concentrated 
in less immediately vulnerable sectors, hosiery and knitwear (in 
Nottinghamshire and Leicestershire) or shipbuilding (in Fife) rather than 
in, for example, iron and steel, vehicles or pottery. It is true that 
Lancashire had large concentrations of employment in the vulnerable 
cotton and motor vehicles industries, but this was balanced by a large 
concentration of employment in the relatively recession-free aerospace 
industry. Secondly, group 2b counties had relatively low rates of job 
loss in the manufacturing sector, even once the structural effect has 
been accounted for. Neither Nottinghamshire, Leicestershire nor Fife 
had a differential shift worse than -1,000 in any minimum list heading. 
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In contrast, Humberside and Staffordshire each had differential shifts 
of worse than -1,000 in five minimum list headings, but despite this had 
relatively slight total negative differential shifts in manufacturing. 
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Counties with exceptionally severe negative differential shifts in 
manufacturing, such as Clwyd and Durham, generally had differential 
shifts of -3,000 or worse in certain vulnerable sectors. Thirdly, group 
2b counties avoided the intense negative differential shifts in services 
which resulted from the multiplier effects of large-scale industrial 
job loss in group la counties. 
Thus group 2b counties avoided worse than average rates of job 
loss primarily because their industrial structure was relatively safe 
given the context of the time. 
In this generalisation, Lancashire is a partial exception. The 
job losses in the textiles industry were particularly severe, with 13,000 
jobs being lost in NLHs 411-413 representing 2.5% of Lancashire's total 
employment, and 54.3% of local employment in these sectors. This was a 
sharper percentage decline than in the 1929-31 slump in the cotton 
industry. Between 1978 and 19810 employment in Lancashire and Greater 
Manchester in MLHs 412 and 413 (the cotton industry), fell by 47.6%, 
while the decline between 1929 and 1931 in the North West region was 
"only" 33.4% (Beck 1951, Table 14(10). The far higher initial employment 
level in the cotton industry (4289000 in 1929v compared with 53,000 in 
1978) meant that decline of the cotton industry had a far stronger 
regional impact in the inter-war slump than in the recent slump, The 
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difference between the two sets of employment figures gives some 
indication of why employment growth in the North West-has been so slow 
in the intervening period. 
Employment decline was also severe in the Lancashire motor 
vehicles industry, with 4,000 jobs (21.5%) being lost, but this actually 
represented a positive differential shift of 1,100. Given that employment 
in the aerospace sector (11LH 383) increased by 2,900 (14.4%) during the 
same period, with a differential shift of +1,800, the vehicles sector as 
a whole in Lancashire can actually be regarded as a stabilising factor. 
Employment in Lancashire also increased by 39200 (76.5%) in ordnance 
and small arms (HLH 342). Without the effects of employment growth in 
defence related sectors, new manufacturing employment growth (Table 
8.19) would possibly have been as low as in Greater Manchester, while 
the differential shift in manufacturing would have been neutral, not 
positive. 
Other group 2b counties showed more diverse patterns of fresh 
growth in manufacturing employment during the slump. For example, in 
Leicestershire 2,200 jobs were created in fruit and vegetable products 
(MLH 218), and 1,100 jobs in industrial plant and steelwork (HLH 341), 
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while in Nottinghamshire 1,500 jobs were created in pharmaceuticals 
(MLH 272), a long established local industry (Boots), in each case 
offsetting a substantial element of job loss in textiles, clothing and, 
in Leicestershire, footwear. In Northamptonshire, classified in group I 
solely as a result of the 6,000 jobs lost in iron and steel (although a 
further 4,000 jobs were lost in footwear), employment increased by 800 
in industrial engines (MLH 334) and by slightly less than 500 in each 
of aluminium and'aluminium. alloys (MLH 321), metal-working machine tools 
(NLH 332) and plastic products n. e. s. (MLH 496). In Fife, with a much 
smaller manufacturing base level, 500 jobs were created in computers 
and 600 in aluminium. 
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It may seem almost perverse to discuss elements 
of manufacturing employment growth in the context of slump, yet industrial 
areas which show relatively low rates of job loss in their traditional 
sectors, and which are capable of generating new industrial employment 
on a relatively large scale, even at a time of slump, probably face 
better long term prospects than industrial areas with very heavy job 
losses and the need for external stimulus to regenerate the local 
industrial base. 
(b) Group 2a counties 
The group 2b counties kept their rates of job loss close to the 
national average largely on account of the relative security of their 
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industrial bases; these counties generally escaped the worst of the 
blizzard of industrial job losses. The manufacturing sector in group 
2a counties (Shropshire, Tayside, Dyfed, Bedfordshire, Derbyshire) was 
not quite so secure, and as a result job losses tended to be slightly 
above the national average. Each of these counties, however, had a 
favourable differential shift in the service sector, which helped 
stabilise their positions. 
Bedfordshire is perhaps best considered separately, since unlike 
the other counties in the group it is situated on the fringes of the 
London outer metropolitan zone, and is thus affected by the various rounds 
of reorganisation of the London space economy, discussed in the context 
of the slump in section 8.8 below. A differential shift of +3.9% in 
the tertiary sector is exceptional in the context of industrial Britain, 
but is merely normal for a county on the outer fringe of the South*East. 
If it had not been for this accident of location, the rate of job loss in 
Bedfordshire would perhaps have matched that of Strathclyde or South 
Yorkshire, rather than Nottinghamshire or Derbyshire. Bedfordshire's 
main industrial problem was the weakness of a single key sector, motor 
vehicles, in which employment fell from 26,900 to 16,600, representing 
a structural shift of -5,900 (-2.9% of total 1978 employment) and a 
differential shift of -2,900 (-1.4% of total 1978 employment). Were it 
not for the problems of the vehicles sector, Bedfordshire would probably 
have found itself classified in group 5ab, along with the neighbouring 
counties of Hertfordshire and Oxfordshire. In a sense, however, 
Bedfordshire's industrial problems can themselves be regarded as an 
indirect result of locations in that the county is situated in the middle 
of the West Midlands-London "vehicle belt" and attracted considerable 
investment in an industry which was later to prove highly vulnerable. 
Bedfordshire, despite severe job losses in the- motor vehicle 
sector, actually had a fairly high rate of job creation in locally 
expanding manufacturing sectors, as Table 8.19 shows. Other counties in 
group 2a, however, showed low levels of job creation, with Tayside and 
Dyfed, two relatively lightly urbanised counties, showing lower rates of 
job creation in manufacturing than the'Greater Manchester conurbation. 
Quite possibly remoteness is an important differentiating factor; in 
industrial counties outside the conurbations, rates of job creation in 
manufacturing tend to be higher within a Midlands/East Wales /Lancashire/ 
Yorkshire zone than in more remote areas. In Wales in particular, 
there was a sharp distinction between an East Wales zone (Clwyd, Powys, 
Gwent, Mid Glamorgan) with relatively high rates of manufacturing job 
creation and a West Wales zone (West Glamorganp Dyfed) where there was 
very little job creation in manufacturing. It would seem that any policy 
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attempt to regenerate the Welsh industrial economy would do well to 
concentrate on East Wales, rather than on West Wales which probably has 
less growth potential. 
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Moving northwards from the central industrial 
belt, Durham and Cleveland each had relatively low rates of new job 
creation in manufacturing, while Strathclyde had an exceptionally low 
rate of new job creation, even for a conurbation. Tayside quite possibly 
shared a similar form of weakness. 
The relative lack of new job creation in manufacturing in group 
2a counties is a factor accounting for part of the differences in 
differential shifts in manufacturing between 2a and 2b counties. In 
addition, and perhaps more importantly, group 2a counties tended to be 
rather more vulnerable to job losses than group 2b counties. 
One might have expected, by reasons of geography and economic 
structure, to find Derbyshire in group 2b rather than group 2a. The 
differential shift in manufacturing is far less positive than would be 
expected on these grounds. There are three main reasons for this. 
Firstly, Derbyshire had a very large job loss, which does not appear to 
be identifiable from FinanciaL Times reports, in abrasives and building 
materials n. e. s. (MLH 469). 3,200 jobs were lost, accounting for a 
differential shift of-2), 200, or 0.59% of Derbyshire's total employment. 
Secondlyt the fact that employment remained merely steady in Derbyshire's 
sizeable aerospace industry, rather than expanding as in the rest of 
Britain, led to a differential shift of-1,000 (-0.26%) in this sector. 
Derbyshire's employment performance in this sector, had it taken place in 
virtually any other sector, would have led to a large positive 
differential shift. Thirdly, Derbyshire's record on expansion of 
industrial employment is far inferior to the records of group 2b East 
Midlands counties. The differences shown in Table 8.19 might not appear 
to be large, but of the 7,396 jobs regarded as being "created" in 
manufacturing in Derbyshire, 1,909 were in NLH 334 Industrial engines, 
quite probably representing a reclassification from another industry, 
such as metal goods n. e. s. Discounting these jobs would lead to a 
measured rate of industrial job creation of 1.50%, lower than that of 
Greater Manchester, 
In Shropshire, the motor vehicle industry accounts for a large 
part of the negative differential shift in manufacturing, a loss of 3,200 
jobs from a base figure of 6,900 representing a differential shift of 
-1,300, or -1.02% of total 1978 employment. If it is accepted that 
much of the negative differential shift in manufacturing recorded in 
Table 8.7 is artificial, arising from a reclassification (see earlier 
discussion), the problems of the vehicle industry account for the whole 
of the "genuine" negative differential shift. 
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Dyfed had major job losses in iron and steel (employment down from 
4,400 to 2,300 in MLH 311) and in motor vehicles (employment down- 
from 59400 to 4,300). This pattern of job loss shows that Dyfed, despite 
its high degree of rurality, shared many of the structural weaknesses 
of other parts of South Wales, and also-the West Midlands conurbation. 
Differential shifts in iron and steel and in vehicles were in total 
neutral, as in the case of other manufacturing sectors in total. Dyfed's 
relatively low density of industrialisation may have helped the county 
avoid the large negative differential shifts registered by West Glamorgan 
or Mid Glamorgan, yet in the context of an industrial region in severe 
decline there is little sign that Dyfed's rurality gave a positive 
boost to industrial production. 
The industrial performances in each of these counties was much 
as would be expected given the highly adverse economic conditions of 
the time, although Bedfordshire had a faster than average rate of job 
loss in the vehicles industry. The conundrum still remains though of why 
these counties with neutral differential shifts in manufacturing had 
high positive differential shifts in the tertiary sector, while group 
2b counties with high positive differential shifts in manufacturing 
(Nottinghamshire, Lancashire, Fife, Leicestershire) had neutral 
differential shifts in the tertiary sector. This is not the type of 
result one would expect from multiplier theory. 
In two cases, measurement errors in educational services (see 
Table 8. 
' 
13ý are largely responsible for the apparent positive differential 
shift in the tertiary sector. In Tayside a differential shift of +3,900, 
or 2.4% of total 1978 employment, was recorded in this sector, while in 
Derbyshire a differential shift of +4,000, or 1.1% of total 1978 
employment, was recorded. These almost certainly represent under-recording 
in 1978 rather than a genuine increase in employment. In reality it 
seems that Tayside had a high negative differential shift in the tertiary 
sector, rather than a high positive differential shift, and had a high 
rate of total job loss rather than an average rate. Tayside had heavy 
job losses in jute, a traditional industry (-2,100 jobs), in construction 
(-2,100 jobs), and in watches and clocks (-10700 jobs). In Derbyshire, 
elimination. of the statistical anomaly in the educational sector halves 
the differential shift in the tertiary sector rather than removes it 
altogether. There are signs that as in neighbouring South Yorkshire, 
though to a lesser extent, the local authority made a deliberate attempt 
to maintain a high level of employment in government services. In 
Derbyshire employment in MLH 906 fell by less than a hundred, representing 
a differential shift of +2,400, or +0.6% of total 1978 employment. In 
South Yorkshire employment in this sector increased by 3,400, a 
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differential shift of +5,400, or +1*0% of total 1978 employment. It 
is hoped that these figures are reliable, although in some instances 
employment figures for local government appear questionable. 
In Shropshire there were high positive differential shifts in 
retailing (+500 in retail distribution of food and drink; +1,200 in 
other retail distribution) representing in total 1.3% of 1978 employment, 
and most of the measured differential shift in tertiary industries in 
the county. Attention here needs to be drawn to Shropshire's urban 
structure, dominated by small and medium sized towns in a largely rural 
setting, and by Telford, one of the "new cities" designated in the new 
towns programme of the 1960s and 1970s. 
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Under conditions of slump the 
long-term drift to small and medium towns, and the expansion of such 
towns, is more strongly expressed in services than in manufacturing (see 
later discussion), while in the development of a new town retail 
provision often lags behind population expansion, leading to possibilities 
of "catching up" in later years. 
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Dyfed was another rural county with a positive differential shift 
in the service sector (compare also Hereford and Worcester, North 
Yorkshire, Borders, Dumfries and Galloway, etc. ), although relatively 
slight. Most rural and semi-rural counties, even outside Southern 
England, had considerably higher positive differential shifts in services, 
for example Hereford and Worcester, Cumbria, North Yorkshire, and the 
more rural of the Scottish regions. It would appear that while the 
service sector in Dyfed remained relatively healthy during the slump, 
employment levels in the service sector would have been even higher were 
it not for problems in the manufacturing sector in which employment fell 
by 22.8%., It should also be noted in passing that while Powys and the 
Island Areas of Scotland each showed negative differential shifts in 
the tertiary sector, these negative differential shifts were recorded 
in construction rather than services. In Powys a differential shift of 
-800 (-2.8%) was registered in construction, leairing a residual 
differential shift of +1.5% in services. In the Island Areas, where the 
ending of the construction phase of the North Sea oil boom was a 
critical factor, the differential shift in construction was -2,200 
(-9.1%),, leaving a residual differential shift of +7.2%. Gwynedd was 
the only other rural county outside Southern England to show a negative 
differential shift in the tertiary sector; this chiefly resulted from 
faster than average job losses in construction (differential shift of 
-2.3%). although a negative differential shift of -1,000 (-1.4%) was 
registered in hotels and other residential establishments (MLH 884) and 
in restaurants, cafesp snack bars. Areas which specialised in tourism 
would have been adversely affected by the unusually low level of demand 
- 59 - 
among the industrial working class, and by high exchange rates 
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discouraging foreign touristse Mostly, however, more rural counties 
showed strong positive differential shifts in services, and Dyfed was 
no exception. 
The differential shift in the tertiary sector in Bedfordshire 
(+3.9%) appears exceptionally high in the context of industrialised 
counties, yet in the context of Southern England such a differential 
shift is not unusually high. Patterns of employment change in the 
service sector in Southern England are discussed in section 8.8 below. 
Group 2a counties were highly diverse, but had in common negative 
structural shifts, and broadlyýneutral differential shifts in 
manufacturing. The positive differential shifts in the tertiary sector 
can variously be ascribed to favourable location (Bedfordshire), to a 
favourable urban structure (Dyfed, Shropshire) or to measurement error 
in educational services (Tayside, Derbyshire). 
Group 4 counties 
Four counties in group 4 with strong negative structural shifts 
had even stronger positive differential shifts, and hence low rates of 
job loss during the slump. These were Hereford and Worcester, Warwickshire, 
Central Region and Cumbria. In addition, the Borders Region also had 
a strong negative structural shift, but an exceptionally strong positive 
differential shift (+12.7%). resulting in substantial increases in 
employment during the slump; neighbouring Dumfries and Galloway also 
had an exceptionally strong positive differential shift9 but with a 
neutral structural shift. Powys and North Yorkshire each had broadly 
neutral structural shifts and strongly positive differential shifts, and 
in consequence a low rate of employment decline during the slump. 
There are many contrasts between the counties listed above, but 
all of them are in the Midlands or periphery and all of them are 
relatively lightly urbanised, or in some cases strongly rural. In some 
cases there is a strong negative structural shift, indicating an 
employment structure weighted towards manufacturing, while in other cases 
the structural shift -is neutral indicating not a service sector economy 
but rather a rural economy with a reasonable balance of industrial and 
s6rvice sector employment. For present purposes these counties may be 
regarded as the most favoured, or least vulnerable, parts of industrial 
Britain. 
Table 8.20 indicates differential shifts in manufacturing in both 
numerical and percentage terms and shows that while the negative 
differential shifts were very large in some of the conurbations (-32p5OO 
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in Strathclyde, -23,500 in Greater Manchester, -19,500 in Merseyside) 
those in the more rural of the counties listed above were small in 
absolute terms, despite the often spectacular percentage figures; +1,200 
in Borders, +1,100 in Powys, +2,300 in Dumfries and Galloway, and +2,700 
in North Yorkshire. To place these figures in contexto West Yorkshire 
had a differential shift in manufacturing of +6,800. While more rural 
counties in industrial Britain tended to have positive differential shifts 
and more densely urbanised counties tended to have negative differential 
shiftst there are clearly some significant exceptions to this 
generalisation, Furthermore, the positive differential shifts in 
manufacturing in less urbanised counties in industrial Britain were 
considerably outweighed by negative differential shifts in more 
urbanised counties. Conversely, in Southern England, Greater London had 
a neutral differential shift in manufacturing while less urbanised 
counties, and indeed also some highly urbanised counties such as 
Hampshire, tended to have fairly strong positive differential shifts. 
While there was an urban-rural dimension to spatial patterns of industrial 
employment change in the slump, the North-South dimension was far 
stronger, with manufacturing job loss being considerably more severe 
in the Midlands and periphery than in Southern England. 
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differences are even more clear cut when manufacturing employment alone, 
rather than total employment, is considered (Table 8.21). While some of 
the more industrialised parts of Southern England (Greater London, Essex, 
Kentv Oxfordshire, Wiltshire) had rates of industrial job loss around 
the national average of 15% between 1978 and 1981, and Bedfordshire lost 
more than 20% of its industrial employment, most counties in Southern 
England had a rate of industrial job loss of less than 10%. A few of 
the more rural counties in the periphery had low rates of job loss in 
manufacturing, and Dumfries and Galloway and the Island Areas even 
registered employment growth in manufacturing, but the experiences of 
other relatively rural counties such as Northumberland (17.4% of 
manufacturing jobs lost), Dyfed (22.8%) and Clwyd (27.7%) shows clearly 
that more rural counties did not always escape the industrial recession 
lightly. 
Thus great care needs to be taken in interpreting the 
differentiation between groups 1,2 and 4 in urban-rural terms. Some 
relatively rural counties were industrially extremely vulnerable, with 
the crisis of the branch plant factory being important in Northumberland 
(compare Mid Glamorgan), steel job losses in Clwyd being on a very large 
scale, and various problems in the steel and vehicles industries being 
significant in Dyfed. The counties of group 4 would for the most part 
have escaped these difficulties. There is however very little internal 
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coherence in group 4. 
Warwickshire is statistically an artificial unit, consisting of 
the area just to the Isouth of Birmingham, beyond the continuous built 
up area, and the area surrounding Coventry (apart from a narrow rural 
strip linking Coventry and Birmingham), without including Coventry 
itself. Warwickshire's industrial structure closely resembles that of 
the West Midlands, and indeed Warwickshire can legitimately be regarded 
as part of the outer semi-rural fringe of the West Midlands conurbation, 
rather than a free-standing rural area. Clearly industrial growth takes 
place most readily on the uncongested outskirts of a conurbation rather 
than in the congested core, and if core and outskirts are in different 
counties, then on average there would be a strong negative differential 
shift in the core county and a strong positive differential shift in 
the suburban county. Motor vehicle manufacturing, which accounted for a 
differential shift of +4,900 in Warwickshire (3.3% of total 1978 
employment), also accounted for a differential shift of 118 (+0.0%) in 
the Metropolitan County. Indeed employment in motor vehicles in 
Warwickshire actually increased, according to Census of Employment figuresoby 
1,800 between 1978 and 1981. Such suburbanisation within a conurbation 
should not be regarded as a genuine urban-rural shift. 
In passing it should be noted that the unexpected negative 
differential shift in the Warwickshire service sector appears to be the 
result of a statistical anomaly, with medical and dental services 
(MLH 874) showing a differential shift of -6,300 (-4.2%) in Warwickshire 
and +9,500 (+0.7%) in the Metropolitan County. 
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If one adjusts for 
this, it would appear that Warwickshire actually showed an increase in 
employment between 1978 and 1981. 
Hereford and Worcester also includes part of the West Midlands 
suburban fringe, and had high concentrations of employment in metal 
industries n. e. s. (IILH 399) and in carpets (MLH 419), the traditional 
industry of Kidderminster. These two industries between them accounted 
for a structural shift of -5,900 (-7.8%), although differential shifts 
in these sectors were neutral. This sectoral composition of employment 
explains the negative structural shift in the county, while the positive 
differential shift may be explained by some combination of urban fringe 
effects, rurality (in the South and West of the county) and location at 
the edge of the Southern England core. 
66 The differential shift in 
manufacturing was spread very widely across sectors; out of a total 
differential shift of +6p5OO no single MLH had a differential shift of 
more than +800.67 
Cumbria showed a contrasting employment profile, with the large 
differential shifts in manufacturing accounted for by a new soap and 
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detergents factory (MLH 275), with employment in the sector increasing 
from 70 to 2,100, and by the relative stability of employment in the 
local shipbuilding and marine engineering sector, a traditional local 
industrye These sectors between them accounted for a differential shift 
of +4,000 (+2.2%). with differential shifts in other manufacturing 
sectors being, in total effect, neutral. A substantial iron and steel 
industry was in part responsible for the large negative structural shift 
in manufacturing. 
The positive differential shift in manufacturing in Central 
Region was'due largely to an, increase in employment in general chemicals 
(MLH 271) from 2,700 to 4,300, a differential shift of +1,900 (+1.7%). 
This can probably be regarded as a side effect of North Sea oil; British 
Petroleum has a large petrochemicals plant in Grangemouth. 
Of the counties discussed in group 4, only Powys had a "purely" 
rural profile, with suburban fringe effects being non-existent, and 
without major gains of employment in the (urban) chemicals sector. 
Manufacturing employment fell from 5,800 to 5,600; the base figure of 
5,800 is so small, however, as to be of little significance at other 
than the local level. For the record, 600 jobs were lost in vehicles, 
while 300 jobs were gained in the clothing industry. 
Powys apart, relatively low rates of job loss in group 4 counties 
represent not so much the effects of rurality, but rather suburban 
fringe effects, revealed at the county level only as a result of the 
West Midlands Metropolitan County'ý boundaries being too tight, or the 
effects of major employment growth in a particular industry, the chemicals 
industry which was relatively undepressed during the slump. 
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8.7 The Service-Based Conurbatiods; London, Edinburgh, 
Cardiff and Bristol 
(a) The Nature of a Core Economy 
The discussion so far has concentrated on what might be termed 
"industrial Britain", and indeed it was industrial Britain that was most 
severely affected by slump. Not all of Britain, nor even all of urban 
Britain, could be described as industrial; indeed by far the largest 
city in Britain, London, is only relatively lightly industrialised, given 
its size of population, and has developed as a result of its service 
sector activities. 
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At a rather smaller scale, Cardiff, Edinburgh 
and Bristol are also primarily service-based cities which, although not 
as large as the industrial conurbations, have avoided the sharp decline in 
economic fortunes of the major industrial centres. Three out of four 
of these cities are capital cities, and thus important administrative 
centres, while all four cities are important financial and trading centres. 
FUrthermore, and this is the justification. for dealing with them together 
in the present chapter, they all showed remarkably similar responses to 
slump. Thus Greater London, Avon (Bristol and surrounds) and South 
x1amorgan (Cardiff and surrounds) are each classified under group 3a with 
an employment decline of about 31% between 1978 and 1981, very strongly 
positive structural shifts, neutral differential shifts in manufacturing 
and negative differential shifts in the tertiary sector (Table 8.7). 
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Lothian region has a broadly similar profilet except that a major 
expansion of employment in brewing (see section 8.9 below) gave a 
substantial positive differential shift in manufacturing, while there was 
also a slight positive differential shift in services. As a result the 
overall drop in employment in the Lothian region during the slump was 
very slight. (-1.4% between 1978 and 1981). 
These similarities in employment profiles exist despite quite 
considerable differences in regional setting. Greater London and Avon 
are both situated in Southern England, where job loss during the slump 
was relatively slight, and show higher rates of job loss than surrounding 
counties. In such cases a notion of urban-rural shift may be invoked, with 
densely urbanised counties in the core regions having systematically less 
favourable employment trends than less densely urbanised counties. It 
should not be forgotten, however, that a substantial part of the 
relatively favourable growth of the less urbanised counties of the core 
is the result not so much of the decUne of London, but the increased 
geographical spread of London. While Greater London and Avon are areas of 
relatively high job loss in a regional setting of low job loss, South 
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Glamorgan with an almost identical rate of job loss is a county of 
relatively low job loss in a regional setting of very high job loss. In 
Scotland spatial patterns of employment change were highly complex (see 
section 8.9 below), but in terms of the central Scotland urban belt, 
rates of job loss in Lothian region were slight. 
Perhaps the most important point to be made about the "service 
cities" is that unlike the industrial cities they avoided the worst effects 
of slump. If comparison is made with West Yorkshire, South Yorkshire, 
Greater Manchester and the WestKidlands conurbation, rather than with 
Tyne and Wear, Strathclyde, and Merseyside, then at one level of analysis 
the difference is simply one of sectoral composition; in terms of 
shift-share analysis the differential shift in both sets of county is 
broadly similaro while structural shifts are strongly divergent as a 
result of differences in the industry/service weighting at a time of 
intense industrial recession. These differences in the industry/service 
ratio and the structural shifts are also apparent in less urbanised 
counties when North and South are compared. 
In general the service-based economy of the South has fared better 
in slump than the industrial economy of the periphery, but the peripheral 
semi-conurbations of South Glamorgan and Lothian are in this respect more 
"Southern" than "Northern". Cardiff, although situated in a declining 
industrial region, is a service-based city relatively close to Bristol 
and other parts of Southern England; Edinburgh, however, is geographically 
remote from other service-based economies. 
The question arises of how to conceptualise the geographical 
service/industrial split. An old-fashioned method, now largely discarded, 
is to see industry as the export "base" of the region and service sector 
employment as responding wholly passively to changes in "base" employment* 
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Undoubtedly employment in parts of the service sector do respond passively 
to changes in industrial employments which makes it possible to calculate 
multiplier effects of industrial job loss (section 8.3 above), but such 
a conceptualisation makes it very difficult to see why certain regional 
economies should be dominated by the service sector. 
71 Base-multiplier 
theory would tend to suggest that the industry-service employment ratio 
would not vary significantly over space. 
Neither is it satisfactory to suggest, as Damesick (1987) does, 
that the fundamental split is between a de-industrialised North and a 
post-industrial South. If the wora "post-industrial" is to have any 
analytical meaning, the economy being described as post-industrial must 
once have been industrials but must have, at a later stage, relied on 
the non-industrial economy as the main motor of growth. The economy Of 
London was, it is suggested, never industrial in the first place, so it 
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can hardly be regarded as post-industrial at present. If the word 
"post-industrial" is being used loosely to mean simply "service-based", 
then the London economy has always been post-industrial, certainly since 
the rise of London as an international financial centrei 
It is more satisfactory to examine the situation in terms of core 
and periphery, and to note explicitly that an essential component of a 
core economy is the extraction of surplus value arising from physical 
production elsewhere. 
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The most obvious paths of extraction are as 
follows: 
(a) through the political system; taxes collected nationally to 
support a political system centred on the capital city; 
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-(b) through trade; 
(c) through finance. 
These considerations, when taken together, suggest that the core 
economy is necessarily-a service-based-economy. This applies whatever 
the state of economic development of the country involved. thder certain 
economic conditions, industrial development is attracted to the core, 
but this is not automatic; much depends on the geographical distribution 
of raw materials, the technology of production, the degree of local 
infrastructural development, and the degree of access to international 
transport routes, particularly waterways. In Britaint 19th century 
industrial development was drawn to the peripheral regionst while in the 
20th century the pull has been towards the core regions, yet with the 
core regions of Southern England having a lower proportion of employees 
in industrial employment than the Midland or peripheral regions. 
Core and periphery may be defined at a variety of spatial scales, 
most notably first world/third world, core region/peripheral region and 
town/country. It hardly needs to be emphasised that on the broadest 
level the British economy is very much a core economy, whatever might 
have been happening to its industrial base in the years being discussed 
here. Indeed, if the argument above is followedo the fate of Britain's 
-industrial base is in many contexts of secondary importance 
in Britain's 
development as a world core capitalist economy. Yet Britain is not simply 
a core economy, and there is a danger that if finance is given a higher 
priority than industry a loss of industrial production may result which 
is quantitatively greater than any increase in extraction of surplus 
value from the rest of the world. 
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This problem was particularly acute 
in the decades leading up to 1914,75 and remains a problem in the 1980s. 
Internally, core and periphery may be defined at either the regional 
or the urban scale. London is by far the largest coret and possibly the 
dominant spatial economic tendency of the 20th century has been the 
tendency for the London regional economy to expand geographically so that 
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virtually the whole of Southern England may be regarded as part of the 
London-centred core. In the 19th century most of Southern England was 
an under-urbanised agricultural backwaterg not a core at all (chapter 9). 
Obviously towns, cities and conurbations outside Southern England 
also have core functions, yet such is the dominance of London that when 
examined at the JR. scale these cities often haveg in effect, core functions 
only at the regional scale. These core functions protect the major 
cities against certain aspects of decline during recession, but set 
against this the peripheral cities may be shown to have, for a variety of 
reasons, exceptionally vulnerable industrial structures (sections 8.4, 
8.5 above). As a result of intense industrial decline, large cities 
outside Southern England tended to have had severe declines of employment 
during the slump, except where the industrial base was relatively small 
and the "core" service base particularly strong. It can be added that 
had the service base not been extremely well-developed, places such as 
Cardiff and Edinburgh would be towns, not cities; many smaller towns in 
the peripheral regions were relatively unscathed by slump. The only other 
peripheral city not to show a major employment decline during the slump 
was Aberdeen, and here the rise of the. oil industry was the crucial 
factor (section 8.9 below). 
Southern England will be discussed in more detail in section 8.8 
below, with much attention being given, inevitably, to the relationship 
between London and the rest of Southern England. In the present section, 
some more detailed comparisons of the structure of employment change in 
the four "service city" counties is to follow. 
(b) London 
London during the 1970s experienced severe job loss, led by the 
manufacturing sector, and depopulation as a result of this employment 
decline. Depopulation in the recent past is likely to lead to a current 
depletion in service sector employment, irrespective of whether such 
depopulation is still active. In this context it is not surprising that 
London should have had a large negative differential shift in services 
(-2.3% of total 1978 employment), or that in the distribution sector 
London should have had a differential shift of -19,300 (-0.5% of total 
1978 employment). National government service showed a differential 
shift of -1391009 indicating a' continuation of the decentralisation of 
the Civil Service, while medical and dental services showed a 
differential shift of -9,400. Many of the higher order private sector 
services showed both employment growth and strong negative differential 
shifts as some of the core functions of the London economy continued to 
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decentralide, though without greatly diminishing London's dominance. 
In banking, insurance and finance, 
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and accountancy and legal services, 
employment in London increased by 37,500 (8.3%) between 1978 and 1981. 
This represented a structural shift of +2.2% of total 1978 employment, 
but a differential shift of -0.5%. 
It has to be emphasised therefore that the business core of the 
London economy, which accounted for about an eighth of London's total 
employment in 1978, was healthily expanding its employment base even 
during the slump, although there were some signs of decentralisation. 
In part this reflects the strong weighting of economic policy towards 
the type of policy favoured by City interests (dear money, whether in 
terms of interest rates, money supply, or exchange rates) rather than 
the types of policy favoured by industry (cheap money; low rates of 
interest and low exchange rates). In a capitalist economy there is a 
perpetual conflict of interest between finance capital and the industrial 
sector, and in Britain there has been a long-standing and much noted 
tendency, resulting in part from the physical and social closeness of 
the City and Whitehall, for economic policy to be dominated by the 
interests of finance capital. 
77 Rarely has this thrust in policy been 
pursued with such dogmatism and extremism as in the early Thatcher 
years; the City's survival and prosperity through the slump was based on 
the same factors that caused industrial devastation in areas further from 
the Centre of power. 
78 Quite obviously there is a perpetual dilemma in 
economic policy, which becomes acute when events are not running smoothly; 
if one operates a City-based policy, industrial production is endangered 
more than is necessary, while if one conducts an industrially based 
economic policy there is a danger that "confidence in the City" will be 
jeopardised. In terms of maximising national production and national 
employment, the requirement is that economic policy needs to be orientated 
towards industry rather than towards finance, the reverse of the dominant 
direction in economic policy presently, and indeed in the last hundred 
years. What is clearly not satisfactory is that the state should 
intervene massively in the economy to restructure the economy in favour 
of financial capitalism, and then claim that this interventionism 
represents "market forces" and that if industry declines it is the result 
of a failure to respond to market forces. Such a policy may consolidate 
and develop the role of London as a core capitalist economy at the world 
scale, but it increases the relative peripheral is at ion of -the industrial 
regions. Overall, the national economy loses more than it gains from 
the City bias in economic policy. 
This, it seems, gets quite close to the heart of the political 
economy of the regional problem in Britaint and indeed to the problem of 
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deindustrialisation. At the centre of the capitalist system lies the 
extraction of surplus value through specifically economic institutions 
(rather than, say, through politicalv religious or kinship institutions). 
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Early attention (e. g. Marx) concentrated on the role of the capitalist 
industrial organisation in extracting surplus value, and indeed the 
creation of surplus value relies ultimately on physical production. Yet 
the story does not end at the level of the producing firm; indeed the 
dominant mechanism through which wealth is accumulated in the capitalist 
system is through the extraction of surplus value by non-producing. economic 
organisations, through finance and trade,, and through portfolio 
investment rather than through direct investment, 
80 Agglomeration of 
such organisations produces a core surplus-extracting economy. The 
periphery is then left to fare. as best it can. At the international 
scale a low productivity country whose economy is restructured to meet 
the needs of international capitalism may well find that the leakage of 
surplus value to core capitalist economies will. seriously reduce the 
availability of economic resources for development according to indigenous 
needs; the process of underdevelopment. At the national scale the problem 
is not so much one of underdevelopment, but rather that of the 
peripheralisation of production activities. It is important to recognise 
that the dominance of a national capitalist economy at the world scale 
relies initially to a large extent on the existence of an indigenous 
production economy of relatively high productivity so that, for example$ 
Britain's Industrial. Revolution and move to 19th century world economic 
dominance went hand in hand. The problem of deindustrialisation in an 
advanced economy results not so much from the weakness of the economy 
but from the persistent policy of attempting to reinforce the undoubted 
strength of the financial capitalist sector of the economy at the expense 
of leaving production to fend for itself in an increasingly competitive 
world. Deindustrialisation is seen as a result not of weakness but of 
overvaluation of the importance of "core" financial activity, though once 
deindustrialisation is under way it itself becomes a source of economic 
vulnerability, leading to any cyclical downswing being very severely felt. 
The further that deindustrialisation progresses, the less likely it is 
that production activities can lead any prolonged upswing, and the more 
likely it is that restructuring of the economy will favour the financial 
sector during the upswing, consolidating and extending the power of the 
core regions, but leading to relative stagnation in the industrial 
periphery. Recovery is thus partial, rather than general. This can be 
seen very clearly in post-slump Britain. 
There are thus fundamental conflicts of interest between London 
based financial capitalism and industrial capitalism, which tends to 
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dominate economic life in large parts of the periphery. -What is good 
for London is not necessarily good, and indeed can often be actively 
harmful, for the rest of the country; structures designed to maximise 
gains in the financial sector will tend not to be those'that maximise 
national income and employment. This can be seen very clearly in the 
slump of the early 1980s. 
The clash of interests is between the London power base, and the 
periphery, not between the London people in general and the periphery, or 
London employment in general and peripheral employment in general. 
Neither of course does it mean that if something is good for the City it 
is automatically bad for industry, or that if something is bad for the 
City it is automatically good for industry; this would be to commit the 
same logical error as arguing that if increased industrial investment, 
output and. emoloyment boost profits they are necessarily harmful to 
labour. 81 
There has been considerable restructuring of capitalism since the 
1960s, and during the 1970s one of its main victims was industrial 
employment in London. This process may be seen most clearly in the boom 
year of 1972-73 when a major Government reflation lead to very sharp 
inflation in the paper value of various forms of asset, and particularly 
urban land. Associated with a national increase in industrial production 
there was considerable industrial decline in London as industrial sites 
were bought and sold to capitalise on high land values. Asset stripping, 
the process by which-small firms were bought up by financial interests 
and then had their more valuable assets sold off, was already becoming 
co=on by the time of the land boom, 
82 but record land prices undoubtedly 
helped accelerate the process. 
By the 1980s, however, London's industrial decline had slowed 
down; despite the slump, manufacturing employment in London had fallen 
by only 4.1% per annum between 1978 and 1981 compared with a fall of 
4.3% per annum, during cyclically much more favourable conditionst between 
1971 and 1978. FUrthermore, in contrast with the 1970s phase of London's 
deindustrialisation, job loss was unevenly distributed between sectors; 
one of the most remarkable features of London's industrial employment 
change in the 1970s was the way in which all industrial sectors in London 
lost jobs at approximately the same rate, whatever was happening to these 
industries nationally (Table 6.27). During the slump, however, the most 
severe job. losses were concentrated in what might be regarded as 
traditional inner city industries. In furniture, employment fell by 
8,000 (26.8%), representing a differential shift of -5,100, while in 
cl'othing and -footwear employment fell by 14,100 (31.5%), a differential 
shift of -3tlOO. These two sectors between them more than accounted for 
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London's negative differential shift in manufacturing of -1,00.83 
In mechanical engineering, London's employment levels during the 
slump increased by 3$400 (+4.1%), a differential shift of +13,900 (+0.4%). 
This is a remarkable result. Earlier discussion, in chapter 6.5(iii), 
has shown that mechanical engineering is an industry which tends to be 
concentrated in the main conurbation of any industrial region, and has 
shown furthermore that a leading component of manufacturing decline in 
the main cities in depressed industrial regions has been a sharp downturn 
in mechanical engineering. A common conjunction in both Scotland and 
North East England has been for employment in mechanical engineering to 
decline extremely sharply in the main city (Glasgow, Nqwcastleitateshead), 
with job loss in other industrial sectors often tending to be far sharper 
outside the city than inside. This process, resulting from a generally 
depressed level of demand for capital goods at, the regional scale, cannot 
be seen in purely urban terms; the question of regionat economic 
structure is involved. What was happening in London presented a complete 
contrast; as in the peripheral cities, though to a lesser extents 
mechanical engineering accounted for a relatively large proportion of 
industrial employment, but during a time of slump, employment in this 
sector increased, rather than decreased sharply. An increase of 4.1% 
(London) is set against decreases of -27.3% (Tyne and Wear) or -32.4% 
(Strathclyde). As far as London is concerned, the increase in employment 
in mechanical-engineering even during the slump is indicative of 
considerable industrial stability in South East England as a whole; it is 
not just the case that elements of industrial vulnerability (e. g. large 
steelworks or textile mills) were relatively lacking, but also that parts$ 
perhaps more advanced parts, of the South Eastern industrial economy 
were continuing to make progress, despite the slump. FUrthermore, the 
1970s squeeze on London's industry, which affected-mechanical engineering 
as severely as other sectors, was at last coming to a close, implying 
favourable post-slump prospects for London's manufacturing base 
(provided land prices could be kept under control 
84 ). 
Electrical engineering, perhaps the most dynamic of London's 
post-war manufacturing industries, showed a slight negative differential 
shift, although this was mainly due to employment remaining merely 
steady, rather than expanding, in radio, radar and electronic capital 
goods OILH 367), in which there was a differential shift of -6,600. 
Whether this can be regarded as decentralisation is, on the basis of 
Census of Employment figures, unclear. Overall, though, London's 
industrial performances were relatively favourable in engineering, and 
particularly in mechanical engineering, while some of the small scale 
traditional inner city industries (clothing; furniture) were in deep 
trouble. 
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(c) Avon, South Glamorgan, Lothians 
London has received the most attention here, because it is the 
largest and most important economy of those being discussed- Attention 
now turns, briefly, to the other "service cities". 
In Avon there was sharp employment decline in paperv printing and 
publithing, with employment falling by 5,000 (27.5%), a differential shift 
of -3,200 (0.8% of total 1978 employment). 4,500 jobs were lost in the 
various paper manufacture industries 04LHs 481-484), while the more 
gradual decline of employment in printing and publishing also represented 
a considerable, negative differential shift (-1,100). This industry 
appears to have been increasingly focused on the South Eastv and 
centralising rather than decentralising. There were also heavy job 
losses in the traditional port-based industry of food, drink and tobacco, 
with employment falling by 3,800 (19.0%). In the context of slump this 
is not an outstandingly high rate of job loss, but given that employment 
tends to be highly cyclically stable in this industry (chapter 7.3), 
a quite large differential shift, of -2,200 (-0.6%) is involved. Comment 
has already been made, in theMerseyside context (chapter 6.7(vi)) of 
a general shift from west, to east in this industry. 
Employment in a "traditional" Bristol industry of a more recent 
vintage, aerospace, was more favourably placed, with an increase in 
employment of 1,300 representing a structural shift of +2,500 (+0.6%), 
and a-very small positive differential shift. The aerospace sector was 
only slightly affected by slump, while the motor vehicle industry was 
deeply affected nationally. Despite this, employment in motor vehicles 
in Avon increased by 300, a differential shift of +1,200. Thus, in the 
manufacturing sector a strong performance in vehicles compensated in part 
for weak performances in food, drink and tobacco, and in paper, printing 
and publishing. 
In the service sector, a differential shift of -2pOOO (-0.5%) in 
education is probably the result of under-enumeration in 1981 (Table 8.15). 
This accounts for nearly half the measured negative differential shift in 
services in Avon; a differential shift of -2v3OO in retail distribution of 
food and drink accounts for most of the rest. 
In South Glamorgan, 2,600 jobs were lost in iron and steel ' 
(general), 
out of a 1978 level of employment of 4,800, a differential shift of 
-700 (-0.4%). In other industrial sectors, the dominant employment profile 
in South Glamorgan was almost the reverse of that in Avon, with heavy 
job losses (-800; -45.3%) in vehicles, and even job losses in aerospace, 
but employment growth (+300 jobs; +6.2%) in food, drink and tobacco, with 
900 jobs being created in bread and flour confectionery. Furthermore, 
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while 900 jobs were lost in rubber, many other manufacturing industries 
showed small increases in employment. Overall, South Glamorgan had a 
rate of industrial job loss closely in line with the national average. 
The fact that employment decreased by less than the national average during 
the slump was due to the unusually low proportion (17.8%) of South 
Glamorgan's total 1978 employment that was accounted for by manufacturing; 
in other urban peripheral counties, a figure of over 30% would have been 
typical (Table 8.20). This heavy weighting towards the service sector 
was due not only to Cardiff's role as a national capital city and service 
centre, but also to the effects of regional policy; Cardiff remained an 
unassisted area throughout the "regional policy bood', while other parts 
of South Wales received considerable policy assistance, with the result 
that not only were large numbers of new jobs attracted to South-Wales, 
they were also in effect diverted a=y from Cardiff and towards other 
centres in the region (Table-8.14). 
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In addition, industrial job losses 
in South Glamorgan in the 1970s were severe, with manufacturing 
employment falling by 29.2% between 1971 and 1978, major industrial job 
losses not being concealed by any significant influx of new employment. 
One of the ironies of regional policy is shown very clearly here; 
Cardiff and its local surrounds escaped the worst effects of slump, in 
part precisely because it had not been assisted by regional policy, while 
elsewhere in South Wales employment declined sharply because of the 
vulnerability of earlier generations of incoming industry. The problem 
was not regional policy as such, but rather that regional policy, in 
concentrating its attention so exclusively on the industrial sector, 
concentrated attention on a sector which was likely to be cyclically 
vulnerable and, as events turned out, vulnerable to a prolonged industrial 
downturn. 86 
According to raw Census of Employment data, the Lothian region, 
with a total job loss of 1.4% between 1978 and 1981, escaped from slump 
even more successfully than Avon, Greater London and South Glamorgant 
where rates of job loss were 3.1%, 3.7% and 3.9% respectively. Attention 
needs to be drawn, though, to an apparent differential shift of +3,100 
in education (Table 8.13). This almost certainly represents under- 
enumeration in 1978, rather than any genuine employment change. Ignoring 
this differential shiftv employment change in the Lothian Region can be 
calculated as being -2.4%, rather than -1.4%. This still represents a 
better performance than in the other "service city" counties, a 
performance which was greatly bolstered by an increase in employment from 
2,200 to 5,800 in brewing and malting, and by increases in employment, 
against national trends, in construction (+700 jobs, a differential 
shift of +2,300). There were, not surprisingly, elements 6f industrial 
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vulnerability, notably'in motor vehicles (employment down by 291001 
or 31.0%) and in coal mining (employment down 1,900, or 21.8%). In 
services, negative differential shifts dominated, and indeed 3,300 jobs 
were lost in hotels, other residential establishments, and public houses 
04LHs 884,. 886). Overallo the Lothian Region's economic performance was 
better than that of the other three counties being discussed, but this 
is due more to jobs created in the brewing industry than to any more 
general Edinburgh revival. In section 8.9 below, scepticism is expressed 
as to whether the favourable employment figures in many of the Scottish 
regions can be attributed to a more general "Eastern Scottish" revival, 
rather than to the specific effects of North Sea oil or rural regeneration. 
The difference in employment performance between Edinburgh and London, 
Bristol or Cardiff is not great enough either to be presented as 
unambiguous evidence of a relative revival in Scotland. 
-As far as the "service city" counties as a whole are concerned, 
perhaps the main common feature is quite simply that having a high 
percentage of service sector employment insulated each county from the 
worst effects of slump. Furthermore, there is a general long-term drift 
from large cities to smaller towns and cities in service sector employment, 
in part following population redistribution, and as a result the service 
cities tended to show negative differential shifts in services. 
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- 8.8 Southern England 
One point of view is that since the slump affected Southern 
England relatively slightly there is relatively little to be gained by 
a detailed study of patterns of employment change in Southern England 
during the slump. This perspective might well have been tenable during 
the slump itself, as attention was attracted, not surprisingly, to 
patterns of job losses in the industrial regions, 
87 
yet hindsight suggests 
that it is important to establish what was happening in Southern England 
at the time. There are two main reasons for this. Firstly, as 1981 
Census of Employment data became available it soon became clear that there 
were significant patterns of zonation in rates of employment change in 
Southern England, as reflected in Table 8.7. Secondly, and even more 
importantly, the experience of post-slump recovery was spatially extremely 
uneven, with recovery being strong in Southern England but patchy 
elsewhere. Projecting this experience back a few years, the question 
needs to be asked of whether Southern England was consolidating its core 
economic functions during the slump, despite industrial collapse 
elsewhere. Undoubtedly there has been a massive restructuring of British 
capitalism during the 1980s with a significant expansion and consolidation 
of "core" capitalist functions (the extraction and circulation of surplus 
value) but an abandonment to market forces of the "peripheral" capitalist 
functions (physical production). In response to the economic crises of 
the 1970s and early 1980s, and to the need to escape from this trajectory 
of crisis, the British economy has become more a capitalist economy, less 
an industrial economy. It is of interest to determine whether signs of 
this renewal of finance capitalism can be identified in the record of 
employment change during the slump. 
In contrast with industrial Britain, the dominant factor behind 
the geography of employment change in the South during the slump was not 
the presence or absence of vulnerable industries, but rather the spatial 
relationship of different areas to the London core. Examination of 
Table 8.7 suggests a four-fold grouping based on distance and direction 
from London. Thus, 
(a) Greater London (group 3a) 
Declining employment, worse than the regional average butt 
in strong contrast with the 1'970s, a better employment 
performance than the national average. 
(b) The conmter belt (groups 5ab and 5ac: Buckinghamshire, 
Surrey, East Sussex, West Sussext Hampshiret Cambridgeshiret 
Hertfordshire, Oxfordshire, in descending order of employment 
gain). 
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All gaining in employment during the 1978-81 periodg with 
rises in employment during the slump itself in the first six 
counties, and possibly also in Cambridgeshire and 
Hertfordshire (section 8.1). 
(c) Western fringe 
, 
(group 5aal, more favoured counties in group 
5aa 2. plus Avon (3a),: Berkshire, Dorset, Gloucestershire, 
Wiltshire, Devon, Somerset, Avon). 
All showing only slight decreases in employment between 1978 
and 1981, with the first five counties listed having 
employment changes ranging from -0.2% to -0.7%. 
M Eastern fringe (group 3c, less favoured counties in group 
5aa2: Suffolk, Kent, Norfolk, Lincolnshire, Essex). 
The le 
, 
ast favoured group of counties (London excluded) in 
the South, with employment changes ranging from -2.0% in 
Suffolk to -4.8% in Essex. 
This grouping fits all counties in the South except for the "tourist 
counties" of Cornwall and the Isle of Wight (combined employment in 1978 
of 165,000), two counties which it is not proposed to examine in detail, 
88 
It should also be noted that the above classification is based solely on 
unadjusted Census of Employment data; there appear to be significant 
inaccuracies in this data source, which lead to employment growth in 
Berkshire having been understated, and in Buckinghamshire and Cambrideshire 
having been overstated (Table 8.16). 
89 These data problems all relate 
to the education sector in which data omissions are often detectable. 
In addition, boundary changes would appear to have shifted part of Harlow 
(Essex) TTWA and Hertford TTWA, artificially inflating the 1981 
employment total for Hertfordshire and deflating the employment total 
90 for Essex. Once all these minor inconsistencies have been allowed for, 
Berkshire may be regarded as part of the "commuter belt" and Hertfordshirep 
possibly also Cambridgeshire, 
91 
as part of the "eastern fringe" (Table 
8.22). 
There are quite marked contrasts between the zonation of 
employment change during the slump and the zonation of employment change 
during the 1970s, as can be seen from Table 8.23. In effect, the basic 
theme in the economic geography of Southern England between the 1930s 
and the 1970s has been that of growth and decentralisation. During the 
1930s the bulk of this decentralisation was to the suburbs of Loridon, 
with significant industrial development taking place in the North 
Western quadrant. There was also a spread of this growth to towns just 
outside London, slight in London terms but highly significant in local 
terms. Employment growth in the more rural flouter South" was much slower 
than the national average. In the post-war years the main zone of 
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conspicuous employment growth during the long cycle upswing was to the 
north of London, beyond the Green Belt, at a radius of between about 20 
and 35 miles (about 30-55km). Most of the Southern New Towns were 
situated in this zone, as well as the'vehicle-producing centre of Luton. 
During the late 1960s and the 1970s there was a conspicuous outward shift 
in the zone of fastest growth, with the "golden arc" coming to be situated 
in a zone between 50 and 80 miles (80-130km) from London. An arc with 
a 60 mile radius would pass through southern Suffolk, south Cambridgeshire, 
outer Bedfordshire, Buckinghamshire and Berkshire, and then through 
Oxfordshire, mid-Hampshire and West Sussex. Thes e counties, with the 
exception of-Oxfordshire (where the car industry was severely hit by 
recession) and with the addition of Gloucestershire, showed the fastest 
employment growth rates in Southern England during the 1970s. An 
important asymmetry needs to be noted; counties outside the "golden arc" 
(notably Gloucestershire, Dorset,, Norfolk, Lincolnshire, Devon, Wiltshire 
and Somerset) tended to have high rates of employment growth, while 
counties inside the "golden arc" (notably Surrey, Hertfordshire and 
Essex) tended to have rather lower employment growth rates, although 
still considerably higher than in the UK as a whole. In Greater London 
employment was in rapid decline. 
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These waves of decentralisation were, even during the 1970s, 
industrially led, although service sector employment also increased 
substantially in the recipient areas, both through the general national 
expansion of the service sector, and through local multiplier effects. 
Areas which have been in the path of decentralising industry haves not 
surprisingly, higher proportions of their employment total in manufacturing 
than other counties. Thus in 1978 manufacturing accounted for 43.4% of 
total employment in Bedfordshire, 37.0% in Hertfordshire, 34.7% in 
Buckinghamshire and 33.5% in Essex, but only 26.3% in West Sussext 
25.3% in East Sussex and 18.7% in East Sussex. This compares with a 
national average of 32.0% and a figure of 20.9% for Greater London. 
Clearly some parts of South East England are strongly industrialised, 
even though the service sector is dominant at the regional. scale. 
In the early 1980s the collapse of industrial production meant 
that decentralisation as an active force could be largely discounted 
(although the effects of some late 1970s investment plans would still 
have been working their way through the system)p while recession-induced 
job loss would have become an important factor. While industrial 
employment in Southern England would have been less vulnerable than 
industrial employment elsewhere, even when'differences in sectoral 
composition have been taken into account (as shown by the generally 
strong positive differential shifts in Southern counties in Table 8.7), 
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within the context of Southern England highly industrialised counties 
have been more prone to job loss than less industrialised counties. Thus 
counties which had earlier received waves of incoming industry now found 
themselves industrially vulnerable. Some of the most conspicuous 
examples of this were in the new towns. 
93 
Summarising, one can note that the outer South (the eastern and 
western fringes described earlier) had, in the Southern contexto 
relatively high rates of job loss in part precisely because of earlier 
industrial growth. Table 8.23 shows that each of the fringe counties 
was increasing in employment even during the relatively depressed years 
between 1973 and 1977, but was decreasing in employment between 1978 
and 1981. In the western fringe employment increased by 0.8% per annum, 
between 1973 and 1977 but decreased by 0.4% per annum between 1978 and 
1981. In the eastern fringe there was a slightly sharper turnaround, 
with employment increasing by 0.8% per annum between 1973'and 1977 and 
falling by 1.1% per annum between 1978 and 1981. This is not too 
unsurprising given that the 1979-82 recession was much more severe than 
the 1974-76 recession. What is more surprising, however, is that 
employment in the commuter belt increased more quickly during the slump 
(+0.8% per annum) than in the mid-1970s. recession (+0.7% per annum). 
The course of events in the commuter belt needs to be examined more 
closely. Analysis here needs to be conducted at a finer scale than the 
county since for present purposes counties are large and awkwardly shaped. 
For example, while one can hardly doubt that the whole of Surrey should 
be included in the commuter belt, counties such as Buckinghamshire and 
Berkshire radiate out from London, and thus incorporate both inner 
commuter belt and outer ring. It is more satisfactory to reconstitute 
the inner commuter belt and the outer ring at the level of the travel to 
work area. The definition of the commuter belt is extended to cover 
not only the "pure" commuter belt,, but also more industrial areas within 
the same travelling distance from London. 
Table 8.24 carries out such an exercise and is very revealing 
about patterns of employment change in London and its surrounds, especially 
when. examined in conjunction with Table 8.25, which indicates patterns 
of employment change in manufacturing and in services for each zone. It 
is also fortunate that London is a large enough city for official 
statistics to show the distinction between the central city (central 
business district, or "Office and shop" zone) and the inner city (the 
"inner industrial perimeter"). 
Within London, employment declined, with the decline of employment 
in the inner city being slightly faster than the national average and 
the decline of employment in the suburbs being slightly slower than the 
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national average. The decline of employment in central London was 
slight. It needs to be remembered though that these are statistics 
based on workplace rather than on residence, and that on a residential 
basis both inner London and outer London would have had smaller 
percentage reductions in employment than the figures suggest* 
Just outside London, the commuter belt may be divided fairly 
readily into an inner ring and an outer ring, and between north and 
south. Table 8.24 indicates that, taken as a whole, employment was stable 
both in the inner ring (up to 40 miles from London) and in the outer ring 
(40-70 miles from London). In contrast with the 1970s, distance from 
London was not a major factor determining rates of employment change. 
Direction, however, was important. In both inner and outer rings, 
employment increased by 21% in the south and decreased by 21% in the 
north. It needs to be noted in this context that towns on the south bank 
of the Thames, downstream of London (Chatham, Sheerness and Sittingbourne 
TTWAs) are regarded as part of the northern belt, indicating a basic 
difference; the northern belt is more heavily industrialised than the 
southern belt. Table 8.25 shows that in the southern belt there were 21 
service jobs to every manufacturing job, while in the northern belt 
there were only 11 service jobs to every manufacturing job. In earlier 
years, areas to the north of London had growth faster than areas to the 
south of London precisely because of the industrialisation of the 
northern belt, this being the part of London's surrounds best orientated 
for serving national markets and for developing linkages with industries 
in other regions. The Thames estuary was another obvious focus of 
industrial development. 
Schematically, therefore, it is possible to identify two main 
phases of growth and decline. In phase 1, growth was concentrated 
primarily in manufacturing, to the north of London and along the Thames. 
In phase 2, manufacturing employment declined sharplyt adversely 
affecting the growth areas of phase 1,, while service sector employment 
grew rapidly. Overall, employment performance during the 1980s slump 
was more favourable in precisely those areas to the south which had 
avoided phase I industrialisation. In general, the industrialised areas 
of Southern England were more successful at avoiding the worst effects 
of recession than were the industrialised areas of the periphery, being 
based on industries of a more recent vintage, although the decline of 
the motor industry complicates the question, especially in Bedfordshire 
and Oxfordshire. 
94 
Table 8.25 shows that 83,000 manufacturing jobs were lost in 
the northern surrounds of London (including northern Kent) at a rate of 
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job loss only slightly below the national average of 15%. In Oxfordshire, 
10,900 jobs were lost in the motor vehicles industry, although in other 
manufacturing sectors there was a net employment gain of 2,400. In 
Bedfordshire, 10,300 jobs were lost in motor vehicles, and there were 
also another 8,400 jobs lost in other manufacturing sectors. In Kent, 
5,800 jobs were lost in shipbuilding, shiprepairing and marine 
engineering as a result of the phasing out of the Naval Dockyard at 
Chatham. 95 A further 4,500 jobs were lost in mtor vehicles, and 3,800 
jobs were lost in paper and board OALHs 481,482). In Hertfordshire 
4,100 jobs were lost in paper and board and in stationery 04LHs 485, 
486,489). In Essex 5,400 jobs were lost in chemicals and in lubricating 
oils and greases 04LHs 263 to 279). These vulnerable clusters . 1iccounted 
for about hal f the total manufacturing job losses in the northern belt. 
The only conspicuously. vulnerable clusters in the southern belt were in 
Hampshire, where 4,000 jobs were lost in shipbuilding and in marine 
engineering, and 2,500 jobs were lost in chemicals; the higher rate of 
manufacturing job loss in the Southern outer ring than in the Southern 
inner ring (Table 8.25) reflects these problems in Hampshire's coastal 
industries. 
The general impression given when examining industrial employment 
figures for South East England is for there to be occasional clusters 
of heavy job loss in some manufacturing industries, relatively stable 
employment levels in other manufacturing industries, and sometimes some 
quite significant employment gains. Many of the most significant 
employment gains were in radio, radar and electronic capital goods, in 
which employment increased by 3,600 in Hampshire, 3,100 in Hertfordshire, 
by 2,100 in Dorset, by 19600 in Kent, by 1,200 in Surrey, by 800 in 
Berkshire, all at a time of industrial slump. Undoubtedly this often 
represents technologically highly sophisticated production; one would 
wish to know however to what extent this extra production was for 
military use and to what extent it was for purely civilian use, 
something which cannot be ascertained at the MLH level. 
96 
Other, 
generally slightly smaller, gains in employment may be detected in other 
parts of the electrical engineering sector, and in aerospace* 
97 it 
seems that during the slump the South East continued to consolidate its 
position in high technology manufacturing industries, partially 
compensating for substantial job losses in vehicles, paper, printing 
and publishing, and various coastal and estuarine industries. In the 
industrial regions the concentration of employment in high technology 
industries was far less pronounced, and provided far less of a cushioning 
effect than in the South East. 
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At a broad scale, and leaving much local detail blurreds 
manufacturing job loss was high (over 10%) in London and the northern 
belt, but low (under 10%) in the southern belt; there was a distinct 
north-south patterning. In services there was a contrasting picture, 
with a slight decline of employment in London itself, an increase in 
employment of 4.3% in the inner ring (both north and south) and an 
increase in employment of just over 71% in the outer ring (both north 
and south). More detailed figures are presented in Table 8.26. 
Such a high degree of symmetry is remarkable, and suggests the 
possibility of an elegant and simple explanation of spatial patterns 
of employment change in the service sector in Southern England. 
Unfortunately the detailed result is spurious; the normal problem in 
social science research is that imperfections in the data source might 
well obscure an underlying regular patterning, but here it is the 
imperfections in the data source which create, by chance, 'the regular 
patterning. In education, a differential shift of +7.800 (4.1% of total 
1978 employment in all sectors) was indicated for Buckinghamshire by 
the Census of Employment, with Milton Keynes accounting for the bulk of 
this differential shift. 
98 The differential shift of +5,200 in education 
in Cambridgeshire was attributable to Peterborough rather than to 
Cambridge, and so is not incorporated in Table 8.25. In Berkshire a 
differential shift of -3,300 was recorded, despite positive differential 
shifts in neighbouring counties. Also, there appears to have been a 
major reclassification in Berkshire, with employment apparently falling 
by 3,000 in "central offices not allocable elsewhere" 04LH 866) and rising 
by 5,600 in electronic computers CNILH 366). The growth of service sector 
employment would thus seem to be overstated by about 7,000 in 
Buckinghamshire and understated by about 7,000 in Berkshire. It was also 
temporarily suspected that there was a major reclassification between 
industries and services in Hampshire, where employment rose, according 
to the Census of Employment, by 2,700 in radios radar and electronic 
capital goods OALH 367), and fell by 3,000 in research and development 
services (HLH 876). Figures at the local area level show however that 
Portsmouth had an increase in employment of 2,900 inMLH 367s with a 
decline of employment of only 400 inMLH 876, suggesting that what is 
involved is not a simple reclassification. Any reclassification that 
has taken place has been within the service sector, with employment being 
shown as falling by 3,000 in research and development services and rising 
by 2,600 in "other professional and scientific services" ýILH 879). 
Minor data imperfections such as these are frustrating for the 
researcher but do not significantly detract from the enormous importance 
of the Census of Employment as a basic source of labour market statistics. 
nI 
As far as the issue being discussed is concerned, detailed examination 
of the available statistics does not uphold the conclusions implicit in 
Table 8.25 that orientation with respect to London has negligible 
effects on the rate of growth of service sector employment. When one 
takes into account the point that employment growth in the service sector 
has been underenumerated in the southern belt and overenumerated in the 
northern beltj then service sector employment can be seen to have grown 
more quickly in the southern commuter belt than. in the northern commuter 
belt. These differences are slight, and certainly no more. than tould.; be 
explained in terms of industry/service multiplier effects* the northern 
commuter belt having been more seriously affected than the southern 
commuter belt by industrial decline. 
The point. still remains, though, that the outer ring has been 
significantly more favoured than the inner ring in terms of service sector 
growth, this not being explicable in terms of industrial multiplier 
effects as industrial decline in the outer ring was more severe than in 
the inner ring. 
Strategically the most important employment growth in the core 
regions has been in what might be termed the "core services", 
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services 
which may often be regarded as being on the "active" side of any 
multiplier equation rather than on the "passive" side. Surrey., perhaps 
the most prosperous of the commuter counties, presents the clearest 
profile of this type of emergent service sector economy, with 3,200 
jobs created in research and development ýIILH 876), 3,000 jobs created in 
"other professional and scientific services" OLH 879), 1,200 jobs in 
insurance, 1,100 in postal services and telecommunications OLH 708), 
1,100 in property owning and managing OLH 863) and 1,200 in "other 
services" OILH 899). Just across the county boundary, 1,800 jobs were 
created in air transport NLH 707) in West Sussex, a differential shift 
of +1,200, which indicate the increasing importance of Gatwick Airport; 
1,300 jobs were also created in this sector in Bedfordshire (Luton Airport), 
and 3,400 jobs were created in East Sussex. These jobs reflect in part 
the increasing economic dominance of the core regionst and in part the 
difficulty of continued traffic expansion at London's main airport at 
Heathrow. 
There were major increases in employment in the financial sector 
in Hampshire (+2,600 jobs in insurance), 100 in Essex (+1,800 jobs in 
banking and bill discounting; +19000. jobs in property owning and managing)o 
in Hertfordshire (+1,100 jobs in insurance), and in Sussex (+l, ooo jobs 
in insurance), as well as in Surrey. Even larger increases in employment 
were registered in several counties in research and development (MLH 876), 
in "other professional and scientific services " (HLH 879) and "other 
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services" (MLH 899), indicating the dominance of the core regions in 
high technology 
101 
as well as in the financial sector. In research 
and development, 3,200 jobs were created in Surrey, 10900 in Oxfordshire 
and 1,300 in Kent. In other professional and scientific servicest 3,000 
jobs were created in Surrey and 1,300 in Kent. In "other services", 
in cases where no obvious reclassification can be detected, 3,400 jobs 
were created in Hertfordshire, 
102 2,700 jobs in Oxfordshire, 1,800 jobs 
in Kent and 1,200 jobs in Surrey. 
Major expansions of employment in various localities could also 
be detected in national government service (, XLH 901). Employment in 
this sector expanded by 4,300 in Kent, by 3,100 in Hampshire, by 1,200 
in Bedfordshire and by 1,000 in Berkshire. National government is very 
much a core region activity, yet there is considerable potential for 
the geographical dispersion of employment in this sector. There was 
much decentralisation of government offices to the peripheral regions 
in the 1960s and 1970s, 
103 but this decentralisation programme was 
effectively abandoned in the early 1980s. Some of the decentralised 
offices showed increases in employment during the slump, but the greatest 
increases in employment took place in the commuter belt, precisely the 
parts of England which had the least need for increased employment during 
the slump. An important policy question arises, which is particularly 
relevant in the circumstances of the late 1980s, by which time post-slump 
recovery has led to severe overheating in the South East economy while 
simultaneously there has remained high unemployment in the periphery. 
A major programme of government office decentralisation to regions of 
high unemployment would create much needed employment in the periphery, 
release office space in the core, reduce the pressure of demand on housing 
in the core, and would allow the Government to sell property in high 
cost regions and buy cheaper property in low cost regions. Such a course 
of action would also set an example to the private sector. 
As things stood in the early 1980s, and indeed as they probably 
still stand, there was noticeable expansion of employment in "core" 
service sectors in Southern England, but this employment growth was 
concentrated very much in the South East rather than in the outer South. 
There were relatively few instances of large-scale employment growth 
between 1978 and 1981 in finance, in research and development or in 
natibnal government services in the various counties of East Anglia and 
the South West. As a result, such counties had relatively modest 
differential shifts in the tertiary sector, the one major exception being 
Wiltshire, which had a differential shift in construction of +2,100 jobs, 
and differential shifts of +1,300 in insurance (following an increase in 
employment of 1,400) and of +1,100 in medical and dental services 
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(following an increase in employment of 1,700 jobs). Many counties in 
the commuter belt also showed substantial increases in employment in 
the medical and dental sector; whether this is due to a concentration of 
more specialised medical activities in core regions, or to various 
multiplier effects (more prosperous areas gaining services, more depressed 
areas losing services) is not clear. 
104 
The basic characteristics of employment change in Southern England 
between 1978 and 1981 may now be summarised. London had, in the context 
of the time, relatively mild job loss; much worse could have been feared 
from the experiences of the 1970s. Manufacturing employment declined 
sharply in outer London, while employment by manufacturing firms in central 
London, in many cases representing head offices rather than production 
centres, increased. Employment in services in London declined slightly, 
in part as a response to earlier population decline, and in part because 
employment in "core" service activity tended to take place preferentially 
in the commuter belt, rather than in London itself, which is congested 
and a high cost location. 
Outside London, the rate of industrial job loss tended to be medium 
to low, although some areas were vulnerable, particularly if the motor 
industry was a major employer. Service sector employment continued to 
expand, in part because of the general looseness of the labour market 
(chapter 6.9 above), and in part because service sector expansion was 
not inhibited by extremely heavy industrial job losses, as would have 
been the case in much of industrial Britain. In the outer South, service 
sector expansion was moderately strong, with expansion tending to be led 
by "local services'., while in the inner South, service sector expansion 
was even stronger, as the effects of expansion in "core" services were 
added on to the effects of expansion in "local" services. The most 
favoured growth zone around London was that part of the commuter belt to 
the south and west of London, from Berkshire to west Kent, in which 
industrial job loss was relatively slight and service sector growth 
particularly vigorous. 
A final point needs to be added. It would be a mistake to assume 
that decentralisation from London to the commuter belt represented an 
urban-rural shift. Much of this expansion actually took place in cities 
and large towns. In Portsmouth employment increased by 6,500 (3.5%) 
while in Southampton employment increased by 6,200 (2.5%); these cities 
between them accounted for five sixths of Hampshire's total increase in 
employment. Brightong another coastal city in the commuter belt, 
increased its employment by 3,600 (2.8%), while several other, usually 
smaller, towns each had increases in employment of over 2,400, namely 
Tunbridge Wells (+4,800; +6.0%), 'Guildford (+3,600; +3.9%), Reading 
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(+30200; +1.97. ). Basingstoke (+2,, 800; +6.0%), Crawley (+2,500; +1.6%) 
and Maidstone (+2, 
'400; +3.0%). The new town of Milton Keynes increased 
its employment by perhaps 7,000 (about 15%). but questionable figures 
for the education sector make the true total difficult to assess. 
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The dominant process is not so much one of London's surplus growth 
spreading into rural areas, but rather one of London's surplus growth 
latching on to existing urban structures, often already highly developeds 
outside London. 
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8.9 Scotland, and Rural'Nurthern England 
Between 1978 and 1981 employment fell by 9.6% in Strathclyde 
region but increased by 9.9% in Grampian region. This range in economic 
performance is greater than for the whole of England and Wales.. While 
the vitality of theSTrampian economy is to be explained chiefly by the 
growth to maturity of the North Sea oil industry, and the spur to activity 
given by the "second oil shock" of 1980,108 all the more rural 
administrative regions of Scotland showed substantial increases in 
employment (Table 8.7). In addition Lothian region, sheltered to some 
extent by its concentration of employment in the higher order services, 
but with more favourable differential shifts than structurally similar 
counties in England and Wales (Greater London, South Glamorgan and Avon; 
see section 8.6 above), showed only a very slight net decline in employment 
during the slump. 
There was thus a very strong duality in economic performance in 
Scotland during the slump, with Strathclyde being extremely depressed 
and the rest of Scotland escaping relatively lightly from slump. Given 
this duality it is difficult to write meaningfully about the Scottish 
economy as a whole, although one may note that positive differential 
shifts in the rest of Scotland (hereafter referred to, for simplicity, 
as Eastern Scotland) slightly outweighed negative differential shifts in 
Strathclyde (Table 8.26). In terms both of differential shifts and of 
total employment change Scotland performed very slightly better than the 
British average. 
It is not intended to discuss Strathclyde in detail hereq given 
the earlier discussion in section 8.5. Strathclyde had a highly depressed 
regional economy, yet other sub-regional economies fared worse, most 
notably the coalfield and steel zone of North East England, inner South 
Wales (excluding Cardiff) and the West4lidlands conurbation, each of which 
had a rate of job loss about two percentage points greater than that of 
Strathlyde, with a size of workforce slightly greater than Strathclyde 
in each of North East England and the WestHidlands, and about half the 
size in inner South Wales. In addition. ' Greater Manchester suffered a 
degree of recession roughly similar to that of Strathclyde, and had a 
similarly sized workforce, while neighbouring Merseyside, with a 
population about half the size, lost jobs slightly more quickly than 
Strathclyde. Thus the basic economic problems faced by Strathclyde 
were of about the same intensity, or slightly less, as those faced by 
the less favoured urban economies of England and Wales. 
A more interesting question theoretically is whether it is 
possible to speak of a resurgence of the "Eastern Scottish" economy and 
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if so, whether this resurgence can be held to be in any sense independent 
of the rise of North Sea oil. This question needs to be tackled from 
two different directions, by comparisons with English and Welsh local 
economies of similar basic structures, and by comparisons with pre-slump 
performance. Only if it is possible to detect unusually favourable 
performances on both counts can one legitimately point to a slump-based 
resurgence in parts of the Scottish economy. 
The question of North Sea oil must firstly be considered. The 
main onshore centre of this industry is Aberdeen, the one large city in 
Grampian Region, where employment increased by l6v800 (13.2%) between 
1978 and 1981. Since employment in the Grampian Region as a whole 
increased by only 17,700 (9.9%)v it is clear that it was North Sea oil, 
rather than any rural resurgence, which dominated employment trends, 
About a third of the new jobs (5,900) Veke- in "petroleum and natural 
gas" (., 14LH 104), with a further 1,100 jobs being created in "mineral oil 
refining" (HLH 262). In addition the 600 jobs created in shipbuilding 
and repairing ('-14LH 371), and quite probably the 1,000 jobs gained in 
"mechanical engineering n. e. s. " and "metal industries n. e. s. " ('MLHs 349, 
399)-may be attributed to the North Sea oil industry. 
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gains total 8,600, leaving 9,100 new jobs unaccounted for. Of these, 
1,400 new jobs (net) were created in construction, while employment 
increased by 2,500 in the distributive trades, by 1,200 in postal services 
and telecommunications, by 1,500 in local government and by 1,100 in 
medical and dental services. Even the rise in employment of 2,100 in 
educational services might be genuine, in the context of a rising local 
population, rather than the result of mis-enumeration. This employment 
growth in the new oil related industries and in the service sector 
outweighed the considerable job losses in food, drink and tobacco, 
totalling 3,500, of which 2,400 were in "bacon curing, meat and fish 
products" (MLH 214), probably indicating the problems of the fishing 
industry; employment in fishing itself fell by 500, a drop of slightly 
over a third, a proportional decline similar to that found in food, 
drink and tobacco. 
Clearly this major decline in traditional occupations, combined 
with an even sharper increase in new occupations, led to considerable 
changes in local labour market structure. In the oil industry, 
recruitment was carried out on a national basis rather than a local basis, 
whether employment in managerial and technical positions is being 
considered, or whether more general employment on oil rigs is being 
considered. Indeed a typical pattern of employment on oil rigs would be 
a week on duty followed by a week off duty, with the off duty periods 
being spent at the worker's home town, often a considerable distance from 
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Aberdeen. It is not immediately clear how readily workers squeezed out 
of traditional industries could be reabsorbed into the new industries, 
although nautical skills among ex-fishermen would presumably be a labour 
market asset. In any case, the extent to which new oil-related jobs 
induced high levels of immigration, when seen in place of work terms, 
ensured that unemployment would rise, though relatively slightly, during 
the slump. 
It ought in principle to be possible to calculate an industry/ 
service multiplier for the Grampian Region, on the lines suggested in 
section 8.3(ii) above. This, it will be remembered, gives a generaZ 
industry-service multiplier, not an indication of specific secondary 
employment effects of expansion in the oil industry. In the Index of 
Production industries employment in Great Britain decreased by 14.8% 
between 1978 and 1981, but increased by 8.4% in the Grampian Region; 
this represented a differential shift of +15,000 in the Grampian Region. 
In services, the G rampian Region had a dif f erential shif t of + 11,420. 
This represents a multiplier of 1.76, somewhat higher than the values 
of around 1.4 indicated in the main steel closure areas (section 8.3(ii) 
above). Quite possibly the differential shift in the service sector 
overestimates the extent of the increase in "passive" employmentp in that 
education services had a (possibly spurious) differential shift of 
+2,700, and in that the increase in employment of 1,800 in postal 
services and telecommunications and in air transport (MLHs 706 and 707) 
could perhaps be regarded as "active", as an element of industrial change, 
rather than as "passive". The evidence is not clear enough to indicate 
strong systematic differences between upward and downward multipliers, 
although further investigation would be welcome. 
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Clearly the strong expansion of the Grampian economy during the 
slump is oil-based. Less spectacular cases of oil-related increases in 
employment may also be noted in other Scottish regions, although in some 
cases oil-related employment would actually have decZined as a result of 
the end of the construction phase of the oil boom and the upswing of the 
production phase of the oil boom. In the Island Areas (with particular 
reference to the Shetlands) the 1970s construction boom ended abruptly 
with the loss of 2,700 jobs; the earlier effects of North Sea oil on an 
extremely rural economy had meant that in 1978 construction accounted for 
22.0% of total employment in the Island Areas. The fading of this element 
in the oil boom outweighed the 700 jobs created in petroleum and natural lic 
gas (MLH 104). In the Highlands 600 jobs were lost in oil rig construction. 
In the Central Region employment in the chemicals industry increased by 
2,200 (of which 1,600 jobs were created in MLH 271, general chemicals), 
probably mostly representing petrocbdmicals rather than inorganic 
chemicals. In Strathclyde 500 jobs were created in petroleum and natural 
gas, presumably mainly office jobs, but this is a very small figure when 
set against the 88,000 manufacturing jobs which were lost. 
Only in the Grampian Region and the Central Region (indirectly, 
via the chemicals industry) did the North Sea oil boom have a significant 
positive effect on employment levels. Thus the apparent "East Scottish" 
resurgence can hardly be explained totally by the North Sea oil factor. 
County by county comparisons show however that the more urbanised of the 
'rest of the Scottish regions (outside Strathclyde) had economic performances 
comparable with those of English and Welsh counties of similar degrees of 
urbanisation. Tayside had a higher than average rate of job loss, with 
Dundee facing severe problems although Perth was relatively little affected 
by slumpPlThe rate of job loss was, for an industrial area, relatively but 
not abnormally low, with employment growth in the electronics sector 
helping to create stability. In the Lothian Region, the rate of job loss 
was apparently somewhat lower than in Greater Londonp Avon and South 
Glamorgan, the other counties dominated by service cities. One must 
regard with suspicion though the differential shift of +3,000 (1.0% of 
total 1978 employment) in education; removing this differential shift would 
halve the gap in the rate of employment change between Edinburgh and the 
other service cities. As shown in section 8.7 above, the favourable 
employment performance in manufacturing is to be explained chiefly by the 
creation of 3,600 new jobs in the brewing industry. 
The impression given is that in those Scottish regions of medium 
to medium7high urbanisation which were not affected by the new oil jobs, 
employment performances during the slump were slightly but n, ot greatly 
better than in corresponding counties in England. The parts of Scotland. 
in which there were major growths of employment independent of the oil 
industry were the highly rural areas, and in particular the Island Areas, 
the Highlands, Dumfries and Galloway, and the Borders. In each of these 
cases there were strong positive differential shifts in both manufacturing 112 
and services, and a strong overall growth in employment despite the slump. 
It would seem therefore that there was not so much a general 
"Eastern Scottish" resurgence, but rather an oil boom centred on Aberdeen 
and a Scottish ruraZ resurgence. Two questions need to be asked: what 
were the structures of employment change in the Scottish rural areas? 
and, was this resurgence a purely Scottish phenomenon, or could it also 
be noted in parts of England and Wales? 
Perhaps the normal type of profile for a relatively favoured rural 
area, noted already for Powys (section 8.6), is for there to be a large number 
of moderate positive differential shifts in both industry and servicest 
rather than a small number of large positive differential shifts; the 
- 89 - 
typical unit of new rural industrialisation is after all the small factory 
rather than, for examplev the large integrated steelworksý. At a time of 
slump though, rural employment growth in the service sector tends to be 
quantitatively more significant than growth in the industrial sector* 
In the Highland Region, 600 jobs were lost in oil rig construction 
and 700 jobs were gained in construction, while between 90 and 150 jobs were 
gained in each of "bacon curing, meat and fish products", metal-working 
machine tools, scientific and industrial instruments, and "metal industries 
n. e. s. 11. In the service sector, 600 jobs were created in, distribution. This 
would appear to be a fairly typical rural profile, with total employment 
increasing by 10400. It is noteworthy, though, that 600 jobs were lost in 
hotels, restaurants, etc. 04LHs 884,885), indicating problems in the tourist 
industry, also felt by Cornwall, Gwynedd and the Isle of Wight. 
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In the Island Areas, total employment increased by 600, despite the 
loss of 29700 construction jobs (see earlier discussion). About 1,200 jobs 
were created in oil related industries (assuming that the gain of 500 jobs 
in industrial plant and steelworth is oil related; the remaining jobs were 
created in "petroleum and natural gas"). A further 100 jobs were created 
in hosiery and other knitted goods, adding to the positive differential 
shift in manufacturing. The most significant gains, perhaps, were in 
services; 500 jobs were gained in local government, and 600 jobs gained in 
transport and communication, reflecting perhaps the needs generated by 
the coming of the oil industry, with a-further 400 jobs gained in 
distribution. Most of this new economic activity would have taken place 
in the Shetlands rather than the Orkneys or Western Isles. 
In the Borders Region, 1,300 jobs were lost in the traditional 
woollen and worsted industry, although employment remained stablet with 
a differential shift of +900, in hosiery and other knitted goods, and 
200 jobs were created in "other textile industries" OLH 429). No other 
industrial sector had a large increase in employment, but 900 jobs were 
created in distribution, 300 in local government and 500 in health and 
dental services. 
In Dumfries and Galloways manufacturing employment actually expanded 
as 700 jobs were created in textile finishing along with 400 jobs created 
in woollen and worsted, and 300 jobs created in cans and metal boxes, more 
than compensating for the 600 jobs lost in clothing and footwear. This 
considerably reinforced the gains in employment in the service sector 
(+600 jobs in distribution, +700 jobs in central government services 
etc. ). 
The general impression given by these highly rural counties is that 
industrial employment was relatively stable during the slump, while the 
service sector was chiefly responsible for growth in employment. In the 
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Shetlands, though, the North Sea oil factor-probably led to a s. ignificant 
increase in manufacturing employment. 
The question needs to be considered of whether this type of rural 
resurgence took place outside Scotland to any extent. This rural growth 
has to be placed in contextv though; Tunbridge Wells TTWA, in the Kent 
commuter belt, had an increase in employment of 4,800, greater than that 
for the Borders and Dumfries and Galloway combined; there were several 
other towns around London which also had substantial increases in 
employment. 
There are no English counties as wholly rural as the Scottish 
regions which have just been discussed; all that it is possible to do 
is construct some English rural pseudo-counties from contiguous rural 
travel-to-work areas, In this way "counties" such as "Northumbria" and 
"Lakeland" can be constructed; to this it is possible to add 'Mid West 
Wales". Table 8.27-shows that each of these rural countiest and 
especially Lakeland, showed substantial increases in employment, although 
slightly slower than in rural Scotland. In broad terms, though, the 
employment growth in rural-Scotland is replicated in rural Northern 
England and Central, Wales. 
A more surprising result, perhaps, is to be found in North 
Yorkshire. When this county is divided into its constitutent travel to 
work areas it is found that the more rural north of the county was a zone 
of job loss, that the tourist zone to the east of the county (Scarborough, 
Bridlington) was also shedding jobs, but-that the moderately-urbanised 
south of the county was a zone of considerable employment growth, with 
employment increasing by 5,200 or 3.7%. In centres such as York, 
Harrogate-and Ripon the role of the service sector could be expected to 
be particularly important, while the development of a new coalfield, with 
the creation of 1,900 jobs9 would have had considerable impact on the 
area around-Selby. 
If one examines a lightly urbanised county in detail, it can 
often be found that the normal urban-rural shift is reversedl and that it 
is often the larger urban centres in rural settings which have the fastest 
rates of increase in employment. Aberdeen. ' when compared with the rest of 
the Grampian region, is obviously a special casev but as in North Yorkshire, 
the fastest growth of employment in "Lakeland" and in Dumfries and Galloway 
is in the towns, Whitehaven and Dumfries respectivelyP4Thus the most 
substantial growth of employment in a predominantly rural area is not 
generally to be found "in the middle of nowhere", but rather in small and 
medium towns, maybe with an industrial base, servicing the rural area. 
115.. In 
Southern England, the rapid growth of medium sized towns such as Exeter 
(+3,000 jobs; +5.6%) or Cheltenham (+3,000 jobs; +4.2%) provide corresponding 
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examples. There-is an element of urban-rural shift involvedo but it is not 
the case that one could say that throughout the size range the smaller the 
settlement is, the better the growth prospects are. There seems to be a 
break in the distribution at around the size of the small to medium town. 
Within a predominantly rural area, towns probably tend to be more favoured, 
in employment growth terms, than villages. Furthermore, it is not just the 
size of town which matters ' but also its setting. A small town like Dumfries, 
set in a rural area, has good chances of showing considerable economic 
expansion, while a similarly sized town such as Irvine set in a declining 
industrial region is liable to suffer extremely heavy rates of job loss. 
Small towns do very well in a rural setting, or in the setting of a 
prosperous regional economy, but do very badly in times of recession in a 
depressed regional economy,. with rates of job loss perhaps even worse than 
in the large cities. It has already been pointed out (section 8.5) that 
Glasgow lost jobs less quickly than smaller towns surrounding Glasgow 
during the slump years. Such results are perverse if one is accustomed 
to thinking in terms of a smooth continuous urban-rural shift; the 
important question, however, is not that of size but rather that of 
economic structure. 
Scotland has a highly complex regional economic structure with the 
country effectively being divisible into a highly depressed West Central 
industrial economy and a relatively prosperous Eastern Scottish economy 
benefiting from the favourable effects of North Sea oil, the general 
stability of employment in Edinburgh, and substantial employment increases 
in rural areas. It is perhaps surprising that the difference in economic 
performance between West and East should be so giýeat; Scotland's 
"average" performance during theslump was the result of averaging two 
highly divergent sets of economic performance. 
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8.10 Conclusion: The Geography of Slump 
There was a time during the mid-1970s when it appeared to many 
commentators as though traditional regional patterns of employment change 
were dissolving and that the periphery was economically keeping pace in 
the coreý161n retrospect this appears as a conjunction of contingent factors 
rather than any genuine long term shift. In the North, the pace of job 
loss in coal mining was slowing down while the growth of regional policy 
factories was still a potent force; in the South congestion costs were 
seriously squeezing employment levels in London, while the motor industry 
was decentralising from its West Midlands base on a large scale, even at 
times of recession. Such equality as there was may be interpreted as 
equality in decline rather than equality in growth; industrial employment 
was falling while unemployment was trending upwards. 
117 
Then from about 1977 more traditional patterns of change started to 
reassert themselves. The North felt recessions strongly and upswings -. 
weakly, the West ILHidlands felt both recessions and upswings strongly$ and 
the South (plus perh!? ps the East Midlands) felt upswing strongly and 
recession weakly. During the slump total employment across large parts 
of industrial Britain fell by about 15% or 2P% (Table 8.16), while 
remaining relatively'steady in the South. After the slump employment 
increased substantially in Southern England and the Midlands, while 
employment growth remained patchy in the peripheral 'regions, increasing 
in some regions where major new investments had been undertaken (for 
example the new Nissan factory near Sunderland)-but continuing to fall 
in other parts of the industrial periphery. This type of pattern, in one 
form or another, has been recognisable since the early 1920s (with the 
single but important exception that the peripheral regions showed 
substantial industrial employment growth between 1932 and 1939), and so 
in many respects the economic geography of the late 1970s and 1980s fits a 
standard pattern. In the early 1980s the industrial recession was 
exceptionally intense; the industrial North has been affectedo as in 
earlier recessions, but with an intensity not seen since the early 1930s. 
In the late 1980s the situation has been startlingly reminiscent of that 
of the late 1950s and early 1960s with employment growth booming in the 
South, creating considerable congestion costs (which are often expressed 
as windfall gains for those happening to be owning scarce assets), while 
employment in the industrial periphery has, on average, been static. 
The main contrast is that unemployment was slightly over 1% in the early 
1960s boom, but slightly over 10% in the late 1980s- In any other political 
climate within the range'of recent British experience the economic and 
social case for a strong regional policy would be regarded as overwhelming. 
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The problem is not that of slowing the southern growth e' nginev but 
rather that of transplanting some of the growth of the South to the North, 
easing some of the frictions in the South, and creating centres of 
sustainable growth in the North. British regional policy faces two 
perennial problems, the problem of combating industrial decline in the 
traditional industrial regions during any downswing, and the problem of 
not letting any boom get out of hand in the South during the upswing. It 
is almost certain that the problem of regional imbalances in the British 
economy will never be fully solved and that the drift to the South will 
continue indefinitely; such imbalances can be kept within reasonable bounds 
however with an intelligently operated regional policy. To ignore the 
problem would be to compound the problem. Already this problem has been 
neglected for far too long, leaving a legacy from the early 1980s of an 
impoverished and deindustrialised North, and a legacy from the mid to late 
1980s of a badly overheated South. One must not discount the possibility, 
either, that the overheating of the southernýeconomy will become so intense 
that a collapse in employment, specific to South East Englando will occur 
as for many employers the high region-specific costs of production (wages, 
property prices, etc. ) will overload the system, setting up possibilities 
of chain reactions among employers. The London economy, was clearly over- 
heating during much of the 1960s and 1970s, leading to industrial job 
losses on a very large scale; unless such a problem is anticipated 
quickly it is-possible that another, even more severe, round of London-based 
recession will occur when the boom gets out of control. 
The slump was unusual not for its geography, but for its intensityp 
severe even the standards of earlier long cycle slumps, and extremely 
severe by he standards of all other post-1945 recessions. Indeed the 
slump in the UK was, as a result of several policy mistakes, unnecessarily 
severe (chapter 7.1 above). Earlier, less severeq recessions had tended 
to pick out weaker elements in the industrial structureq causing irreversible 
job losses, but had relatively minor and reversible effects on other 
industrial structures. In the late 1950s and 1960s for example the impact 
of recession was felt strongly in shipbuilding, coal and textilest but 
relatively weakly in other sectors. Recessions started to become more 
acute 'in the late 1960s, with construction also being severely affected. 
In the 1970-72 recession, job losses in coal mining, shipbuilding and 
construction were not as heavy as in the late 1960sq but mechanical 
engineering, metal manufacture and textiles each lost 10% of their 
employment base in two years. In the 1974-76 recession perhaps the most 
striking element of industrial vulnerability was expressed in functional 
terms rather than in sectoral terra; the crisis of the branch plant 
factory. Typically the rationale for developing branch plant factories 
in the peripheral regions was to expand facilities for routine production 
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in an environment with relatively low wages and readily available labour; 
at around this stage it was becoming technically feasible, and economically 
advantageous, to switch this type of production to third world locations. 
The recession in "heavier" industries such as steel, chemicals, and 
shipbuilding was not especially severe when set against job losses in 
"light" industries such as electrical engineering and textiles, although 
rates of job loss were often still high. After 1976, however, it was 
becoming clear that the heavier industries were still highly vulnerable 
despite the weak general cyclical upturn, and major programmes of job 
losses in these industries, notably in steel and shipbuilding, were under 
way before the slump set in. 
This is a highly condensed and selective summary of the analysis 
presented in chapter 6, but it makes the point that particular recessions 
affected particular industries to an extent beyond that which can be 
explained in terms of a purely temporary cyclical downturn in expectations. 
The slump though was so severe that aU industries were permanently 
affected. It was not the case any longer that firms, in seeing sales 
say 2% below anticipated levelspmporarily., cui backby a corresponding. amount 
in the next round of production, while preparing to gain lost ground in the 
next downturn. With 6conomic conditions dictating a fall in production 
of perhaps 10% to 20% across a very wide range of sectors, j-*ob losses in 
such sectors we re likely to be both severe and irreversible. Extremely 
severe rates of job loss (over 10% in two years) were felt not in 
isolated industries, but in iron and steel, in vehicles, in textiles and 
clothing, in mechanical engineering, in metal goods, in constructions 
and indeed in virtually every industrial sector. 
In the economic collapse of 1980 and 1981 virtually the whole of 
the industrial sector was severely affected, and consequently virtually 
the whole of industrial Britain was severely affected. There were 
extremely heavy job losses in iron and steel, sometimes marking the end 
of the local industry, in several steel towns. In the vehicles industry 
the area round Birmingham was severely affectedv with there also being 
major job losses in other vehicle producing centres, even in Southern 
England. Lancashire, Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire were affected, 
yet again, by deep recession in textiles, while in Staffordshire the 
problems of the pottery industry continued and intensified. The decline 
of Strathclyde and Tyne and Wear as centres of heavy industry continued, 
while the vulnerability of regional policy branch plant factories continued 
to be a problem in the South Wales and*North East England coalfields*and 
on Merseyside. To all this must be added industrial problems of a lesser 
order in many other spatial/sectoral complexes* 
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The account in this chapter and in chapter 7 covers the events of 
1980 and 1981, when industrial job loss was most intense. In this 
Ac 
concluding section, though, the emphasis is not so much on recalling and 
summarising the earlier analysis, but rather on trying to place the 
geography of 1980 and 1981 into a longer term context. It has already 
been noted that the slump was in many respects an intensification of 
earlier recessions; the implications of what happened in 1980 and 1981, 
with respect to later developments, now need to be considered. 
It needs to be remembered that the slump did not end in September 
1981, the date of the Census of Employment. Job loss continued to be 
severe, though on a lesser scale, through 1982, and the economy did not 
show much sign of picking up until at least 1983. To appreciate the 
effects of the slump as a whole, comparison needs to be made between the 
Census of Employment results of 1978 and 1984, as summarised in 
Table 8.16.. One would prefer to compare figures for 1979 and 1983, but 
the Census of Employment was not conducted in these years. 
The most obvious feature is that the collapse in employment in 
Cleveland and West Glamorgan continued after 1981, so that each county 
lost about a quarter of its employment base in six years. In such 
circumstances the word "collapse" is no exaggeration. These are counties 
already identified as having had severe problems in the steel industry in 
the earlier part of the slump. 
Fortunately the other depressed industrial counties did not suffer 
from such a heavy rate of job loss after 1981, but it is also highly 
noticeable that each of the peripheral industrial conurbations except 
West Yorkshire lost a further 5 to 10% of its employment base between 
1981 and 1984 (compare tables 8.3 and 8.16), with employment falling by 
between 15% and 20% between 1978 and 1984. Each of these local economies 
had been in trouble in the, 1970s (chapter 6; see especially Table 6.29), but 
the slump intensified these problems considerably. In employment terms, 
Mid Glamorgan showed a similar cyclical profile. 
Six 'counties showed job losses of between 10% and 15% between 1978 
and 1984. In five of these cases (West Midlands, Gwent, Durham, Humberside, 
West Yorkshire) job losses had been severe in 1980 and 1981, but with 
employment levels stabilising thereafter. 
The counties with job losses ranging from 3% to 9.9% were a fairly 
mixed group, but consisted mostly of counties with moderate rates of job 
loss between 1978 and 1981 and fairly stable employment levels thereafter. 
It is noticeable, however, that one rural county (Clwyd) was recovering 
successfully from heavy job losses in steel, while the gains made between 
1978 and 1981 in parts of rural Scotland did not persist after 1981. 
Half the counties in Britain were only lightly affected by slump, 
and a quarter of the counties actually showed employment growth during the 
slump. In the cases of Northamptonshire, Staffordshire and Northumberland 
this indicated a very rapid recovery from job losses in 1980 and 1981.119 
In most cases, however, these represented counties in which the industrial 
base was only lightly affected by slump, and in which employment growth in 
the service sector could continuep delayed slightly perhaps, but otherwise 
unaffected by slump. Most of these counties, particularly among those with 
net employment growth, were situated in Southern England although. many of 
the rural counties of the periphery (e. g. Powys, North Yorkshire) were 
similarly favoured, and the oil boom in Aberdeen continued as before. 
Quite clearly there was considerable polarisation of economic 
performance during the slump; "two Britains", to use the journalistic 
shorthand. In Southern England, in the early 1980s as in the early 1930s, 
the slump acted, merely as a temporary check to growth; as soon as 
economic depression lifted, rapid growth could resume. in the great 
industrial cities of the North, in the valleys of South Wales, the damage 
caused by slump has been severe and possibly irretrievable. In these 
areast perhaps a sixth of the total employment base has disappeared in 
the span of a single severe recession. Even if these counties were to 
be especially favoured in any cyclical upturn, it would still take a 
very long time before the damage of the early 1980s, could possibly be 
patched up, yet one of the long-standing problems faced by major cities 
is that they tend to be relatively unattractive areas for new industrial 
investment, making employment slow to pick up during any cyclical, 
upswing. For the foreseeable future, therefore, the prospect for much of 
Britain is one of mass unemployment, inner city decay, heavy youth 
unemployment, leading to chronic skill shortages among the workforceg 
and youthful frustration which may well at times break out in violence. 
In such areas public sector services will tend to decline in quality as 
the local-tax base is continually eroded, while substantial net 
emigration, leading to depopulation will continue. The decline of older 
industrial areas, whether in the cities or on smaller coalfield towns, 
has been seen before, even at times of relatively low unemployment. 
When national unemployment is low, however, emigration from relatively 
depressed areas is usually sufficient to keep the labour market in some 
sort of balance, without mass unemployment accumulating in the industrial 
areas. In the mid to late 1970s, and even more in the 1980s, the problem 
is that industrial decline in the older areas has taken place in a context 
of high national unemployment, meaning that there are relatively few jobs 
in the South to attract migrating workers from the North. In such 
circumstances labour market equilibration does not work and unemployment 
accumulates in areas which have lost jobs. 
-Any-economic geography of Britain in, say, 1988 needs to consider 
both the geography of the early 1980s slump and the geography of the 
late 1980s revival. Often memories are short and the problems being faced 
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by the North are attributed not to the extremely severev and as-yet 
unrepaired, damage done to the local economic fabiic by the slumpp but 
rather to a shortage of "enterprise culture", a failure to share in the 
"Thatcherite boom! 1120, f the damage done by a recession is permanent 
however, iýs effects will still be felt during a subsequent boom; this 
point should never be ignored. 
The course of the North-South divide through the 1980s may be 
summarised-as followsoo 
North Early 1980s 
Late 1980s 
Sharply declining employment 
Static employment 
South Early 1980s Steady employment 
Late 1980s Rapidly rising employment. 
This summary is given statistical backing in Table A5. 
A comparison may readily be made with the course of the North-South 
divide through the 1930s: 
North Early 1930s Sharply declining employment 
Late 1930s Rapidly rising employment 
South Early 1930s Steady employment 
Late 1930s Rapidly rising employment. 
The magnitudes of change involved are not dissimilar, so the main 
geographical contrast between two slump-recovery decades is that in the 
1930s the industrial North shared fully in the post-slump recoveryq 
although starting from a high level of unemployment, while in the 1980s 
the industrial North was largely excluded from the post-slump recovery. 
To the present author the vigour of post-slump recovery in the South 
comes as no surprise; since at least the 1920s the Southern economy has 
tended, with occasional exceptions, to expand rapidly in any cyclical 
recovery, and to maintain stable levels of employment in any recession, 
even during a slump recession, while any post-slump cyclical upswing 
can be expected to be particularly prolonged and intense, especially in 
the South. What is far more surprising is the slowness of recovery in 
the North; the author's own projections, dating from about 1981 and 1982P 
was that during any*post-slump recovery employment would be likely to 
expand substantially in the North as well as in the South, leading to 
unemployment being substantially below 2, ooo, 000 by the late 1980s 
without any need for the Government to massage the figures. Such 
projections'were made at a time when it seemed very unlikely that a 
Conservative Government would be returned to power at the next electiont 
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but in principle it was considered that such a recovery ought to take 
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place whichever *Oarty was in power. Whatever damage is inflicted by 
slump, a post-slump recovery provides splendid opportunities for 
regenerating the productive base of the economy. When set against the 
opportunities which have been available, the Government's economic 
record since 1983 has been at best disappointing. 
The problem can be diagnosed quite simply. According to the 
latest available figures at the time of typing (Gazette, June 1988), 
seasonally adjusted employment in production industries (excluding 
construction) fell by 5769000 (9.5%) between June 1983 and March 1988. 
That industrial employment should fall by 2% per annum, during a strong 
cyclical upswing is indeed remarkable; these continued job losses have 
been sufficient to nullify the net employment gains in banking, insurance 
and finance. Despite all the gloss of a consumer led boom, 
deindustrialisation continues apace, leading to continued problems in 
the industrial regions. Yet had industrial employment remained merely 
stable during the cyclical upswing, unemployment nationally would have 
been perhaps 2 percentage points lower than is actually the case, while 
a relatively modest increase in industrial employment of 1% per annum 
would have led to unemployment being perhaps 3 points lower. With 
massaged figures and a firm industrial upswing, unemployment rates 
could have been reduced to 6% nationally! 
Quite clearly the industrial problem has still not been solved, 
and industrial employment has continued to drain away. The problem 
becomes still more urgent if examined from a balance of payments 
perspective (Table 8.28). Historically, the structure of the British 
economy has been such that balance of payments deficits have been 
recorded in food and raw materials, while surpluses have been recorded 
in manufactures and in "invisibles". As Table 8.28-shows, this pattern 
of trade persisted through to the late 1970s. By the end of the 1970s, 
the UK was starting to become a net exporter of oil rather than a net 
importer, a shift which led to a considerable improvement to the balance 
of payments position in the first half of the 1980s. Indeed, were it not 
for North Sea oil, it seems likely that the British economy would have 
suffered acute balance of payments problems as early as 1982 or 1983, 
considerably prolonging and intensifying the effects of slump. The 
non-oil balance of payments stood at +E3,200m in 1981, -E600m in 1982, 
-E3,600m in 1983, and -E5,700m by 1988 (all figures at current prices). 
Thus the growth of the North Sea oil industry helped conceal a 
considerable disintegrationof the trading structure of the British 
economy in other sectors. The-Conservative Government has been extremely 
lucky that the massive investment in the North Sea oil industry under 
the 1974-79 Labour Government actually started to bear fruit in the early 
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1980s, providing a windfall gain to offset the wholesale destruction of 
the industrial economy in the early 1980s, and cqncealing the underlying 
weakness of the British economy in the mid to late 1980s. The 
"underlying weakness" has of course been in the manufacturing sector. 
By 1977 and 1978, the weakness of manufacturing industry was a 
source of considerable concern, (e. g. Singh 1977, Bacon and Eltis 1978, 
Blackaby 1979), with doubts being expressed as to whether the industrial 
sector was strong enough to generate an export surplus sufficient to 
bring the overall balance of payments into balance. In 1978 the 
manufacturing sector provided a payments surplus of E5,900m, or +3.5% 
of Gross Domestic Product. This trading surplus persisted into the 
slump, despite unprecedentedly severe recession in the manufacturing 
sector; levels of demand were so low that the demand for imports was 
hit as severely as the demand for home products. 
122 By the end of the 
slump, so much industrial capacity had been destroyed and so little new 
capacity had been built up that the industrial sector was in no position 
to expand sufficiently to meet an upturn in world demand. Manufacturing 
exports increased, but not nearly as quickly as manufacturing imports 
increased. In 1983, for the first time in at least 200 years, the UK 
showed a balance of payments deficit in manufactures. By 1984 this 
deficit had reached -E3,900m, or -1.2% of GDP. This deficit decreased 
slightly as the Government's battle against the National Union of 
Mineworkers (regarded by the Chancellor of the Exchequer as an "investment") 
helped to depress economic activity. In 1986 and 1987, however, the 
Government launched a consumer boom and the manufacturing deficit in 
1986 reached -E5,500m, or -1.6% of GDP. A swing of -5% of GDP in the 
balance of payments performance of manufacturing represents not a 
transition to a post-industrial society but rather a severe and 
unnecessary weakening of the industrial sector. Obviously a balance of 
payments deficit in manufacturing of -E5,000m per annum represents an 
atypically high figure, created by a consumer-led boom, yet even under 
less overheated economic conditions the long-term damage of the early 
1980s has been so severe that there is little prospect, without a highly 
active Government industrial policy., of achieving balance of payments 
parity in the manufacturing sector. Furthermore, North Sea oil revenues 
cannot be maintained at high levels indefinitely, partly because reserves 
will eventually become depleted, and partly because the oil prices of 
the early 1980s were perhaps artificially high; indeed, as Table 8.28 
shows, when oil prices fell in 1986, the balance of payments surplus 
in oil halved. Given the severe deterioration of the balance of payments 
performance of manufacturing industry, all it takes to create a balance 
of payments crisis is for oil revenues to fall; thus it happened that in 
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1986,1987 and 1988 the balance of payments went out of control. 
One would expect the Government to respond that a rapidly 
increasing surplus in invisible trade both compensatesfor these industrial 
problems, and providesa pointer for the way the economy is to develop 
in the future. With such. a viewpoint, it would matter little what the 
balance of industrial trade is, so long as profitability is high, and a 
large surplus is made on invisible trade. Certainly the increase in 
this surplus from E1,700 million in 1982 to E8,100 million in 1987 is 
in many ways impressive, and indeed central to the boom in Southern 
England. This increase is dominated by financial services, rather than 
by transport or travel. Indeed, despite the almost obsessive emphasis 
given to tourism by the Department of Employment, 
123 leisure travel 
provided a balance of payments surplus to Britain up to 1980, and an 
increasingly severe balance of payments deficit after 1980, a similar 
profile to manufacturing industry. 
124 In contrast, net overseas earnings 
of United Kingdom financial institutions increased from E1,700 million 
in 1979 to E3,900 million in 1982 to E9,300 million in 1987, a very 
rapid increase, even if inflation is taken into account. 
125 
Undoubtedly, in terms of "the City" the Government has done very 
well economically. This, however, is an unduly narrow perspective. 
Firstly, the improvement in the balance of payments performance in 
invisibles is smaller than the deterioration in the balance of payments 
performance of manufactures. Secondly, the types of economic policy 
which are in the interests of the City are often extremely unfavourable 
to industry; there is a strong implication that the decline in the 
balance of payments performance in manufacturing, and indeed part of the 
decl ine in manufacturing employment, might well be a conse4uence of, and 
an expense to be set against, the improved balance of payments performance 
in the City. Thirdly, the oVerseas earnings of the City are by implication 
based ultimately on foreign physical production, rather than on domestic 
production; relatively little support to British physical production is 
given in this way. 
In a post-slump conjuncture, rapid economic expansion is, in an 
advanced economy, not only possible but also probable. A boom is likely 
to take place independently of Government policy; the form of the boom, 
however, is strongly dependent on policy factors. In Germany in the 1930s 
it was guns before butter; in the USA of the 1930s, the New Deal was 
brought into operation; in the UKof the 1980s it is a case of the City 
before industry. The release of new productive possibilities gives the 
state considerable scope to'divert the course of economic change into 
directions favoured by the political ideology of the party in power; 
furthermore such changes are accompanied by historically high rates of 
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growth, so that the economic policies being followed may always be 
presented as successful. Yet if underlying economic conditions are 
such that a high growth rate will be achieved whatever policy is followed, 
then short-term growth rates do not present a decisive criterion of whether 
the policies which have been followed. are good policies, indifferent 
policies or bad policies. An assessment of structural changes is more 
important, with particular'reference firstly to whether post-slump 
recovery has solved the- problems of the preceding slump and long cycle-' 
downswing, and secondly, to whether structural changes in the post-slump 
recovery provide the basis for stable future growth. On either count 
the answer must be no; the charges against the Thatcher Covernment's 
handling of the economy are firstly that as a direct result of Government 
economic policy the slump of the early 1980s has been unnecessarily severe 
and unemployment unnecessarily high, and secondly that the opportunities 
presented by North Sea oil and by-the post-slump recovery have been 
recklessly squandered in favour of short term profit. 
The damage occasioned by slump has been recounted in some detail 
in this chapter and-the preceding chapter.; a collapse of industrial 
investment and output, a collapse of industrial employmento unemployment 
increasing by about 2,000,000, and a severe blight being imposed on the 
prospects of large parts of urban industrial Britain. Industrial output 
by 1986 had at last just exceeded 1979 levels, while manufacturing 
investment in 1987 was still about 10% below 1979 levels, and industrial 
employment was much lower at the end of the slump than at the beginning 
of the slump, and continued to decline thereafter. Unemployment remains 
stubbornly high; the unemployment figures continued to rise between 1983 
and 1986, and fell thereafter only in the context of an artificial 
boom, accompanied by a dangerous balance of payments deficit. Furthermore, 
as indicated in chapter 7 (note 84), most of the drop in the official 
unemployment total has been attributable to administrative changes, 
designed to coincide with this artificial boom, and to make it appear 
as though recovery has been stronger than is actually the case. Britain's 
peripheral areas, despite several years of post-slump recovery, still face 
severe economic problems. These pontinued problems represent, as 
MacInnes (1987) notes; not the major restructuring of the productive 
economy claimed by the Government but a failure to restructure. 
The long term prospects for the British economy cannot be regarded 
as favourable. 'Before the slump Singh (1977 p. 128) defined an "efficient 
manufacturing sector" as one which "currently and potentially not only 
satisfies the demands of consumers at home, but is also able to sell 
enough of its products abroad to pay ior the nation's import requirements. 
" 
Singh's discussion was based on a situation in which manufacturing exports 
102 - 
exceeded manufacturing imports, with the problem being posed that the 
competitive weakening of British industry might well reduce this gap 
and endanger the balance of payments position, and in turn economic 
growth prospects. Since then the situation has worsened dramatically. 
On Singh's definition the British manufacturing sector, with imports 
greatly exceeding exports, is now extremely inefficient, and the question 
is whether the financial sector can generate big enough surpluses to pay 
for imports of manufactures and other goods. Before Thatcher, trade 
surpluses in manufactures and invisibles paid for Britain's import needs 
in food and raw materials. In the Thatcher years a situation has been 
developing in which trade surpluses in oil and invisibles have been 
required to pay for Britain's net import needs in food, non-oil raw 
materials and manufactures. Clearly the economy is being severely 
overstretched, with dangers of chronic balance of payments deficits, 
especially when trade surpluses on North Sea oil fade away, and with the 
possibility of severe recessions in the future as attention is given to 
dealing with the balance of payments problem. There are two main possible 
dangers. Firstly, there is the possibility that in a deteriorating 
financial climate at some unspecified date in the future the surplus on 
invisible trade will diminish, exposing the considerable trading deficit 
in visibles, leading to a major balance of payments deficit. Secondly 
and more subtly there is the probability that whenever future economic 
difficulties are encountered, City interests will point to the extent to 
which the UK's trading position depends on the City and will argue 
strongly for a pro-City economic policy, resolving the crisis in favour 
of the City and at the expense of physical production. The clash of 
interests between the City and industryg geographically expressed as the 
clash between the core and the periphery, has been a long-standing 
feature of the economic policy debate in Britain, with City interests 
generally prevailing. The situation now is even more unbalanced; at 
least in previous years manufacturing industry, with a considerable 
trading surplus, has been in a reasonably strong lobbying position, but 
how many Governments will in the future give priority in their policies 
to a sector recording persistent and large trading deficits? 
Thus the problems of the peripheral areas have not been solvedf 
and in some respects have even been intensified, by the post-slump 
recovery. A sustained upswing in industrial employment after the slump 
would not totally have repaired the damage caused to Britain's industrial 
areas by a Thatcher-intensified slump, but. at least some genuine 
improvement would have been recorded. This however has not happened and 
industrial employment has continued to fall, leading to static employment 
levels and continued high unemployment in the periphery, even as the 
-iM- 
South overheats. If industrial employment declines even through a 
strong cyclical upswing, though, what will happen during any future 
recession? This is a question which must give grave cause for concern 
in Britain's industrial areas. The slump added considerably to the 
intensity of the British regional problem and the post-slump period has 
merely changed the form of the problem rather than reduced the size of 
the inequality. It seems virtually certain that the British regional 
problem will continue to be severe, perhaps even more severe than at 
present, into the 21st century. 
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Table 8.1 Official Estimates of Numbers of UK Employees in 
Employment, June 1978 to September 1981, Before and After 
Publication of the 1981 Census of Employment 
Number of Employees in Employment 
Year Estimate (000s) Estimate (000s) Cumulative shortfall 
in Gazette., in Gazette, (000s) 
June 1982 December 1983 (Difference between 
two estimates) 
1978 (June) 22757 22777 20 
1979 (June) 22920 23157 237 
1980 (June) 22511 22972 461 
1981 (June) 21198 21871 673 
1981 (September) 21062 21799 737 
Sources: as given. 
Table 8.2 Author's Own Estimate of Number of UK Employees in 
Employment, June 1978 to June 1981, Calibrated using 
Changes in the Unemployment Rate 
Year Estimated employment 
(000s) 
1978 (June) 22777 (Gazette) 
1979 (June) 23046 
1980 (June) 22926 
[1981 (June) 22119] 
-111 
-46 
Sources as given. 
For methods of estimation see text, section 8.1 
Estimated employment 
minus estimate in 
Gazette., Dec. 1983 
(000s) 
Percentage change 
in employment over 
previous year 
(a) (b) 
Author's Official 
estimate estimate 
+0.6 +0.6 
+1.2 +1.6 
-o. 5 -o. 8 
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Table 8.3 Total Employment Change By CoUnty, 1978-81, 
As Percentage of 1978 Employment; a Shift Share Analysis 
County Total Struc. Diff. County Total Struc. Diff. 
Change shift shift Change shift shift 
1 Cleveland -12.72 -3.7 -3.9 34 Gtr London -3.70 +3.7 -2.2 
2 M Glamorgan -12.51 -3.1 -4.2 35 Central -3.49 -2.6 +4.3 
3 Tyne & Wear -12.05 +0.2 -7.0 36 Cumbria -3.33 -2.3 +4.2 
4 W Midlands -11.76 -5.3 -1.3 37 Norfolk -3.16 +1.8 +0.3 
5 Clwyd -11.67 -2.5 -3.9 38 Avon -3.12 +3.0 -0.9 
6 Durham -11.56 -2.9 . -3.5 
39 Kent -2.69 +1.0 +1.5 
7 Humberside -11.20 -1.9 -4.1 40 Powys -2.58 -0.2 +2.8 
8 W Glamorgan -11.12 -4.0 -1.9 41 Warwickshire -2.10 -2.0 +5.1 
9 Merseyside -10.96 +0.1 -5.9 42 Heref & Worc -2.05 -1.9 +5.1 
10 Gwent -10.03 -5.3 +0.5 43 Suffolk -1.99 +0.9 +2.4 
11 Strathclyde -9.65 -0.6 -3.8 44 Somerset -1.79 +1.3 +2.2 
12 W Yorkshire -9.50 -3.6 -0.7 45 Lothians -1.43 +2.9 +0.9 
13 G Manchester -9.31 -1.4 -2.7 46 N Yorkshire -0.88 +0.9 +3.4 
14 S Yorkshire -8.77 -3.9 +0.4 47 Wiltshire -0.69 +0.8 +3.7 
15 Northampton. -7.94 -2.9 +0.2 48 Devon -0.66 +2.0 +2.6 
16 Cheshire -7.29 -1.5 -0.6 49 Gloucester. -0.39 +1.4 +3.5 
17 Northumb. -7.18 -0.5 -1.5 50 Dorset -0.33 +3.0 +1.9 
18 Stafford. -7.16 -2.6 +0.7 51 Berkshire -0.21 +2.1 +2.9 
19=Cornwall -5.81 +2.8 -3.4 52 Oxfordshire +0.74 +0.1 +5.9 
20 Dyfed -5.81 -1.2 +0.6 53 Hertford. +0.86 +1.6 +4.5 
21 Tayside -5.61 -1.1 +0.7 54 Cambridge. +1.08 -1.1 +7.4 
22 Derbyshire -5.59 -3.0 +2.6 55 Highlands +1.98 +1.7 +5.5 
23 Leicester. -5.54 -2.3 +2.0 56 Hampshire +2.85 +1.7 +6.3 
24 Lancashire -5*52 -1.8 +1.5 57 West Sussex +2.90 +3.9 +4.2 
25 Shropshire -5.50 -0.2 -0.1 58 East Sussex +3.18 . -+4.0 +4.4 
26 Bedfordshire -5.04 -2.3 +2.5 59 Borders +3.94 -3.6 +12.7 
27 Essex -4.77 +0.6 -0.1 60 Surrey +4.05 +4.1 +5.2 
28 Nottingham. -4.74 -1.3 +1.7 61 Buckingham. +4.82 +2.3 +7.7 
29 Fife -4.46 -1.8 +2.6 62 Dumf & Call +6.50 +0.2 +11.5 
30 Lincolnshire -3.99 +1.4 -0.1 63 Grampian +9.88 +5.8 +9.3 
31 S Glamorgan -3.94 +2.3 -1.0 
32 Gwynedd -3.86 +1.4 -0.0 55 (a)isl. Areas +2.58 +3.4 +4.4 
33 Is of Wight -3.73 +3.3 -1.8 
Source: Unpublished Census of Employment Data, 1978-1981. 
Structural and differential shifts have been calculated as 
part of the National On-line Manpower Information System. 
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Table 8.4 Changes in Employment by CountyO 1977-81v 
For Counties With increases in Employment Between 
1978 and 1981 
County Percentage change in employment 
1977-8 1978-81 1978-9 (est. ) 1979-81 (est. ) 
Oxfordshire +1.7 +0.7 +2.3 -1.6 
Hertfordshire +o. 4 +0.9 +1.0 -0.1 
Cambridgeshire +0.5 +1.1 +1.1 +0.0 
Highlands -2.6 +2.0 -2.0 +4.0 
Hampshire +0.7 +2.8 +1.3 +1.5 
West Sussex +2.0 +2.9 +2.6 +0.3 
East Sussex +1.8 +3.2 +2.4 +0.8 
Borders -0.0 +3.9 +0.6 +3.3 
Surrey +1.0 +4.0 +1.6 +2.4 
Buckinghamshire +3.3 +4.8 +3.9 +0.9 
Dumfries and Galloway -2.1 +6.5 -1.5 +8.0 
Grampian +0.3 +9.9 +0.9 +9.0 
These estimates are produced for illustrative purposes only, and 
do not claim to represent precise levels of employment change in 1978-9 
and 1979-81. It is regarded as likely that the estimates for Southern 
England are reasonably representative, but it is considered that a large 
amount of the employment increase in Scotland allocated to the 1979-81 
period might well have taken place in 1978-9. 
Method of estimation: 
Employment nationally is assumed to have risen by 1.2% in 1978-9, 
compared with 0.6% in 1977-8 (Table 8.2). Employment increase in 
each county has been assumed to have increased in line with this. 
Source: Census of Employment 1977,1978,1981; unpublished 
county data. 
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Table 8.5 A Five Category Grouping of Counties According to 
Response to Slump 
Group 1- Employment change ranging frbm -7% to -13% 
Predominantly negative shifts. 
Counties: CZeveland, Mýd Glamorgan, Tyne and Wear, West Midlands, 
CZwyd_, Durham, Humberside, West Glamorgan, Merseyside, 
Gwent., StrathcZyde, West Yorkshire., Greater Manchester, 
South Yorkshire, Northamptonshire, Cheshire, Northumberland, 
Staffordshire (18). 
Group 2- Employment change ranging from -41% to -6% 
Negative structural shifts, positive differential shifts. 
Counties: Dyfed, Tayside, Derbyshire., Leicestershire, Lancashire, 
Shropshire., Bedfordshire, Nottinghamshire, Fife (9). 
Group 3 Employment change ranging from -3% to -4% (two outliers: - 
Essex -4.77%; CornwaZZ -5.81%) 
Positive structural shifts, negative differential shifts. 
Counties: CornwaZZ., Essex., LincoZnshi--, ie;, South GZamorgan' Gwynedd, 
IsZe of Wight., Greater Londonj NorfoZk... Avon (9). 
Group 4- Employment change ranging from -2% to -31% 
Negative structural shifts, positive differential shifts. 
Counties: CentraZ, Cwnbria, Powys, Warwickshire, Hereford and 
Worcester (5). 
Group 5- Employment change ranging from +10% to -2% 
(one outlier: Kent -2.69%) 
Predominantly positive shifts. 
Counti, es: Kent., SuffoZk, Somerset, Lothians, North Yorkshire, Wiztshire, 
Devon, GZoucestershire, Dorset,, Berkshire, Oxfordshire., 
Hertfordshire, Cambridgeshire., HighZands., Hampshire., 
West Sussex., East Sussex., Borders., Surrey, Buckinghamshire., 
Dumfries and GaZZoway., Grampian (22 - also Island Areas). 
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Table 8.6 Unweighted Average Shifts for the Five Groups of 
Counties Shown in Table 8.5. 
Group Number Total change in Structural Differential 
of employment shift shift 
Counties M M M 
1 18 -10.1 -2.5 -2.4 
2 9 -5.3 -1.7 +1.6 
3 9 -3.8 +2.2 -o. 7 
4 5 -2.7 -1.8 +4.3 
5 22 +1.4 +1.7 +4.9 
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Table 8.7 A Shift-Share Analysis of Employment Change by County, 
1978-81, Subdivided into 16 Groups 
Sub Structural shift (%) Differential shift(%) Total Group County 
Manuf Tert Prim Total Manuf Tert Prim Total changi 
W 
la Humberside (YH) -4.3 +2.6 -0.1 -1.9 -0.4 -3.4 -0.3 -4.1 -11.2 
Clwyd (Wa) -5.7 +3.3 -0.1 -2.5 -2.0 -1.8 -0.1 -3.9 -11.7 
Durham (N) -5.0 +2.4 -0.3 -2.9 -1.4 -1.8 -0.2 -3.5 -11.6 
Mid Glamorgan (Wa) -5.4 +2.6 -0.3 -3.1 -1.3 -2.1 -0.7 -4.2 -12.5 
Cleveland (N) -6.5 +2.8 +0.1 -3.7 +0.2 -3.8 -0.2 -3.9 -12.7 
lb Tyne and Wear (N) -2.9 +3.2 -0.1 +0.2 -1.9 -4.2 -0.9 -7.0 -12.0 
Merseyside (NW) -3.1 +3.2 -0.0 +0.1 -3.1 -2.7 -0.0 -5.9 -11.0 
Strathclyde (SO -3.9 +3.3 +0.0 -0.6 -3.3 -0.5 +0.0 -3.8 -9.6 
1C Staffordshire (WM) . -4.5 +2.1 -0.2 -2.6 -0.4 +1.1 -0.1 +0.7 -7.2 
Northamptonshire (EM) -5.5 +2.7 -0.0 -2.9 -0.1 +0.4 -0.1 +0.2 -7.9 
West Yorkshire (YH) -6.5 +3.1 -0.1 -3.6 +0.8 -1.7 +0.2 -0.7 -9.5 
South Yorkshire (YH) -6.5 +2.8 -0.3 -3.9 -0.2 +0.2 +0.4 +0.4 -8.8 
West Glamorgan (Wa) -6.5 +2.6 -0.1 -4.0 -3.5 +1.6 +0.0 -1.9 -11.1 
West Midlands (WM) -7.8 +2.5 -0.0 -5.3 -1.0 -0.3 -0.0 -1.3 -11.8 
Gwent (Wa) -7.6 +2.4 -0.2 -5.3 +1.4 -1.5 +0.5 +0.5 -10.0 
ld Northumberland (N) -2.8 +2.8 -0.5 -0.5 -0.2 -2.5 +1.3 -1.5 -7.2 
Grt. Manchester (NW) -4.5 +3.1 -0.0 -1.4 -2.0 -0.6 -0.0 -2.7 -9.3 
Cheshire (NW) -4.0 +2.5 -0.0 -1.5 +0.7 -1.4 +0.1 -0.6 -7.3 
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Table 8.7 - continued 
Sub Structural shift (Z) Differential shift(%) 
Group County Total 
Manuf Tert Prim Total Manuf Tert Prim Total change 
M 
2a Shropshire (WM) -3.3 +3.3 -0.2 -0.2 -1.8 +1.8 -0.0 -0.1 -5.5 
Tayside (Sc) -4.4 +3.0 +0.3 -1.1 +0.0 +1.0 -0.3 +0.7 -50*6 
Dyfed (Wa) -3.8 +2.9 -0.4 -1.2 -0.1 +0.9 -0.2 +0.6 -5.8 
Bedfordshire (SE) -5.3 +3.1 -0.0 -2.3 -1.6 +3.9 +0.1 +2.5 -5.0 
Derbyshire (EM) -4.6 +1.8 -0.2 -3.0 +0.4 +1.9 +0.4 +2.6 -5.6 
2b Nottinghamshire (EM) -3.2 +2.3 -0.3 -1.3 +1.1 -0.0 +0.7 +1.7 -4.7 
Lancashire (NW) -4.9 +3.1 -0.0 -1.8 +1.3 +0.3 -0.1 +1.5 -5.5 
Fife- (SO -3.8 +2.2 -0.2 -1.8 +2.7 +0.3 -0.5 +2.6 -4.5 
Leicestershire (EM) -4.8 +2.6 -0.1 -2.3 +2.4 -0.3 -0.1 +2.0 -5.5 
3a. Greater London (SE) -1.5 +5.2 +0.1 +3.7 +0.0 -2.3 +0.0 -2.2 -3.7 
Avon (SW) -1.2 +4.3 -0.0 +3.0 +0.1 -1.3 +0.2 -0.9 -3.1 
South Glamorgan (Wa) -2.0 +4.4 -0.0 +2.3 +0.3 -1.2 -0.2 -1.0 -3.9 
3b Isle of Wight (SE) -0.1 +3.5 -0.1 +3.3 -2.5 +1.2 -o. 4 -1.8 -3.7 
Cornwall (SW) -1.4 +4.1 +0.1 +2.8 -1.0 -2.3 -0.1 -3.4 -5.8 
Gwynedd (Wa) -2.1 +3.7 -0.1 +1.4 +1.0 -1.2 +0.1 -0.0 -3.9 
3c Norfolk (EA) -2.2 +3.9 +0.0 +1.8 +0.6 +0.2 -0.6 +0.3 -3.2 
Lincolnshire (EM) -1.5 +3.1 -0.2 +1.4 +0.0 -0.3 +0.2 -0.1 -4.0 
Essex (SE) -2.7 +3.3 -0.0 +0.6 -0.5 +0.5 -0.1 -0.1 -4.8 
4 Powys (Wa) -3.3 +3.5 -0.4 -0.2 +3.7 -1.3 +0.3 +2.8 -2.6 
Heref & Worcester(WM) -4.7 +3.0 -0.2 -1.9 +2.9 +2.2 -0.1 +5.1 -2.0 
Warwickshire (WM) -5.1 +3.3 -0.1 -2.0 +5.3 -0.8 +0.5 +5.1 -2.1 
Central (SO -4.6 +2.1 -0.1 -2.6 +2.4 +2.2 -0.3 +4.3 -3.5 
Cumbria (N) -5.0 +2.8 -0.1 -2.3 +1.9 +2.1 +0.3 +4.2 -3.3 
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Table 8.7 - continued 
Sub Structural shift (%) Differential shift(%) 
Group County Total 
Manuf Tert Prim Total Manuf Tert Prim Total chanj 
(7. ) 
5aa 1 Dorset (SW) -1.4 +4.4 -0.1 +3.0 +1.7 +0.2 -0.0 +1.9 -O.. ý 
Berkshire (SE) -1.6 +3.7 -0.0 +2.1 +2.4 +0.7 -0.2 +2.9 -0.19 
Devon (SW) -2.2 +4.2 -0.1 +2.0 +2.7 -0.1 +0.0 +2.6 -0.; 
Somerset (SW) -2.4 +3.8 -0.1 +1.3 +1.2 +0.7 +0.2 +2.2 -1. f 
5aa 2 Gloucestershire (SW) -1.9 +3.3 -0.1 +1.4 +0.9 +2.7 -0.1 +3.5 -0.2 
Kent (SE) -2.2 +3.3 -0.1 +1.0 -0.1 +1.8 -0.1 +1.5 -2.; 
Suffolk (EA) -2.5 +3.4 -0.0 +0.9 +0.8 +1.8 -0.3 +2.4 -2. C 
Wiltshire (SW) -2.9 +3.8 -0.1 +0.8 -1.3 +4.8 +0.2 +3.7 -0.; 
5ab Hertfordshire (SE) -1.9 +3.5 -0.0 +1.6 +0.5 +4.0 -0.0 +4.5 +o. S 
Oxfordshire (SE) -3.7 +3.9 -0.1 +0.1 +0-9 +5.1 -0.0 +5-9 +M 
Cambridgeshire (EA) -4.9 +4.0 -0.2 -1.1 +4.7 +2.8 -0.1 +7.4 +1.1 
5ac Surrey (SE) 
East Sussex (SE) 
West Sussex (SE) 
Buckinghamshire (SE) 
Hampshire (SE) 
-1.0 +5.1 -0.0 +4.1 +0.6 +4.5 +0.1 +5.2 +4. C 
-1.4 +5.5 -0.0 +4.0 +0.9 +3.4 +0.1 +4.4 +3.2 
-0.9 +4.9 -0.1 +3.9 +1.6 +2.3 +0.3 +4.2 +2.9 
-2.2 +4.7 -0.1 +2.3 +1.6 +6.1 +0.0 +7.7 +4.6 
-2.0 +3.8 -0.0 +1.7 +0.8 +5.6 -0.0 +6.3 +2. E 
5ba Lothian (SC) -1.3 +4.3 -0.1 +2.9 +1.1 +0.2 -0.3 +0.9 -1.4 
North Yorkshire (YH) -2.4 +3.4 -0.2 +0.9 +1.2 +1.3 +1.0 +3.4 -0.9 
5bb Grampian (SO 
Island Areas (SO 
Highlands (SO 
Dumf & Galloway (SC) 
Borders (SC) 
-2.2 +3.9 +4.1 +5.8 +2.3 +7.7 -0.8 +9.3 +9.9 
-1.1 +4.0 +0.5 +3.4 +3.3 -2.0 +3.2 +4.4 +2.6 
-2.1 +3.9 -0.1 +1.7 +2.1 +3 .2 +0.2 +5.5 +2.0 
-2.4 +2.9 -0.3 +0.2 +4.7 +6.6 +0.3 +11.5 +6.5 
-6.0 +2.8 -0.3 -3.6 +3.2 +8.6 +0.9 +12.7 +3.9 
Source: Based on Census of Employmentp 1978,1981. 
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Table 8.8 Shift-Share Analysis of Employment Change by 
16 Sub-Groups, 1978-81 (Unweighted averages) 
Sub Number of Structural shift (%) Differential Shift M Total 
counties Manuf Tert Prim Total Manuf Tert Prim Total change 
M 
la 5 -5.4 +2.7 -0.1 -2.8 -1.0 -2.6 -0.3 -3.9 -11.6 
Ib 3 -3.3 +3.2 -0.0 -0.1 -2.8 -2.5 -0.3 -5.6 -10.9 
lc 7 -6.5 +2.6 -0.1 -3.9 -0.4 -0.0 +0.1 -0.2 -9.5 
ld 3 -3.8 +2.8 -0.2 -1.1 -0.5 -1.5 +o. 5 -1.6 -7.9 
2a 6 -4.3 +2.8 -0.1 -1.6 -0.6 +1.9 0.0 +1.3 -5.5 
2b 4 -4.2 +2.6 -0.2 -1.8 +1.9 +0.1 0.0 +2.0 -5.3 
3a 3 -1.6 +4.6 +0.0 +3.0 +0.1 -1.6 +0.0 -1.4 -3.6 
3b 3 -1.2 +3.8 -0.0 +2.5 -0.8 -0.8 -0.1 -1.7 -4.5 
3c 3 -2.1 +3.4 -0.1 +1.3 +0.0 +0.1 -0.2 +0.0 -4. o 
4 5 -4.5 +2.9 -0.2 -1.8 +3.2 +0.9 +0.1 +4.3 -2.7 
5aa 1 4 -1.9 -4.0 -0.1 +2.1 +2.0 +0.3 0.0 +2.4 -o. 8 
5aa 2 4 -2.4 +3.4 -0.1 +1.0 +0.1 +2.8 -0.1 +2.8 -1.4 
5ab 3 -3.5- +3.7 -0.1 +0.2 +2.0 +4.0 -0.0 +5.9 +0.9 
5ac 5 -1.5 +4.8 -0.0 +3.2 +1.1 +4.6 +0.1 +5.6 +3.5 
5ba 2 -1.8 +3.8 -0.2 +1.9 +1.2 +0.8 +0.4 +2.2 -1.2 
5bb 5 -3.0 +3.5 +0.8 +1.5 +3.1 +4.7 +0.8 +8.5 +5.0 
Source: Based on Table 8.7 
f, 
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Table 8.9 Patterns of Employment Decline in Steel Countiesq 
1978-1981 
Employment Change Iron and steel emp. 
as % of total emp. 
(000s) M 
Iron and Other Iron and Other 1978 1981 
steel steel 
Cleveland -9.4 -21.4 -31.2 -10.1 14.2 10.9 
Clwyd -8.8 -6.1 -65.0 -5.3 11.9 4.4 
Durham -9.6 -15.4 -69.3 -7.6 6.8 2.3 
Humberside -8.2 -18.5 -38.2 -9.3 7.0 4.8 
West Glamorgan -10.5 -7.4 -54.3 -5.2 13.6 6.6 
Gwent -9.1 -7.6 -42.8 -5.2 14.6 8.8 
South Yorkshire -16.8 -31.6 -32.8 -6.3 10.2 7.3 
Northamptonshire -4.1 -11.2 -43.2 -5.8 6.1 3.7 
Source: Census of Employment, unpublished data. 
See also Table 8.12. 
If the evidence of Table 8.15 is taken into accounto employment 
change in "other" sectors may be estimated at -11,800 (-8.3%) in West 
Glamorgan, and about -8f400 (-4.4%) in Northamptonshire. 
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Table 8.10 Industry-Service Multipliers in Towns with Major 
Job Losses in Steel, 1978-1981 
Travel to work area Differential shift in 
(a) (b) (c) Multiplier 
Manufacturing Construction Services (1+1(c)/(a+b)]) 
Consett -5,912 -180 -1,153 1.189 
Teesside -5,061 -5,386 -3,628 1.347 
Scunthorpe -4,707 -2,073 -1,285 1.189 
Shotton -4,453 -551 -1,484 1.297 
Corby -4,096 -93 -10184 1.283 
Port Talbot -2,123 -182 -885 1.384 
Total -26,352 -8,465 -9,619 1.276 
Source: Census of Employment, unpublished data. 
Differential shifts are calculated against national rates of 
employment change in manufacturing, construction and services. No attempt 
has been made to disaggregate to either the level of the SIC Order or to 
the Minimum List heading. 
In cases where the differential shift in educational services 
has been so extreme as to be obviously unreliable, differential shifts 
for this sector have been ignored. 
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Table 8.11 Industry-Service Multiplier by Region, 1978-1981 
SE 
EA 
Sw 
South 
wm 
EM 
YH 
NW 
N 
Wa 
Sc 
IndustriaZ 
regions 
Differential Shift (000s) Implied 
Multiplier 
Manuf. Const. Services 
+92 +l4 +30 
+l5 +l +lo 
+16 +7 -1 
-50 -3 -5 
+l6 +4 +0 
-21 -3 -21 
-15 -5 -10 
-9 -9 -17 
-25 +0 -7 
-17 -4 +22 
Source: Census of Employment 
1.28 
1.63 
0.96 
1.27 
1.09 
1.00 
1.88 
1.50 
1.94 
1.28 
-0.05 
1.27 
Residual growth in 
service sector 
employment, unaccounted 
for by multiplier of 1.2, 
(000s) 
+1 
+6 
-7 
-0 
+9 
+5 
-15 
-5 
-12 
-0 
+28 
-0 
In many cases a large part of the residual component in the service 
sector can be explained by misenumeration in education (MLH 872). 
Table 8.16 suggests that growth of employment in education has possibly 
been overstated by about 11,000 in Scotland, and by about 5,000 
in East Anglia, and has possibly been understated by about 12,000 in 
Yorkshire and Humberside, by about 10,000 in the North West and by 
about 8,000 in the Northern Region. Such figures are only approximations, 
but allowing for these data imperfections helps explain some of the 
erratic values in the "implied multiplier" column. 
The consistency of the average multipliers indicated in Tables 
8.10 and 8.11 is noteworthy; in each case a value of about 1.27 is 
indicated. This would appear to suggest that the service sector 
multiplier effects of industrial enVloyment change are confined 
primarily to the local labour market area in which events of industrial 
employment change are taking place. 
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Table 8.12 Patterns of Employment Decline in Non-Steel 
Counties in Groups la and 1c, 1978-1981. 
Employment Change Employment of 
i, 
(000s) M main 
industry as 
% of total emp. 
Main Other Main Other 1978 1981 
industry industry 
(i) TextiZe counties 
West Yorkshire -36.0 -46.7 -34.6 -6.1 11.9 8.0 
Greater Manchester -38.0 -69.3 -36.5 -6.6 9.0 6.3 
(ii) TextiZes, pZus 
watches and cZocks 
Tayside -5.1 -7.8 -30.7 -5.4 10A 7.6 
(iii) VehicZes 
West Midlands -45.4 -112.1 -29.2 -9.5 11.6 9.3 
(iv) Pottery 
Staffordshire -10.2 -16.5 -24.8 -5.0 11.0 8.9 
Source: Census of Employment 1978,1981 
See also Table 8.9 for a corresponding analysis on steel counties. 
"Textiles" here is taken to refer to textiles, leather and fur goods, 
clothing and footwear. 
Tayside is included in this Table as it would have been classed as 
part of group I were it not for an anomalous differential shift in 
the education sector (Table 8.15). This differential shift has been 
excluded in the present calculation. Figures for education in West 
Yorkshire are also regarded as unreliable; excluding differential shifts 
in this sector, employment change in "other" sectors may be estimated 
as -36,900 (-4.9%). 
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Table 8.13 Major Industrial Job Losses in Mid Glamorgan, 
1978-1981 
Firm, Location, Sector 
I Hoover, Merthyr TydfiZ 
(domestic electrical appliances) 
2 Great Universal Stores (Polikoff), 
Rhondda (clothing) 
3 Revlon, Maesteg 
(toilet preparations) 
4 P. Leiner, Treforest 
(other chemical industries) 
5 GEC, Hirwaun 
(radio and electronic components) 
6 Tube Investment (Helliwells), 
Aberdare M 
7 Lin-Pac (Rosedale), Bedwas 
(plastic products, n. e. s. ) 
8 Triang (Pedigree), Merthyr Tydfit 
(toys, games, etc. ) 
9 Cambrian castings, Aberdare 
(motor vehicle manuf. ) 
10 Harris Economy Bridgend 
(metal working machine tools) 
Jobs at beginning Jobs lost 
of period (total) 
5500 2300 
1450 750 
1250 500 
750 490 
2000 350 (b) 
315 315 
300 300 
300 300 
240 240 
240 240 
12345 5785 (46.9%) 
Source: FinanciaZ Times, as follows: 1,30.11.78s 23.12.78p 
28.8.79p 5.3.81; 2,11.10.80; 3,3.7.81; 4,14.2.80,25.3.80; 5,18.5.78; 
6,30.8.80; 7,12.10.79; 8,11.12.78,11.5.79; 9t 3.9-80; 10,2.12.78. 
(a) Jobs lost according to the Census of Employment (MLH 368). 
FinanciaZ Times reports suggest a total job loss of 1880. 
(b) The Census of Employment suggests a total job loss in this 
sector of 1600, although GEC accounted for only about half the total 
employment in this sector. It is possible, though not certain, that GEC 
shed rather more jobs at Hirwaun than is indicated here. 
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Table 8.14 Manufacturing Jobs Created in south Wales, 1966-1975, 
by Firms New to The Area. 
County Number of Employment 
establishments created 
opened, Total Per Establishment As % of 1978 1966-1975 
employment in 
manufacturing 
& coal mining 
South Glamorgan 22 1650 75 5.3 
Mid Glamorgan 115 12160 106 13.5 
West Glamorgan 45 6400 142 10.2 
Gwent 91 8550 94 11.8 
Source: Alden 1977 p. 292, based on unpublished official data. 
Also Census of Employment 1978. No account is taken here of jobs lost 
between 1975 and 1978 in establishments opened between 1966 and 1975. 
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Table 8.15 Apparently Anomalous Differential Shifts in the 
Education Sector, 1978-81 
County Differential Shift in Education Total employment change 
000S % of enployment Including Excluding 
in MLH 872 Total Diff. shift Diff. shift 11LH 872 MLH 872 
(i) Suspected Under-enumeration in 1978 
Buckinghamshire +7.8 +38.9 +4.1 +4.8 +0.7 
West Glamorgan +4.4 +36.4 +2.8 -11.1 -13.9 
Tayside +3.9 +35.5 +2.3 -5.6 -7.9 
Cambridgeshire +5.2 +23.9 +2.5 +1.1 -1.4 
Grampian +2.6 +21.1 +1.5 +9.3 +7.8 
Borders +0.4 +15.6 +0.9 . +3.9 +3.0 
Derbyshire +4.0 +12.5 +1.1 -5.6 -6.7 
Central +1.0 +11.5 +0.9 -3.5 -4.4 
Lothian +3.1 +lo. 3 +0.9 -1.4 -2.3 
(ii) Suspected under-enumeration in 1981 
Cheshire -10.1 -33.6 -2.8 -7.3 -4.5 
Tyne and Wear -8.2 -20.3 -1.6 -12.0 -lo. 4 
Northamptonshire -2.8 -15.3 -1.3 -7.9 -6.6 
West Yorkshire -9.9 -14.0 -1.1 -9.5 -8.4 
Leicestershire -4.4 -13.7 -1.2 -5.5 -4.3 
Cornwall -1.5 -11.2 -1.2 -5.8 -4.6 
Berkshire -3.3 -10.7 -1.1 -o. 2 +0.9 
Essex -4.4 -10.3 -0.9 -4.8 -3.9 
Source: Census of Employment, 1978,1981. 
Differential shifts between +10.0% and +5.0% were recorded in 
Shropshire, Highland, Suffolk, Bedfordshire, Cleveland, Devon, Hampshire, 
East Sussex, Island Areas and Cumbria. 
Differential shifts between -10.0% and -5.0% were recorded in Norfolk) 
Humberside, Lincolnshire) Nattinghamshire and Avon. 
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Table 8.16 Employment change by County 1978-1984 
County Employment County Employment 
change change 
West Glamorgan -28.9 29 South Glamorgan -2.7 
Cleveland -24.1 30 Cumbria -2.2 
Merseyside -19.1 31 Leicestershire -2.1 
Mid Glamorgan -18.6 32 Cornwall -2.0 
Tyne and Wear -17.7 33 Essex/Herts. -1.7 
South Yorkshire -16.2 34 Staffordshire -1.5 
Greater Manchester -15.2 35 Lothian -1.4 
Strathclyde -15.0 36 Shropshire -1.3 
West Midlands/Warks. -14.9 37 Northamptonshire -1.0 
Gwent -14.2 38 Kent/E. Sussex -0.9 
Durham -13.0 39 Norfolk -o. 6 
Tayside -11.2 40 Dorset -0.1 
Humberside -11.0 41 Northumberland +0.2 
West Yorkshire -10.7 42 Hereford and Worcester +0.4 
Derbyshire -9.9 43 Suffolk +1.9 
Dyfed -9.2 44 Devon +2.2 
Lancashire -8.6 45 Wiltshire +2.5 
Gwynedd -7.7 46 Isle of Wight +3.9 
Clwyd -6.8 47 Somerset +4.2 
Island Areas -6.5 48 Hampshire +5.2 
Greater London -5.5 49 North Yorkshire +5.2 
Lincolnshire -5.0 50 Beds/Berks/Bucks +5.7 
Nottinghamshire -5. o 51 Highland +6.8 
Fife -4.6 52 West Sussex +7.9 
Avon -4.3 53 Oxfordshire +8.0 
Gloucestershire -4.3 54 Powys +13.1 
Borders/D &G -4.1 55 Surrey +14.5 
Cheshire -3.7 56 Cambridgeshire +16.1 
57 Grampian +19.8 
Source: Census of Employment (1978); Regiona4 Trends (1988 pp. 38-39). 
1978 figures are based on Jobcentre areas, while 1984 figures are 
based on local authority wards (Regionat Trends 1988 p. 145). This will 
lead to various minor errors. There would also appear to be various major 
discrepancies, and as a result some counties have been amalgamated in 
the above table. Separate scores, which are regarded as unreliable, are 
Bedfordshire, +3.7%; Berkshire, -3.7%; Buckinghamshire, +23.4%; 
Essex, +0.4%; Hertfordshire, -3.8%; Kent, -6.6%; East Sussexq +0.4%; 
West Midlands Metropolitan, -18.6%; Warwickshire, +18.1%. Figures for 
Central, -19.6%, have been suppressed; it is likely that rates of job 
loss in either Strathclyde or Lothian are understated in the above table. 
The time interval between the two dates is 6.25 years. An average 
rate of employment decline of 4% per annum would give a total job loss 
of 22.5%, while an average rate of employment decline of 2J% per annum 
would give a total job loss of 14.6%. 
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Table 8.17 A Shift-Share Analysis of Employment Change in the 
Conurbations 1971-1978 
County 
Tyne and Wear 
Merseyside 
Strathclyde 
Greater Manchester 
West Midlands 
West Yorkshire 
South Yorkshire 
Greater London 
Shif t 
(000s) (As % of 1971 employment) 
Structural Diff. Total Structural Diff. Total 
-3.2 -9.7 -12.9 -0.6 -1.9 -2.5 
+2.1 -67.0 -64.9 +0.3 -10.0 -9.7 
-7.5 -48.5 -56.0 -o. 7 -4.8 -5.5 
-30.4 -8.4 -38.8 -2.6 -o. 7 -3.3 
-31.7 -61.6 -93.3 -2.3 -4.4 -6.7 
-35.5 +23.8 -11.6 -4.1 +2.8 -1.3 
-21.3 +19.9 -2.6 -3.9 +3.7 -o. 2 
+167.5 -548.0 -380.5 +4.3 -13.9 -9.6 
Source: Census of Employment, unpublished data at HLH level. 
Table 8.18 A Shift-Share Analysis of Employment Change in 
Conurbational Subregions, 1959-1971 
Shif t 
Subregion (000s) 
Struct. Diff. Total 
Industrial North-East(North) -64.6 +21.0 -43.6 
Merseyside +10.4 -36.6 -26.2 
Glasgow and West Central -21.0 -57.6 -78.6 
Manchester -31.4 -71.6 -103.0 
West Midlands Conurbation +85.2 -119.8 -34.6 
West Yorkshire -55.0 -3.1 -58.1 
South Yorkshire +7.9 -16.3 -8.4 
London +425.8 -885.0 -459.2 
(As % of 1959 emp. ) 
Struct. Diff. Total 
-9.9 +3.2 -6.6 
+1.5 -5.1 -3.7 
-2.0 
I. 
-5.6 -7.6 
-2.8 -6.4 -9.2 
+7.4 -10.4 -3. o 
-6.5 -o. 4 -6.9 
+2.4 -4.9 -2.5 
+9.4 -19.6 -10.2 
Source: Based on Fothergill and Gudgin 1979a, pp. 216-217 (shifts) 
and pp. 208-209 (1959 total employment levels). 
In calculating this table, the shifts presented by Fotýergill and 
Gudgin for the separate periods 1959-1966 and 1966-1971 have been 
amalgamated. 
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Table 8.19 Elements of Manufacturing Employment Growth, 
Industrialised Counties 1978-1981. 
County Jobs created As percentage of 
in manufacturing 1978 total 
employment 
Humberside (la) 9687 2.96 
Clwyd (la) 3658 2.86 
Durham (la) 3836 1.78 
Mid Glamorgan (la) 6365 3.42 
Cleveland (la) 4844 2.00 
Merseyside (lb) 6823 1.10 
Tyne and Wear (lb) 5876 1.16 
Strathclyde (lb) 6785 0.69 
Greater Manchester (ld) 19074 1.66 
West Midlands (1c) 18206 1.36 
West Yorkshire (1c) 11575 1.33 
South Yorkshire (1c) 8172 1.48 
Staffordshire (1c) 8553 2.30 
West Glamorgan (1c) 1572 0.98 
Gwent (1c) 5150 3.08 
Northunberland (ld) 3042 3.29 
Leicestershire (2b) 8336 2.33 
Northangtonshire (1c) 5427 2.64 
Nottinghamshire (2b) 8885 2.14 
Cheshire (ld) 8205 2.30 
Lancashire (2b) 13709 2.63 
Fife (2b) 3487 2.79 
Shropshire (2a) 3021 2.36 
Tayside (2a) 2614 1.61 
Dyfed (2a) 1705 1.62 
Bedfordshire (2a) 5229 2.58 
Derbyshire (2a) 7396 2.02 
Powys (4) 1154 3.88 
Hereford and Worcester(4) 5877 2.66 
Warwickshire (4) 6768 4.52 
Central (4) 5134 4.61 
Cumbria (4) 5705 3.14 
In metropolitan counties, plus Strathclyde, the job gains in 
all MLHs in manufacturing with increases in employment have been summed. 
In other counties, all increases of 50 or more have been summed. 
This difference in the method of calculation is intended to counteract 
to some extent the greater likelihood in larger-.. - counties that any increase in employment in a particular factory will be outweighed by 
a job loss elsewhere in the same sector. 
Figures for Fife assume a major reclassification of employment 
between the electronic computers sector and the electronic capital 
goods sector (see note 56). If this assumption is dropped, corresponding 
figures would be 5571 and 4.46%. 
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Table 8.20 Differential Shifts in Manufacturing, Industrial 
Britain 
County Differential Shift County Differential Shift 
(000s) M (000s) M 
Warwickshire +7.9 +5.3 Tayside +0.0 +0.0 
Dumf. & Galloway +2.3 +4.7 Dyfed -0.1 -0.1 
Powys +1.1 +3.7 Northamptonshire -o. 2 -0.1 
Borders +1.2 +3.2 South Yorkshire -1.0 -o. 2 
Heref. & Worcester +6.5 +2.9 Northumberland -o. 2 -o. 2 
Fife +3.4 +2.7 Humberside -1.3 -o. 4 
Leicestershire +8.5 +2.4 Staffordshire -1.3 -o. 4 
Central +2.6 +2.4 West Midlands -13.0 -1.0 
Cumbria +3.4 +1.9 Mid Glamorgan -2.5 -1.3 
Gwent +2.4 +1.4 Durham -3.1 -1.4 
Lancashire +6.7 +1.3 Shropshire -2.3 -1.8 
North Yorkshire +2.7 +1.2 Tyne and Wear -9.8 -1.9 
Nottinghamshire +4.5 +1.1 Greater Mancheste r -23.5 -2.0 
West Yorkshire +6.8 +0.8 Clwyd -2.6 -2.0 
Cheshire +2.4 +0.7 Merseyside -19.5 -3.1 
Derbyshire +1.3 +0.4 Strathclyde -32.5 -3.3 
Cleveland +0.6 +0.2 West Glamorgan -5.7 -3.5 
Source: Census of Employment (unpublished data). A county in 
"industrial Britain" is defined as one in the Midlands 
or periphery with a structural shift less favourable 
than +1.0%. 
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Table 8.21 Manufacturing Employment Change by County 1978-1981 
County Man. emp. County Man. emp. 
change change 
W W 
West Glamorgan -33.1 Greater London -12.8 
Clwyd -27.7 Borders -12.8 
Strathclyde -26.6 Gwynedd -12.2 
Merseyside -24.3 Nottinghamshire -11.8 
Durham 23.8 Central -11.8 
West Midlands (Met) -23.2 Lincolnshire -10.9 
South Yorkshire -23.0 Norfolk -10.7 
Mid Glamorgan -22.9 Suffolk -10.6 
Dyfed -22.8 Leicestershire -10.6 
Greater Manchester -22.2 Hereford and Worcester -10.3 
Shropshire -21.9 North Yorkshire -10.3 
Cleveland -21.3 Avon -9.2 
Bedfordshire -21.2 Hampshire -9.1 
Tayside -20.9 Hertfordshire -8.8 
Gwent -20.8 Somerset -8.7 
Tyne and Wear -20.3 Fife -8.3 
West Yorkshire -20.0 East Sussex -8.1 
Cornwall -19.5 Gloucestershire -7.9 
Humberside -19.2 Buckinghamshire -7.2 
Northamptonshire -18.3 Surrey -7.0 
Wiltshire -18.1 Lothian -6.3 
Northumberland -17.4 Cambridgeshire -5.8 
Staffordshire -16.3 Highlands -5.3 
Oxfordshire -15.7 Warwickshire -4.7 
Isle of Wight -15.5 Grampian -4.5 
South Glamorgan -15.0 Dorset -4. o 
Derbyshire -14.8 Powys -2.8 
Essex -14.6 Devon -2.7 
Lancashire -14.1 West Sussex -2.4 
Kent -14.0 Berkshire -2.3 
Cheshire -13.6 Dumfries and Galloway +4.5 
Cumbria -13.3 Island Areas +16.4 
Source: Census of Employment, 1978,1981. 
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Table 8.22 A Shift-Share Analysis of Southern Englando Excluding 
Differential Shifts in the Educational Sector 
County Structural Differential shift 
shift (%) (excluding HLH 872) 
Manuf. Tertiary Primary Total 
Total change 
(Excluding 
diff. shifts in 
HLH 872) 
(a)Greater London +3.7 +0.0 -2.4 +0.0 -2.3 -3.8 
(b)Surrey +4.1 +0.6 +4.1 +0.1 +4.8 +3.6 
East Sussex +4.0 +0.9 +2.9 +0.1 +3.9 +2.7 
West Sussex +3.9 +1.6 +2.2 +0.3 +4.1 +2.8 
Hampshire +1.7 +0.8 +5.1 -0.0 +5.8 +2.3 
Hertfordshire +1. *6 +0.5 +3.7 -0.0 +4.2 +0.6 
Oxfordshire +0.1 +0.9 +4.8 -0.0 +5.6 +0.4. 
Berkshire +2.1 +2.4 +1.8 -o. 2 +4.0 +0.7 
Buckinghamshire +2.3 +1.6 +2.0 +0.0 +3.6 +0.7 
(c)Dorset +3. o +1.7 +0.7 -0.0 +2.4 +0.2 
Gloucestershire +1.4 +0.9 +2.9 -0.1 +3.7 -0.2 
Devon +2.0 +2.7 -0.8 +0.0 +1.9 -1.4 
Wiltshire +0.8 -1.3 +4.5 +0.2 +3.4 -0.4 
Somerset +1.3 +1.2 +0.6 +0.2 +2.1 -2.0 
Avon +3.0 +0.1 -0.8 +0.2 -0.4 -2.6 
(d)Cambridgeshire -1.1 +4.7 +0.3 -0.1 +4.9 -1.4 
Suffolk +0.9 +0.8 +1.1 -o. 3 +1.7 -2.7 
Kent +1.0 -0.1 +1.8 -0.1 +1.5 -2.7 
Norfolk +1.8 +0.6 +1.0 -o. 6 +1.1 -2.4 
Lincolnshire +1.4 +0.0 +0.3 +0.2 +0.5 -3.4 
Essex +0.6 -o. 5 +1.4 -0.1 +0.8 -4.0 
Source: Based on Tables 8.7 and 8.15. Unitalicised figures 
are those presented in Table 8.7 ; italicised figures 
are "hypothetical". 
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Table 8.23 Employment Change in the South of England, 1971-81 
Employment change (% per annum) 
County Group (1) (2) (3) (4) 
in 
Table 8'. 7 1971-78 1973-77 1978-81 Change between 
(recession) (pre-slump 1973-77 and 
and slump) 1978-81 
(3)-(2) 
(a)Greater London (3a) -1.03 -1.49 -1.15 +0.34 
(b)Buckinghamshire (5ac) +3.19 +2.52 +1.46 -1.06 
Surrey (5ac) +0.52 +0.26 +1.23 +0.97 
East Sussex (5ac) +0.64 -0.23 +0.97 +1.26 
West Sussex (5ac) +2.17 +1.65 +0.88 -0.77 
Hampshire (5ac) +1.71 +0.89 +0.87 -0.02 
Cambridgeshire (54b) +1.73 +1.28 +0.33 -0.95 
Hertfordshire (5ab) +1.01 +0.61 +0.26 -0.35 
Oxfordshire (5ab) +0.18 -1.49 +0.23 +1.72 
(c)Berkshire (5aa 
1) +2.26 +2.04 -0.06 -2.10 
Dorset (5aa 1) +1.69 +1.07 -0.10 -1.17 
Gloucestershire (5aa 2) +1.94 +0.57 -0.12 -0.67 
Devon (5aa 1) +1.41 +0.31 -0.20 -0.53 
Wiltshire (5aa 2) +1.40 +0.85 -0.21 -1.06 
Somerset (5aa 
1) +1.32 +0.47 -0.55 -1.02 
Avon (3a) +0.56 +0.17 -0.97 -1.14 
(d)Suffolk (5aa 
2) +1.67 +1.05 -0.62 -1.67 
Kent (5aa 2 +1.21 +0.99 -0.84 -1.83 
Norfolk (30 +1.57 +0.60 -0.98 -1.58 
Lincolnshire (30 +1.43 +1.10 -1.25 -2.35 
Essex (30 +1.05 +0.46 -1.49 -1.95 
Group averages (weighted) : 
(a)Greater London -1.03 -1.49 -1.15 +0.34 
(b)Commuter belt +1.32 +0.67 +0.77 +0.10 
(c)Westem fringes +1.45 +0.76 -0.38 -1.14 
(d)Eastern fringes +1.30 +0.80 -1.06 -1.86 
UK +0.42 -0.0 -1.34 -1.34 
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Table 8.23 (cont. ) 
Source: Annual Census of Employment 1971,1973,1977,19780 1981. 
As shown in Table 8.15, figures for employment change 
in the education sector are to be regarded as highly 
suspect in Buckinghamshire, Cambridge, Berkshire and Essex. 
Ignoring differential shifts in 11L11 872 in these counties 
would produce annual rates of employment change between 
1978 and 1981 (improvement or deterioration since 
1973-77 shown in brackets) as follows: Buckinghamshire, 
+0.02% (-2.50%); Cambridgeshire, -0.43% (-1.71%); 
Berkshire, +0.27% (-1.77%); Essex, -1.19% (-1.65%). 
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Table 8.24 Employment Growth and Decline in London and 
Surrounds, 1978-81 
Zone Employment (000) Change 
1978 1981 (000) M 
Central London 1158.6 1147.5 -1 1.2 -1.0 
Inner London 845.9 792.6 -53.3 -6.3 
Outer London 1659.3 1588.1 -71.2 -4.3 
Inner ring 
North 930.1 907.3 -22.8 -2.5 
South 664.1 682.1 +18.0 +2.7 
1594.2 1589.4 -4.8 -o. 3 
Outer ring 
North 752.3 731.4 -20.8 -2.7 
South 849.7 872.3 +22.6 +2.7 
1602.0 1603.7 +1.8 +0.1 
Source: Census of Employment, 1978,1981. 
Zones used: 
Central London: Amalgamated office areas of Westminster, 
City of London, Boroughq St. Marylebone, 
Kings Cross 
Inner London: ILEA, minus Central London (above) 
Outer London: Outer London Education Authorities 
Inner ring: 
North: Slough, High Wycombe, Watford, St. Albans, 
Stevenage, Hertford & Harlow, Chelmsford, 
Southend, Chatham 
South: Readingo Aldershot, Guildford, Crawley, 
Tunbridge Wells, Maidstone 
Outer ring: 
North: Oxfordq Buckingham, Aylesburyj Luton, milton 
Keynes, Bedford, Hitchin, Cambridge, Haverhill, 
Braintree, Colchesters Sheernesso 
Sittingbourne 
South: Newburys Andover, Basingstoke, Alton, 
Southampton, Portsmouth, Chichester, Worthing, 
Brightong Eastbourne, Hastings, Cranbrook, 
Ashford 
- 129 - 
Table 8.25 Employment Growth and Decline in Manufacturing 
and Services in London and Surrounds, 1978-81 
Zone Manufacturing 
Employment (000s) Change 
1978 1981 (OOOS) M 
Central London 123.4 128.3 +5.0 +4.0 
Inner London 163.5 130.7 -32.8 -20.0 
Outer London 482.0 411.5 -70.5 -14.6 
Services 
Employment (000s) 
1978 1981 
1002.3 991.7 
625.5 607.2 
1083.3 1081.9 
Change 
(000s) M 
-10.6 -1.1 
-18.3 -2.9 
-1.4 -0.1 
Inner ring 
North 348.6 302.9 -45.7 -13.1 526.6 549.1 +22.5 +4.3 
South 153.7 150.1 -3.6 -2.3 459.1 478.6 +19.5 +4.3 
outer ring 
North 252.8 215.6 -37.2 -14.7 443.6 477.5 +33.9 +7.6 
South 232.1 212.9 -19.2 -8.3 551.7 594.0 +42.3 +7.7 
Ratio of manufacturing employment to service employment in each zone: 
Central London 1: 8.1 
Inner London 1: 3.8 
Outer London 1: 2.2 
Inner ring 1: 2.0 
Outer ring 1: 2.1 
North 1: 1.6 
South 1: 2.6 
Inner ring (North) 1: 1.5 
Inner ring (South) 1: 3.0 
Outer ring (North) 1: 1.8 
Outer ring (South) 1: 2.4 
Zones as defined in Table 8.24 
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Table 8.26 Differential Shifts in Employment Change in 
Scotland 1978-1981 
Region 
Grampian (0) 
Dumfries and Galloway (r) 
Borders (r) 
Central (0) 
Highlands (r) 
Fife 
Lothian 
Tayside 
Island Areas (r) 
Strathclyde 
Rest of Scotland 
Scotland 
Differential shift 1978-1981 
(000s) (% of 1978 employment) 
+16.7 
+5.8 
+4.9 
+4.8 
+3.9 
+3.2 
+3.0 
+1.2 
+1.1 
-37.3 
+44.5 
+7.2 
+9.3 
+11.5 
+12.7 
+4.3 
+5.5 
+2.6 
+0.9 
+0.7 
+4.4 
-3.8 
Source: Census of Employment (unpublished data). 
The structural shift in petroleum and natural gas (MLH 104) in the 
Grampian region stood at +7,600 (from an employment base of 3,700) 
representing a further 4.2% of 1978 employment. 
Regions marked (o) will have had their employment totals in 1981 
boosted by the boom in North Sea oil, while regions marked (r) are highly 
rural in nature. 
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Table 8.27 Employment Change in Scottish Rural Region and in 
Various Combinations of Travel-to-Work Areas in the 
Rest of Britain, 1978-1981 
Borders Region 
Dumfries and Galloway Region 
Highlands Region 
Island Areas 
"Northumbria" (Berwick, Alnwick, Haltwhistle, 29532 
Hexham) 
"Lakes" (Whitehaven, Keswick, Kendal, 64181 
Penrith) 
"Mid West Wales" (Aberystwyth, Lampeter, 21269 
Machynlleth, Llandeilo, 
Tywyn) 
Employment 
(Number) 
1978 1981 
38329 39840 
50003 53251 
71161 72573 
24526 25159 
Change 
Number (Z) 
+1511 +3.9 
+3248 +6.5 
+1412 +2.0 
+633 +2.6 
29863 +331 +1.1 
66076 +1895 +3.0 
21687 +418 +2.0 
Southern North Yorkshire (Selby, York, 176618 179832 +3214 +1.8 
Harrogate, Ripon, 
Malton, Bridlington, 
Scarborough) 
The same, excluding Bridlington and 141726 146934 +5208 +3.7 
Scarborough 
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Table 8.28 UK Balance of Payments, 1977-1988 
All figures in E million 
Visible trade 
Year Oil Other raw Manufactures TOTAL Invisible Current 
materials, food trade balance 
1977 -2774 -5789 +5874 -2324 +2174 -150 
1978 -1987 -5091 +5054 -1593 +2557 +964 
1979 -737 -5694 +2690 -3398 +2902 -496 
1980 +308 -4774 +5450 +1353 +1769 +3122 
1981 +3106 -4733 +4575 +3350 +3586 +6936 
1982 +4639 -5147 +2279 +2218 +2467 +4685 
1983 +6972 -6120 -2361 -1075 +4907 +3832 
1984 +6932 -7914 -4054 -4580 +6602 +2022 
1985 +8101 -7757 -3121 -2346 +5683 +3337 
1986 +4056 -7533 -5710 -8716 +8517 -199 
1987 +4184 -7761 -7490 -10162 +7658 -2504 
. 1988(Jan-c7uZy) +1621 n. a. n. a. -11038 +3064 -7973 
Source: United Kingdom BaZance of Payments 1988 Edition; 
British Business 2.9.88. 
1988 figures refer only to a7 month peri od rather than 
a twelve month period; grossed up figures would show a 
balance of visible trade of -E18,900 mill ion per annum, 
and a current balance of -E13,700 million per annum. 
If anything, the 1988 figures are slightl y worse th an this, 
in that the official series estimates the invisible 
balance as being E500 million per month f rom April to 
July yet in the previous three months the invisible 
balance averaged only E350 million. 
(Since this table was compiled, balance of payments figures for the 
whole of 1988 have become available, showing a current balance 
deficit of E14,936m, and a visible balance deficit of E20,557m. 
1989 figures are so far worse than 1988 figures. ) 
S 
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Notes to Chapter 8 
At a late stage of this research, detailed figures for the 
1984 Census of Employment will have become available. For reasons 
of time and space, no close analysis is made of the 1984 Census of 
Employment, although this is regarded as potentially a useful piece 
of research work. Table 8.16 summarises total employment change by 
county between 1978 and 1984. 
2. See especially Martin (1982), Gudgin, Moore and Rhodes (1992), 
Townsend (1983), Regional Studies Association (1983). Gudgin et al 
used the official quarterly estimates for employmento and official 
unemployment figures, each published in the Gazettej to determine 
the degree of recession, while Martin (1982) used the redundancy 
rate as an indicator of the regional severity of recession. Townsend 
(1983) used a mixture of official redundancy statistics and 
Financial Times reports on named industrial closures or major job 
loss events. The survey by the Regional Studies Association (1983) 
provides very little useful empirical. material on the geography of 
slump, confining itself to impressionistic regional surveys and a 
rather unsystematic use of unemployment figures. 
3. These sectoral differences in the degree of accuracy of 
official employment estimates can present considerable difficulties 
in interpretation. For example, while early estimates of rates of 
industrial change by region were later proven to be reasonably 
accurate, and to identify the correct relative regional rates of 
change, there appeared to be an outlier in estimated rates of 
employment change in Scotland which could not be properly explained, 
it seemed, by any known economic process. Gillespie and Owen (1982a) 
assumed that this anomalous figure meant that Scotland had escaped 
relatively lightly from slump, and when the present author (Crouch 
1982b) noted the likelihood of a mis-estimation, they insisted that 
these figures can be taken "as being no less reliable than any other 
of the Department of Employment's estimates. " Yet the divergence 
between the estimates for Scotland and for all other regions was 
extremely large, to such an extent that a statistical anomaly was. 
at the time the-only plausible explanation; any researcher exercising 
any proper caution would recognise this point and would refrain 
from drawing strong conclusions from a reading which is suspected 
to be inaccurate. Gillespie and Owen did not observe such caution. 
When Census of Employment figures were finally publishedo 
it was conclusively shown that the appareht relative advantage of 
Scotland in the service sector was indeed fictitious, as Crouch 
(1982b) had earlier argued. Ironically, though, figures for 
employment change in the Scottish sector were shown to be reasonably 
accurate; the estimates for employment in aZZ other regions were 
shown to be major underestimates, though. 
Clearly in many ways this is a minor point, and is resurrected 
only to bring up a methodological issue, that it is unwise to treat 
quarterly employment estimates as precise enumerations of employment, 
and doubly unwise to draw strong conclusions soZeZy on the basis of 
such estimates without eliminating the possibility of a substantial 
data error. 
4. Gazette 1983 pp. 242-244. 
5. See also the discussion in Townsend (1986), based on data 
at the level of the travel-to-work area. It should be added that a 
minority of the increases registered by Townsend are possibly 
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spurious, with under-recording of employment in education in 1978 
(see Table 8.15) and-unannounced boundary changes between travel 
to work areas being the most frequent problems. For example, Kelso 
(Borders) showed an increase in employment of 54.4%, while 
neighbouring Eyemouth showed a decrease of 54.0%; combined Kelso/ 
Eyemouth figures show a decrease in employment of 8.6%, An even 
more serious anomaly, as it concerns larger towns and affects 
rates of employment change at the county level, is that Hertford 
showed an increase in employment of 22.2%, while neighbouring Harlow 
(Ess6x) showed a decrease of 17.9%; combined figures show a decline 
of 2.9%. 
The variety of international experience is perhaps best 
shown by tabulation of paid employment in non-agricultural 
activities: 
Employment (million) Change 
1979 1982 M 
(i) Advanced capitalist economies 
USA 89.8 89.6 -0.9 
Japan 48.7 50.9 44.6 
UK 22.8 21.1 -7.6 
West Germany 24.0 23.8 -1.1 
France 17.7 17.8 +0.7 
Italy 17.4 18.1 +4.1 
Spain 7.6 7.1 -6.3 
(ii) Eastern bloc 
USSR 98.8 102.7 +3.0 
East Germany 7.4 7.5 +1.6 
Czechoslovakia 6.2 6.4 +2.6 
(iii) Newly industrialising countries 
South Korea (1980-82) 8.6 9.6 +11.8 
Hong Kong 1.9 2.1 +11.6 
Singapore o. 8 1.0 +13.7 
Philippines 8.8 8.9 +1.0 
Source: International Labour office Yearbook of Labour 
Statistics 1987 pp. 438-450. 
This list is nowhere near comprehensivel and for slightly 
different purposes one might wish for figures either for total 
employment or for manufacturing employment (both available in the 
ILO Yearbook). Industrialisation generally continued at a fast 
pace in the newly industrialising countries, although the Philippines 
showed a definite slowing down in non-agricultural employment 
growth. Employment growth roughly matched population growth in the 
Eastern bloc. 
In the advanced capitalist economies trends were highly 
divergent. Japan, which can alternatively be regarded as the 
economically most advanced of the Eastern Asian newly industrialising 
countries, still increased its industrial employment during the 
slump, outcompeting Western Europe and North America. Most Western 
European and North American economies showed stable or slowly 
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declining non-agricultural employmentq this tending to decompose 
into falling industrial employment and rising service sector 
employment. It is important to remember that with rising populations, 
stable employment levels are not sufficient to prevent unemployment 
from rising. 
Two Western European'economies had very large drops in 
employment during the slump, Spain and the UK. In Spain the cyclical 
downturn in thetburist industry, which also affected demand for new 
construction, led to shrinkage of employment (-145,000 or -14.0% in 
construction; -31,000 or -2.0% in trade, restaurants and hotels). 
To this must be added the effects of industrial recession (416,000 
jobs, or 13.6%, lost in manufacturing). All figures relate to 
1979-82, and are derived from the ILO Yearbook. 
The UK was the advanced economy most severely affected by 
slump, in part because of a poor competitive position before the 
slump, but perhaps more importantly because of the monetarist 
policies followed by the new Thatcher Government. All market 
economies in Europe (except for Portugal, Turkey, Greece, Finland, 
Iceland and San Marino) showed declines in manufacturing employment 
between 1979 and 1982, but the decline was much faster in the UK 
than elsewhere, as the following percentage changes show: UK -18.8%, 
Spain -13.6%, Belgium -10.3%, Ireland -8.4%, Sweden -7.8%, France 
-5.6%, West Germany -5.4%, Netherlands -5.2%. Austria -4.2%. Italy 
-2.5%, Switzerland -1.0%, Portugal +1.9%, Turkey +2.4%, Finland 
+2.5%, Greece +2.8%. The UK lost almost as many industrial jobs 
during the slump as the rest of Europe put together; the "Thatcher 
effect" is highly conspicuous. 
7. Raw averages if numerical shifts are totalled, weighted 
averages if, as in Table 8.3, shifts are measured as a percentage 
of the local employment base. 
8. Many attempts have been made in the social sciences to 
create a positivist social science, with emphasis on collecting 
quantifiable information, in alliance with a hypothesis testing 
approach. Arguments for, and critiques of, positivism are familiar 
territory to those acquainted with such disciplines as sociology 
(see especially Keat and Urry 1982) and human geography (see 
especially Gregory 1978). This debate is conducted on different 
terms in economics, where empirical neo-classical economics has been 
conducted on "positivist" lines before such methods ever became 
fashionable in most other social sciences; indeed neo-classical 
economics is, to many, perhaps most, positivist social scientists, 
the high point of social science. The basic objective of such 
approaches is the generation of law-like statements9 whether through 
empirical work backed up by formal hypothesis testing or through 
deductive work. Little attention is paid, in the positivist 
orthodoxy, to explaining individual events except insofarý as they 
can be subsumed under more general laws. For such an approach to 
work, background conditions need to be taken as stable. 
Two propositions may be advanced; firstly that historical 
human societies are never stable but always in a state of flux, and 
secondly that it suits existing power structures to regard human 
societies as inherently stable, so that any disturbance within 
society can be regarded as basically unimportant. One can add a 
third proposition that although nature changes the laws of nature do 
not (whereas both society and the laws of society change). Insofar 
as social science is coopted by the powers that be, it is not 
surprising that a methodology should be developed for the social 
sciences on the basis of a rather restricted version of the 
methodology of the natural sciences, and that this methodology 
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should show both an ideological bias. (when applied to the social 
sciences), and be incompetent to explain scientifically much that is 
happening in society. In economics, for example, the attempt to 
fit everything into a full employment equilibrium framework (a 
stable society) has seriously retarded scientific progress in the 
subject, while leaving ideological functions intact. The point being 
made in the text is that when the results of a shift-share analysis 
show economic instability, then that is the result of instability 
-in the economic system and not, as suggested by Richardson (1968), 
of defects in the shift-share method. 
9. For example Fothergill and Gudgin (1979b, 1982). Keeble 
(1980 p. 962). 
10. See chapter 6 above, also the discussion in section 8.5 
below. For Glasgow see also Lever and Mather (1986), where it is 
emphasised that on a sector by-sector basis Glasgow has for a long 
period had a rate of job loss considerably higher than the national 
average. For a discussion of Tyne and Wear, see Robinson, Wren 
and Goddard (1986 pp. 4-25). For discussions of North East England, 
the industrial region of which Tyne and Wear is the dominant 
conurbation, see especially Hudson (1983,, 1986)*,, also Buswell, 
Champion and Townsend (1987). 
Woollen and worsted (HLH 414) and men's and boys' tailored 
outerwear (MLH 442) accounted for 62% of the net structural shift in 
West Yorkshire between 1978 and 1981. 
12. For Merseyside, see for example Townsend (1983 pp. 94-96), 
Merseyside Socialist Research Group (1980). Section 8.5 argues that 
in many respects the severity of the problems that Merseyside faced 
were due not so much to Merseyside being a conurbation, but rather 
to Merseyside being a branch plant economy at the scale of the 
conurbation. 
13. See Weber (1929 pp. 124-174). and note 35 below. 
14. See chapter 9 below. One point which needs emphasis is that 
while the peripheral cities were centres of rapid population and 
employment growth in the 19th century, thiey did not fully achieve 
the core status of London, core status being defined in terms of 
the power of the commercial and financial sector. While such cities 
as, for example, Liverpool often became powerful financial centress 
they were outcompeted in time by the even more powerful London 
financial centre. Thus in the 19th century an important process 
was the growth of the great industrial cities, while in the 20th 
century the functional peripheralisation of the great industrial 
cities has been a serious problem. 
15. See especially the discussion of the urban-rural shift in 
Fothergill and Cudgin (1982). Large parts of this chapter and of 
chapter 6 above may be taken as a running critique of Fothergill and 
Gudgin's work. This is not because the author thinks that Fothergill 
and Gudgin (1982) is a bad work; on the contrary, it is considered 
here to be in many respects possibly the best work on the British 
regional economy published during the years in which this thesis 
was prepared, presenting a clear case, making good use of official 
published statistics and setting out the arguments in such a way 
as to be potentially refutable. Pothergill and Gudgin raised 
genuinely new issues, and even if detailed examination of statistical 
material shows several weaknesses in their results and conclusions$ 
at least the material is set out in such a way that constructive 
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debate is possible. 
Fothergill and Cudgin draw attention to the urban-rural 
shift in manufacturing industry, the tendency in the late 20th 
century for manufacturing industry to drift away from old city-based 
locations as new investment takes place preferentially on less 
congested greenfield sites in small towns or semi-rural locations. 
They suggest also that the urban-rura ,1 shift 
has dominated spatial 
patterns of employment change, with core-periphery distinctions being 
relatively slight. It is on this particular point that the author 
parts company with Fothergill. and Gudgin; the urban-rural shift is 
held to exist, but not to be dominant. In the context of the 1980s 
especially, and also in the late 1960s-and 1970s, the geography of 
recession would appear to be dominant, with the critical conditions 
being which industries declined where, when and why. An important 
point being made in the text is that in many cases the big city 
locations show high rates of job loss through reasons which cannot 
be interpreted in terms of an urban-rural shift, notably the decline 
of traditional city based industries, e. g. textiles and clothing in 
West Yorkshire. Furthermore, if one goes back to the years of full 
employment before 1966, regional patterns of employment change were 
dominated by the North-South divide; many of the more rural areas 
of Southern England expanded their employment base as the London 
economy spread on to "green fields", yet less urbanised areas of 
the periphery often showed very limited employment growth (Table 
5-7). One cannot say therefore that the urban-rural shift dominated 
employment trends in the long boom. 
Fothergill and Gudgin's work is based primarily on the 
experience of the 1970s when it began to appear, as London's 
employment base declined rapidly and the West Midlands conurbation 
was hit by recession and industrial restructuring, that there was 
some degree of convergence at the North-South scale, and that the 
main spatial economic problems were occurring at the urýan scale. 
This "convergence", as chapter 6 emphasises, was a temporary 
conjunction of events relying on such contingencies as a slowing down 
of employment decline in coal mining, high land prices in London, 
the decentralisation of the car industry and the continuation of 
regional policy. Furthermore, loosely urbanised counties in the 
periphery (e. g. Durham, Northumberland) were often more severely 
hit by the 1974-76 recession than the conurbations (e. g. Tyne and 
Wear). The hypothesis of the urban-rural shift might appear to 
cover much of the pattern of change at a very broad scale, yet 
there are far too many anomalies at a more detailed scale for the 
thesis of the dominance of the urban-rural shift to be acceptable. 
What remains is that the urban-rural shift is important in 
some cases, but definitely should not be overestimated or ignored. 
Certainly there is a general tendency in Table 8.7 for differential 
shifts in peripheral counties to be negatively related to the degree 
of urbanisation, but this is a relatively minor factor in the 
geography of employment change. Both the presence or absence of 
vulnerable industriess and the core or peripheral location ofa 
particular county are shown in this chapter to be more important 
determinants. 
16. "East Suffolk" is taken as being comprised of Beccles, 
Halesworth, Ipswich, Leiston and Lowestoft travel to work areas; 
"West Suffolk" is taken as being comprised of Bury St. Edmunds, 
Haverhill, Newmarket and Sudbury travel to work areas. 
17. See chapter 6.7 above. 
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18. This was the impression drawn during the early part of the 
analysis. Later writing (section 8.6(c) below) suggests that 
employment trends in Hereford and Worcester were boosted by 
suburbanisation from Birmingham. Kidderminster showed a decline in 
employment of 8.8%, largely as a result of problems faced by the 
carpet industry, but Redditch increased its employment by 2.0%. In 
general, the Worcester part of Hereford and Worcester showed stable 
or increasing employment (Redditch, as above; Worcester -0.3%; 
Evesham. +7.22), in line with Warwickshire, where the net employment 
decline registered relates solely to those parts of the Coventry 
travel to work area outside the metropolitan county. In contrast, 
the more remote Hereford part of the county showed employment decline 
(e. g. Hereford -2.9%, Leominster -7.8%; Ross on Wye -2.9%). 
There were definite signs that even during the slump the West 
Midlands conurbation was expanding towards a southern "suburban" 
belt (see also note 38). This suburbanisation was far more prominent 
to the south and east of Birmingham than to the north and west - 
primarily because the main national growth zones were to the south 
and east of Birmingham, and economic activity tends to orientate 
itself towards the growth areas. 
19. As pointed out in chapter 7, note 42, this present analysis 
concerns itself only with the employment effects of steel closure 
and does not address the question of whether or not the policies 
being followed by the British Steel Corporation in the early 1980s 
were irrational, as suggested by Bryer, Brignall and Maunders 
(1982). It might well be the case that job losses in steel were, 
with respect to what was economically required, excessive. The 
present analysis, though, takes place on a different scale, looking 
at the economic effects of job losses in steel rather than the 
causes. 
2o. Job losses as a result of multiplier effects of employment 
decline in iron and steel, amounting to perhaps a third of the job 
losses in iron and steel, are incorporated into the figures for 
"all other sectors". In that the rate of job loss in iron and steel 
was about twice the average for manufacturing industry, an excess 
of job loss results in "all other sectors" (when compared with the 
situation in which steel is "replaced" with an "average" industry) 
of about one sixth of the total job loss in iron and steel, or 
about one eighteenth of the 1978 level of employment. in iron and 
steel. This excess figure approximates to the national average rate 
of job loss (-5.2%). 
21. In September 1981, with unemployment nationally standing at 
12.4%, unemployment in Cleveland stood at 19.2%, slightly lower than 
the 19.8% recorded in Northern Ireland, but higher than the 18.6% of 
Merseyside, 17.9% of Clwyd, 17.1% of Strathclyde, 16.9% of Mid 
Glamorgan, etc. Of other British counties, only the Western Isless 
with a size of workforce too low to make statistically meaningful 
comparisons, had a slightly higher rate of unemployment (20.7%). 
Cleveland's unemployment problems persisted after the slump. 
The massaged figures for May 1988 (see chapter 7 note 84) still show 
an unemployment rate in Cleveland of 17.4%, compared with 19.0% in 
Northern Ireland, 17.9% in Merseyside, 15.9% in Strathclyde, 15.6% 
in Mid Glamorgan, 15.3% in South Yorkshire and 15.2% in Tyne and 
Wear. These figures exclude the self-employed and HM Forces from 
the base, unlike the national figures. 
The stickiness of unemployment in Northern Ireland, and in 
some of the main industrial cities of Northern Englandl and in much 
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of South Wales, is the most discouraging feature of the labour 
economy in the last few years. Not only have these areas been 
severely hit by the deep recessions of the late 1970s and early 
1980s, they have also been passed over by the subsequent recovery* 
One'should not be misled by a few new city centre office blocks 
and shopping centres into imagining that there has been an economic 
renaissance in the industrial areas. 
How should the severe problems of the depressed industrial 
cities and regions in the late 1980s and 1990s be tackled? 
First and foremost, the dangerously lopsided economic 
policies followed by the Thatcher Government need to be reversed. 
In essence, the Government has in the last few years consistently 
followed a policy of restructuring the economy in favour of City 
interests, and in favour of the very wealthy, and has used the 
windfall of North Sea oil to cover the costs-to the rest of the 
economy of this restructuring, (section 8.10). No real attention, as 
opposed to cosmetic attention, has been given to rebuilding the 
industrial base, the general policy in the last few years having 
been to let industry find its "natural" levels of output and 
employment in the context of an economy in which production is no 
longer regarded as being of primary importance. The costs of such 
policies outweigh the benefits, and the costs are reflected in such 
features as continued mass unemployment, in the North and a growingly 
acute balance of payments problems as a result of continued 
deindustrialisation, and despite historically very high surpluses 
in invisibles, and despite North Sea oil. 
This reversal of national economic policies is essential if 
the industrial areas are to revive, and indeed if Britain is ever 
again to be able to class herself as a major industrial nation. The 
question of more explicitly spatial policies is more difficult. 
However a second priority would seem to be a radical restructuring 
of the space economy of the large regions. If unemployment rates 
are persistently high in the large industrial-conurbations, there 
is an implication that the size of population of these conurbations 
needs to be scaled down to a more sustainable level. Certainly 
there is-little-evidence so far that conurbations are fruitful 
places to expand employment, the dominant evidence being that job 
creation is more effective in areas of medium urbanisation. In 
the long term a policy of encouraging vigorous growth in the medium 
sized and well situated towns of industrial regions seems to be 
most appropriate (note 67 below). 
In the short term,, --however, unemployment at the local level 
in the big cities will still be severe. To deal. with this, local 
authorities will need to be given encouragement, including financial 
encouragement, to engage in the process of job creation and training, 
whether directly or indirectly through investment in firms. A 
strengthening of the powers of local authorities is thus seen as 
important. 
The persistence of extremely high unemployment rates in 
Northern Ireland, on Merseyside and on Clydeside, along the North 
East Coast and in South Wales is a major national problem, and indeed 
a national scandal in that nothing has been done about it in six 
years of economic upswing. one is aware of course that the policies 
suggested run completely contrary to those which have been adopted, 
and those which would even be contemplated by a Government of the 
present political hue, but this is not a retreat into impracticability, 
but rather an assertion that the Government's policies are a major 
part of the problemp not a part of the solution. 
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22. See discussion in chapter 7.3. 
23. The possibility of data inaccuracies always needs to be borne 
in mind. Two main general problems may be noted, the possible 
reclassification of establishments from one minimum list heading to 
another (sometimes, but not always, reflecting a genuine change of 
activity, 6r a switch in the balance of activity in a complex 
plant), and various minor and unnotified geographical boundary 
changes. Clear instances of both types of inconsistency have been 
detected and noted in the text. Often industries which are vaguely 
described ("other "industrial engines" etc. ) are the most 
liable to reclassification. 
There are also problems to be found within particular sectors. 
It is not totally clear why figures for education (MLH 872) should 
be so erratic (see Table 8.15); under-recording is common, though. 
There is some lesser degree of suspicion, also, about some of the 
figures recorded in the construction industry; the presence of 
many small firms, and the high degree of self-employment in the 
industry, can cause problems for any Census. It might well be that, 
in the case cited in the main text, the rate of job loss in 
construction in Cleveland was substantially less than actually 
stated; this is not, however, clear and the evidence is certainly 
not strong enough to justify immediately rejecting the Census of 
Employment result. 
24. There would seem to be a general principle that the greater 
the degree of the geographical. concentration of production, the 
greater the degree of rationalisation of production that is possible. 
The instances noted in the text refer to the activities of large 
firms which dominate production in particular centres; it may also 
happen, though, that a traditional specialised industrial economy 
dominated by small producers may be rationalised through a series 
of takeovers. Thus, of the longer term trends leading. up to the 
very heavy job losses of the late 1970s, Townsend (1983 p. 111) 
notes that "led by Courtaulds, Tootal,, Carrington-Viyella and Vantona 
large corporations had bought out, rationalised and re-equipped most 
of the traditional cotton mills of Greater Manchester and Lancashire, 
and the rationalisation was now intensifiedf"" 
A thinly disguised account of the events leading up to the 
establishment of one of the major chemicals works in Cleveland (ICI, 
Wilton) is presented in Luttrell (1962 vol 2, pp. 626-635). as part of 
the most detailed existing study of industrial relocation in Britain 
during the long boom. Luttrell emphasises the many locational 
advantages of the Teesside area, in term both of physical setting 
and resource availability, and also in terms of Government assistance 
through regional policy, and labour availability. A very large and 
capital-intensive complex soon developed, and while numerous jobs 
were created in the industry, the high existing degree of capital 
intensity in itself encouraged further rounds of increased capital 
intensification to maximise the competitive advantages of a large, 
complex, multifunctional site. In such conditions jobs can be lost 
on a large scale during any economic downturn, despite high 
productivity. 
25. These difficulties, related in part to the earlier over-fishing 
of the North Sea and the resulting strict EEC quota system, may 
be seen more directly in the employment figures for MLH 003p 
fishing. In Humberside 800 jobs (28.9%) were lost in this sector in 
addition to the 2,100 jobs lost in mLH 214 (fish products, bacon 
curing and meat products). In the Grampian region 500 jobs (34.8%) 
were lost in fishing and 2,400 jobs (33.1%) lost in HLH 214. It is 
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regarded as no coincidence that Britain's two main fishing centres 
should show large negative differential shifts in MLH 214. 
26. In the early 1980s South Yorkshire County Council and 
Sheffield City Council were quite prominent in such matters as 
campaigning against Government economic policies, setting up new 
public sector employment (through for example the expansion of 
public transport, operating with a cheap fares policy) to counteract 
some of the effects of industrial job loss, initi'ýting along with 
some other Labour councils local assistance for industry along 
enterprise board principles, and so on. Such initiatives gained 
media attention; see also Chandler and Lawless (1985). 
In view of the comments made in note 33, though, the possibility 
needs to be borne in mind that the apparent increase of employment 
in local government services (MLH 906) might be spurious. Yet 
even in making such a judgment, there is the complicating factor 
that a Zarge increase in measured employment in a particular sector 
is more likely to be the result of a moderate genuine increase plus 
a spurious increase than the result of a genuine decrease plus a 
spurious increase; if the genuine trend is downwards, spurious 
increases, unless exceptionally large, would tend to be represented 
by a modest measured increase which ironically might well not 
arouse suspicion, rather than a large increase. 
For the record, South Yorkshire showed an increase in 
employment of 3,400 (23.7%) in local government, while all other 
counties in Yorkshire and Humberside showed decreases of over 10%. 
The magnitudes involved would appear to suggest both misenumeration 
and local policy effects. 
27. See notes 28 and 30. 
An important distinction needs to be drawn between multiplier 
effects and linkage effects. Linkage effects refer to reduced 
expenditure by the declining industry on the products of other local 
industries (components, machinery, etc. ), and may well lead to 
further industrial job loss. Multiplier effects refer basically 
to reduced spending in the local economy due to a reduction in wages, 
with the effetts being mainly felt in the service sector. The 
practice being followed here is to attempt to exclude linkage 
effects from multiplier calculations; any multiplier figure which 
includes linkage effects is likely to be somewhat higher. 
28. See also Kahn (1984 pp. 91-104). The context in which Kahn's 
1931 paper was written was of course one of slump and mass 
unemployment, with Kahn trying to place on a more theoretical 
footing the question of whether the Government, through a public 
works programme, could successfully intervene in the economy to 
reduce unemployment, and whether any increases in employment through 
a public works programme would be equilibriated out of existence 
(by investment simply being transferred from the public sector to 
the private sector), or whether such increases in employment would 
be mltipZied as a result of the additional expenditure generated 
by additional primary employment. Kahn argued, on macroeconomic 
grounds, that "with the building of roads9 funds are released from 
various sources at precisely the rate that is required to pay the 
cost of the roads" (Kahn 1931 p. 174): thus that the total fund 
available for investment is flexible not fixed (indeed, how 
otherwise could one comprehend fluctuations in investment through 
the business cycle? ), and that the multiplier effect is therefore dominant. 
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Kahn suggested a multiplier of about li (primary plus 
secondary changes in employment divided by primary changes), and 
that if anything the multiplier was likely to be higher than this, 
rather than lower. This is a rather higher figure than the value 
of 1.3 to 1.5 given in the current text, but it must be emphasised 
that the present work is using a much wider definition of primary 
employment change (total industrial employment change) than Kahn 
was using (employment resulting directly from a particular 
investment decision). The wide and the narrow concepts of primary 
employment change are both relevant, but to slightly different sets 
of problems. 
29. Care must be taken to avoid too rigid a use of such terms as 
first round effects, second round effects, etc. It is easy, but 
somewhat misleading, to envisage a situation in which a short term 
multiplier of (1 + 1/K) is converted to a long term multiplier of 
(1 + 1/(K-1)), as follows (for K=4) 
Round 
Jobs lost 1111 
(as fraction of primary losses) T T6- 64 
with job losses totalling 11 the primary losses. The point is that 
by redefining the "length o the round" one changes the value of 
the final long term multiplier. If for example rounds 1 and. 2 
together are treated as the first round, with a job loss of 5/16 of 
the P§ imary job loss, týe long term multiplier would be calculated 
as lf-l rather than 1ý. 
The time profile of induced job losses following a primary 
job loss event is unclear, and undoubtedly further detailed research 
is desirable. This topic has some interest for business cycle 
analysis. The implication of lagged multipliers is that the rate 
of growth of consumer demand is likely to be below average for a 
period subsequent to major industrial job losses, affectingo at the 
national scale, both industries and services. These secondary 
depressive effects imply a delay to any cyclical recovery following 
major job losses, and indeed it is arguably only after the " 
"secondary recession" is out of the way that a firm cyclical upturn 
is possible. 
3o. According to Brownrigg (1980 p. 205) a downward multiplier 
value of 2.0 is routinely used in consultancy and planning 
estimates of decline. One would expect any bias to be towards an 
overestimate, in that it is prudent to plan for the worst case, 
rather than to find that secondary employment decline is significantly 
worse than had been anticipated. Retrospective analysis indicates 
a rather lower figure for the downward multiplier; in slump-based 
analysis, for example, a multiplier between 1.2 and 1.5 has been 
suggested in a 1983 Cleveland County Council report (cited in 
Hudson, Peck and Sadler 1985 pp. 103,115), following the decline of 
the steel industry. A similar 1984 study in Barnsley (cited in 
Hudson et al, p. 115) suggested a multiplier of 1.21. These are 
broadly in line with the current findings. 
Hudson, Peck and Sadler (1985), in estimating likely 
multiplier effects of projected job losses in coal mining in 
Easington, County Durham, suggest a much higher multiplier, more in 
line with the estimates cited by Brownrigg. The methods they use 
to estimate the multiplier are highly unreliable; they simply 
compare increases in unemployment in service industries with 
increases in unemployment in non-service ., industries (Hudson et al 
1985 
pp. 114-115). This raises a number of methodological difficultiest 
not least the problem of inferring changes in employment from 
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changes in unemployment, No attempt is made to look more directly 
at changes in employment, and hence no particular credence should 
be given to this higher estimate (about 1.8) for, the income 
multiplier. 
Brown (1972 pp. 190-192) suggests a radical difference between 
the values of the short-term multiplierv calculated on the basis 
of changes in money flow, and the long-term multiplier, calculated 
on the basis of longer-term changes in regional employment structure. 
A value of about 1.2 is indicated for the short term multiplier, 
and a value of about 1.8 is indicated for the long term multiplier. 
In calculating the long-term multiplier, Brown's basic procedure 
Was to calculate employment change between 1921 and 1961 in service 
industries and in'non-service industries, and expressing these as a 
percentage of 1921 totaZ employment. From these a scatter diagram 
may be produced, the slope of the best fit line (which fits the 
data reasonably closely) indicating a multiplier of about 1.8. 
The method used by Brown for calculating the long term multiplier 
closely resembles that used in the text to calculate base-service 
multipliers for the period 1978-1981, yet the results differ 
considerably. obviously not all the indirect effects of slump-based 
industrial job loss would have been felt by September 1981, and yet 
by the same token one might expect that longer term multiplier 
effects of the 1974-76 recession, and maybe even of earlier recessions, 
would still be working themselves out during the slump. This would 
especially be the case if, as suggested by Brown, there is a major 
difference between the short-term multiplier and the long-term 
multiplier. The argument in the text is that the calculated 
multiplier value of about 1.3 is not far short of the ultimate 
multiplier value, the only basic reason why it falls short being 
that because the slump was so much more severe than earlier 
recessions, the "unfinished" job losses resulting from multiplier 
effects for job losses in the slump are greater than job losses 
resulting from longer term multiplier effects derived from earlier 
recessions. Such effects would not seem to be sufficient to explain 
a gap between multipliers of 1.3 and 1.8. 
A more subtle possibility is that spatial patterns of service 
sector employment change in any cyclical upswing reflect not only 
differential patterns of basic employment growth in the upswing, 
but also, and strongly, the patterns of relative prosperity 
established in the immediately preceding recession, and in earlier 
recessions. Such a process would be one of equilibriation, rather 
than one of direct causation. If a value of 1.3 represented the 
final value of the multiplier then this would imply sharp increases 
in the proportion of the population engaged in manufacturing in the 
more prosperous regions, and sharp decreases in the less prosperous 
regions; this polarisation does not seem to happen. One possibility 
that needs to be noted is a regionally differentiated Engel curve 
effect in which as incomes rise there is a short-term 
cross-sectional tendency for the proportion of expenditure on services 
to rise faster in high income, high growth regions, than in low 
income, low growth regions. This implies that service sector growth 
tends to be, in relative terms, attracted to prosperous regions 
and repelled from depressed regions during any cyclical upswing. 
It is possible that the difference between the short term multiplier 
and the "long terid' multiplier thus chiefly lies in differential 
employment change during a cyclical upswing; a closer study of 
structures of employment change in a cyclical upswing following a 
deep recession would appear to be desirable. 
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31. These are net changes rather than gross changes, and various 
filtering processes will take place within the local labour market. 
Furthermore, it is not certain how stable this relationshipq deduced 
from Table 7.3 for a slump period, is for a non-slump recession. 
It has already been pointed out in earlier chapters that during 
cyclical upswings migration patterns respond more to shortages of 
labour in more prosperous regions than to levels of residual 
unemployment in less prosperous regions; during recessions the 
relationships are less clear. 
Given the indirect evidence on workforce migration in Table 
7.3, and the evidence of multiplier effects in the text, the local 
labour market effects of a large job loss event in an industrial 
area may be summarised by a hypothetical example: 
Jobs Lost: 3,000 as direct result of redundancies, 
closure, etc. 
as indirect result, with 800 
jobs lost as a result of the 
industry-service multiplier, 
and perhaps 200 industrial jobs 
(depending on the strength of 
local linkages of the firm 
responsible for the primary job 
losses) also disappearing. 
+10000 
4,000 
Labour market results: 2,000 
2,000 
4,000 
increase in unemployment 
net migration as result of 
job losses 
Thus local increases in unemployment as a result of a major 
job loss decision in recession will tend to settle at about 2/3 of 
the number of primary jobs lost, while unemployment in the "rest 
of the economy" will tend to increase by about the same amount, if 
the experience of the early 1980s is to be taken as representative* 
In applying this result to a specific local situation it has to be 
remembered that unemployment may increase as a result of factors 
unconnected with the major job loss decision (e. g. the demographic 
influx of new entrants to the labour force, independent factory 
closures) so that the ratio of totaZ local increases in unemployment 
to jobs lost in a single major event will tend to be rather higher 
than 2/3. 
As illustrations consider the local labour markets of Shottong 
Corby and Consett (see also Table 7.5). In Corby, unemployment 
stood at 2,088 in December 1979,6,80,15 in September 1981 and 6,714 in 
September 1982, an increase in unemployment of aDproximately 4,700. 
Job losses in the steel industry totalled 61,500. ' In Consett 
unemployment about 5,000 jobs were lost through the closures of 
the British Steel works and the Ransome Hoffman Pollard factory# 
while unemployment increased by about 5,000. In Shotton unemployment 
increased by about 6,000, with job losses in steel making standing 
at about 8,500. In each of these relatively isolated "small town" 
travel to work areas, steel job losses and associated multiplier 
effects are primarily but not wholly responsible for the large increases in unemployment. The 2/3 ratio seems to hold reasonably 
well, though, at least as a rule of thumb. 
The tindng of the relevant labour market changes presents 
complications. In the early stages a mass redundancy might even boost the local service sector as redundancy money becomes readily 
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spent, so that there is a time lag before downward multiplier effects 
start to operate. Migration is a prolonged process, certainly not 
instantaneous, so various time lags are involved here as well. 
Since the downward effects on unemployment as a result of migration 
are perhaps twice as great as-the upward effects on unemployment as 
a result of multiplier effects, the most likely occurrence is that 
unemployment will reach an early peak as a result of job loss, then 
settle downwards slightly. Clearly, at a time of recession, 
independent'events could raise unemployment again, while any time 
"banding" of multiplier effects may also cause secondary rises in 
unemployment. 
The overall conclusion, that the effects of multipliers on 
the unemployment rate are smaller than the effects of outward 
migration following a major job loss, is perhaps of considerable 
importance in attempting to predict how local labour markets will 
behave at a time of recession. 
32. It is not clear whether the effects of selective migration on 
the multiplier have been properly considered. As a first approximation, 
the change in direct income resulting from a major job loss event 
will not be E(w-b) (change in employment multiplied by the gap 
between take-home wages and benefit), but rather EN-N-Wb)' where 
m is the increment to outward net migration, as a proportion of the 
number of jobs lost, resulting from a major job loss event. The 
value of m depends on general labour market conditions; note 31 
above implies a value of perhaps 1. 
The effects of housing market changes on local income and 
the value of the multiplier are complex. Insofar as rent is paid 
locally, depressions in the level of rent have no overall effect on 
local income; if a worker's take-home pay is expressed as d+r (where d stands for disposable income, thus take-home pay minus rent, and 
r stands for rent), and if d+r is regarded as fixed, then a change 
in r will affect merely the distribution of income between landlord 
and tenant, not the total local income. The loss of rent through 
people moving away from the area is covered in W above, it being 
assumed that rent is paid out of current income rather than savings, 
while any housing benefits paid to unemployed workers are covered 
in b above, unless housing benefits are paid out of the Zoca4 tax 
base. In the owner-occupied sector, the implications of major 
localised joblosses are complex. Clearly such job losses will tend 
to depress house prices, and to the extent to which the expenditure 
of owner occupiers relates to the value of capital assets as well 
as to current income this will depress local expenditure. Yet 
there are also ways in which a local depression in house prices can 
actually increase local expenditure, especially if it should be 
the case that a slack demand for local housing merely increases 
the time it takes for occupied property to be sold, rather than 
leads to an increase in empty property. Thus if an emigrant sells 
at a depressed price and buys somewhere else at a non-depressed 
price, this will tend to reduce non-housing expenditure in the 
recipient area, while if an incomer sells at a non-depressed price 
and buys at a depressed price, this will tend to increase non-housing 
expenditure in the local area. 
All this shows that the ramifications of job loss and migration 
on the local economy are complex. 
A final point needs to be added. It is perhaps slightly 
unfair to Brownrigg (1980) to imply that he compZeteZy neglected 
the question of migration, as a close reading of his text shows that 
the matter is considered briefly in a footnote (Brownrigg 1980 
pp. 209-210), with Brownrigg acknowledging that migration effects 
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will tend to increase the value of the multiplier. Evidently 
though Brownrigg assumes 'the effects to be relatively small, 
insufficient to overturn his conclusions that employment multiplier 
effects-are much smaller than is generally allowed for. This 
represents, it would seem, another case of an academic writer 
underestimating the significance of net migration flows in labour 
market analysis; see'Green, Owen et al (1986) for another example, 
with Gordon (1986) providing a relevant critical comment. It 
cannot be emphasised too strongly that while net migration flows 
are small in relation to the total population they are large in 
relation to unenployment levels or to changes in employment, and are 
highly sensitive to labour market changes. Migration is not an 
optional extra, but is a very important component of the labour 
market response to primary employment change, and affects both 
employment and unemployment levels. 
33. It appears, on further checking, that the claim in the text, 
while still being plausible, is not fully substantiable from Census 
of Employment data, in that there are some considerable erratics in 
figures. for employment in national and local government service, with 
Shotton showing an apparent employment increase of ý7%, and 
employment decreases of 55% and 31% being shown in Corby and Ebbw 
Vale respectively. At the time of writing the main text9 the author 
had to hand only the figures for steel towns in the Northern region 
and Yorkshire and Humberside, and these indeed show consistent 
negative differential shifts (although in retrospect figures for 
Scunthorpe may be seen as anomalous). Despite first impressions* 
therefore, it has not been concZusiveZy shown that in the cases being 
considered major job loss depresses employment in the public services 
(supply effects), rather than increases such employment (demand 
effects). The balance of probabilities would suggest, however, 
that the supply side effects dominate, though a closer examination 
is required. 
In contrast with education, it is noticeable that anomalies 
in employment figures for national and local government are often 
conspicuous at the level of the travel to work area, but relatively 
inconspicuous at the county level. This might possibly be held to 
imply that some of the anomalies may have arisen from inconsistencies 
in the enumeration of county council activity across district 
council boundaries. 
34. Annual estimates of population in each local authority area 
in England and Wales, updated to take account of the 1981 Censusp 
have been published in OPCS Monitor PPZ 8412 (March 1984), and updated 
in the annual PopuZation and VitaZ Statistics. It is noticeable 
that major conurbations had both declining employment (chapter 6) 
and declining population in the 1970s, while other declining 
industrial areas (e. g. Cleveland) had stable population levels. 
Between 1973 and 1978 population declinedo according to the 
estimates, by 5.6% in Greater London, by 3.0% in the West Midlands 
Metropolitan County, by 0.7% in West Yorkshire, by 0.8% in South 
Yorkshire, by 2.6% in Greater Manchesterv by 4.3% in Merseyside and 
by 2.3% in Tyne and Wear. Faster rates of decline can be measured 
in the major cities of each conurbation, e. g. 7.7% in Liverpool 
and 9.2% in Manchester. Undoubtedly these falling p*opulation figures 
reflect declining employment opportunities, including declining 
opportunities in the local service sector as a result of downward 
multipliers. The declining popuZation figures though themselves imply 
a further period of relative decline in the local service sector, 
going beyond the immediate multiplier effect, To attempt to measure 
such effects, given the complexity of leads and lags and cyclical 
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movements involved, would be a complicated task. 
35. The classic theoretical outline of 19th century agglomeration 
is Veber (1909/1929). Weber notes firstly that technical factors 
(notably the locations of raw materials and markets) delimit the 
feasible locations for production, and secondly that once the original 
locational framework has been developed, economic activity will 
tend to agglomerate in specified centres where a high level of 
economic activity is already taking place, thus facilitating new 
economic activity. Hence industrialisation and urbanisation were, 
in the 19th century, complementary processes. Indeed Weber in his 
introduction (pp. 2-3) clearly indicates his intention to relate 
urbanisation to the geography of production. 
Moving on to late 20th century conditions, industrial 
employment in major urban areas in advanced industrial economies 
has-shown a marked industrial decline. How should this be 
conceptualised? Weber notes (pp. 131-134) the possibility of 
I'deglomeration" in which increased land costs make production more 
expensive for certain producers inside the agglomeration economy 
than outside. One can identify an urban-rural shift when 
deglomerative diseconomies for the city-as a whole exceed 
agglomeration economies; indeed if the opportunity cost of producing 
in a congested city location rather-than an open greenfield 
location is taken into account, the analysis of Fothergill and 
Gudgin (1982) follows Weber in'important-respects. Undoubtedly 
deglomeration effects are important in several instances, although 
the conclusion of the present author is that they are not as dominant 
as Fothergill and Gudgin suppose. What is involved is, in many 
cases, the geography of recession rather than the geography of 
deglomeration; older urban based industries decay under intensifying 
economic pressure, rather than decamp. 
36. There may, of course by significant exceptions in the short 
run, for example the high rates of job loss in electrical * engineering Lck in 1974-76, largely as a result of the "global shift" (D: * en 1986) 
of assembly production to low wage countries (chapter 6.7(i) above), 
and the high rates of job loss in the vehicles industry, largely as 
-a result of competitive weakness, during the slump. During most 
recessions, including the slump, job losses tend to be faster 
overall in "old" industries (e. g. textiles, coal, iron and steel) 
than in "new" industries (e. g. electrical engineering). 
37. A much more detailed account of recession and slump in the 
West Midlands conurbation is presented in Spencer et al (1986 
especially pp. 52-112). Emphasis there was placed on the relatively 
narrow range of industries and the high concentration of control 
of the local industrial economy by a relatively few corporations, 
most of which were in economic difficulties by the late 1970s. 
Added to the problem was the high degree of interlinkage between the 
industrial sectors of the West Midlands economy such that if there is 
a strong recession in the "downstread' part of-the industrial economyo 
in this case vehicles, problems were created - "upstread'. (Spencer et al 
1986, p. 56). British Leyland was by-this time in severe financial 
difficulties, with various rescue plans already having bien 
undertaken in the 1970s and various rationalisation decisions being 
by 1979 imminent (Bhaskar 1979 pp. 161-! -203). -' 
The shift-share analysis presented in Spencer et al (1986 
pp. 59-62) is puzzling in that the results do not'correspond with 
those in the present text, based on the NOMIS system, and using a 
Minimum List Heading disaggregation. Figures for employment change 
are identical, but the Spencer et al study indicates far greater 
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negative differential shiftsv both in manufacturing (-429300 
compared with -13,000) and in total (-54*400 compared , with -16,800) than does the present study. The difference is that the University 
of Birmingham study has conducted a shift share analysis on the 
basis of SIC Orders rather than Minimum List Readings. That this 
apparently trivial distinction can make a major difference can be 
shown by considering the vehicles sector: 
Differential shift 
on Order basis on MLH basis 
380 Wheeled tractor manuf. -5,200 -2,200 
381 Motor vehicle manuf. -8,200 +100 
382 Motor cycle, pedal cycle, manuf. -10100 -700 
383 Aerospace +200 -3,800 
384 Locomotive and railway track eq. -100 -100 
385 Railway carriages, etc, +600 +200 
-13,800 -6,500 
Conducting a shift-share analysis on an SIC order basis 
ignores the point that the West Midlands not only has a high 
concentration of employment in the vehicles industry, it also has a 
high concentration of employment in the more vuZnerabZe parts of the 
vehicle industry. In calculating a shift-share analysis, it is 
preferable if at all possible to use a fine disaggregation of the 
data; it is not clear whether the University of Birmingham team 
had data at the MLH level available. - 
There is also the rather strange comment in the Birmingham 
report that "the county's employment record is shown to have been 
better than the national one over 1971-8 but markedly worse over 
1978-81" (Spencer et al 1986 p. 61) when the figures presented 
instead show strong negative structural shifts and strong negative 
differential shifts for the earZier period, implying a considerably 
worse than average performance. Close analysis of the text appears 
to suggest that the relevant author in the Birmingham team believes 
that the national component measures whether a local area is 
performing better or worse than the national economy. If this is 
the case, this shows elementary misunderstanding of shift-share 
analysis since the national component refers to what is happening 
to nationaZ employment, with no reference to local deviations from 
national trends. 
38. A crucial distinction, not made by Fothergill and Gudgin 
(1982) is here made between suburbanisation and the urban-rural 
shift proper. The point at issue is the definition of a conurbation. 
Standard geographical dictionaries (e. g. Johnston 1981p Clark 1985, 
Small and Witherick 1986) define "conurbation" in terms of a 
continuous built up area, often resulting from the coalescence of 
smaller settlements. Such a definition is unsatisfactory in three 
ways. Firstly it implies that the word "conurbation" is simply a 
long-winded word for "city". Sedondlys most of the officially 
defined British conurbations would not be conurbations according 
to the dictionary definition, because of the presence of open space 
between several of the major towns of. the conurbation (e. g. between 
Bradford and Leeds). Thirdly, as implied in the official definition$ 
the area economically wholly dominated by a dense cluster of 
settle , ments 
is generally greater than the built-up area itself, 
consisting in part of rural infilling between towns, and in part of 
a semi-urban fringe on the edge of the main built-up-zone. 
It is very important to keep a conceptual distinction between 
the terms "city" and "conurbation", as outlined in chapter 6.4(iii) 
above. From this, a definition of suburbanisation-arises; the 
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decentralisation of activity from the existing city as it stands to 
less urbanised parts of the conurbation, often but not exclusively 
at the edge of the conurbation. The term "urban-rural shift" is 
reserved for instances in which less urbanised areas away from the 
conurbation grow more quickly than the conurbation itself. 
If a situation arises, as illustrated in the text, in which 
there is a large negative differential shift in zone 1, the existing 
city, an approximately equivalent positive differential shift in 
zone 2, a less urbanised zone immediately adjacent to the existing 
city, and a broadly neutral differential shift in zone 3, a less 
urbanised zone beyond zone 2, this would appear to represent strong 
evidence that zone 2 should be regarded as a "suburban" part of the 
conurbation. This applies to large parts of Warwickshire, Hereford 
and Worcester, and also to the commuter belt around London 
(section 8.8 below). 
39. Comparable instances may be noted for the chemicals industry 
on Teesside (see Luttrell 1962 vol 2 pp. 633-634) and the vehicles 
industry on Merseyside. Finding adequate labour supplies would have 
been a considerable problem for firms contemplating major investment 
projects at times of full employment. 
4o. For example, at June 1966 unemployment in Merseyside and Prescot 
Development District stood at 14,068 (2.3%). Higher unemployment 
rates were recorded in the Welsh Valleys, but with far smaller 
numbers being involved, and often spread across a large number of 
small towns and large villages, for example 1,182 (4.5%) in the 
Rhondda, 964 (4.1%) in Merthyr Tydfil, Dowlais and Treharrisp 
951 (3.6%) in Bargoed, Blackwood, Pontlottyn and Ystrad Mynach and 
1,047 (2.6%) in Ebbw Vale, Abertillery, Brynmawr, Newbridge and 
Tredegar (all figures from Gazette, July 1966). 
41. Sep Garside (1980 pp. 9-61) and Buxton and MacKay (1977 
pp. 55-58). 
Given that the coverage of the Unemployment Insurance scheme 
was weighted, before 1948, towards occupations with a relatively 
high risk of job loss, and excluded large parts of the service 
sector, any percentage rate of job loss recorded in the Unemployment 
Insurance statistics is likely to be exaggerated, to an unknown 
degree. As a working assumption, open to later amendmento one can 
suggest that employment levels remained broadly stable among the 
uninsured section of the population. The following calculations may 
then be made: 
County Durham Glamorgan 
1929 1931 1929 1931 
Insured employment '(000s) 337.7 269.5 267.2 2o3.3 
Uninsured employment (000s) 190.0 190.0 199.7 199.7 
Total employment (000s) 527.7 459.5 466.9 403.0 
Change M -12.8 -13.7 
Sources: Insured employment from Beck (1951 Table 17). Total 
employment from the 1931 Census. Uninsured 
employment calculated by subtraction. 
These figures, which present a minimwn rate of jot, loss, 
indicate a very slightly higher rate of job loss during the main 
part of the early 1930s slump than for the most depressed counties 
in the main part of the early 1980s slump. However, the assumption 
than uninsured employment remained relatively stable is not 
watertight in that: 
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(a) Multiplier effects need to be considered. 
(b) The long-term consolidation of high incomeq non-insured, 
employment in the core regions, implying a negative 
differentiil shift in the periphery, also needs to be 
considered. 
(c) Agriculture was an uninsured industry, liable to depression 
(see for example Whetham 1976 pp. 226-240, especially 
p. 236), although not to such a great extent as in other 
countries. Agricultural employment nationally fell by 
perhaps 7% between 1929 and 1931 (calculated from 
Whetham p. 236), although this tended to affect rural 
counties in the East rather than the industrial areas. 
(d) Workers aged between 14 and 16 were not insured, and 
although the youth labour market was, in contrast with 
current conditions, more resilient than the adult labour 
market, job losses might well be expected in this part 
of the uninsured sector. 
If one suggests that, in Durham and Glamorgan at leasts 
uninsured employment fell numerically by about a third of the fall in insured employment, then employment declines of 16.6% and 17.5% 
may be estimated for Durham and Glamorgan respectively. This "compromise estimate" still represents a significantly higher rate 
of job loss than in the corresponding stages of the early 1980s 
slump, yet with a much lesser gap than implied by the Unemployment 
Insurance statistics. 
42. Reference is made here to Ellen Wilkinson IIP's classic work 
on Jarrow, The Town That Was Murdered (Wilkinson 1939). Wilkinson 
refers not just to the shipbuilding depressions of the 1920s and 
1930s, but also to the longer term history of industrialisation and 
deindustrialisation in Jarrow. The process of industrialisation was, 
as Wilkinson emphasises, not smooth, with intense industrial conflict both in the coal mines in the early 19th century and in the 
shipyards, and with cyclical fluctuations in shipbuilding being 
particularly severe. There was much poverty, even in the "good 
times", although of course poverty was endemic in the Victorian 
economy rather than specific to Jarrow. 
Clearly such a book could have been written "of many other 
towns in Lancashire, in West Cumberland, in Scotland and South 
Wales. The outline would be the same. The human tragedy very 
similar. Only the details of the background would differ with the 
differences in the industry, cotton instead of shipbuildingi 
hematite instead of coal" (Wilkinson 1939 p. 273). Such a book 
could still be written, about the rise and fall of a steel town 
such as Consett, an industrial new town such as Irvine, a coal town 
such as Mexborough or even a large city such as Middlesbrough or 
Liverpool. In the present text it is not possible, regrettably, 
to delve far into local history; all that can be provided is the 
synoptic view. 
43. Thus, shifts per annum in thousands were as follows: 
Structural Differential 
1971-78 1978-81 1971-78 1978-81 
Tyne and Wear -o. 5 +0.3 -1.4 -11.0 
Strathclyde +o. 3 -1.9 -9.6 -11.5 Merseyside -1.1 +0.2 -6.9 -11.2 
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(Sources: Table 8.17; Census of Employment 1978,1981). 
One would expect differential shifts to become more intense 
in a time of slump; allowing for this effect, only Tyne and Wear 
of the three conurbations noted had a really severe deterioration 
in its differential performance during the slump; in the other two 
cases negative differential shifts were firmly established before 
the slump. 
44. See also Robinson, Wren and Goddard (1987 pp. 4-25) . where both 
the importance of expansion of public sector services in the 1970s 
in covering up the effects of industrial job loss, and the impact 
of recession after 1978, are stressed. 
45. The decline of Clydeside's "heavy" industrial base in the 
1960s and earlyý1970s has been noted by Lever and Mather (1986)9 
along with the point that after 1978 employment in such sectors fell 
sharply nationally but even more sharply on Clydeside. 
46. To some extent this point is made rhetorically, in that it 
is very difficult to make a definitive assessment of where the 
boundaries of a conurbation lie, especially in a region with a high 
density of industrialisation away from the main ýities. Maybe 
it seems artificial to draw a distinction between the Clydeside 
conurbation and the rest of the West Central Scotland industrial 
region, when on a-reasonably broadly based definition of the 
conurbation, only the Ayrshire towns, and arguably some of the towns 
on the lower Clyde (Greenock/Port Glasgow, Helensburgh, possibly 
Dumbarton) could be regarded as outside the conurbation. It seems 
artificial, for example, to draw a line across the narrow gap between 
East Kilbride, Hamilton, Motherwell on one side and Glasgow on the 
other, to provide a balance between the conurbation and the rest of 
the region. Possibly a large part of Strathclyde's severe regional 
problem is due to the extent to which industrial development has 
been compressed, through reasons of topography, into a relatively 
small area, leading to the effects of any urban-rural shift working 
strongly against the sub-region. 
Strathclyde poses genuine problems for the researcher trying 
to untangle the separate effects of urban structure and of regional 
structure on economic change. Spatially, the conurbation is much 
smaller than the region, but the bulk of the land outside the 
conurbation is hilly, even mountainous, and sparsely settled. 
Economically, conurbation and region are virtually identical. Maybe 
it would make sense to adopt a different regional subdivision of 
Scotland, and instead of dividing between Strathclyde and the rest 
of Scotland, one could make the division between the South of 
Scotland (the Central Valley plus Fife and points south) and the 
North of Scotland (containing Dundee and Aberdeen, but otherwise 
fairly sparsely populated). Then one could interpret the "drift to 
the east". from the Clyde valley to the Forth Valley, as an intra- 
regional driftq towards less congested areasq rather than an 
inter-regional shift. If one compares the eastern and western 
parts of central Scotland, the fact that the Clydeside conurbation 
has been more severely affected than Edinburgh is not the result of 
Clydeside being more congested, but rather the result of Clydeside 
being heavily industrialised and Edinburgh being a service based 
economy, 
47. The significance of earlier branch plant movement into 
Merseyside has been noted elsewhere (chapters 5 and 6 above, Keeble 
1976, Rodgers 1980b). Indeed Rodgers, with an element of hyperbolet 
wrote of an "economic miracle" on Merseyside (see chapter 6 note 22), 
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when what was happening was basically that new employers moved in 
to fill a large vacuum in theJob market resulting from employment 
decline in the port industries, plus a high natural demographic 
growth rate. This was at a time when nationally labour was scarce. 
Bristow (1987 p. 129) presents an oversimplified picture when 
he argues that"Ithe specific causes of (Merseyside's) malaise 
centre on the postwar contraction of the port of Liverpool". This 
would be parallel to arguing that the problems of County Durham and 
of South Wales in the 1980s result from the decline of the coal 
industry. The problems of high unemployment in such areas result 
only to a limited extent from the decline of the traditional industries, 
but to a far greater extent to the decline of the incoming industries 
which replaced the traditional industries. Merseyside during the 
slump undoubtedly showed major employment decline in traditional 
industries, but to a lesser extent than, for example, Greater 
Manchester, West Yorkshire or South Yorkshire. Employment in 
Merseyside's port industries (MLH 705t 706) fell by 28.2% between 
1978 and 1981, but the numerical fall-in employment, at -5,900,, 
was not much greater than in a single "new" industryl telegraph and 
telephone apparatus (MLH 363; -401009 -42.6%). 
The "crisis of the branch plant economy" represents a three 
stage process: 
1 Decline of traditional industries 
2 Replacement of old industries by new, incoming industries 
setting up. branch plants 
3 The decline of the branch plant industrial economy 
By this means the depressed region problem transmits itself 
through time, even though at stage 2 it might well have appeared 
that the regional problem had been "solved". It is argued that 
despite considerable differences in urban setting, the three stage 
process above applies to Merseyside as much, or nearly as much, as to 
the coalfields of South Wales and North East England. The main 
difference is that the problems of the old exporting coalfields 
are predominantly of stage 3, while Merseyside has a complicated mix 
of stage 1 and stage 3 problems. 
48. See note 46 above. Merseyside is regarded as being very much 
part of the North West regional economy; there seems to be no 
sensible way in which one could regard the North West as split into 
discrete Manchester and Merseyside regions. There is no real 
parallel with the Strathclyde case where the conurbation in effect 
is equivalent to the region. 
49. Agricultural machinery (MLH 331) excluded. 
Negative differential shifts in mechanical engineering were 
also prominent in Strathclyde (-9,100, or -0.9%)q Tyne and Wear 
(-4,700, or -0.9%). West Yorkshire (-3,0009 or -0.3%) and the West 
Midlands (-6,400, or -0.5%). but less prominent in regionally 
subdominant conurbations such as South Yorkshire (+lo300, +0.2%), 
Merseyside (-1,700, -0.3%) or Cleveland (-7609 -0.3%). This is a 
clear reversal of patterns since the 1970-72 recession (chapter 
6.5(iii) above) in which job losses in mechanical engineering were 
relatively slight in the main conurbations of the industrial regionso 
the traditional centres of the industry, but severe elsewhere. 
Clearly a decade of severe urban industrial decline has significantly 
eroded the strategic importance of the main regional conurbations 
insofar as the mechanical engineering industry is concerned. 
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5o. Most obviously between Hertford/Harlow (note 90) and, within 
a single county, Kelso/Eyemouth. In these cases, it seems probable 
that a Jobcentre area, or a number of Jobcentre areas, have been 
transferred from one travel to work area to another. Some of the 
more subtle boundary changes are very difficult to detect and, as in 
the case noted in the text, rely on matching changes in individual 
MLHs in adjoining counties. 
51. See Table 8.9, which shows that outside the iron and steel 
sector, employment fell by 5.8%, within the range of group 2 
experience, rather than by 7.9% as actually recorded. 
On a travel to work area basis, Corby had a drop in 
manufacturing employment of 6,700 (-43.2%), almost entirely accounted 
for by steel, and a decline in total employment of 8,100 (-29.5%)* 
Elsewhere in the county, Northampton showed a "South Eastern" 
profile with very slight net job losses (-7.7% in manufacturing, 
-2.3% in total), while smaller centres showed an "East Midland" 
profile with moderate job losses. In Kettering, manufacturing 
employment fell by 15.5%, close to the national average despite the 
problems of the footwear industry, while total employment fell by 
7.3%. In Wellingborough and Rushden manufacturing employment fell 
by 20.5% and total employment fell by 8.8%. Separate figures for 
Wellingborough and Rushden are subject to boundary reclassification; 
it is unlikely that an increase of 12.6% in service sector employment 
and a 3.6% increase in total employment in Wellingborough is 
compatible with a 20.5% decline in service sector employment, and a 
26.0% decline in total employment in Rushden. It is possible that 
Northampton travel to work area has also been slightly affected by 
a realighment of boundaries and a "transfer" of employment from 
Wellingborough; to check this it would be necessary to attempt to 
find mismatches at the Minimum List Heading level (major employment 
increases in one area, major employment decline in a neighbouring 
area). This checking has not been done, since only a relatively 
minor point is involved. 
52. See the more detailed discussion in note 63 below. 
53. The differential shift in manufacturing stood at -320500 in 
Strathclyde, -23,500 in Greater Manchesterg -19,500 in Merseyside, 
-13,000 in the West Midlands County and -9p8OO in Tyne and Wear. 
Positive differential shifts in Hereford and Worcester (+6,500) and 
Warwickshire (+7,900) cancel out the negative differential shift in 
the Metropolitan County; later discussion suggests that this 
indicates a process of suburbanisation of the West Midlands 
conurbation. In other group 4 counties, positive differential shifts 
are very slight in relation to the negative differential shifts in 
the conurbations noted above. Thus, Powys had a differential shift 
of +1,100, Central region one of +2,600 and Cumbria one of +3,400. 
Numerically high positive different shifts in manufacturing tended 
to be recorded in counties of medium urbanisation, e. g. +8,500 in 
Leicestershire and +6,700 in Lancashire. 
54. In motor vehicle manufacturing (MLH 380) there were 26,900 jobs in Bedfordshire in 1978, but employment in this sector fell by 
10,300 (-38.1%) between 1978 and 1981. In 1978 the vehicles sector 
accounted for nearly a third of Bedfordshire's total manufacturing 
employment. 
55. Cheshire is taken here as being part of group 2b rather than as 
part of group 1, as indicated in Table 8.70 since underrecording of 
job loss in the education sector (Table 8.15) is held to have 
exaggerated the recorded rate of job loss. 
ICL 
56. It is assumed that there has been a reclassification in 
Leicestershire from industrial engines (MLH 334), where 800 jobs 
were recorded as lost ,a dif f erential shif t of -1,300, to industrial 
plant and steelwork (MLH 341), where a growth of 1,100 jobs, 
representing a differential shift of +1,200, was recorded. In Fife, 
it is assumed that there has been a reclassification between 
electronic computers (MLH 366), with a recorded job loss of 2,100 
and a differential shift of -2,800, and radio, radar and electronic 
capital goods, with a recorded growth of 2,600 jobs, and a 
differential shift of +2,600. 
57. In Humberside the manufacturing sectors with differential 
shifts of -1,000 or worse were general chemicals (MLH 271) (-2,400 
jobs, differential shift of -1,700), bacon curing, meat and fish 
products (MLH 214) (-2,100 jobs, differential shift of -1,400), 
1tother machinery" (MLH 339) (-1,700 jobs, differential shift of 
-1,300), shipbuilding and ship repairing (MLH 371) (-1,900 jobs, 
differential shift of -1,200) and "other chemical industries" (11LH 
279) (-1,400 jobs, differential shift of -1,100), although in 
this last case it is likely that there has been a reclassification 
from MLH 272, pharmaceutical chemicals. Many "smaller" industries 
showed employment growth and positive differential shifts. 
In Staffordshire the following manufacturing sectors had 
differential shifts of worse than -1,000; pottery (MLH 462) (-10,200 
jobs, differential shift of -3,400), "other machinery" (MLH 399) 
(-2,200 jobs, differential shift of -1,600), "other mechanical 
engineering n. e. s. 11 (-1,500 jobs, differential shift of -1,500), 
brewing and malting (-1,800 jobs, differential shift of -1,500) and 
"other printing, publishing, bookbinding" (MLH 489) (-1,000 jobs, 
differential shift of -1,400). There were large positive differential 
shifts in several sectors, notably electrical machinery (MLH 361) 
(+1,100 jobst differential shift of +2,300), "other electrical 
goods" (MLH 369) (+1,400 jobs, differential shift of +2,200) and 
metal working machine tools (MLH 332) (+1,900 jobs, differential 
shift of +2,000). 
58. It is quite likely, but not certain, that the "growth" in 
MLH 341 resulted from a reclassification; see note 56 above. There 
seems no reason to doubt the far larger recorded growth in HLH 218. 
59. The reclassification in Fife suggested in note 56 has been 
assumed, and the word "computers" has been used to refer to 
electronic computers or radio, radar and electronic capital goods. 
There can be very little doubt that such a reclassification has 
indeed taken place in the official figures, while there is rather 
more scope for doubt in the Leicestershire case (notes 56,58). 
6o. Such a strategy is also suggested by Warren (1980d pp. 357-359) 
who notes (p. 357) that "there are undoubtedly superb growth 
prospects in the Cardiff-Chepstow lowland belt. " The thinking behind 
such a suggestion is that spatial policy is likely to be far more 
effective if it runs with the tide, building up investment in the 
most favoured parts of each "problem region" rather than against 
the tide, trying to stem decline in declining areas. To try to 
direct investment to areas in which the long term decline has been 
heaviest increases the risk that investment and employment built up 
during an upswing will be destroyed a few recessions later. This 
should not be taken to preclude the possibility that some areas 
which have had particularly heavy job losses in some industries 
might well be suitable long term growth centres for other industries. 
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The experiences of the 1974-76 recession and the 1979-83 
slump_would appear to indicate that a policy of concentrating 
assistance on the most depressed areas does not solve the problem 
of the long run vulnerability of the depressed areas, but can 
instead often intensify the problem of cyclical vulnerability by 
attracting the development of factories which are often marginal 
to the firm involved and which are not deeply-rooted in the local 
economy. Thus despite regional policy, and-indeed partly because 
of the way that regional policy has functioned, spatial patterns of 
recession have been remarkably similar in the post-1929 and post-1979 
slumps. In particular, South Wales and North East England were very 
badly affected by both slumps. 
There is of course no simple cure for the-regional problem, 
but at least attention ought to be given to this question of the 
accidental perpetuation of vulnerability. Fortunately, in any 
depressed industrial region one can usually identify a corridor 
with rather more favourable growth possibilities. Furthermore, 
such corridors will tend, under current conditions, to have relatively 
high unemployment rates as a result of migratory equilibriation 
so that to encourage the development of such corridors will not 
merely be pusing employment into areas which already have low 
unemployment. In South Wales, the possibilities of developing 
the north side of the Mouth of the Severn have been noted, by Warren 
(1980d) and others. In the North West it would make strategic 
sense to pay particular attention to the area to, the South of 
Liverpool and Manchester, from perhaps Warrington to Chester and 
Crewe and including some of the southern suburbs of Manchester. In 
the North East the development of a Washington-Darlington corridor, 
perhaps even stretching south into North Yorkshire, would appear 
to offer the most secure geographical prospects for stable 
employment growth. As far as the major cities are concerned, it is 
difficult to suggest any other possibility than that they should find 
their own natural level of employment, with the provisos that firstly 
the attempt is made to generate employment in towns closer to the 
city, to facilitate migration and to help drain pools of unemploymentp 
and secondly, and importantly, that local authorities are given 
greater powers to generate local employment, with substantial 
redistribution of resources from areas with low unemployment to 
areas with high unemployment. 
61. Cha4ion, Clegg and Davies (1977). 
62. This time-lag is fairly well known; Schaffer (1972) gives some 
examples, mostly involving the provision of public services. Similar 
problems are involved almost anywhere where population is expanding 
very rapidly, for example London's new suburbs between the wars, 
London Dockland at present and large numbers of housing estates 
of various sizes. 
In percentage terms the service sector-in new towns will 
expand very rapidly in the early stages of development, yet 
numerically it might well happen that the main growth takes place 
significantly later. 
63. No attempt is made to cover in detail employment change in 
tourist areas. One problem is that it can often be very difficult 
to separate out employment catering for a tourist market from 
employment catering for a local market; this is particularly a 
problem in retail distribution and in "other services" (MLH 899). 
Differential shifts in NLHs 884 and 885 (hotels, other residential 
establishments; restaurants, cafes and snack bars) appear to be a 
good indicator of the state of the domestic tourist industry, 
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indicating differences in economic performance betweeng for example, 
city centre restaurants and hotels, and seaside resort restaurants 
and hotels. 
A summary of performances of these sectors in Cornwall, 
Gwynedd and the Isle of Wight, along with some other counties with 
a large tourist industry, is presented below. 
County Employment in HLHs 884,885 Differential shift 1978-f 
as % of county total(1978) (000s) (% of total 
employment in 
county) 
Cornwall 8.5 -1,300 -1.0 
Gwynedd 9.2 -1-000 9 -1.4 Isle of Wight 12.0 100 -o. 3 
Devon 5.8 -900 -0.3 
West Sussex 3.2 -600 -o. 3 
East Sussex 4.1 +200 +0.1 
North Yorkshire 4.9 -1,600 -o. 7 
Cumbria 3.8 +200 +0.1 
The impression given is that a high concentration of employment 
in tourism in these counties was a drag on employment; rates of job 
loss in these MLHs were characteristically around 152, the same rate 
as the decline of employment in manufacturing. It is true that the 
1978 Census of Employment was taken in June while the 1981 Census was 
taken in September, but this does not seem to bias the results to 
any significant extent, in that both months are only slightly removed 
from the peak of the tourist season in late July and*August. 
Much publicity has been given by the Government to rising 
employment in the tourist sector since the slump, but the present 
author gains the impression that the main growth of employment and 
self-employment in hotels, guest houses, restaurants, etc., is often 
not so much in-traditional resort centres but in various ' 
inland 
areas where the tourist industry had not firmly established itself 
by 1979. 
64. It is difficult to produce a wholly satisfactory set of 
definitions for "urbanised". "less urbanised" and "rural" counties; 
for example, it is hard to agree with Keeble (1980c) that Cleveland 
should be regarded as a "less urbanised" county, though this 
classification follows from his definitions. At a crude conurbation/ 
non-conurbation level, the following patterns of employment change in 
manufacturing between 1978 and 1981 are to be found: - 
% emp. change in manufacturing, 
1978-81 
South Midlands "North" North-South shift 
Conurbations -12.8 -23.2 -22.8 -10.0 
Non-conurbations -10.2 -16.0 -15.8 -5.6 "Urban-rural" shift -2.6 -7.2 -7.0 
Job loss in manufacturing was fastest in conurbations outside 
Southern England, then in non-conurbations outside Southern Englando 
then in London, then in non-conurbations in Southern England. 
Thus North-South status was the primary determinant of employment 
change during the slump, and urban-rural status the secondary 
determinant. In terms of rates of employment change in manfuacturing, 
the Midlands were virtually indistinguishable from the North, once 
urban composition has been taken into account, though such results 
do not apply to the Post-slump period (note 84 below). 
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65. This anomaly relates purely to medical and dental services; 
no other sector shows a large decline in employment in Warwickshire 
and a large increase in employment in the West Midlands Metropolitan 
County. It is quite possible that the anomaly results from differences 
in administrative zones used by the Department of Employment and the 
National Health Service, with in one year no correction being made 
for such differences. 
66. At the level of the travel to work area, Kidderminster had 
a drop in employment of 8.8% between 1978 and 1981. In the south of 
the county employment either increased or stayed stable (+7.2% in 
Evesham, -0.3% in Worcester, +2.0% in Redditch). Gloucestersh ' 
ire, 
the county to the South, showed a job loss of 0.4%. In the rural 
west, the old Herefordshire, modest employment declineswere recorded 
(-2.9% in Hereford, -2.9% in Ross-on-Wye, but +0.9% in Ledbury). 
This suggests that Hereford and Worcester hadv in common with 
Warwickshire, a "Southern England" profile of job loss in many 
respects, It was noticeable in 1980 that increases in unemployment 
in Hereford and Worýester were much slower than in the rest of the 
West Midlands region. 
67. 
.A reclassification from MLH 339 (other machinery) to IILH 337 (mechanical handling equipment) is assumed; the former MLH is shown 
as losing 1,300 jobs and the latter MLH as gaining 1,000 jobs. 
Otherwise the largest differential shift in Hereford and Worcester 
was in MLH 214 (bacon curing, meat and fish products) in which 
employment increased by 500, a differential shift of +800. 
68. See the more detailed discussion in chapter 9. 
69. The similarities in performance cannot be traced back 
convincingly to before the slump since two of the counties had 
favourable employment performances between 1971 and 1978, while 
the other two suffered severe job losses. The respective changes in 
employment were Avon, +4.0%; Lothian, +3.0%; South Glamorgan, -5.6%; 
Greater London, -7.0%. Specific reasons may be noted for the poor 
employment performance of the latter two counties, in that reýional 
policy tended to divert employment away from the Cardiff area and 
into the more heavily assisted neighbouring counties, while the "land 
squeeze" in London was a potent factor. Yet when the slump came and 
the relative importance of these special factors weakened, all the 
service cities appeared to be fairly well insulated from slump. 
7o. In principle, export base theory is simple and, mostlYP 
uncontroversial. The difficulties cow with interpretation. There 
can be little doubt that exports have a favourable multiplier effect 
on non-exporting, local, economic activity, with the size of the 
multiplier depending on the rate of leakage of income as a result of 
purchases from outside the area made by those earning in the 
non-exporting sector. This is merely a standard macroeconomic 
result. 
The problem with export base theory, as it has commonly been 
used, is indicated by the common usage of the term "base-service" 
multiplier (as in, for exampleg Pfouts 1960), with the implication 
that the service sector is essentially passive. As Lee (1984 
pp. 139-140) points out, this implication is also to be found in 
many standard works on the economic history of 18th and 19th century 
Britain, with the result that the autonomous development of the 
London service economy has been largely ignored in the literature. 
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The implications of seeing processes in terms of a base- 
service multiplier may readily be tabulated: 
Basic Local 
Export industries Industries producing for local consumption 
Services 
The problem with export base theoryg interpreted in base- 
service terms, is that it concentrates wholly on visible trade (the 
export and import of goods) but ignores invisible trade (the balance 
of payments on services, the repatriation of profits, etc. ). This 
is a major omission. Indeed one could even define "core" and 
"periphery" in terms of whether the balance of invisible trade is in 
surplus (core) or in deficit (periphery) in the long run. Such a 
definition still has elements of approximation about it (for example, 
should an area with a heavy dependence on tourism necessarily be 
classified as a core area? ), yet it is difficult to think of a way of 
defining core and periphery in a way which is both simple and comes 
closer to the economic essentials. On such a definition it is also 
possible for an area to be peripheral in national terms, but core in 
international terms. Special attention needs to be given, however, 
to the question of advanced industrial economies, notably West 
Germany and Japan,, which have large balance of payments deficits on invisibles. 
If one reinterprets export base theory in balance of payments 
terms, then the following tabulation can be produced: 
Basic Local 
Export industries Local industries 
Exporting s ------- Local services 
This tabulation is made purely on the basis of exports; the 
size of the multiplier depends on the rate of leakage of income, which 
in turn depends on the volume of imports (both visible and invisible) 
with respect to total income. Clearly the rate of leakage will tend 
to be higher, and the size of the multiplier lowerg in areas with a 
deficit on invisibles, all other things being equal. If for example 
any profits from an industrial concern are repatriated away from 
the area (representing a deficit on invisible trade in that industry), 
any expenditure from those profits will tend to build up the local 
service sector not in the area of production but rather in the core 
region. 
Thus invisibles need to be considered in any export base 
model, which has perhaps not been the case hitherto. An important 
result which has been demonstrated here is that core regions will 
tend to have higher proportions of employment in the service sector 
than peripheral regions, at whatever scale of analysis. 
71. See above note, also Lee (1984). Table 9.10 shows for the late 
19th century the great variability in the ratio of employment between 
basic industries and services. In London in 1881, basic industries 
accounted for 8.8% of total employment and services for 64.0%* while 
in Yorkshire's West Riding basic industries accounted for 47.2% of 
total employment and services for 32.4%. 
72. Such a definition of "core" would be regarded as elementary by Marxian analysts, especially those working in a third world 
context, yet captures the basics of the core/periphery distinction 
far better than any "mainstread' definition, and indeed aittempts to 
explain core-periphery distinctions in prosperity rather than simply 
to describe them. Merely to group together a set of contiguous 
fast growing regions or countries and to describe them as "core" 
does not particularly advance theoretical understanding; if however 
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"core" is defined in terms of extraction of surplus value from 
production elsewhere ("periphery"), then several ramifications arise. 
one cannot begin to discuss in detail the implications of 
such an issue here, but an important parallel needs to be drawn 
between the modernisation/underdevelopment debate as it concerns 
third world economies, and what might in the British context be 
described as a modernisation/deindustrialisation debate. In third 
world terms "modernisers" (e. g. Rostow) argue that the problems 
of the third world economies arise from their failure to develop 
modern Western methods of production, and that the solution to their 
problems is to I'modernise", to try to imitate the advances made by 
more successful economies. The "underdevelopers" (Frank, Amin, 
etc. ) argue that the problems faced by third world countries arise 
chiefly from their subservience to the capitalist economies; there 
are several routes through which the core capitalist economies can 
ensure that to a large extent peripheral production takes place 
according to the interests of the core rather than according to the 
interests of the periphery, and indeed often involving the direct 
impoverishment of the periphery. 
If this debate is transposed into terms relevant to the 
internal structure of-the British economy, the debate becomes one 
of whether industrial job loss and slow industrial growth are signs 
of the "modernisation" of the economy (the post-iridustrial thesis) 
or of the "underdevelopment" of the economy (the deindustrialisation 
thesis). "underdevelopment" does not simply mean decline; instead 
it means the retardation of economic development as a result of the 
economic interests of core capital. Once this point is understood, 
it becomes clear that fast economic growth in the core is consistent 
either with a postindustrialisation-modernisation thesis or a 
deindustrialisation-underdevelopment thesis; the South's economic 
success most certainly does not refute the deindustrialisation 
thesis. 
The question, empirically, is one of magnitudes. Manufacturing 
output declined by 17% between mid-1979 and mid-1981. Had there 
been stable employment and a modest productivity growth rate of 3% 
per annum, industrial output would have expanded by 6% in the same 
period. This representg an "output gap" of about a quarter of total 
potential output. The fact that the gap should be so large, and 
should have developed over such a short period, clearly indicates 
an industrial crisis affecting virtually all sectors of industry. 
Only the most fervent supporter of the post-industrialisation thesis 
could suggest that this was merely the winnowing out of old-fashioned 
sectors as a result of competition from more efficient sectors. 
Two points may immediately be made; firstly, why on such an 
interpretation should all the "more efficient" sectors be in 
services, where in any case the expansion in employment was modest 
during the slump? and secondly, why was industrial job loss reflected 
so clearly in rising unemployment? 
A more reasonable interpretation is that the events of 
1979-81 marked a major industrial crisis, affecting both strong and 
weak sectors. That manufacturing was far more severely affected 
than other sectors should not be taken to imply that manufacturing is a primitive sector when compared with services, but rather that 
the economic environment was structured in such a way as to penalise 
any activity requiring to borrow money for investment or for 
carrying out production, and requiring to sell in competition with 
foreign producers. The service sector was for the most part lightly 
affected by slump (although tourism appears to have been an 
exception) not because it was in any sense more sophisticated 
than the industrial sector but rather because it was more insulated 
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from outside events, in part precisely because of the orientation of 
Government policy. "Freedom for capital" is the protectionism of 
the City. 
After the slump there is generally an intense boom (chapter 2 
above) which obscures many of the facets of vulnerability. One 
often has to wait to the next recession to find out what is really 
going on. Deindustrialisation still seems to be a potentially 
severe underlying problem; all the much heralded advances in the 
financial sector cannot hide the facts that decimation of the 
industrial sector has severely weakened the British trading position, 
to an extent beyond the ability of invisibles to compensate for, and 
also that jobs are stiZZ being lost in manufacturing on a large 
scale. 
73. In the context of contemporary Britain, this would refer 
most obviously to the siting of Parliament in London and the 
concentration of the Civil Service, the upper echelons especially, 
in and around London. As one moves further back in time, the 
significance of London as centre of the Royal Court acquires 
increasing significance. 
Under modern capitalism the role of economic institutions 
in extracting and concentrating surplus value and establishing core 
status for certain local city economies has attracted the main 
attention, although obviously political questions apply also. In 
pre-capitalist economies it would appear that political 
centralisation, along with its associated economic implications, 
provided the main source of core status. Wallerstein (1974 p. 15) 
notes of the political centralisation of empire in such circumstances 
that "Its strength lay in the fact that it guaranteed economic 
flows from the periphery to the centre by force (tribute and 
taxation) and by monopolistic advantages in trade. Its weakness lay 
in the fact that the bureaucracy made necessary by the political 
structure tended to absorb too much of the profit, especially as 
repression and exploitation bred revolt which increased military 
expenditure. " Thus empires could grow along with the increasing 
political and economic power of the imperial core, but could also 
fade away as imperial control becomes too expensive. Wallerstein 
regards it as the central achievement of the capitalist system to 
have found the economic technology to transfer surplus from the 
periphery to the core without a cumbersome imperial political 
apparatus. Thus after the Second World War Britain, the declining 
imperial power, could still maintain core status despite (or perhaps 
because of) the loss of Empire, although the residual 
overmilitarisation of the economy still remains a retarding factor* 
and meanwhile the USA, the dominant political and economic power, 
could build up a highly informal empire, with little direct political 
control and much economic control. Even informal empire has its 
costs, though, as the political power of the imperial power has 
often to be established, in the absence of direct rule, by open or 
clandestine warfare. 
The structure of core and periphery in the British economy 
cannot be adequately explained with some notion of Britain's imperial 
past, of how Empire consolidated and greatly expanded the political 
and economic core functions of London, and of how London perpetuated 
itself as a core economic centre even after the fall of Empire. 
74. This question seems absolutely pivotal when tryinif to 
understand the structure of the British economyt and prospects for 
the British economy. Britain is, without a doubt, a core capitalist 
economy, but this centrality to the capitalist economic system 
depends on Britain's role as a financial centre, as a centre for 
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accumulating and circulating surplus value, rather than as an 
industrial centre. The role of the industrial sector in a core 
capitalist economy is open to questiong or to make the point in 
another way, the industrial development of an advanced economy can 
be threatened by the economics of core capitalism. Deindustrialisation 
can be seen as a form of underdevelopment within an advanced 
capitalist economy, but precisely because it takes place within a 
capitalist country it threatens to pull down the economy of that 
country in a way in which third world underdevelopment could not. 
The voraciousness with which the core capitalist economy seeks to 
extract, circulate and skim off the surplus value created by physical 
production perpetually threatens to undermine that physical production 
on which it ultimately relies. Britain is now a long way down the 
path of economic self-destruction, with the extent of the problem 
being accentuated greatly since the late 1970s. During the 1970s 
and early 1980s the chief problem could be seen as one of industrial 
decline. This made economic steering more difficult and caused an 
unemployment increase. In the late 1980s the problem is not so 
much one of current industrial decline, but rather that the excessive 
decline of the earlier period has led to the economy being 
unbalanced, with the imbalance being most clearly shown in the 
balance of payments figures (Table 8.28). The industrial problem at 
present is not so much that the industrial sector is in danger of 
collapse (as of 1988 profits are high and investment is expanding) 
but rather that the industrial sector is too small, with little 
possibility of an autonomous expansion (that is one not based merely 
on a generalised expansion of demand) sufficient to balance the 
balance of payments and to reduce unemployment. The difference 
between an autonomous industrial expansion and an induced industrial 
expansion is of critical importance here. If expansion is Zed by 
industry, then there might be some hope of solving Britain's chronic 
economic problems. If however the route is one by which the 
Government boosts demand in the economy through a consumption boom, 
then obviously industry will expand as a result of the boom, but so 
wiZZ inports. If there is no autonomous industrial expansion to 
match the demand induced expansion, the result of even a modest 
consumer boom will be a balance of payments crisis. Furthermore, 
the smaller the industrial sector is the worse the trade crisis 
will tend to be. 
75. There are seemingly interminable debates among economic 
historians along the lines of whether or not the late Victorian 
economy failed, on whether the heavy foreign investment of the 
period was good or bad for the national economy; see especially 
chapter 9.1 below. Clearly if one writes from the point of view of 
the rapidly expanding late Victorian and Edwardian bourgeoisie of 
Southern England, their prosperity enhanced by the wide range of 
investment opportunities abroad, then the decades leading up to 
1914 would have appeared highly successful. Yet there was also an 
obverse to this picture of Edwardian prosperity, in that Britain's 
industrial supremacy was fast slipping, and the restructuring of 
industries and the development of new industries were slow. 
Relatively little attention was given to the renewal of the 
productive base, in contrast to the considerable attention being 
paid to industrial development in other countries; considerable 
attention was paid, however, to maintaining a climate in which the 
returns on foreign investment were high. There were undoubtedly 
major advances made in the development of London as a financial 
centre, but this was inevitably at the expense of the industrial 
areas to some extent; indeed chapter 9 below argues that many of the 
roots of the regional problem formed in this period, even if the "above ground" manifestations did not show until the 1920s. At the 
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national scale, there is considerable scope for debate on whether 
the late 19th and early 20th century restructuring in the economy 
was favourable or unfavourable in its effects, in the short term 
and in the long term. The answer one arrives at will depend largely 
on whether one gives primacy to the financial sector, and the need 
to maintain freedom of movement on capital so as to maximise returns 
to investment, or whether one giles primacy to the renewal and 
development of the productive base. 
This century old issue has achieved new relevance in the mid 
to late 1980s, as once again economic policy has been directed very 
much towards Britain's role as a financial centre, with comparative 
neglect of her role as a centre of production. No doubt there will 
be more interminable debates in future generations about whether 
the Thatcherite economy failed or not, with various schools of 
orthodox, revisionist and radical thought developing according to 
political alignment. To all except the most Conservative strands 
of future opinion, looking back at such times across decades of 
severe balance of payments difficulties, low industrial investment, 
and slow growth when compared with competitor economies, it will no 
doubt appear strange how mainstream commentators in the late 1980s 
eulogised the success of the Thatcherite economy on the basis of 
an unsustainable cyclical boom following an unnecessarily severe 
slump. Attention will no doubt turn to more basic questions, such 
as the development of chronic and acute balance of payments deficits in manufacturing, resulting in part from the massive reduction in industrial capacity in 1980 and early 1981, and in part from the 
quite understandable caution over major new investment by industrialists in the years thereafter. Indeed one of the unusual 
features of the late 1980s boom is that high industrial profits 
have not been translated into high investment; it has made more 
financial sense, at times of high interest rates, for firms to hold 
onto money and purchase assets rather than to invest in productive 
equipment. 
Above all, however, one would expect the future commentator 
to bemoan the wasting of North Sea oil. Britain shared in the 
post-slump boom, and did rather better, in consumption terms, than 
to share in the boom as a result of the additional effects of North 
Sea oil production. Yet while North Sea oil revenues have helped 
the Government boost consumption and create a certain element of 
prosperity (though in the midst of mass unemployment) there has been 
little sign of attention being given to the renewal of the 
productive base. 
76. Excluding MLH 866, "central offices not elsewhere allOcablets, 
77. Ingham (1984 especially pp. 201-224) provides one of the most 
interesting recent discussions on the relationship between the 
City, industry, and the state. Before 1914 London was the "natural" 
financial capital of the world, yet this position was threatened 
by the major economic disruption of two world wars and the 
possibility ot the emergence of New York as the pre-eminent 
financial centre of the world (although this was in part, according 
to Ingham, blocked by the power of the American industrial bourgeoisie). After the First World War, the City needed protection. 
"In the face of massive economic problemsq successive British 
governments have maintained the political conditions for the City's 
existence as an international centre; an open economy; a stable, 
high value currency; attractive interest rates for the holders of 
sterling. All three policies have invariably clashed with the plans 
to strengthen the productive economy. " (Ingham 1984 p. 224). Ingham 
notes a partial reversal of priorities by the post-1964 Labour 
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Government, with the setting up of the Department of Economic 
Affairs, yet this new direction was undermined by Treasury opposition 
(representing, in political terms, the City as opposed to industry) 
and by the fading of the post-war boom. Not enough attention was 
paid at that stage to the extent to which the City needed to be 
restructured to ensure that industrial modernisation was possible. 
For the most part however British economic policy has been 
persistently weighted in Favour of the City rather than in favour 
of production. Ingham (1984 p. 224) emphasises that "this situation 
cannot be explained simply as a consequence of the City's economic 
power in relation to the rest of the economy. Rather, the means by 
which commercial and wholesale banking capital have maintained their 
dominant position are to be found in enduring elements in the British 
state, civil society and financial system; that is, in the 
autonomous practices of the Bank of England and Treasury in monetary 
and fiscal matters; in the relative insulation of the dominant class 
from the industrial bourgeoisie; and in the c. ontinued institutional 
separation of finance and industry. " 
So the point is not simply that the City has dominated 
industry because it is stronger or more efficient; the point is 
rather that a strong alliance of interests has developed between the 
City and strategically critical echelons of the state, leading to 
a strong tendency for British economic policy to be weighted towards 
the dictates of the City. If such a process should continue for 
long enough, it is hardly surprising that eventually the City should 
become strong and industry weak; this is not a natural tendency, 
but rather a policy-induced tendency. Pollard (1982), in a sharply 
polemical work on the state of the British industrial economy (indeed 
it is difficult to see how one could write anything other than 
sharply about conditions in 1982), notes the persistent "contempt 
for production" in British economic policy-making and the preference 
for "symbols" before "reality", or monetary symbols before 
physical production, in setting policy goals. This in itself is 
indicative of the split between the City, dealing in symbols, and 
industry, dealing in production. 
78. A simple tabulation makes this point fairly clearly. 
Aspects of the early 1980s Effects on City 
High interest rates Highly favourable; 
lending becomes 
extremely 
profitable 
Effects on industry 
HighZy unfavourabZe; 
borrowing expensive, 
investment very 
expensive; 
pressure to destock 
High exchange rates HighZy favouraMe HighZy unfavourabZe 
sterling buys more difficult to compete 
on foreign markets with foreign producers 
If elements of a cyclical downturn are added to the above, 
and if the currency is far enough overvalued and interest rates 
excessive enough, then the potential exists for industrial 
devastation. 
79. Attention is drawn here to Godelier's (1986) analysis of 
the base-superstructure question. Godelier notes that in much of 
the literature, both in anthropology and in other social sciences, 
the critical distinction between economic functions and economic institutions is lost, in part precisely because most influential 
social scientists come from a background, advanced capitalist 
societies, in which-economic institutions (the firm, etc. ) dominate 
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economic functioning. In pre-capitalist economiesq Godelier argues, 
specifically economic institutions do not play a dominant role, but 
this does not mean that the economic functioning of society is 
anything other than at the centre of the structure of society; instead 
it means that economic functions tend to be carried out and allocated 
by dominant non-economic institutions. In that kinship, religious 
and political organisations are central to economic functioning, and 
in that economic relationships are not central to the mental 
structure of these institutions, natural limits would tend to be 
set to economic diversification and to the possibilities of core 
formation and relative peripheralisation. As economic activity 
became more "pure" and more dynamic the possibilities for multiple 
differentiation into core and periphery started to increase in 
strength. 
One would thus expect patterns of core and periphery, of 
development and underdevelopment,. to exist in pre-capitalist 
economic formations with urbanisation and economic growth taking 
place in the core, and with the core "underdeveloping" the periphery 
only insofar as the, core can afford to maintain political, military 
or religious power over the periphery; under other circumstances the 
periphery is simply ignored and lags behind. The emergence of 
capitalism and thus of powerful economic institutions, increases 
the possibilities both of development and underdevelopment, of rapid 
progress in the core and of the possibility that economic development 
in the periphery is distorted (even if periodically accelerated) by 
the economic interests and economic and political power of the core. 
8o. Various subtly different meanings may be given to the terms 
direct investment and portfolio investment. If however one examines 
the situation from the viewpoint of production, investment may be 
seen as expenditure on equipment designed to enable production to 
take place (at certain levels of output, productivity, etc. ). This 
process may be termed direct investment. Even in the case of 
direct investment it often happens that the investing organisation 
cannot raise the required money purely from internal sources, and 
has to rely on raising money from outsiders who in effect build up 
assets in the organisation concerned. This use of financial power 
to build up assets in productive organisations may be termed 
portfotio investment. In the case of direct investment, the 
rationale for investment is set by the productive needs of the 
organisation (and an industrial firm which fails to invest will soon 
diminish in importance) while in the case of portfolio investment 
the search is for the company which appears safest, has the best 
prospects for generating profits, or which appears to be ripest 
for a takeover bid, so that speculative gains may be forseen. There 
is obvious scope for tension here. 
81. Thus the battle between capital and labour is not a "zero 
sum game" or a fixed sum game; indeed one can go further and suggest 
that if either capital or labour treated class conflict as a zero 
sum game in which the destruction of the other side is a prerequisite for one's own side's material gain then the most likely result is a deterioration in the conditions of production. Yet if such a deterioration is possible then the game does not have a fixed sum; furthermore if one round of the game has a low sum then this increases the likelihood that the next round will have a low sum 
through a change in the sets of payoffs. An economy in whi6h class 
conflict is pursued over-vigorously either by capital or by labour is likely to be an unsuccessful economy. 
Neither, however, is the model of a harmony of economic interests particularly convincing. Firstly there are undoubtedly 
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situations in which there is a zero sum game; each time a worker's 
wage is cut by E10, profits increase by E10. Secondly, and at the 
macro-level, sets of outcomes which maximise the total payoff do 
not necessarily maximise the payoffs of particular groupsq or to 
state the matter conversely, the outcome favoured by particular 
groups may well not be the outcome that maximises social welfare. 
Various forms of inter-class and intra-class conflicts of interest 
may result, most notably: 
(1) Total income is maximised when there is full employment, 
and labour's income is maximised when there is full employment; 
capitalist income tends to be maximised at Zess than full 
employment. 
(2) The conditions which maximise . 'profits in the financial 
sector are likely to be significantly different from the conditions 
which maximiýe profits in the production sector; one side desires 
dear money, high exchange rates, etc., while the other side desires 
cheap money, low exchange rates, etc. 
(3) The conditions which maximise employment are likely to 
be significantly different from the conditions which maximise 
incomes for individual workers in employment. 
Conflict (1) is derived from Keynes's (1936) theory of 
effective demand, with class categories introduced. Conflict (3) 
is a genuine conflict, but one which tends to be much exaggerated 
("one man's pay increase is another man's job loss") by apologists 
for the capitalist class. Conflict (2) raises some very interesting 
questions for an economy in which the interests of financial capitalism 
are held to be paramount. Firstly, the state of the economy at 
which total profits are maximised is indeterminate; depending on 
the shapes of the relevant curves it could be at the point favoured 
by finance capital, at the point favoured by industrial capital, 
or at some intermediate point. Secondly, the point at which profits 
in the financial sector are maximised represents a level of 
production below that at which industrial profits are maximised, and 
even further below that at which industrial production and employment 
are maximised. This implies a very genuine conflict of interest 
between industrial labour and financial capital, less direct than 
the conflict between industrial labour and industrial capital, but 
no less strong for being indirect. 
Two polar forms of analysis of political economy may be 
noted, the harmony of interests approach (which naturally tends to 
assume full employment) and the pure class conflict approach, in 
which capital and labour are pitted against each other with other 
forms of conflict being secondary. The harmony approach tends to 
assume that the economic welfare of any particular group is 
maximised at a point at which the economic welfare of all is 
maximised; the present approach, developed from Keynesian rootst is 
that there are persistent conflicts between the interests of 
particular groups and the general interest, conflicts which are 
embedded in the economic system and do not disappear under "equilibriud'. 
82. See chapter 6.6(i). 
83. Some of the problems faced by inner London industries during 
the slump are depicted in Harrison's portrait of Hackney in the 
early 1980s (Harrison 1983 pp. 52-92). 
There was also a strong negative differential shift (-6,600) in Greater London in radio, radar and electronic capital goods (MLH 367), but this reflects more a failure of this sector to 
expand in London than any substantial job losses; employment fell 
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from 23,300 to 22,600. In other parts of the. plectrical engineering 
industry differential shifts were, in total, slightly negative, 
(-11900). 
84. As events turned out, a combination of rapid expansion in 
the core services and slow recovery in the industrial sector meant 
that one of the most conspicuous features of the post-slump recovery 
was a massive boom in house and land prices in London and the South 
East, gradually rippling out into neighbouring regions. One would 
expect that this would have led to yet another squeeze on industrial 
employment in London. No detailed breakdown of employment change 
through the land boom is available at present (late 198$), but the 
following estimates for manufacturing employment change between 1983 
and 1988 are of interest. 
Region 
Greater London 
Rest of South East 
EA 
Sw 
wm 
EM 
YR 
NW 
N 
Wa 
Sc 
GB 
Employment change in manufacturing, 
March 1983 - March 1988 
(000s) M (% per annum) 
-109 -17.7 -3.8 
-79 -8.5 -1.8 
+34 +19.0 +3.5 
-7 -1.9 -o. 4 
-3o -4.2 -0.8 
+1 +0.2 +0.0 
-67 -13.1 -2.8 
-102 -14.5 -3.1 
-35 -11.2 -2.5 
-4 -1.9 -o. 4 
-64 -14.2 -3. o 
-461 -8.4 -1.7 
Source: Gazette, HistoricaL SuppZement February 1987, and 
August 1988). 
Much has been made of the boom and the overheating of the 
South East economy, yet this boom clearly has not spread to the industrial sector. After the slump, as well as before the slump* 
London has been Britain's main centre of industrial job loss. The 
rest of the South East, before the slump a major generator of 
industrial employment and during the slump an area largely immune 
from major job losses, now has slightly faster than average rates 
of employment decline in manufacturing. Thus the boom in the South 
has the effect of squeezing out industrial employment rather than 
encouraging job creation in manufacturing. 
Three main implications of the boom may be noted. 
(1) To continue industrial production on a highly valuable 
site incurs a significant opportunity cost. (2) The cost of housing in the South places significant 
upward pressure on wages, and makes it difficult to recruit 
labour from other areas. 
(3) The situation is often exacerbated by shortages of skilled 
labour, in part as a result of the cost of housing and in 
part as a result of long-standing weaknesses in Britain's industrial training, the Government appearing to regard 
official training schemes more as an opportunity to. reduce 
the unemployment figures. and provide cheap labour than as 
serious training. 
It is important to note that the above employment statistics 
do not support any notion that the south East has led the way in 
industrial development since the slump, despite the continued 
severe leakage of industrial employment in the peripheral regions. 
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As in the 1970s there is a complicated set of circumstances in 
which industrial employment in and around London is mildly vulnerable 
to cyclical downturns but heavily vulnerable to high land prices, 
while industrial employment in the periphery is highly vulnerable 
to generally weak industrial performances. In the Midlands, 
representing the "core" part of industrial Britain. industrial trends 
since the slump have been relatively favourable, while there are 
signs of expansion in the "outer South" (EA, SW), Industrial 
employment has also remained stable in Wales which, despite its 
severe historical structural problems, adjoins the Midland growth 
belt. In the North of England and in Scotland severe industrial 
job loss continues as before; 270,000 manufacturing jobs were lost 
in these regions (NW, YH, N. Sc) in five years after the slump. 
85. No presumption is made here as to whether it is "correct" or 
"incorrect'I'that Cardiff should have been left out of the regional 
policy net. The arguments that Cardiff, and the rest of South 
Glamorgan, should have been included are firstly that the considerable 
industrial job Zosses of the 1970s in South Glamorgan might well 
have held the South Wales economy back (with the implication that 
something stronger than simple diversion was involved) and secondly, 
taking a broader view of regional policy, that the service sector 
should have been included in the regional policy net and that 
regional policy should have helped enhance Cardiff's role as a major 
service centre. The contrary argument is that new industrial jobs 
were both more needed and more efficiently sited in the rest of 
South Wales, where unemployment was higher and urban congestion 
lower. 
86. The "echo effect" problem is held to have been the main 
weakness of traditional regional policy, with the assisted areas 
having had their employment base built up in industries liable to 
later decline, creating an echo of the 1930s regional problem. 
Whether the orientation of regional policy towards manufacturing 
should be regarded as a "mistake" depends on to what extent it should 
have been regarded as forseeable that manufacturing employment was to 
decline sharply from the mid-1960s. Probably there was no reason 
why this possibility should have been forseen; if however one still 
wishes to note a "mistake" at the centre of regional policy, this 
"mistake" pervaded the whoZe of British post-war economic policy. 
Maybe, as Manners (1976) suggested, the direction of regional policy 
should have concentrated more on services as soon as it became 
clear that manufacturing employment was in deep decline while only 
service sector employment was growing. Maybe also more attention 
needs to be given to the question of generating self-sustaining 
endogenous growth in the periphery, rather than relying simply on 
industrial migration. 
87. See especially Townsend (1981,1983). 
88. See, though, the brief discussion in note 63 above. 
89. The strong positive differential shifts in education in 
Buckinghamshire and Cambridgeshire are dominatedo at the level of 
the travel to work area, by Milton Keynes and Peterboroughq two Of 
the largest and most expansive of the New Towns. One would expect 
rapid growth of employment in education, even during recession, in 
each town, yet the rates of increase indicated in the Census of 
Employment seem excessive. An increase in employment over a third 
in three years in Buckinghamshire, and even faster in Milton Keynes 
itself, seems highly implausible. The great size of the positive 
differential shift would appear to be explained in part by 
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under-enumeration in 1978 and in part by the "natural" differential 
shift being positive. 
90. Hertford showed an apparent increase of employment of 9,300 
(+22.2%) between 1978 and 1981, while neighbouring Harlow showed 
an apparent decrease of -12,600 (-17.9%). Combined Hertford/Harlow 
figures are -3,300 (-2.9%). Such contrasting experiences in 
neighbouring travel to work areas, combined with, in context, 
abnormally high increases of employment in one of the areas, 
represent strong evidence thata boundary shift has taken place. 
See also note 102 below. 
Figures for employment totals by countyp up to the 1981 
Census of Employment, are based on the nearest fit of Jobcentre 
areas, rather than the nearest fit of travel to work areas. There 
is a Very strong likelihood (note 102) that statistical 
reorganisation of the data would involve redrawing of the Jobcentre 
areas, and hence a shift of employment from Essex into 
Hertfordshire. 
Later researchers will need to note that Census of Employment 
figures for 1984 onwards are disaggregated to the level of the local 
authority ward, rather than to the level of the Jobcentre area (see 
for example RegionaZ Trends 1988 p. 145), meaning that figures at 
the county level cover the administrative county precisely rather 
than approximately. This is undoubtedly an improvement, but leads to 
some loss of comparability between 1981 and 1984 figures (Table 8.16). 
91. If anomalous results in the Cambridgeshire education sector 
(Peterborough TTWA) are excluded (Table 8.15), the county would be 
shown as having a job loss of -1.4% between 1978 and 1981, instead 
of an employment gain of 1.1%. 
Another statistical anomaly may also be noted for 
Cambridgeshire, a gain from nothing to 8,000 jobs in MLH 334 
(industrial engines) and a loss of 9,600 jobs, leaving zero 
employment, in MLH 380 (wheeled tractor manufacturing). This is 
evidently a reclassification in a factory which in fact had around 
the national average rate of job loss in manufacturing, yet a 
structural shift of -5,700 (-2.7%) and a differential shift of 
+4v6OO (+2.2%) is indicated. The extreme positive differential 
shift, combined with a negative structural shift, for Cambridgeshire 
(Table 8.7) is thus unreliable. 
92. Thus: 
Employment (000s) Change 
1971 1978 M (% per annum) 
London 3939.4 3663.8 -7.0 -1.0 
Inner ring 1789.2 1911.1 +6.8 +1.0 
"Golden arc" 1862.1 2102.8 +12.9 +1.8 
outer ring 1336.3 1486.7 +11.3 +1.5 
The inner ring comprises of Hertfordshireq Essex, Surrey, 
East Sussex and Kent. The "golden arc" comprises of Suffolk, 
Cambridgeshiret Bedfordshireq Buckinghamshire, Berkshire, Oxfordshire, 
Hampshire and West Sussex. The outer ring comprises of Norfolkv 
Lincolnshire, Gloucestershire, Wiltshire, Somersett Devon and Dorset. 
93. See for example Townsend (1983 pp. 180-188). New towns in 
the periphery were more deeply affected by slump than new towns in 
Southern England, but within Southern England new towns were often 
affected more severely than less industrialised areas. 
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94. In Bedfordshire 10,300 out of 26,900 car jobs were lost; 
in Oxfordshire 11,000 out of 28,300. 
95. Although the running down of Chatham Dockyard was fairly 
widely reported at the time, relatively little attention was given 
to it in the Financial Times, perhaps in part because the running 
down of employment in a state-owned naval dockyard has, in comparison 
with a private firm selling in the open market, relatively few wider 
commercial implications. A mid-1981 report (F. T. 27. '6.81) notes 
the loss of 7,000 jobs at Chatham dockyard and 6,000 jobs at 
Portsmouth dockyard over an unspecified period; the Census of 
Employment indicates that between June 1978 and September 1981 
5,800 out of 7,600 shipbuilding, repairing and marine engineering 
jobs were lost in Chatham TTWA. 
There is the irony that at this stage British defence policy 
was concentrated so heavily on the "official enemy" and so weighted 
towards nuclear rather than "conventional" force that naval dockyards 
were being rapidly dismantled at just the time when a naval war 
was approaching. It seemed that the Conservative Government had 
not appreciated the possibility that an ideologically sympathetic 
foreign government, whose internal policies created favourable 
opportunities for British arms exporters, might at a time of severe 
economic and political stress bring*to a head a long-standing 
territorial dispute. It is interesting to speculate what might have 
happened if Argentina had attacked the Falklands a year or two 
later. 
96. Townsend (1986 p. 539) cites a 1985 press report as indicating 
that in a typical year nearly half of aerospace output and nearly 
a third of output in electronics industries is accounted for by the 
Ministry of Defence. Such an estimate seems plausible, though it 
is not clear how closely defined the electronics sector is in this 
particular case. 
In 11LH 367 (radio, radar and electronic capital goods) there 
are industries with obvious military implications (e. g. radar 
equipment, radio communication equipment and relay link manufacture; 
various other radio sectors) but also clearly non-military sectors 
of production (e. g. radiant heat lamp and bath, electro-medical). 
There is no clear sector labelled "electronic weapons systed', 
etc., but one would suspect a much higher weighting towards military 
use in HLH 367 than in most other HLHs in electrical engineering. 
Indeed, various MLHs (e. g. 368, electrical appliances, domestic 
use; 365 broadcast, sound reproduction equipment) are very clearly 
orientated to the domestic consumer market. 
Detailed relationships between defence and high technology 
can be very difficult to untangle unless one works at a localised 
scale. See however Boddy and Lovering (1986) for an assessment of 
the importance of military demand in'supporting Bristol's high 
technology industrial sector, centred chiefly on aerospace. The 
authors note (p. 222) that the aerospace sector includes not just the 
building of aeroplanes, civilian or military, but also the development 
of a wide range of electronic weapon systems, and ancillaries to 
weapon systems, They also note (p. 223) the considerable significance 
of high technology military production elsewhere in the South West; 
similar considerations would also apply in much of the South East. 
Con=nt has already been made (chapter 6, note 80) about the 
possibility that high technology military production representst in 
terms of opportunity costs, a significant drain on the economy and a 
hidden subsidy to the South. It is not in dispute that in many 
respects the South has "natural" advantages over the North in terms 
of high technology production; the basic problem, faced also by other 
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over-militarised economies (e. g. the USA, but not Japan) is that 
military production denies resources to the civilian sector, and thus 
slows down progress in the development of products sold on markets 
rather than to the state sector. 
97. For example, +3,300 jobs in aerospace in Hertfordshire, +2,800 
jobs in "other electrical goods" (MLH 369) in Kent, +1,100 jobs in 
aerospace in Hampshire, +700 jobs in radio and electronics 
components in Surrey, +700 in electronic computers in West Sussex, 
+600 in broadcasting and sound reproduction equipment in Essex. 
Again, in many of these cases the military/civilian split in market 
destination is not clear from the available evidence. 
In addition, perhaps 3,000 jobs were created in electronic 
computers in Berkshire, although the picture is partially obscured 
by a major reclassification (see text). 
98.5,800 jobs were recorded as having been created in education 
in Milton Keynes between 1978 and 1981, more than doubling the 
previous total. This is excessive even for a new town. 
99. More specifically, banking, insurance and financeg national 
government, legal services, research and developmento etc., and the 
higher echelons of the education and health sectors (e. g. universities 
rather than primary schools). 
100. The Census of Employment shows a gain of 1,200 jobs in 
Hampshire in banking and bill discounting (MLH 861), but a loss of 
1,600 jobs in this sector in Dorset. One suspects informal boundary 
changes, although the figures for employment growth in insurance 
are more firmly based in that both Hampshire and Dorset showed 
increases in employment. 
101. Several recent sources, for example Howells (1984) and works 
cited therein, have noted the strong weighting of high technology 
industry and of research and development towards the core regiops, 
where reservoirs of'skill at all levels of production represent 
an important locational factor. It takes time for such pools of 
skill to build up, and in a much longer tem perspective one can 
trace the dominance of core regions in higher technology industries 
back to market orientation factors. 
An important point being developed in the text is that the 
division of the economy into core and periphery is largely independent 
of industrial location patterning, Critically, core status depends 
on the degree of development of the "quaternary" sector, of economic 
activities based mainly on the handling of money and various forms of 
credit rather than on the handling of goods. Industrial trends tend 
to reflect this core-periphery distinction rather than create it, 
even though core-periphery distinctions in rates of employment change 
tend to be most conspicuous in the industrial sector. In that high 
income groups tend to be concentrated in the core regions, creating a 
market for more sophisticated industrial products, and in that high 
status workers are more readily attracted to high income regions than 
to low income regions, there are reasons on both the demand and 
supply sides why a spatial division of industrial labour should 
emerge in which advanced production should take place in the core 
and routine production should take place in the periphery. 
In earlier discussion in this thesis the empirical attention 
has been concentrated chiefly on patterns of industrial employment 
change and on their effects on unemployment. A definite and strongly 
entrenched tendency for the South to be industrially favoured 
relative to the North has been noted and described in terms of 
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core-periphery effects. Since the 1920s patterns of relative 
industrial advantage and of labour market buoyancy have undoubtedly 
closely matched the pattern of core and periphery. It is important 
to keep the basic direction of causality in mind, however; the 
South's core status has attracted the more advanced industries, 
while the North perpetually faces the dual handicap of a failure to 
attract in sufficient *umbers newer industries at levels other than 
of routine production and an industrial structure with a strong 
legacy of "older" industries (coal, shipbuilding, iron and steel, 
textiles, etc. ) which, although displaying considerable possibilities 
of technical advance, approached market maturity a long time ago, 
thus not being likely motors of rapid industrial growth. Discussion 
of Southern England during the slump emphasises, thoughp that the 
relative advantage of the South over the North ultimately depends 
on "finance" rather than "industry", This point takes on major 
significance in chapter 9 below in which the 19ýh century is 
discussed. During the 19th century, and in strong contrast with 
the post-1918 period, industrial development was for various 
technicaf reasons more vigorous in the North than in the South, yet 
despite this the South, or more specifically London, still clearly 
remained the core of the national economy. 
102. "Other services" refers here exclusively to HLH 899. 
Hertfordshire also showed an increase of employment of 4,200 in 
sea transport (MLH 7Q5). This would appear implausible, especially 
if one consults a map (Hertfordshire is land-locked), but would 
presumably refer to head office employment. Figures for Essex show, 
however, a decrease of employment of 4,300 in this sector, strongly 
implying a boundary shift between Hertfordshire and Essex. At the 
level of the travel-to-work area, Hertford showed an increase of 
4,000 jobs in this sector while neighbouring Harlow (Essex) showed 
a corresponding decrease of 4,100 jobs. This confirms that a 
boundary shift was involved, and furthermore one which has artificialli, 
reduced the 1981 level of employment in Essex and increased it in 
Hertfordshire, when measured with respect to 1978 employment totals. 
103. See for example the Hardman Report (Great Britain 1973), 
which noted (pp. 23-27) the dispersal of 25,200 non-industrial Civil 
Service staff up to 1963, of 22,500 staff between 1963 and 1972 
(notably 3,700 to Glasgow and 1,800 to Durham in the National 
Savings Department, and 2,200 to Manchester in-the Inland Revenue)p 
with 6,300 jobs awaiting dispersal as of October 1972. New office 
work, as of October 1972, accounted for 9,500 posts in scattered 
locations, with 10,400 projected after 1972. Such dispersal "has 
been substantially of work which is relatively self-contained and 
can be done anywhere" (Hardman Report, p. v). The number of jobs 
involved is large, though clearly not as large as the number of jobs 
decentralised in the manufacturing sector. In general, costs tended 
to be reduced by office dispersal, although para. 14 of the Hardman 
Report creates a confusing impression when it suggests that other 
non-cost considerations are needed "to justify the loss of efficiency 
which dispersal involves, " The loss of efficiency described is 
essentially related to a reduction, probably economically 
unquantifiable, in the richness of contacts through dispersion; as 
in manufacturing industry, there was a tendency in the Civil 
Service for high-level activities requiring frequent contact inside 
and outside the organisation (including in this case other Civil 
Service departments) to gravitate to core locations while routine 
activity could be decentralised to the periphery. 
It is never fully clear how much Civil Service activity is 
fully decentralisable; the payoff between cost factors and information 
factors is indeterminate. One can suggest however that with modern 
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advances in communications technology, and with ever-increasing 
congestion in the office district of Central London, the scope for 
decentralisation might well have strengthened considerably since 
the early 1970s. 
It goes beyond t' he scope of this thesis to enter into debate 
on the complicated and controversial question of changes in the 
National Health Service, and on class and geographical inequalities 
both in standards of treatment and in changes in standards of 
treatment, A general point to be made, though, is that especially 
with attempts being made to place strict limits on NHS expenditure 
there is the danger that areas in relative economic decline will 
tend to fall back in the efficiency with which they meet local 
needs. This might well be accentuated considerably by variations in 
general levels of health created by variations in general social 
conditions (income inequalities, work hazards, etc. ), implying a 
greater need per head for health care in poorer areas, and by 
changes in the age structure of the population in areas of net 
emigration. Close empirical analysis is required to see how such 
factors work themselves out in practice. 
105. See note 97. Allowing for the anomaly in the education sector, 
it can be estimated that employment in Milton Keynes increased by 
perhaps 3% or 4% between 1978 and 1981. 
106. For an account of the second oil shock see Terzian (1985 
pp. 257-307), on which the following summary is based. 
The increasing unpopularity of the American-backed regime of 
the Shah in Iran precipitated a revolutionary situation, with a 
national oil strike starting in mid-October 1978. It has to be 
emphasised that anti-Shah feeling was strong across a wide range of 
political groups; in the early stages of the Iranian revolution 
there was no simple battle between Ayatollah Khomeini and the Shah, 
although later, as the revolution crystallised, the religious 
fundamentalists led by Khomeini were able to marginalise other 
revolutionary groups. The oil strikes lasted from October to 
December, at which stage the Americans withdrew their support from 
the Shah, who soon fled into exile. 
The stoppage of Iranian oil production did not immediately 
create a physical shortage on the world oil market as other countries, 
notably Saudi Arabia, were able to expand production to meet the 
gap in the market. Spot prices increased however, and oil 
companies were anxious to keep high stocks of oil in reserve, 
partly in anticipation of future supply difficulties and partly, 
perhaps, in anticipation of further price rises. Indeed, as 
political tensions implied the possibilities of oil shortages, 
various countries, notably the USA, tried to increase imports. 
Spot prices on the open market were considerably higher than 
the official OPEC prices, and so in early 1979 oil producing 
countries attempted to sell on the spot market rather than the 
official price. By mid-1979 a third of the international oil trade 
was conducted on the spot market, compared to a normal figure of 
about 5%. By the end of May, Saudi oil was selling at almost three 
times the official rate. Oil companies were, according to the 
interpretation given by Terzian, actively using the "panic" I itself to a large extent artificially contrivedo to boost profit 
margins. The differences between official prices and spot prices 
also precipitated a wave of corruption and bribery in some of the 
oil producing countries, notably Saudi Arabia. 
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OPEC official prices rose only modestly in 1979, the major 
component of price rises being speculative purchases by the West 
on the spot market. By the beginning of 1980, however, "the oil 
market lurched into indescribabl 
,e 
chaos" (Terzian p. 275)9 the spot 
market stabilising slightly, but with producer countries continually 
adding surcharge upon surcharge on official prices, completely 
disrupting price structures. By late 1980 prices had more than 
doubled in the space of 16 months. Eventually, howeverv prices 
fell back again, as the slump reduced demand for oil and as the 
speculative wave peaked. In February 1982 prices on the spot market 
actually fell below the official OPEC prices. 
One aspect of the oil shock was that it boosted North Sea 
Oil production, and in Scotland boosted the Aberdeen economy. The 
broader question arises though of whether the oil shock actually 
caused the slump. 
Many commentators were inclined to "blame the Arabs" for 
the 1974-76 recession, and yet this type of explanation was far 
less fashionable in, say, 1980 or 1981, when causes of industrial 
recession were being discussed. Various salient differences between 
1973-4 and 1979-80 may be listed: 
(1) Although both oil shocks took place at relatively late 
stages of the long cycle downswing, the spiral of relative 
decline up to 1973 had been fairly weak, givingthe impression 
that background economic conditions were smooth. A deep 
recession under such conditions would tend to be attributed 
by the pundits to specific external shocks, and there is no 
doubt that what happened in 1973 was a severe shock to the 
world economy. 
In contrast, in 1979, the economic situation was 
manifestly perilous; western governments were by this stage 
well used to high inflation, high unemployment and, in many 
cases, balance of payments problems. Trouble could be 
anticipated, independently of what was happening in oil 
markets. 
(2) The oil shock of 1973 had such severe effects in part 
because it was so unexpected and presented novel difficulties 
for governments and companies. In contrast, the possibility 
of a future oil shock would have been more central in 
strategic planning in the late 1970s, especially given the 
considerable political tensions in the Middle East. 
(3) In Britain, at least, attention was concentrated more on 
the role of Government economic policies in precipitating 
a slump. 
With close knowledge only of the British experiencep in which 
the slump took place earlier than elsewhere, it is difficult for 
the, present author to state with conviction how important a factor 
the oil crisis was during the international slump. Undoubtedly, 
though, a jump in energy prices can hardly have made things easier. 
107. Regular statistics are published in the Scottish Economic 
BuZZetin on employment in the North Sea oil industry (see also 
Table 6.57), but these excZude associated manufacturing industries, 
such as oil rig construction and engineering. As so often, one has 
to try to make reasonable inferences (which may turn out-to be 
incorrect) from limited data. 
Employment in North Sea oil in Scotland peaked, on half-yearly 
figures, at 66,000 in December 1985 (52,900 in Grampian). Falling 
oil prices and a natural peaking of production led to a decline of 
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employment to 50,800 (40,700 in Grampian) by June 1987; subsequently 
employment in this sector had-increased again. 
Boonr-slump cycles tend to be very pronounced in extractive 
industries since in the short term prices of raw materials often 
tend to be highly unstable, and since in the longer term the natural 
resources being extracted may start to run out, The most destructive 
combination is that of falling prices and depleted reserves, which 
severely affected the older coal mining areas in the inter-war 
years (chapter 4). Clearly Aberdeen's problems in 1986 were not as 
severe as this, although the earlier boom in house prices was thrown 
into reverse. In the longer term there is no guarantee that 
Aberdeen will continue to be an area of great relative prosperity; 
much depends on the strength of diversification into other economic 
activities as North Sea oil production starts to fade away. 
108. The most obvious asymmetry would be in the construction 
industry, in that any major "active" expansion of employment will 
require an increased housing stock, more roads built9 etc., while 
if there is a downturn in activity jobs will be lost through a slowing 
down of housebuilding but not through the depletion of the existing 
housing stock. Construction is regarded in the text (section 8.3(ii)) 
as part of the active side of the multiplier equation rather than 
as part of the passive side, although house-building (as opposed 
to, for example, factory building and infrastructural development) 
may perhaps be regarded as at least partially "passive". There 
might well be parallel considerations,, though, in more purely 
passive sectors. 
109. Assuming a reclassification in the Highland Region between 
MLH 341 (industrial plant and steelwork), -3,000 jobs, and MLH 371 
(shipbuilding and ship repairing), +2 v 400 jobs. 
110. Total employment fell by 8.7% in Dundee TTWA and by 0.4% in 
Perth TTWA between 1978 and 1981. Manufacturing employment fell by 
28.0% in Dundee and by 1.0% in Perth. Unemployment figures in the 
early 1980s reflected this differential performance with Dundee 
typically having an unemployment rate about the same as Glasgow's, 
while Perth's unemployment rate matched that of South East England. 
Thus, for June 1981 unemployment rates were UK 11.1%. Dundee 15.5%, 
Glasgow 15.1%, Edinburgh 9.3%, Perth 7.8% (South East England 7.7%) 
and Aberdeen 6.4%. This wide spread of unemployment rates obviously 
reflects differential economic performance, yet even so it is 
perhaps surprising that differences in unemployment rates should be 
so large, given the possibilities of migratory equilibriation. For 
example, in South Wales the difference between undepressed Cardiff 
(11.9% unemployment) and other towns (Port Talbot 14.2%, Swansea 
14.3%, Newport 13.6%, Pontypridd 14.3%, Ebbw Vale 18.7%) was 
generally rather less. Perhaps a large part of the explanation lies 
in the very low density of population in areas between the major 
Eastern Scottish cities, so that for example there are few places 
such that there would be substantial emigration from Dundee to A 
and from A to Perth or Aberdeen. In such cases unemployment 
differentials can remain sharp. 
ill. See Tables 8.7,8.26. 
In the Island Areas a positive differential shift-in the 
service sector is concealed by a very large negative differential 
shift (-2,200; -9.1% of total 1978 employment, in all sectors) in 
the construction industry. This relates to the end of the constructic 
and investment phase of the'North Sea oil boom; in 1978 construction 
accounted for 22.0% of total employment in the Island Areas, an 
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abnormally high figure which clearly-cannot be explained by purely 
local demand. 
112. It should also be noted that the rural South of Scotland 
had only slow increases in employment levels up to 1978; between 1973 
and 1978 employment in the Borders Region went from 38,400 to 38,300 
while employment in Dumfries and Galloway went from 47,600 to 
50tOOO. 
113. See note 63 above for a more detailed discussion. 
114. In Whitehaven TTWA, employment grew by 7.3%, while in Dumfries 
TTWA employment increased by 8.1%. Whitehaven's industrial 
performance was boosted by significant employment growth in soap 
and detergent (HLH 275), while the public sector services were 
expanding rapidly in Dumfries, with employment in national 
government services (MLH 901) increasing by 500 (114.6%). 
To some extent Lakeland as constructed in Table 8.27 is 
artificially constructed in that, for example, Whitehaven is 
included but Workington excluded. The point of Table 8.27 is not 
so much to try to show in which large rural area ( including small 
towns) growth is fastest, but rather to show that rural/small-town 
growth took place in the periphery in regions other than Scotland. 
115. Townsend (1986) has also noted the significance of employment 
growth in various medium sized towns in various regional settings, 
continuing even through the slump. 
116. See especially Keeble (1977). The elaboration of the concept 
of the urban-rural shift by, for example, Fothergill and Cudgin 
(1979b, 1982) and Keeble (1980c), represented a development of this 
theme in that the main differentiating factor between regions in 
terms of employment growth was not the familiar North-South divide, 
but rather the degree of urbanisation of particular regions. 
Wildly inaccurate results have occurred when this type of 
reasoning was applied to conditions in the slump, in for example 
Gillespie and Owen (1981). Perhaps the most bizarre comment by 
academic writers on the slump has been that "the most recent recession 
has done more for the equalization of employment rates across 
regions than three decades of regional policy" (Frost and Spence 
1983 p. 258). This astonishing claim, which is wholly incorrect 
whether "employment" is a misprint for "unemployment" or not, 
represents part of an argument,, or rather an assertion, that 
regional convergence has been dominant for a long period, a result 
which., especially in the 1980s, does not withstand close examination. 
Gillespie and Owen (1981) presented their results as an 
assault on the "conventional wisdom! ' that the peripheral regions 
were more prone to recession than Southern England, yet when in a 
later paper (Owen, Coombes and Gillespie 1986) it fails to escape 
their attention that employment fell less during the slump in the 
South than in the North, this is presented as an overturning of 
the "conventional wisdoms of the mid-1970st such as the paramountcy 
of the urban-rural shift and the shrinking of North-South 
differentials. " It is commendable that Gillespie and Owen should 
retract, even if only implicitly, their earlier views yet it still 
appears that they are confused about what the "conventional wisdod' 
of the 1970s really was. 
117. See for example Hudson (1978). 
- 176 - 
118. These were to be expressed mostly at the level of the large 
factory closure, or mass redundancy, in a single town, although 
in some industrial areas a combination of major redundancies in 
apparently unrelated industries could have a major effect. 
119. For Northumberland, the unusually early decrease in 
unemployment in Morpeth TTWA in early 1983 has already been noted 
in chapter 7.7(ii), with the inference being made that a specific 
major job creation event was involved. 
In Northamptonshire especially, and to a lesser extent in 
Staffordshire, favourable location with respect to the South East 
core has probably assisted recovery from slump. 
120. Clearly the intensity of the slump and of the North-South 
divide has been something of an embarrassment, though ultimately not 
a decisive setback, to the Government, and has created the need 
for the Government to create a framework of analysis in which the 
Government could be absolved from all blame and in which the victim 
instead could be blamed. Thus it was decreed that the South was 
the "enterprise culture" while the North became the "dependency 
culture", allegedly preferring to rely on state handouts to getting 
involved in economic activity. In particular, recent rhetoric has 
concentrated heavily on the need to bring the enterprise culture to 
the inner cities, yet much of the intensity of the inner city 
problem derives from the extent to which enterprise earlier deserted 
the inner cities. 
Inevitably, a situation in which work is scarce implies the 
growth of dependency, on the state and on other institutions, and 
one can perhaps argue that a "culture" of dependency arises, showing 
itself in various forms of passivity, frustration, resentment, petty 
crime, breakdown of family ties, and so on. Indeed if one is 
marginalised in the labour market it often takes considerable 
strength of character to avoid being over-acclimatised into 
dependency. If indeed it is possible to speak of a general culture 
of dependency, then no Government can have done more to spread and 
to perpetuate that culture than the post-1979 Conservative 
Governments. Any UK fovernment which is proud of its record on 
unemployment with unemployment persistently over 2,000,000, largely 
resulting from a collapse in industrial employment, chiefly in 
the private sector, which was greatly exacerbated by its own policy 
measures, is a government deeply responsible for the creation of a 
culture of dependency. Furthermore, the Government's view that 
dependency can be reduced by cutting back the welfare state shows 
a fundamental misunderstanding of the problem; dependency is created 
in the labour market, and not by individuals nor by the state. 
121. In the end such projections turned out to be incorrect, and 
the Conservative Government was re-elected. This most certainly 
does not mean that the projections were incorrect at the time, any 
more so than, for example, a die showing 6 makes it incorrect 
earlier to have projected that the die would show a number from 1 to 
5. Given that as of 1980 and 1981 the economy was in a state of 
collapse, unemployment was soaring and opinion poll ratings for the 
Conservatives were for long periods well below 30%, it would have 
taken a major and sudden political shift to leave the Conservatives 
with any real chance of winning the next election. This happened, 
but under most levels of analysis the sequence of events involved 
could be classed as "historical accident". To have predicted the 
Falklands War and its political impact, one would need ýo have 
predicted the misreadings of the situation by various key actors, 
notably the assumption made by Britain that Argentina would not 
attack the Falklands and the assumption made by Argentina that 
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Britain would not defend the Falklands. 
The main point in the text, however, was not the question of 
whether the 1980/1981 prediction of the next Election result was 
"correct" or not, but rather the projection being made that after 
the slump there would be a considerable economic upswing whichever 
party won the next election. Such a projection was at the time 
highly unorthodox, and it may well be that the present author did 
his academic career prospects no favours by proposing research on 
the 1930s post-slump boom to gain advance indications of the future 
shape of the forthcoming (as of 1981/1982 
,) 
1980s boom. The boom 
materialised, but now the orthodoxy is to suggest that this was the 
result of Mrs. Thatcher's success(! ) in overcoming Britain's economic 
problems. It is suggested instead that the boom of the last few 
years represents simply the normal contours of economic change after 
a slump, and would have taken place under a Government of any 
political complexion. 
It is quite possible to set up a counterfactual "history" 
of the mid-1980s, assuming away the major exogenous shock of the 
Argentine invasion of the Falklands, and allowing for a more normal 
course of political and economic events. It is assumed furthermore 
that the Labour Party would not have self-destructed completely as 
a result of the intensification of internal battles as the prospect 
of power becomes closer, although this is perhaps a generous 
assumption. The likelihood under the given assumptions is that 
Labour would have formed either a majority or a minority government 
at some stage in early 1984, and would have inherited an economy 
with massive unemployment, but poised for rapid growth with North 
Sea oil providing an important boost. By about 1988, with economic 
policies bein&directed towards reducing unemployment, one would 
expect unemployment to have fallen below 2,000,000 (in early 1982 
the present author regarded 1,500,000 as a difficult but achievable 
target). Political emphasis, given that unemployment would still 
have been seen as an important problem, would have been given not 
so much to the strength of the boom, but rather to the immensity of 
the inherited problem, requiring still further imaginative 
restructuring of the economy. And, critically, had the Falklands 
War never happened, Thatcherism as an economic policy would have been 
seen as a disastrous failure; the new policies designed to overcome 
the Conservatives' crisis of confidence in the mid-1970s would 
themselves in their collapse have created a new crisis of confidence. 
Under such circumstances it would be a Conservative opposition, not 
a Labour opposition, which would be seen as fatally lacking in 
ideas and seen as concentrating above all on maintaining an illusion 
of unity to hide low morale and a sense of crisis. 
Historical accidents can have profound effectsq and there 
can be little doubt that the Falklands War was, in terms of its 
effects on British political life, one such historical accident with 
profound effects. A historical accident is not a mere random 
occurrence; human history is far more closely structured than that. 
Historical accidents can themselves be regarded as having analysable 
causes. The point, however, about a historical accident is that it 
represents a relatively marginal event which has a disproportionate 
effect on the main currents of historical motion. 
122. Thus the tendency towards increased import penetration in UK 
markets was temporarily halted during the slump; see chapter 7 note 58. 
123. The front cover of the Gazette has featured tourism in four 
out of the first eight months of 1988. 
- 178 - 
124. For leisure travel, the balance of payments position was as 
follows: 
Year Balance Year Balance Year Balance 
(Em) (Em) (Em) 
1977 +971 1981 -455 1985 +353 
1978 +770 1982 -563 1986 -951 
1979 +535 1983 -243 1987 -1333 
1980 +9 1984 -156 
Source: United Kingdom BaZance of Payments 1988 Edition p. 26. 
Between 1977 and 1987 credits from tourism (leisure travel) 
have increased by 19.9% (1.8% per annum) while debits have increased 
by 262.7% (13.8% per annum). The price deflators used are the 
implied price indices for services given on p. 29 of the source 
reference. 
Unless there has been a very major change of accounting 
practice, or of producing estimates (which are generally slightly 
lower than those published in the Gazette, even taking into account 
business travel), the general picture has been one in which UK 
tourism abroad has been booming, leading to considerable outflows 
of currency, and in which foreign tourism in the UK has been growing 
relatively slowly. Obviously any expansion in the UK tourist 
industry is to be welcomed, and the expansion of employment in this 
sector is also to be welcomed (+221,000 jobs, or +20.6% between March 
1982 and March 1988; Gazette, August 1988, Table 8.1; self-employment 
increased by perhaps 40,000 in the same period), yet this increase 
needs to be set in context. Given the severe and increasing balance 
of payments deficit on tourism, it cannot be said that the UK is 
greatly improving its competitive position in international tourism; 
still less can it be said, Government hyperbole notwithstanding, that 
tourist development is a suitable replacement for industrial 
development in an allegedly "post-industrial" society. The 
situation seems more as described in chapter 6.9 above in which 
rising real incomes and the persistence of high unemployment combine 
to induce a substantial expansion of employment in the lower paid 
parts of the service sector. 
125. These figures represent net earnings of City institutions# 
rather than the total balance of payments in financial services. 
During the slump the main 
' 
increase in City earnings was in 
banking (UK overseas earnings averaging E120m per annum between 
1977 and 1979, then E139m in 1980, E849m in 1981 and E1,361m by 
1983). After the slump, the most spectacular increase in overseas 
earnings was in insurance, with net earnings rising from E1,648m 
in 1982 to E4,913m in 1986 and E4,834m in 1987. 
All figures taken from United Kingdom BaZance of Payments 
1988 p. 38. 
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Fig 8.1 Classification of Counties According to Degree and 
Structure of Job Loss 
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Chapter 9 Pre-1914 Origins of the Regional Problem 
- 9.1 Int-koduction 
The preceding few chapters have been devoted to discussing 
various aspects of regional economic change in 20th century Britain. 
Much of the discussion has been in a semi-narrative form, emphasising 
the specificity of developments through each business cycle; from such 
relatively detailed accounts a broader picture may be developed without 
the over-generalisations which are liable to occur in a more "thematic" 
account. The problem of over-generalisation is seen, for example, in 
those accounts of the inter-war period which treat the period as a whole 
as being uniformly depressed, without taking account of the radically 
different sets of economic trends operating either side of 1932,1 
In all the variety of economic conditions which have characterised 
the study periods, several reasonably consistent themes have emerged. 
The most central theme is that during the post-1918 period, the "core" 
regions of Southern England have persistently outperformed economically 
the peripheral industrial regions. This tendency has at times been weak, 
particularly in periods in which a strong regional policy had been 
operative, and at other times the tendency has been very strong, 
particularly during periods of deep recession. This is broadly what 
might be expected from a cumulative causation model of the type suggested 
by Myrdal (1957), as discussed in chapter 1.5 above. In any given period, 
the more dynamic economic performance is likely to be attained by the 
more prosperous region rather than the less prosperous region; this 
dynamism improves the background structure for the more prosperous region 
in subsequent periods, and helps perpetuate superior growth. In periods 
of recession, heavier rates of job loss are likely to be found in the 
less prosperous region, particularly if such a region has a large industrial 
sector, susceptible to decline. 
There is undoubtedly a strong core-periphery component to the 
regional differences in economic growth in the 20th century. The London 
region, with its concentrations of employment in administrationg higher 
finance and the more income-elastic branches of industry, certainly shows 
the central attributes of a dominant core region. The periphery may 
then be described negatively, in terms of "not-core". The relative 
absence of the higher economic functions in the peripheral regions tends 
to be a constraint to growth in the peripheral regions, not just in 
Britain but also in most other countries. This however is not sufficient 
to define a specific form of economic problem in the periphery. Peripheral 
regions vary considerably in economic structure from country to country; 
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the distinction in structure between a declining industrial region in 
Northern England and a backward rural area in a less developed country 
is in many ways more fundamental than the differences between the core 
metropolitan regions in each country. 
The basic regional problem in a less developed country is one of 
lack of economic development in the periphery; the basic regional problem 
in a more developed country is that past economic development in the 
periphery cannot be sustained, leading to the development of coal mining 
problem regions and depressed manufacturing regions. 
2 Agricultural 
problem regions may still be an important feature in the more developed 
economies, but this is less the case in contemporary Britain, with a 
small agricultural population, than elsewhere. 
The dominant regional problem in Britain in the 20th century, 
and the one which has affected most people, has been the poor employment 
performances of the coal mining and manufacturing areas. In recession 
after recession, throughout the periods studied in chapters 4 to 8, this 
has been the central component in the geography of employment change. 
Industrial and coal mining employment has historically tended to be 
concentrated in the periphery, and has also tended to decline there more 
quickly than in the core regions. 
This pattern of decline presupposes an earlier period of powerful 
industrial growth in the periphery. That this growth, from the late 18th 
century to the late 19th century, took place in the periphery rather than 
in the core, is regarded as accidental rather than fundamental at the 
current scale of analysis. Had Britain's main coalfields been located 
in Southern England rather than in the peripheral regions, Britain's 
Industrial Revolution would probably have taken place predominantly in 
the South rather than in the North, if it were to have taken place 
anywhere. The presence of water power in the Pennine fringes was 
undoubtedly an important factor in the early industrial expansion of the 
Northern cotton and woollen industries, 
3 but it is difficult to envisage 
the shift to large scale production taking place without access to cheap$ 
and thus relatively locally mined, coal. 
19tb century industrial growth was concentrated in the peripheral 
regions not because they were peripheral but rather because they had 
coal. This, the main source of non-living energy in the steam revolution., 
was very bulky, and hence difficult and costly to transport. It is worth 
noting, for example, that much of the very early development of the 
British railway system was carried out primarily to deal with the major 
problem of moving coal from the pithead. 
4 
The presence or otherwise of coal was an extremely important 
locational factor for industry in the 19th century. Coal is a sporadically 
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occurring raw material which is not transported away with the finished 
product in any form. The combination of 100% weight loss and sporadic 
occurrence means, using Weberian analysis, 
5 
that industrial location is 
likely to be tied quite closely to the coalfields. The cost of 
transporting coal was far from negligible. In the decades up to 1913, 
the price of coal in London was typically 10s per ton higher in London 
than at the pithead, with the -., pithead price varying between 5s and 9s per 
ton. 
6 
In effect, energy was over twice as expensive in London than in 
the coalfield areas; the differences in industrial profit margins which 
would have resulted from this were likely to be substantial. The weakness 
of industrial development in the towns and cities of Southern England 
in the 19th century can be largely explained by this factor. The effect 
of the Industrial Revolution was, paradoxically, more to deindustrialise 
the South than to industrialise the South. 
7 
Fortunately for the development of British industry, there was 
not just a single coalfield, but several, allowing considerable regional 
specialisation in industrial development. In following the arguments 
later in this chapter, it is important to recognise that while much of 
Britain's main industrial growth was, in locational terms, coal 
orientated (or transport orientated, in Weber's more ambiguous terms), 
it was not orientated to final consumer markets, almost by definition in 
the case of the main export industries. The fact that rapid industrial 
growth could take place without being dependent on a local market meant 
that cities could emerge almost from nothing in a very short time period. 
8 
Investment was needed to develop such urbanisation, yet there was no 
requirement for investment to be generated wholly from the previous 
savings of the inhabitants of a place; mobility of capital was present 
in a number of forms in the 19th century. 
9 
An extremely important set of technical developments had profound 
implications on the geography of industrial development in the 20th 
century. These revolved around the increased transportability of energy, 
most obviously through the widespread use of electricity and also through 
the increased use of liquid oil rather than solid, bulky coal. Weber 
( 1909/1929 pp. 91-94) noted at an early stage that the use of electricity 
would substantially reduce the transport costs of energy, and allow 
location to be orientated towards markets and sources of other raw 
materials, rather than towards sources of coal. In practice, the greater 
attractiveness of market locations dominated, with the focus of industrial 
development, particularly in the newer industries, shifting decisively 
towards the Midlands and South. When examined from a longer Iiistorical 
perspective, however, it seems rather strange that the main markets should 
be in the Midlands and the Southq after a century and a half of vigorous 
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industrial development in the North and relative industrial stagnation 
in the South. If the Industrial Revolution of the late l8th and early 
19th century had a decisive transforming effect on the British economy 
(a clai'm which is made, usually in the introduction, in virtually every 
economic history of the Industrial Revolution), 
10 it is difficult to see 
why, after a century and more of the Industrial Revolution the dominant 
markets should have been at the end of England which did not participate 
in the Industrial Revolution, namely London and the South East. For the 
time being, let it merely be suggested that there is no automatic 
presumption for the economic dominance of the new industrial areas over 
the South in the 19th century. A stronger version of the argument, that 
the South has been economically dominant over the North throughout 
Britain's economic history, will be advanced later. 
A complicated set of questions is opened up here. It hardly needs 
stressing that the British economy has been in relative decline since 
the First World War, and that this decline has been concentrated in 
industry 11 and, geographically, in the industrial areas (chapters 4 to 8 
above). Somewhere, Britain ýlost her way. Pollard. (1985) in a recent 
review article, notes that there is a tendency for those studying 
Britain's relative economic decline to look back to roots of decline in 
the 1870-1914 period. In that the British regional problem is spatially 
the sharpest manifestation of this relative decline, and in that it is 
felt necessary to go back before 1914 to search for the roots of the 
regional problem, the current author is following this tendency. 
In studying decline at the national level, the question has often 
been raised of whether the heavy capital exports of the 1870-1914 period 
were good or bad for the national economy. Pollard (1985) distinguishes 
between a "gut reaction" school on the one hand which suggests that 
capital exports were bad for the economy, and that capital should be used 
to create jobs at home rather than abroad, 
12 
and a "neo-classical" 
school on the other hand, which suggests that the diversion of capital 
towards home uses would have lowered the rate of return on investment and 
damaged the economy. 
13 
Pollard does not find decisive support for one 
point of view or the other from the available evidence, but he notes 
various instances in which industrial expansion was clearly hindered by 
a lack of capital at a time in which overseas investment was considerably 
more fashionable than domestic industrial investment. 
14 
Fortunatelyq there is no need here to attempt a definitive answer 
to this particular question, although the present author would tend to 
agree with the "gut reaction" school rather than the "neo-classical" 
school. The central question as far as the present analysis is concerned 
is not whether the heavy capital exports were good for the nationaL 
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economy, but rather whether they disfavoured the industrial areas. The 
answer in this case is reasonably unambiguous; a major switch of investment 
from home to abroad can hardly have been anything but detrimental to 
industrial employment growth, and to the industrial areas. It is possible 
that the economic gains to the South largely or fully compensated for 
this loss at the aggregate scale, but even if this were the case, there 
would still be a strong shift in the balance of economic advantage from 
North to South, and from Northern industrial interests to Southern 
rentier interests. 
The development of industrial Britain was thus undoubtedly hampered 
by the direction of investment abroad. This would affect not just current 
rates of industrial development, but also the possibilities of developing 
new industries in the longer term; Britain largely missed out on the 
industriaZ upswing starting in the mid-1880s, but had a very strong 
record of foreign investment (chapter 2.6). In terms of longer term 
industrial dynamics, it is surely mitleading to suggest, as McCloskey 
does, 15 that "by keeping savings at home the British people could have 
had two Forth Bridges, two Bakerloo lines, two London housing stocks, 
two Port Sunlights"; what was at stake was whether Britain, supposedly 
the leading industrial country, would keep up with Germany and the USA in 
the development of the chemicals industry, and such infant industries as 
the vehicles industry and the electrical industry. 
The retardation of the peripheral industrial areas in the late 
19th century is shown clearly in Fig 3.1. Throughout the 19th century 
up to the 1881 Census there was a powerful drift in population to the 
North, and more specifically to the Northern industrial areas, while after 
1881 the North-South balance of population remained stable. The period 
after 1881 was furthermore one in which exports of capital were very 
high, 16 corroborating the impression that it was the diversion of capital 
investment abroad which was largely responsible for the North's 
retardation. 
The argument has now been carried back one stage further. There 
still remains the presumption of a split between finance and industry, 
in which what happens in the financial sector is crucial to what happens 
in the industrial sector, without the converse necessarily being the case. 
Prior to the Industrial Revolution, one could state that the main forms 
of wealth were landed wealth and financial wealth (banking, trade, etc. ). 
The industrial capitalist represented not so much an offshoot of these 
older classes, but rather a new class. In the early stages of the 
Industrial Revolution especially, many of the industrial capitalists 
17 
started from fairly humble origins, which suggests that while such 
capitalists may have accumulated considerable wealth by the standards 
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of the industrial wage level, this wealth was relatively small compared 
with the more traditional concentrations of wealth. Furthermore, the 
development of industrial wealth would have been constrained by the 
requirement for access to investment funds, which were not necessarily 
forthcoming if the holders of major wealth preferred to concentrate on 
non-industrial investment. 
Industrialists tended to be moderately wealthy rather than 
extremely wealthy, while those with extreme wealth in the 19th century 
tended to be either landowners, or bankers and merchants based in the 
capital city; this aspect of the distribution of wealth has been much 
emphasised by Rubinstein (1977,1981), although a reworking of Rubinstein's 
data in chapter 9.4 below suggests that Rubinstein somewhat understated 
the relative concentrations of wealth in the Northern conurbations. The 
extreme wealth of London does not require a large local industrial 
workforce to perpetuate itself, in contrast with the more moderate wealth 
of the industrial North. A centre of finance and wealth such as London 
tends, however, to generate a substantial middle class, and also 
substantial employment in miscellaneous services and finished goods 
industries. The Northern industrial areas would have, in proportion to 
the wealth existing in the area, a far larger industrial working class 
than the South. 
Later sections in this chapter will elaborate on this basic 
picture of how a large industrial base developed in the North while the 
main locus of wealth remained in the South. An important distinction can 
be made between the "visible geography" of the 19th century (industrial 
location, employment, unemployment, migration, etc. ) which can be examined 
from readily available statistics, or even seen on the ground, and the 
"invisible geography", the hidden structures of wealth which underlie so 
much of what is happening on the ground. 
18 Geographers have tended to 
concentrate on the visible geography of the 19th century, and in particular 
on such features as industrial location 
19 
or urban growth? 
o The 
invisible geography, of wealth and of capital exports, has largely been 
ignored. Nineteenth century imperialism is perhaps the most conspicuous 
form of this invisible geography, "invisible" insofar as the internal 
structure of Britain is concerned, but also the sheer accumulations of 
wealth suggested by Rubinstein as underlying the economy of London will 
tend not to be fully revealed in the "visible" indicators. 
This does not mean that population growth, or employment growth, 
in London was negligible. Table 9.1 shows that while Northern cities 
grew in proportionate terms far more quickly than London, and hence far 
more spectacularly, the absolute growth of London at least balanced that 
of the Northern cities. This feature is often overlooked in accounts of 
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the geography of 19th century Britain, especially those which concentrate 
on the industrial geography of the period (e. g. Perry 1975). Even on 
visible indicators, Southern urbanisation matched Northern urbanisation. 
This chapter attempts to elaborate on aspects of British economic 
geography prior to 1914, both to give a coherent picture of the period 
itself, and to establish the background against which regional economic 
change after 1918 was set. 
Section 9.2 summarises the geography of migration up to 1914 in 
order to give an outline of the visible geography of Britain, and in 
order to identify major patterns of change through time. 
Section 9.3 considers in more detail, and on a theoretical basis, 
some features of the geography of wealth in 19th century Britain, and 
how this influenced the geographical structure of the working class. 
Section 9.4 discusses Rubinstein's evidence on the geography and sectoral 
composition of wealth, and some of the implications of this evidence. 
Section 9.5 in many ways is the crucial link section between the 
discussions of regional class structure in the 19th century (sections 9.2 
to 9.4) and the discussions of the regional geography of unemployment in 
the 20th century (chapters 4,5,7). Beveridge (1944) has suggested that 
there was a fundamental reversal of regional patterns of unemployment 
before and after the First World War. 
21 Up to 1914, unemployment was high 
in London and the rest of Southern England, but low in the coalfield 
industrial areas. After the First World War, London and the South had 
low rates of unemployment, while the coalfield industrial areas had high 
rates of unemployment. Beveridge interpreted this in terms of a prosperous 
North and a depressed South. It is suggested, however, that this is 
too simple a distinction, and that the extreme wealth which was present 
in London encouraged an employment structure to develop which was liable 
to labour glutting in a way in which the labour markets of the industrial 
towns of the North were not. 
Section 9.6 concentrates on the coal industry to see what aspects 
of its pre-1914 expansion can be used to help explain the extreme 
rapidity of employment decline in this sector in the 1920s and 1930s. It 
is suggested that the patterns of expansion in this industry were highly 
lopsided, and that the growth in employment which resulted was exceptionally 
unstable. Much of the intensity of the regional problem between the wars 
can be explained by this factor., 
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9.2 Geographical Patterns of Migration Before 1914 
It is not inconsistent with earlier arguments to examine the 
redistribution of population through time as an indicator of spatio- 
temporal shifts in prosperity, so long as a distinction is drawn between 
"prosperity" and "wealth". Under such a distinction, prosperity refers 
to the economic well-being of the mass of population who have to sell or 
attempt to sell their labour power in the job market (and refers to such 
matters as the degree of unemployment and the dynamics of wages)-while 
wealth, or riches, refers to the economic condition of the capitalist 
class(es). It is not necessarily true, and depends a lot on regional 
class structure (sections 9.3 to 9.5 below), that the geography of 
prosperity and the geography of wealth should coincide, and indeed it is 
a central contention of this chapter that due to a complex set of 
circumstances they did not coincide in the 19th century. This basic 
point applies whether the class of'wealth-holders is defined narrowly 
(e. g. millionaires) or broadly, to include a large part of the middle 
class. 
A geography of migration is mainly a geography of prosperity, or 
lack of prosperity, rather than one of wealth, and as such links in with 
týe statistical indicators ( unemployment, migration, etc. ) used in 
previous chapters to measure the geography of prosperity in the 20th 
century. 
That there has been a geographical reversal of patterns of 
prosperity is clear. A striking illustration of this is to compare the 
map of net absorption and dispersion of population up to 1881 in 
Ravenstein's classic paper on migration (Map 6 in Ravenstein 1885) with 
present migration trends. Net absorption is given by expressing, as a 
percentage of the county's 1881 population, the difference between the 
county's population and the number of people enumerated as being born in 
that county, and as such gives a long term pattern of migration rather 
than an expression of current tendencies, which were in considerable 
flux, as Cairncross (1953 p. 69) points out. 
The general picture of migratory trends in England and Wales 
presented by Ravenstein for the mid-19th century is almost the complete 
reverse of general trends of migration and economic growth at present. 
In the 19th century the four "metropolitan counties" (in the sense of 
containing the metropolis of London) were particularly rapid absorbers of 
population, more so in Middlesex and Surrey, where the London built-up 
area represented a dominant part of the population, than in Kent and Essex, 
which had large rural hinterlands. As well as Surrey (net absorption 
level of 30.7% of the 1881 population) and Middlesex (17.7%), 
22 
there 
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were three other counties with absorption leVels considerably in excess 
of any other county in England and Wales. These were Glamorgan (26.7%), 
Durham (19.9%) and Lancashire (18.1%). In no other county was the 
absorption rate over 8.0% but generally the more industrialised counties 
were net absorbers of population; thus, in addition to the above, 
Monmouth, Kent, Yorkshire, Cheshire, Warwick, Sussex, Carnarvons 
Hampshire, Essex, Derby, Nottingham, Merioneth, Northumberland, Stafford. 
Of these only Kent, Sussex, Hampshire, and Essex, in the London zone of 
influence, and Carnarvon and Merioneth in the North Wales slate mining 
zone were outside the main coalfields. 
23 All other counties in England 
and Wales were net dispersers of population, about half of them showing 
net dispersion rates of over 20%, although certain counties, notably 
Cumberland, (-1.7% net absorption rate), Leicester (-3.6%), Worcester 
(-3.6%) and Gloucester (-5.9%)*had only slight degrees of net dispersion 
of population. Of particular interest is that the counties in the rural 
belt from the Wash to Cornwall universally showed heavy rates of net 
dispersal of population yet it is these counties which in recent years 
have tended to be fastest net absorbers of population. Thus, in the 
1971-1981 period the following English counties had net migration rates of 
over 9% (measured in terms of gain in population through net migration): 
Cornwall (+15.1%), West Sussex (+15.1%). Isle of Wight (+13.5%), 
Buckinghamshire (+13.5%), Dorset (+11.9%), Norfolk (+10.9%), 
Hereford and Worcester (+10.5%), Cambridgeshire (+10.1%), Devon 
(+9.4%), Suffolk (+9.2%), Shropshire (+9.1%). 
24 
All these counties except West Sussex were in the rural zones of 
net population dispersal in Ravenstein's analysis. 
Clearly this line of analysis could be carried much further, but 
this is hardly necessary if one intends merely to outline the reversal 
of patterns of internal migration between the mid-19th century and the 
late 20th century. This reversal is noticeable on a North-South basis 
(Fig. 3.1), but is even more strongly marked on a rural-urban basis, most 
clearly but certainly not exclusively in the South. Fothergill and 
Gudgin (1982) appear to make a false distinction when they suggest that 
in contrast to earlier experience current spatial problems are best 
expressed on an urban-less urban basis rather than a North-South basis. 
Both aspects need to be treated together, both for the present and for 
previous periods; neither can be treated in isolation. The 20th century 
regional problem of the North is not simply a regional problem of an area 
of the map; it is the regional problem of Northern urbanisation deriving 
from past periods. The late 20th century rural growth in the South is 
not simply abstract rural growth, as Fothergill and Gudgin seem to imply$ 
but the growth of the metropolis on green fields. 
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A 19th century writer (Ogle 1889 p. 230) suggested that 
"Towns and manufacturing districts in all times and in all countries 
grow more rapidly than rural districts, and at their expense; this being 
a necessary consequence of the rigidly limited amount of land available 
for agriculture, and the practically unlimited amount of material 
available for manufacturing purposes. " 
This, despite some overgeneralisation (... "in all times and in 
all countries" ... ) seems a reasonable statement of the nature of the 
19th century rural-urban shift, though perhaps some indication of the 
importance of the service sector in urban areas, and particularly in 
London, would have been useful. Whereas Fothergill and Cudgin explain 
the 20th century urban-rural shift in terms of the rigidly limited 
amount of land available in cities for industry, Ogle describes the 19th 
century rural-urban shift in terms of the 1-imited availability of land 
in ruraZ areas for agriculture, the question of congestion in the city not 
yet having been"seen as a major problem. 
The rural-urban shift of the 19th century and the urban-rural 
shift of the 20th century are not entirely parallel, however. In the 
former period the growth of the cities and the relative stagnation of 
the rural areas was the result of a major sectoral shift in economic 
activity from agriculture to industry and services. In the latter period 
the relative decline of the cities and the growth of smaller population 
centres needs to be explained in terms of geographical shifts in activity 
within broad sectors. 
Summarising, one can state that the general tendency before 1914 
was for population to be redistributed from country to town, a process- 
which was international in scope but felt most strongly in Great Britain, 
25 
and that this major redistribution of population involved, secondarily, 
a net redistribution of population from South to North. These trends 
need to be examined in more detail. Table 9.2, taken via Cairncross 
(1953 p. 70) from Welton (1911) and ultimately from Census data, is a 
basic source for analysis. Much of the relevant data is mapped by Lawton 
(1968) who is able to show that "the fewness of the areas of migrational 
gain over the period as a whole is a reflection of the concentration of 
employment into a limited number of growth points" and that "the volume 
,, 26 of migration into these areas was very large . The general trends 
are reasonably well known, however; it is the pattern of fluctuations 
which are of primary interest here, in that these fluctuations might 
shed considerable light on the changing economic geography of pre-1914 
Britain. The emphasis is on domestic migration; Thomas (1973) has 
covered in considerable detail the question of international migration. 
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In general patterns of change were relatively stable up to the 
1870s, although the Irish migrations of the 1840s tended to augment the 
growth of the Northern towns and displace English net rural migration. 
27 
After the 1870s, patterns of migration fluctuated sharply from decade 
to decade; Cairncross (1953 p. 69) noted that "up-to 1881 the movements 
of population were along channels that seemed fixed- and deep, and that it 
was not until the eighties that they overflowed into unfamiliar 
courses. " The switch between the 1870s and the 1880s seers to be pivotal. 
The most important aspect of the rupture of trends of the 1880s, 
combined with the subsequent violent switches of trend, was not its 
internal geography but rather its external geography. Table 9.2 shows 
that apart from the 1840s, the decade of the Irish famine (chapter 3.3), 
England and Wales were moderate net exporters of population up to 1881, 
with a loss of population through net emigration averaging around 
100,000 per decade between 1851 and 1881. After the 1881 Census, the 
net loss of population through migration increased sharply in comparison 
with previous periods, with a loss of over half a million in both the 
1880s and the 19009. In the middle, the loss of population through 
migration in the 1890s was remarkably slight. Fig 9.1 graphs the official 
annual statistics for UK migration, and thus shows more clearly cyclical 
turning points. As the graphed series includes Ireland, while Table 9.2 
excludes Ireland, Fig 9.1 indicates much higher figures for net emigration 
than does Table 9.2. Emigration from the UK was on an increasing trend 
during the late 1860s and early 1870s, peaking in 1873. During the 
depression of the 1870s, which was felt both in Britain and in America, 
emigration dropped sharply. Emigration recovered, and remained at high 
levels during the 1880s. The period from 1888 to 1896 was one of falling 
emigration, but after 1896, the date conventionally used to mark the 
upswing of the long cycle, net emigration from the UK reached new peaks. 
The economic forces behind such major fluctuations in migration 
were highly complex. In general, unless there are extreme factors 
operating (as in Ireland in the 1840s) the level of net emigration from 
a zone of population dispersion is set not by the level of economic 
depression in that zone, but by the degree of economic opportunity 
elsewhere. In the context of internal migration in 20th century 
Britain, 
28 
the "degree of economic opportunity" is set by the growth of 
employment in the more prosperous regions; in the context of 19th century 
imperial expansion, it was set by the development of new territories 
abroad, most notably in the USA, but also across substantial other parts 
of the "white periphery" (Australia, New Zealandq etc. ). The rate of net 
migration from the UK, and from other parts. of Europe, thus tended to be 
high when economic conditions in the white periphery were favourable, 
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and low when trade was dull in these peripheral countries, a feature 
noted both by contemporaries 
29 
and by later writers. 
30 This clearly 
applied to business cyclical swings in migration, but the presence of 
0 31 inverse long swings in economic development creates complications. 
It was noted in chapter 2 that there was a very powerful upswing in 
economic development in the white periphery from the 1880s, which relied 
heavily on a redistribution of capital and population from the European 
core. The growth of the new, lands was perhaps the central feature of 
the upswing of the "imperial Kondratieff" cycle, but this growth would 
have been partly at the expense of employment in the European core 
nations, as a result of the diversion bf investment abroad. The upswing 
from the mid-1880s was thus characterised by very heavy rates of emigration 
from Europe and particularly from the rural areas, but there was a 
significant interruption in the process in the early 1890s, when the 
collapse of the Baring bank, which had over-invested in Argentina, 
significantly discouraged new investment in the white periphery* 
32 
Long swings in the peripheral economies clearly had considerable 
repercussions on the British domestic economy. British domestic 
investment and British foreign investment were in the long run inversely 
related; 
33 
the extreme volume of overseas investment in the 1880s and 
in the decade up to-the First World War was such that domestic investment 
was certain to be affected. In periods when overseas investment was 
heavy, for example the early 1870s, the later 1880s, and the period from 
about 1906 onwards, domestic investment was reduced, whereas when 
overseas investment was slight, as in the later 1890s, domestic investment 
was high. Cairncross (1953) regarded domestic and foreign investment 
as coming from a common pool of saving, and although the size of this 
pool, as a proportion of GNP, fluctuated through time 
34 
these fluctuations 
were slighter than the fluctuations in overseas investment, so that 
inverse swings between domestic and overseas investment still existed. 
It was suggested in section 9.1 that whatever the effects of 
overseas investment on national income as a whole, a considerable shift in 
the balance of economic advantage between the industrial North and the 
metropolitan South would result. Any problems which the Northern industrial 
economies might face as a result of the direction of investment overseas 
might reasonably be expected to be stronger in the 1880s and 1900s than 
in the 1890s. Table 9.2 suggests that this was indeed the case, and that 
in the 1880s the Northern industrial areas, previously centres of heavy 
immigration, had actually become areas of net outward migration. In 
the 1870s, these areas had a net inflow of population of 350,000 while 
in the 1880s they had a net outflow of 6090009 a change in the total 
balance of -410,000. Table 9.3 notes this shift and disaggregates it. 
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"The changes in the 1880s fell with particular vehemence on 
the northern towns" 
35 
while the migration balance in the non-industrial 
towns remained steady, although with an evidence of a shift in the balance 
away from the North and in favour of the South. It might have been 
expected that the heavy increases of migration from Englaný and Wales 
would have led to substantial increases in net migrations from the rural 
areas. Tables 9.2 and 9.3 show emphatically that this was not the case. 
The level of migration from rural areas was basically set by push factors, 
notably a lack of employment expansion in areas in which the natural 
increase in population is very high. The agricultural depression of the 
1870s and 1880s 
36 
probably contributed to the peaking in the rate of rural 
emigration in these decades, but there is little clear evidence that the 
overseas orientation of investment had much effect. Immigration of a 
rural population from Ireland undoubtedly reduced domestic rural emigration 
in the 1840s through intensified competition for jobs (Table 9.2), but a 
redirection of growth from the Northern cities to "abroad" had relatively 
little effect. 
The switch-in final destinations of migration was far more significant 
than any switch in origins. Table 9.3 shows a change in the migration 
balance of -459,000 between 1871-1881 and 1881-1891. The Northern towns 
account for -439,000 of this, 
37 
of which the bulk is accounted for by the 
cities and industrial towns. London had a substantial deterioration 
(-139,000) in its migration balance, possibly in part because the local 
labour market was starting to become heavily glutted (section 9.5 below) 
and in part because London, a port city, represented a convenient stepping 
stone for migration between rural origins and final destinations abroad. 
In other areas, the migration balance remained fairly steady, while in 
the South Wales coalfield inward migration increased substantially, in a 
totally counter-cyclical fashion; this feature needs closer investigation. 
Table 9.4 lists in more detail migration into the specialised 
colliery districts. In the 1840s and 1850s migration into the coalfields 
was substantial, both in England and in South Wales. In the 1860s and 
1870s, migration into the South Wales coalfield slowed down substantially$ 
but in the 1880s and 1900s such migration became extremely high; virtually 
all the net migration into the British-colliery districts was directed 
to South Wales. The movements of the South Wales economy were thus out 
of phase with the rest of the British economy, but in phase with the pace 
of development overseas. The more rapid development of the South Wales 
coalfield, in contrast with the rest of Britain's coalfields, can be found 
in Wales's role as an exporter of steam--coal. Thomas (1973 p. 293) notes 
that: "In the period 1861-1911 long swings in the export sector of 
Britain were inverse to those in home investment. The rate of output of 
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coal in Wales synchronised with fluctuations in the British export 
sector, whereas the rate of output of English-coal consumed on the home 
market was sensitive to the long swing in home capital construction. " 
A pattern of inverse swings within British industry is therefore possible, 
although the dominant positively phased swing is of course linked to 
domestic investment rather than to foreign investment. 
In general, the relative fortunes of the industrialised North 
declined sharply in the late 19th century, as the balance of investment 
shifted from the domestic economy to foreign investment. The large 
industrial cities were more capable of riding the storm than the smaller 
centres of population. Table 9.5 suggests that the major cities of the 
East (Leeds, Sheffield, Leicester, Hull) were hardly affected 
demographically by the shift of the 1880s, although Nottingham seems to 
represent an exception. It is in the West, in Liverpool, Manchester 
and Birmingham, that the switches of the late 19th century were most 
sharply felt, with net emigration taking place in the 1880s (or, in 
Manchester, a significant deceleration of net immigration), and high 
rates of immigration in the 1890s. 
Of all the main Northern cities, Liverpool was most affected by 
the changes of the 1880s in terms of migration. This city had been*a 
centre of considerable net immigration during the mid-19th century, and 
not just during the "hungry forties", yet in the 1880s the city was a 
source of considerable net emigration. The migratory shift between the 
1870s and 1880s in Liverpool stood at -64,100 (Table 9.5), compared with 
-166,400 in the eight Northern cities as a whole (Table 9.3); this is a 
substantial proportion. A likely reason for the extremity of the 
migratory shift in Liverpool is that the lure of overseas economic 
expansion would have skimmed off surplus population far more readily in 
Liverpool, a Western port city with a history of heavy immigration and 
emigration, than in the inland cities of the East. It seems quite 
possible that with the high levels of external migration in the 1880so 
Liverpool was still a considerable centre of net internaZ migration, but 
that much of this migration was increasingly transitional, with the final 
destination not being Liverpool itself but rather the USA and the white 
dominions. Various forms of 11stepwisell processes (Ravenstein 1885) could 
be envisaged, with migrants from smaller towns moving into the city, and 
migrants from a previous period, having acquired skills in Liverpool, 
moving abroad. Net emigration from Liverpool does not necessarily imply 
a depressed local economy; it could simply be a side-effect of Liverpool 
having been the primary migrant port in a time when prospects abroad 
were, to many, more attractive than prospects in Britain. 
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While attention so far has concentrated on patterns of migration, 
and in particular on the effects of, events abroad on patterns of migration, 
it should not be overlooked that Britain was undergoing an intense 
industrial recession in the early 1880s which had several of the features 
of a long cycle slump. If the Northern industrial areas could show a net 
migratory balance of -60,000 in a decade in which net migration from the 
rural areas stood at -850,000, economic trends can hardly have been 
favourable. A Royal Commission on the Depression of Trade and Industry 
reported in 1886 and found evidence of considerable economic depression 
in the industrial areas. The evidence is not structured in such a way 
that it is easy to provide a picture of the economic geography of slump, 
but doubtless close sifting of the evidence would provide important 
information on the performance of the industrial economy at what was a 
critical stage in Britain's economic development. Unfortunately, a 
discussion of the economic geography of the 1880s slump goes beyond the 
bounds of the present thesis; this subject can perhaps be left to later 
researchers. 
38 The slump of the early 1880s is not regarded as resulting 
from a switch from home to foreign investment; it is seen instead as 
representing the culminating phase in a series of intensifying recessions 
as a result of a particular generation of industries losing momentum, 
and is thus regarded as broadly comparable with the post-1929 and post- 
1979 slumps. The post-slump recovery was unusual, however, in that half 
the total savings in the economy were directed to foreign investment and 
only half to domestic investment. Under such circumstances, the vigorous 
post-slump industrial growth which characterised the 1840s and 1930s 
could hardly be expected to take place in the 1880s. 
The extent to which the unfavourable migration figures in the 
Northern industrial areas represent the geography of slump, and the 
extent to which they represent the geography of recovery, remain unclear. 
Allen (1929 pp. 211-243) suggests that the West Midlands were particularly 
severely affected by the slump as a result of a rapid decline in the older 
metal trades, and in the iron industry especially, but comparative 
regional statistics on the severity of slump are hard to compile. If 
Allen is correct, this could explain why Birmingham was a centre of 
emigration in the 1880s, and why the "Northern industrial (non-textile) 
towns" in Table 9.3 also showed net emigration. Five of these smaller 
industrial towns (Potteries, Stafford, Rugby, Walsall and Wolverhampton) 
were in the West Midlands, and some of thesel notably Walsall and 
Wolverhampton, were economically closely linked with Birmingham. 
There has been no shortage of research on the 1870-1914 period$ 
but much of it has concentrated on broad questions such as the international 
movement of capital. The relative lack of any detailed modern research 
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into patterns of industrial growth and decline in specific trade cycles 
is keenly felt. 
In the 1890s, overseas investment remained slack, largely as a 
result of a series of financial crises, which had their roots in 
over-investment abroad, 
39 
which produced a debt crisis, which reverbgrated 
across financial markets. Tha main single event in this was the crisis 
of the Baring bank in 1890, a bank which had been heavily involved in 
Argentinian finance, but which had run into liquidity problems. A Wall 
Street panic in 1893, and various other factors, including the end of 
an Australian land boom, combined to make overseas investment far less 
attractive during the 1890s. Once these disruptions had worked their 
way through domestic economies, both at home and abroad, economic expansion 
resumed, and at a fast pace. In the UK, overseas investment had reached 
a low level by the mid-1890s while domestic investment was rising quickly. 
Table 9.2 implies that this renewed expansion had favourable effects on 
the Northern cities, and counter-acted many of the worst effects of the 
1880s, but that the smaller industrial towns did not benefit much from 
renewed domestic expansion. Amongst these smaller industrial towns, 
both the textile and non-textile towns were undergoing continued net 
emigration during the 1890s. In the North, therefore., the balance was 
shifting towards the larger cities and away from the smaller towns. 
Table 9.2 suggests that the pace of urbanisation in the South was 
accelerating, and that a new component was beginning to exert a strong 
influence, namely the large-scale growth of the non-industrial town. Net 
migration to the 71 non-industrial towns listed by Welton, of which 55 
were in the South, stood at 218,000 in the 1890s, which, when added to 
London's net migration (226,000), overshadowed urban growth in the 
industrial areas. These centres of renewed urbanisation outside London 
were not so much the 20 "old" towns (Carlisle, York, Cambridge, Exeter, 
etc. ) which had a positive migratory balance of less than 2,000 between 
them, but rather the 35 "residential" towns with a combined migration 
balance of 143,000. These residential towns consisted mostly of seaside 
resorts, such as Blackpool, Scarborough and Brighton, but also included 
a large number of inland spas, such as Harrogate, Bath and Cheltenham$ 
and also, significantly, various towns immediately surrounding London, 
such as Guildford, Uxbridge and Watford. The 16 military towns in the 
South (Aldershot, Plymouth, Salisbury, etc. ) also showed a strong positive 
migratory balance, of 73,000. These military towns could also be 
regarded as "residential" in that they would have represented natural 
places for military personnel to settle down, having completed-their 
military service. 
The growth of the suburbs, which was most prominent in London, 
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and the growth of the seaside resorts have often been noted as 
distinctive features of the economic geography of Britain at the turn of 
the centuryýo This distinctive feature first became clearly noticeable 
in the 1880s and became expecially prominent in the 1890s and 1900s. 
At a regional scale, urban growth was becoming particularly powerful 
across the whole of South East England, and not just in London, as maps 
produced by Robson (1973 pp. 108-110) show. The rural areas of the South 
were still areas of heavy emigration, but one could suggest that as soon 
as drift from the land slowed down, whether as a result of a falling 
birth rate or as a result of improved economic conditions, the South 
would appear in a position of clear ascendancy over the North. This was 
beginning to happen in the 1900s. 
The major expansion of London and the residential towns was based 
more on the expansion of middle class wealth than on industrial growth. 
This expansion of middle class wealth was based, directly or indirectly, 
largely on overseas economic expansion, both inside and outside the 
British Empire. The dominance of London as a world financial, trading 
and political centre was central to Britain's role, and represented an 
increasingly important component in Britain's internaZ geography. In 
contrast, the Northern industrial towns and cities were beginning to 
become marginalised, a development undoubtedly accentuated by the shift in 
investment away from domestic industry and towards overseas development. 
The major domestic markets at this time would undoubtedly have 
been situated in the South rather than the North. One would expect that 
there was a potential for a considerable degree of industrialisation in 
the South; as Hamilton (1967) points out, Weber's industrial location 
theory, which was being developed in Germany at around this time, 
41 
postulated that industry would tend to gravitate to the final market 
areas, unless the cost of transporting bulky raw materials, which lost 
bulk in the manufacturing process, was prohibitive. The technical 
preconditions for such a major industrial drift to the South were not yet 
in existence in that coal, a raw material which was expensive to transportq 
and which had 100% bulk loss during manufacturing, was still the main 
source of industrial energy. When energy became more easily transported, 
through the widespread use of oil and electricity, the industrial 
advantages of the South became more apparent. Between the wars, the 
traditional industries, which happened to be in deep decline, tended to 
remain in their old locations as a result of locational inertia 
42 
while 
the new industries tended to grow in the prosperous areas of the South; 
these trends are described in more detail in chapter 4 above. 
As far as urban growth trends are concerned, the advantage of the 
South over the North was already clear in the late 19th century, despite 
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the continued growth of the coal mining areas (a growth which section 
9.6 below suggests was highly unstable). The advantage of the urban 
South is concealed in regional population figures (Table A3) by heavy 
emigration from the rural areas of the South. 
The basic advantage of the South continued in the 1900s. 
Migration figures (Table 9.2) are dominated by two features, the heavy 
net emigration from the UK as a whole (Fig 9.1) and the slowing down of 
the population loss from the rural residues. The combination of these 
two features implies a considerable shift in the migration balance against 
the towns and main cities. Both North and South were affected by this, 
although the high natural rate of increase of population meant that urban 
population was still increasing. 
Migration out of London was extremely high, but this would seem to 
imply more that decentralisation from the metropolis was strong, rather 
than that Edwardian London was in decline. To be offset against this 
migration loss of 232,000 is a migration gain of 129,000 in the Southern 
residential towns. In addition, the suburbanisation of London meant that 
rural parts of counties surrounding London (Hants., Berks., Herts., 
Essex, Bucks., Oxford, Kent, Surrey, Sussex) showed a net loss through 
migration of 12,000 between 1901 and 1911, compared with 130,000 in the 
previous decade. 
43 
Had rural depopulation diminished only to the same 
extent as in the rest of the rural South, one would have expected a 
migration loss of 58,000. Therefore, one can estimate that the 
decentralisation of London led to a component of net migration of 46,000 
to the rural areas of surrounding counties. once these two factors are 
offset against London's migratory loss, the net migration level from 
the London urban system may be estimated at 57,000 rather than 232,000; 
11% of the national total rather than 46%. 
Net emigration from the industrial centres of the North was thus 
far more substantial even when the growth of the South Wales coalfield 
is taken into account. The net loss in migration from the EngZish 
industrial areas (including the English colliery districts, but excluding 
the Welsh colliery districts) stood at 235,000, a loss of population 
through migration comparable to that of the rural districts. The problems 
of the industrial North, so conspicuous between the Wars, was starting 
to become serious in the 1900s. 
The 20th century regional problem was incipient in the economic 
geography of Edwardian Britain; a thriving South with a strong rentier 
based economy (8.6% of GNP in 1913 consisted of returns from foreign 
investment, 
44 
of which the South took the main share) contrasted with a 
relatively stagnant industrial North. A series of severe industrial 
recessions, such as occurred in the 1920s and early 1930s could easily 
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send the North into a spiral of decline. 
It seems that even as early as the 1880s the South was economically 
more favoured than the North, which is as the balance of advantage 
remained in the pre-industrial period. A major. problem still remains. 
The patterns of redistribution of population up to the 1870s suggest that 
the industrial North was the most favoured zone in the early 19th century. 
This implies two reversals of "polarity". It would be more parsimonious 
if the explanation of the evolution of the British space economy required 
no such assumed reversals of polarity, if it could be suggested that in 
some sense the South had always been better off than the North. Such a 
continuity cannot be demonstrated for working class standards of living, 
in that 19th century annual wages tended to be higher in the North than 
in the South, 
45 both in rural areas and in urban areas, but the 
geography of major wealth holding and general middle class wealth needs 
to be considered as well. It is argued that while there have indeed 
been two reversals of polarity in patterns of working class prosperity 
there has been a long period of continuity in the North-South distribution 
of concentrations of wealth. Section 9.3 and 9.4 below consider the case 
in more detail. The attempt. is made to clarify the confused conventional 
picture in which Britain's 19th century economic dynamism was built on 
industrialisation, and major wealth accrued to the coalfield industrial 
areas whereas in the 20th century the location of economic activity 
became increasingly "market oriented" towards the main market areas of 
the South. This picture appears convincing until one asks why the main 
market areas should suddenly have been in the South, even as early as 
the 1920s., when the greatest visible concentrations of economic growth 
had at a previous stage been in the North. To explain the reversal in 
terms of a prolonged intermediate period does not help any proposed 
explanation; if the North was economically dominant up to 1881, then 
presumably capital invested abroad would have had Northern origins rather 
than Southern origins, and rentier wealth would have accumulated primarily 
in the North rather than the South. This is not what happened. 
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9.3 The Geography of Wealth and Prosperity; Some Basic Issues. 
The distribution of wealth in the 19th century is seen as a central 
question. While the increase of employment in manufacturing and mining 
was a particularly prominent feature of the 19th century, it cannot 
automatically be assumed that industrialists became the most prominent 
wealth holders in their period. Landed wealth was extremely important, 
and given that land has a capital value and that land ownership is far 
from evenly spread amongst the population, simply the ownership of land 
represented a dominant form of wealth. 
46 
If a landowner should own 
land where urban development was rapid, or land across which a railway 
was to be built, or land from which coal could be extracted, the 
possibilities for the accumulation of landed wealth would intensify. 
47 
Landed wealth thus represented the dominant source of extreme 
wealth in the Victorian period. Commercial wealth, based on finance and 
trade, represented another major source. Industrial wealth, according 
to Rubinstein (1981) represented merely a third form of extreme wealth; 
the more sucessful industrialists became wealthy, but not sufficiently 
wealthy to compete with the major land owners or the more successful 
financiers. Rubinstein's work, or aspects of it, will be discussed in 
greater detail in section 9.4. In this section, the discussion concentrates 
on some more theoretical issues, indicating firstly that there is no 
necessary connection between the generation of industrial employment 
in an area and the generation of extreme wealth in that area, and secondly 
that it is quite plausible on economic grounds that commercial capital 
rather than industrial capital could be the main ultimate beneficiary of 
industrialisation. 
Trade and industry are complementary; the relationship between 
these branches of the economy is one that it is necessary to elaborate 
in order to understand the dynamics of the Industrial Revolution and its 
aftermath. There is an easy temptation to note the "visible" history of 
the Industrial Revolution, the legacy of early mills and factories, and 
urban growth, and to assume that it was the manufacturing dynamic which 
dominated the Industrial Revolution, and 19th century economic growth. 
The products of manufacture have to be sold, however, and in large-scale 
manufacture this presupposes trade between areas. One cannot build up 
an adequate picture of the Industrial Revolution simply by accumulating 
a list of significant inventions and saying that these brought about a 
whole new economic system into being; the question of economic_ 
preconditions is crucial. 
Mantoux, in his early, classic work on the Industrial Revolution 
laid considerable stress on the role of commerce in the Industrial 
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Revolution: 
"From the economic point of view the industrial revolution is 
characterised by the concentration of capital and the growth of 
large undertakings, the existence of which from being only 
exceptional came to be the normal conditions of industry. Though, 
not without reason, this concentration is often considered as the 
result of technical inventions, yet to a certain extent it preceded 
such inventions. It was essentially a commercial phenomenon and 
was connected with the gradual hold obtained by merchants over 
industry. Not only was it accompanied, but it was also prepared 
by the expansion of trade and credit. " 
(Mantoux, 1928/1961 pp. 475-476). 
The penultimate sentence is the one to be einphasised; Mantoux 
sets industrialisation firmly in the context of commerce, rather than 
the other way round, and suggests that merchants were obtaining a gradual 
hold'on industry, rather than the other way round. In Lancashire, 
Mantoux 
48 
stresses, the early, growth of Manchester, the manufacturing 
city, depended on the prior growth of Liverpool, the port city; Liverpool 
was far more than just a western port for the cotton industry. 
There is no need to conduct any form of detailed analysis of the 
origins of the Industrial Revolution here. The important point to note 
is that industrial development was not a wholly alien element superimposed 
on an "empty" North of England, but instead presupposed a certain degree 
of development of trading relationships in the local economy. The general 
opinion amongst current economic historians would appear to be that while 
the economic and industrial growth of the 1780s was undoubtedly rapid 
and substantial, this represented an intensification of earlier patterns 
of growth, rather than a "revolutionary" new start. 
49 It was tentatively 
argued in chapter 2.9 above that the industrial burst of the 1780s can 
perhaps be seen in terms of a post-slump recovery following an earlier 
long cycle from the 1740s to the late 1770s. The conception of a sudden 
Industrial Revolution is, however, obsolete. 
A simple model of industrial wealth would suggest that manufacturers 
buy raw materials, purchase labour power to process these raw materials* 
using various forms of machinery, and sell the finished material for a 
profit, once the non-labour costs of production have been accounted for. 
Since the industrial worker is paid for less than the value of the labour 
he or she undertakes, wealth-accumulates to the industrialist. This is 
in many respects a gross oversimplification of Marx's basic model of 
industrial capital accumulation, 
50 but it helps focus on some basic 
issues. The process which takes place inside the factory is the key 
process in industrial commodity creation and industrial wealth creationg 
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yet it would be a mistake to assume that all the net wealth produced 
accrues either to the workers, or even to the workers plus the industrial 
capitalists. The industrialist needs to buy his main raw materials from 
outside (from the USA in the case of the cotton industry) and to sell his 
finished product, often on export markets. This gives the commercial 
capitalist the chance to achieve his "cut" at two different stages of 
the production process, and puts him in a position to squeeze the 
manufacturer's profit margins. 
51 
If as a result of mechanisation, even 
of a limited kind, production costs are reduced significantly in one 
producer country, far more than in others, and goods are traded at a 
world scale, then the cost of the finished product would be expected to 
fall considerably in relative terms. The purchaser of the product thus 
pays a lower price than before, yet there is no necessary reason why the 
price of the final product on foreign markets should drop to a level 
which merely deeps commercial profits in line with those of the 
manufacturer; it is sufficient to be able to undercut foreign competition. 
52 
The extent to which profits accrue to the industrialist, and the 
extent to which they accrue to the merchant capitalist, is seen as being 
dependent upon the degree of openness of competition in each sector. 
If for example manufacturing is dominated by small to medium sized firmst 
and there is relative ease of entry into manufacturing, the high degree 
of competition prevents the produce being sold at the factory gate for 
much more than the cost of production. If however there is a higher degree 
of monopoly in the merchant capitalist sector, and less freedom of entry 
into this sector, a situation develops in which a relatively limited 
number of merchants from one country can sell cheaply produced goods 
whereas merchants from other countries can sell only more expensive 
produce. The relatively low degree of competition between merchants of 
the low cost country implies a less powerful tendency for the price of 
sale to be pushed down to the price of purchase. In such circumstanceso 
which may be taken as broadly representative of Britain at the time of 
the Industrial Revolution, the merchant is in a more favourable position 
to accrue wealth than the industrialist. 
By such mechanisms, and many analogous mechanisms, trade can 
advance on the basis of advancing industry, with the possible generation 
of fortunes through commerce being greater than the possible generation 
of fortunes through industry. There is an implication here that while 
the Industrial Revolution gave Britain the power to dominate the world 
economically 'both in industry and in trade and finance, the commercial 
dominance was likely to be on a firmer basis and more enduring than the 
industrial dominance. Rival countries were beginning to pose a 
substantial threat to Britain's industrial dominance by the mid- to late 
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Victorian years, this threat being strongest. from Cermany and the USA. 
Numerous contemporary observers were concerned about growing industrial 
competition. 
53 In contrast, Britain's position as a financial and imperial 
centre flourished in the late Victorian years, and up to the First World 
War. Britain represented the capital'-rich corq which was a major source 
of funding for the development of the rapidly expanding peripheral 
economies such as Argentina and Canada; in addition the British imperial 
grip tightened across much of the non-European world. 
54 
The decades leading up to the First World War can be regarded as 
decades in which Britain's industrial hegemony was on the decline while 
the British imperial hegemony was strengthening; this, it is suggested, 
represented a logical culmination of the interplay of economic forces 
present through 19th century Britain. Chambers (1967 pp. 1-2) suggests 
that around the 1820s Britain "was in the throes of the transition ... 
from a primarily agricultural and commercial economy to a modern industrial 
state. " If however one of the central features of industrialisation was 
to generate a whole new set of possibilities for expanding commercial 
wealth, perhaps the process of the evolution of late Victorian Imperialism 
should be regarded as the most significant transitional process in the 
late 19th century. 
If the "economic base" of 19th century Britain was not so strongly 
orientated to manufacturing as was previously thought, but instead tied 
more firmly to commerce and to its imperialist offshoots, then it is more 
readily appreciated why the "superstructure 1155 was tied to pre-industrial 
forms. If the dominant culture reflects the dominance of particular 
economic and social forces, as Marx's distinction between base and 
superstructure suggests, then one would expect a tendency, especially 
throughout the late 19th century, for a specifically "imperial" rather 
than an "industrial" culture to develop. Wiener (1981) argues instead 
that the long process of deindustrialisation in Britain was primarily the 
result of the "decline of the industrial spirit" and the development of 
anti-industrial cultural norms. This argument, which suggests that the 
form of the "cultural superstructure" determines the evolution of the 
"economic base" is, probably quite deliberately, the complete reverse 
of Marx's argument; Wiener's analysis is defective, however, precisely 
because it neglects the economic basis of changing cultural norms. The 
development of imperialism both had a profound effect on domestic economic 
structure and also created large numbers of career opportunities for the 
sons of the wealthy. University and public school education, chiefly 
the preserve of the wealthy, would thus tend to concentrate far more on 
the qualities required for the develo pment of empire than on the qualities 
required for the development of manufacturing industry, but here 
"high culture! 'was following rather than leading economic trends. 
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Wiener's treatment of Imperialism is extremely superficial; in a period in 
which the globe was being "painted pink" (the conventional colour for 
representing British owned territories) and in which Britain's investment 
abroad was a dominant feature of the balance between savings and investment, 
there is surely more to be said about imperial culture than that it 
represented merely a return to nostalgic rural values. 
56 
If imperial 
culture indeed emphasised the virtues of pre-industrial rural England, 
this would seem to say more about continuities in class structure than 
about changes in fashion. 
The picture is drawn here of a continued dominance of commercial, 
financial and landed wealth, with industrial wealth beingan important, but 
subsidiary, feature of the economy. So far the argument has been presented 
largely in theoretical and abstract terms, but the empirical basis of 
the argument is essential, particularly on the question of the overall 
distribution of major wealth, given that this element of the argument 
could be regarded as the most controversial. Much of the following is 
based on the researches of Rubinstein (1977,1981) for the simple reason 
that the subject has otherwise been largely unexplored; it has been a 
tacit assumption that the "invisible geography" of the 19th century has 
largely matched the "visible geography". Rubinstein (1977, p. 602 states 
that 
"the chief .... (tacit assumptions commonly made) .... are 
that the wealthiest men of nineteenth-century England, apart from 
the great landowners, were engaged in industry and in manufacturing, 
in trades which were a direct part of the Industrial Revolution; 
that the nineteenth-century middle class consisted primarily of 
industrialists and manufacturers; and that the new towns of the 
north of England brought into existence a group of middle-class 
industrialists sufficient in wealth and numbers to constitute 
the dominant element in Victorian society. None of these assumptions, 
it will be suggested here, is correct, and any view of Victorian 
society which subscribes to them must stand in need of revision. " 
Rubinstein's direct evidence is based primarily on valuation 
figures in probate records for all persons leaving E100,0000 or more on 
death between 1809 and 1939, with particular concentration on half- 
millionaires. He concentrates mainly on non-landed wealth, rather than 
"older" landed wealth, although for completeness it needs to be emphasised 
that landed wealth, the ownership of land, was still the dominant source 
of wealth in Britain during this period, and especially before the 
agricultural depression of the 18.70s (Table 9.6). 
57 
The source of landed 
58 
wealth is mainly the capital value of the land, but even when this has 
been allowed for, the possibilities of the investment of annual returns 
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from the land imply the possibilities of subsiantial extra income 
generation through reinvestment in other forms of economic activity. 
Thus som e, possibly quite significantg proportion of landed wealth could 
have derived from commercial and industriat activities, rather than from 
land itself. The possibility of a switch in investment to foreign 
investment in the late 19th century would presumably have helped preserve 
landed wealth at a time when agricultural incomes were falling. 
Table 9.7 shows the occupational sector of non-landed major 
deceased wealth holders in Rubinstein's study period, and Table 9.8 shows 
the ratio between manufacturing and financial/commercial wealth holders 
for various sub-periods. The separation of food, drink and tobacco 
from manufacturing proper, adopted by Rubinstein, has been retained. 
Rubinstein argues that this is justifiable since such trades were not 
essentially part of the Industrial Revolution, and indeed were in many 
respects sociologically far closer to the pre-industrial society than to 
the new manufacturing. 
59 
Table 9.8 suggests that the sources of manufacturing and commercial 
wealth were becoming increasingly more important through time whereas 
the sources of landed wealth were becoming relatively less important 
through time. The degree of wealth in manufacturing was never, since 
the Industrial Revolution, negligible, but in the early part of the 19th 
century it was strongly outweighed by landed wealth, and throughout the 
period there were more fortunes made in finance and commerce than in 
manufacturing (food, drink and tobacco excluded). 
Rubinstein notes that very few of the extreme, multi-million pound, 
fortunes were made in manufacturing, whereas there were several in 
commerce and finance. The distinction between industry and commerce also 
seems to apply strongly at lower levels of wealth. The unfortunately 
incomplete evidence provided by Rubinstein 
60 
notes 85 lesser wealthy 
(ElOO, 000 to E500,000 at death) occupied in commerce and finance dying 
between 1809 and 1829, compared with 22 in manufacturing, a ratio of 
3.86: 1. Rubinstein provides no information on the next twenty year 
period, but shows that between 1850 and 1869,79 "lesser wealthy" 
occupied in commerce and finance died, compared with 48 in manufacturing, 
a much smaller ratio of 1.65: 1. 
Of the 198 non-landed millionaires to die between 1809 and 1919, 
exactly half (99) made their fortunes in commerce and finance, and 34 in 
food, drink and tobacco (mainly in the drink and tobacco industries, 
rather than the food industry). Other main industrial sectors were 
represented as follows: 16 millionaires in cotton manufacture, 12 in 
engineering, 9 in iron and steel, 8 in chemicals, 6 in coal mining, 3 in 
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shipbuilding (compared with 10 in shipowning), and sio-on. Stated in these 
terms, the relatively fragmentary nature of manufacturing wealth is clear, 
with for example'only 8% of the non-landed millionairesq and an even lower 
proportion (4.9%) of half-millionaires making their fortunes in cotton 
manufacture. Rubinstein 
61 
points out that during the 1809-1939 period 
there died only two cotton manufacturing millionaires in Creater 
Manchester ("cottonopolis"), of which one was in Manchester and one in 
Bolton; the majority of the millionaires came instead from the Coats and 
Clark dynasties of Paisley. In contrast, there. were a large number of 
half-millionaires with a greater geographical spread indicating roughly 
the scale of wealth it was possible to make as manufacturers in the 
cotton industry. If only one Manchester cotton manufacturer died a 
millionaire between 1809 and 1914, then seven Manchester cotton merchants 
died millionaires there during the same period, 
62 indicating the possible 
locus of advantage in the manufacture/commerce distinction. 
Rubinstein's work helps place some of the features of 
industrialisation in clearer perspective. While it was undoubtedly the 
case that the factory owners of the time were more wealthy than the 
people they-employed, the degree of wealth of the factory ownerst 
especially at a time in which there was a relatively low degree of 
concentration of ownership in manufacturing, was small compared with the 
levels of wealth of the more successful merchants and financiers, and 
larger landowners. The geographical implications of this will be 
discussed in the next section. To conclude this section, a brief outline 
can be presented, following an account by Checkland (1964 pp. 115-133) of 
the locus of advantage between cotton manufacturer and cotton merchant. 
Checkland notes 
63 
that "in the early decades of the (nineteenth) 
century cotton men could start modestly, often financed by cotton dealerst 
buying a few mules, hiring space and power, and employing half a dozen 
workers or less. In 1834 there were some 300,000 cotton looms; of these 
the hand-looms still outnumbered the powered by two to one .... The 
cotton manufacturer, in fact, was the classic case of the entrepreneur 
who hires his factors of production from others, whose function most 
obviously consisted in making combinations of these factors, and who may 
rise from petty production to the ownership of a large firm. " Undoubtedly, 
therefore, from small beginnings there was considerable concentration of 
§4 
ownership, which was becoming readily apparent by the 1830s and 1840st 
much of this, however, was taking place at a time in which the tendency 
to overproduction was becoming severe. 
65 
The form of concentration is worth noting. Checkland 
66 
states 
that "though (various) influences operated to promote size, the cotton 
entrepreneur seldom integrated vertically. He was flanked on the one 
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side by the cotton broker and on the other by the textile merchant; 
within the industry proper there was a great deal of specialisation on 
one or two operations. " It was the merchants who were outflanking the 
manufacturers rather than the other way round. Many of the well 
documented abuses of industrial labour resulted-not so much from the 
desire of increasing already substantial wealth, but rather from the 
problems of the less successful manufacturer, who, faced with eclipse, 
and with no influence over "the suppliers of raw materials,, the cotton 
market, or the suppliers of machines, the stro 
, 
ngly placed engineers or 
the merchants, " tended to react to an unsatisfactory market position, 
and to a lack of economies of scale, by demanding longer hours from the 
workforce. 
67 
The larger producers in contrast, had greater scope for 
more efficient methods of production, and for a more paternalistic 
treatment of labour. 
The balance of power in the early cotton industry was complicated. 
The manufacturer was by no means all-powerful, although the directness 
of contact between the manufacturer and the industrial working class 
tends to focus attention on the question of class conflict in the factory. 
The more indirect, but still antagonistic, relationships between merchant 
capital and the working class may easily be obscured. 
The balance of advantage between industrialists and financial 
and commercial wealth holders appears to have been tilted in favour of 
the latter, although possibly not as decisively as Rubinstein has 
suggested. Rubinstein's statement 
68 
that "the wealthy have 
disproportionateZy earned their fortunes in commerce and finance 
rather than in manufacturing or industry" (emphasis added) may be 
regarded as either ambiguous (what would be proportionate? ) or an 
exaggeration, given that the ratio of wealth holders shown in Table 9.8 
averaged about 1.4 in commerce and finance to I in manufacturing. 
Perhaps the fairest statement to make is that while there was substantial 
wealth generated in manufacturing in the late 18th and 19th centuries* 
the wealth generated in commerce and finance would appear to have been 
even more substantial, and certainly not less substantial. Closer 
historical analysis of this whole complex question would seem to be 
warranted. 
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9.4 Elements of Regional Class Structure in the 19th Century 
To locate concentrations of wealth is to locate only part of the 
complex pattern of class structure. To gain a fuller understanding of 
class structure, it is necessary to examine in more detail how the 
development of different types of wealth leads to the development of 
different types of class structure, and more specifically, to show that 
the type of class structure which develops around financial or commercial 
wealth is radically different from the type of class structure which 
develops around industrial wealth. 
The development of large accumulations of wealth depends ultimately 
on some form of physical production and on the ability of certain people 
to'retain at least part of the "surplus product", that part of net 
production which is not paid out to labour. The relationship between 
physical production and the accumulation of wealth can, in certain cases, 
be extremely indirect, particularly where financial and commercial wealth 
are concerned. For an industrialist the relationship is fairly direct, 
however; the industrialist requires a particular workforce in a particular 
place to undertake the physical production which creates his-wealth. This, 
in the days before the widespread operation of multi-regional and 
multi-national corporations, would tend to imply that any local concentration 
of industrial wealth will be spatially closely linked with the presence 
of a substantial industrial working class. 
In the case of commercial or financial wealth, howeverv the 
separateness of commercial transactions from physical production implies 
that only a relatively small ZocaZ labour force, weighted heavily towards 
clerical occupations, is required in the process of accumulating wealth. 
If, for example, a cotton merchant buys raw cotton from the USA to sell 
to Lancashire manufacturers, or if a financier lends a Latin American 
government money so that a railway may be built, the process of physical 
production which is "ultimately" responsible for creating wealth is 
located far away from the centre of the accw=Zation of wealth. The 
City of London, the main commercial and financial quarter of London, is 
the place in which many of these fortunes were generated, yet the 
employment which ultimately created this wealth was definitely not local, 
quite often not even national, but could well have been spread across the 
whole of the commercialised world. 
Industrial wealth, to be generated, therefore requires a large 
local labour force while commercial wealth requires only a small local 
labour force. This has considerable regional implications; the 
manufacturing regions could develop a large industrial working class, 
despite only moderate concentrations of wealth, while London could remain 
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economically dominant despite having a relatively small working class, 
in relation to the degree of local wealth. The general northward drift 
of population up to 1881 shown in Table A3 is seen in terms of this 
regional ly differentiated, and sectorally differentiated, process of 
formation of the working class. 
Rubinstein (1981 pp. 102-110) in his discussion of the geography 
of extreme wealth tended to suggest a strong London dominance, and within 
that, a strong City dominance. He notes, for example, that among 
non-landed millionaires, "London was the venue for between 39 per cent 
and 63 per cent of the total number in each cohort; among half-millionaires 
for between 38 per cent and 64 per cent; while among the lesser wealthy 
London's lead was even clearer. " 
69 
Table 9.9 suggests, using a 
reclassification of Rubinstein's data, that London's dominance was rather 
less, when compared with the periphery, than Rubinstein implied. The 
major division to be made is not between London and the North, nor 
even between the South and the North, but rather between the conurbations 
and the rest; the overall nationwide growth of urban wealth is perhaps more 
remarkable than the North-South division of urban wealth. London's 
proportion of the total number of non-landed millionaires is, when 
examined in comparison with other conurbations, not excessively high. It 
can be seen, from Table 9.8, that Merseyside and Clydeside, the two 
peripheral conurbations most strongly involved with commodity trading, 
had a slightly higher proportion of major wealth holders in their 
population than London. The concentration of major wealth holders in 
the textile conurbations (Greater Manchester, West Yorkshire) was around 
the average for conurbations, while the proportion of wealth holders in 
the metal manufacturing conurbations (West Midlands, South Yorkshire) was 
distinctly low. Major non-landed wealth was, as one might expect in a 
period of extremely rapid urbanisation, concentrated in the swelling 
conurbations rather than in the less expansive "small town England" of 
the rural South; parts of the industrialising Midlands and periphery outside 
the conurbations also had relatively high concentrations of major 
wealth holders. 
The proportion of minor wealth holders (E100,000 to E500,000 at 
death) in London is, as Rubinstein 
70 
points out, rather more striking. 
Between 1809 and 1829,92 "lesser wealthy" from London died, compared 
with 16 from the other conurbations and 15 from the rest of the UK. The 
figures for 1850-69 show 75 lesser wealthy from London, 29 from the 
peripheral conurbations and 21 from the rest of the UK, a rather lesserl 
but still substantial disproportion. 
71 The conclusion could be drawn 
that the "middle-middle clas s,, 
72 
was far more strongly represented in 
London than elsewhere. Given the substantial opportunities in a major 
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financial and administrative centre for highly lucrative professional 
employment without, in the more open sectors, the requirement of an 
exceptionally large capital backing, this disproportion is perhaps not 
surprising. A more detailed assessment would be required, however, to 
see whether Rubinstein is correct in emphasising that "above everything 
else )there was London, the fixed point around which the Victorian middle 
classes revolved". 
73 
or whether there were substantial middle classes 
developing throughout all the conurbations, with London having the 
largest number simply because it was the largest conurbation. It seems 
highly probable that Rubinstein captures an important element of 
Victorian class structure, and correctly emphasises its importance, but 
in this emphasis exaggerates slightly. 
The fact-that. -London -gaine-d in population by over 6 million between 
1801 and 1911 
74 
suggests that a large London working class was also 
being created; such an expansion of population could not come about simply 
through the emergence of the Victorian middle class. This working class 
was not primarily an industriaZ working class; to understand its 
composition it is necessary to consider not the wealth generation processes 
of the wealth, but rather the expenditure patterns of the wealthy. 
A simple model of income and expenditure, as divided between an 
industrial working class and industrial capitalists might start off by 
regarding workers' wages as representing the productive expenditure 
required to produce and reproduce the labour force. No implication is 
made that workers' wages tend to be reduced to their subsistence level; 
on the contrary, in a growing economy a wide range of new commodities 
would come to be regarded as wage goods, the price of which would be 
taken into account in wage bargains. 
The more wealthy will also undertake this basic expenditure on 
wage goods, but an unequal distribution of income will leave a considerable 
discretionary element for saving and expenditure. In that saving is 
required in order to provide funds for investment, which enable the 
economic system to expand, saving may be regarded as "productive", along 
with basic expenditure. This element of saving reproduces the capitalist 
class, it being assumed that most, but not necessarily all, saving takes 
place in this class. 
75 
The pattern of investment which results from this 
saving has considerable implications for the future prosperity of the 
working class, a point with obvious implications, for example, for the 
question of foreign investment before 1914, but this is not a point which 
shall be considered in depth here. 
Productive expenditure-and savings would certainly not account for 
all the income of the wealthy (the case of the miser excepted). A highly 
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uneven distribution of income implies a high level of unproductiVe 
expenditure, which does not contribute to the development of the economic 
system, but instead meets what might more kindly be called the higher 
needs of the wealthy, and less kindly the luxuries, fads and fancies of 
the wealthy. 
This unproductive expenditure might be concentrated on goods or 
on services. -Adam Smith, in his early discussion of productive and 
unproductive labour, concentrates on questions of physical production and 
classes as unproductive those employments of which it can be said that 
"the work of them perishes in the very instant of its production", 
76 
thus 
menial and other services. Marx, in his own discussion of productive 
and unproductive labour*, 
77 
emphasises instead the importance of what 
would in modern terms be called income distribution in distinguishing 
between productive and unproductive expenditure of labour. If labour is 
directly transformed into capital it is productive; 
78 if not it is 
unproductive. There is a clear implication that the production of luxury 
goods for wealth-holders is not a form of productive labour. 
The unproductive element of capitalist expenc7iture does not vanish, 
but instead produces an "unproductive" labour force, of menial servants 
(as emphasised by Smith) of makers of luxury goods, and, as Marx delighted 
in pointing out, of various miscellaneous services from priests to 
prostitutes, 
79 
The presence of substantial wealth-holders will tend to result in 
the presence of considerable elements of unproductive labour, with an 
occupational bias towards services and the production of luxury goods. 
If the wealth-holder is basically an industrial wealth-holder, this 
presence will be diluted considerably by the presence of a large industrial 
work force. If however the wealth holder is engaged in finance or 
commerce, an economy strongly oriented to unproductive services will 
develop; this, it is suggested, was an important feature of 19th century 
London. The London labour market will be discussed in more detail in 
section 9.5 below, with attention focusing on the mechanisms by which a 
strong orientation towards non-productive employment, with attendant high 
seasonality of employment, and also a powerful stream of rural immigration, 
combined to produce continually high levels of unemployment in London 
before 1914. In the remainder of this chapter attention focuses on the 
regional distribution of the labour force. 
Table 9.10 illustrates the employment structure in Britain's main 
centres of urbanisation in 1881, a Census year which might be regarded as 
reasonably typical of the late 19th century. Regional specialisations 
in industry are clearly revealed; textiles in Lancashire and the West 
Riding of Yorkshire, coal mining and shipbuilding in the North Eastern 
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coal field, the metal trades and engineering in the West Midlands (and 
also pottery manufacture, classified under "other manufacturing") and 
a mixture of engineering, shipbuilding and textiles in Strathclyde. 
In the main industrial areas in 1881, between one third and a half 
of the employed population worked in the "basic industries" of the 
Industrial Revolution. The corresponding figure for London was 8.8%. 
In contrast, London had a far higher proportion of employment in consumer 
industries, and in the lower order services, much as would be expected 
from the previous discussion. The "not classified" element should by no 
means be ignored, since it includes various ill-defined and numerous 
groups such as "general labourers" or "aftisans" or "other workers in 
sundry industries" which would generally tend, in urban areas, to imply 
an orientation towards various miscellaneous services or construction, or, 
in more general terms, a marginal position with respect to the labour 
market. 'Employment in the higher services (professional, financial, 
government services) was proportionately far greater in London than in 
the provincial conurbations, yet as Table 9.10 shows, this had relatively 
little direct effect on overall differences in employment structure. 
Lee (1984) criticises the previously accepted generalisation that 
the service sector grew primarily in response to the growth of industrial 
demand, and suggests instead that the service sector could generate its 
own growth. Indeed had service sector provision remained a passive 
followiý_r of industrial employment, one would expect that the main 
provincial cities would have grown far more quickly than actually was 
the case, or that London would have grown far more slowly. Lee rejects 
the notion that growth in service sector employment in Victorian England 
was the result of industry-led forces, and cites Rubinstein's evidence of 
a concentration of wealth in the South to explain the growth of the 
service sector through income effects. In his analysis, Lee emphasises 
the regional dualism in employment structure in the Victorian economy, 
but does not consider in depth the significance of dualisms in the service 
sector within the service-based London economy. 
It is important to recognise that the growth of the service sector 
in London is far from homogeneous. A clear distinction may be made 
between the leading "active" services which were primary generators of 
employment, and the lagging "passive" services, where employment expanded 
in response to flows of income generated in other sectors. 
80 The South 
East's predominance in the higher order active services (banking, finance, 
insurance; professional services; national and local government), and 
the rapid growth in employment in these sectors, may be regarded as largely 
responsible for the increased dynamism of the Southern economy in the 
decades before the First World War. Employment also increased 
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substantially in the miscellaneous services, but this had a rather more 
double-edged impact on patterns of regional prosperity, Table 9.11 
shows that between 1881 and 1911 the fastest expansions of employment 
in the miscellaneous services were in the South East, from an extremely 
high base, and in the industrial regions of Northern England (YH, NW, N). 
The rural South (SW, EA) had high proportions of employment in 
miscellaneous services, largely as a result of the presence of landed 
wealth alongside a relatively small industrial base, but a low rate of 
increase. The rapid expansion of this sector in the South East suggests 
the development of a low wage sector in a high. wage economy. 
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9.5 The London Labour Market and the Question of Unemployment 
Prior to 1914 
(i) An Overview of the Problem 
There are immense difficulties involved in the construction of 
even an outline geography of working class prosperity, or the lack of it, 
in 19th century Britain. The patterns themselves would appear to be 
highly complicated, yet the data base on which to build an analysis is 
irretrievably incomplete. There were of course numerous surveys, some 
of considerable detail, of patterns of industrial change, and patterns of 
poverty, in 19th century and Edwardian Britain, 
81 but these cannot 
satisfactorily be pieced together to provide the sort of overall 
geography of prosperity and recession which national insurance statistics 
make possible for the 20th century. There are, however, some questions 
about the 19th century which need to be urgently considered in order to 
help make sense of Britain's 20th century economic geography. 
It is useful to make a brief summary of points which can readily 
be established from Census and other data. These may be listed 
numerically: 
(1) That the rural areas were persistent areas of heavy net 
emigration, while the urban areas were persistently characterised 
(except for the 1900s) by heavy net immigration (Table 9.2). On 
average, the rural areas showed a net emigration level of about 
60,000 per annum in England and Wales, while the urban areas showed 
a net immigration level of about 50,000 per annum. 
From what is known about migration patterns in the 20th 
century, 
82 
it can be inferred that rural areas in the 19th century 
would have had persistent labour surpluses while urban areas would 
have tended to have, in relation to their total population, smaller 
labour surpluses. 
(2) That Britain as a whole was a substantial net exporter of 
population. This implies a persistent tendency towards a labour 
surplus in the economy as a whole, and thus that the urban areas 
were probably not running at full employment, despite their rapid 
growth of employment. 
(3) That the tendency towards labour surplus was, in the Zong run, 
determined by demographic factors (an unusually high natural rate 
of growth of population of over 10% per decade) rather than by any 
deficiencies of growth of employment. A rate of growth of 
employment which would have maintained full employment in post-1945 
conditions would have led to a substantial accumulation of 
unemployment prior to 1914.83 
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Point (3) is crucial in understanding patterns of unemployment 
and labour surplus prior to 1914. Background levels of unemployment were 
generally high in the 19th century, although this was quite often 
disguised by irregular patterns of employment in which a casual labourer 
might be employed for, say, three days in a week but unemployed, through 
a Zack of avdiZabiZity of work, during the rest of the week. 
Patterns of unemployment before 1914 would tend to reflect at 
least as much the .. geography of where this surplus labour congregated, 
as patterns of job loss during recession. It would be careless to 
assume, as Southall (1983,1986) does, that the geography of unemployment 
before 1914 was determined by the geography of job loss during recession 
in the industrial sector, and-that the geography of unemployment may 
thus be established simply by calculating local unemployment rates for 
members of industrial trades unions. Such unemployment would represent 
only a minority, and furthermore an unrepresentative minority,, of total 
unemployment. This point will be discussed later. 
On the question of unemployment, it can be noted: 
(4) That between 1912 (the first date for which national insurance 
data on regional unemployment rates are available) and 1920, 
unemployment rates were consistently higher in London, especially, 
and also in the rest of Southern England, than in the industrial 
regions of the North and Midlands (Table A7). It sould appear 
reasonable to assume that this relationship, which is the complete 
reverse of post-1921 relationships, also applied for substantial 
periods before 1912. Clearly, corroborative statistical evidence 
is in principle unavailable, although Stedman Jones (1971). in an 
important work on the 19th century London labour market, notes 
that "when economists, politicians and pamphleteers first talked of 
'unemployment', they thought above all of the situation in London see 
Metaphors of poverty and depression came not from Wigan Pier but 
from the London docks. " 
84 Statistical evidence, both in Booth's 
Life and Labour of London, 
85 
a monumental seventeen volume piece 
of late Victorian empirical social research, and also in other 
sources, 
86 
shows that the London labour surplus was indeed great, 
but unfortunately there is a marked absence of detailed research 
covering industrial cities on which to base a comparison. 
It would seem that a closer examination of the London labour marketv 
where unemployment was high and industry weakly developed, is critical 
for any understanding to form of the transition between Britain's 19th 
century economic geography and Britain's 20th century economic geography. 
There needs to be full recognition both of the high degree of concentration 
of the nation's wealth in London, a feature comm n to both the pre-1914 
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and post-1914 periods, and also of the high degree of concentration, 
before 1914, of poverty in London, a concentration which was lacking 
thereafter. Jones (1971) focuses his attention on the slump decade of 
the 1880s, when "outcast London" first became a major perceived threat 
for the substantial middle classes of the metropolis. The assessment 
which follows also concentrates largely on this period. The conclusions 
which are drawn with respect to the London labour market are often at 
variance with those drawn by Jones, however. In particular, it is suggested 
that Jones underestimates the importance of rural immigration in 
generating the crisis of poverty in London. 
The basic picture given by Jones is one of what might now be 
termed an "inner city probled'. A declining inner city industrial base 
leads, at a time of economic crisis, to a substantial shedding of labour, 
and a large increase in the number of workers trapped in the inner city 
(or the "inner industrial perimeter" 
87 ) and available for a relatively. small 
number of casual jobs, with the result that there is substanital 
irregularity of employment, and a high degree. of poverty. 
Jones thus concentrates attention on patterns of short term and 
long term industrial decline in inner London: 
"The condition of casual labour in the East End in the 1880s 
bore all the signs of a conjunctural crisis: the result of a 
temporary fusion of seemingly unconnected long-term and short term 
phenomena .;... The trade depression of the mid 1880s, the unforseen 
increase in Jewish immigration and a series of hard winters 
highlighted and reinforced more long-term tendencies towards 
industrial decline .... At the basis of the crisis lay the 
long-term impact of the Industrial Revolution upon the London 
economy. This impact was complex. For industrialisation proved 
as greatly beneficial to London's commerce as it was detrimental 
to its traditional industries. " 
88 
Thus London had high levels of unemployment during the slumpo 
although these tended to be expressed not so much in terms of continuous 
spells of unemployment, covered by unemployment insurance, but rather by 
the operation of a large-scale casual labour market in which workers are 
employed on a day to day basis, but with days of unemployment interspersed 
between days of work. 
To say, however, that London had high rates of unemployment during 
the slump of the 1880s is notp perhaps, to say very much, It would be 
more remarkable if London did not have a high rate of unemployment during 
a major slump. 
89 
It is more important, in terms of regional labour market 
theory. to ask firstly whether unemployment rates were significantly 
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higher in London than in other urban centres, 'Particularly in the coal- 
field industrial areas, and secondly-to consider the Zong term states 
of local labour markets, through times of prosperity as well as times 
of depression. 
The evidence of 1913 unambiguously suggests that background 
unemployment rates (the minimum unemployment rates reached at a cyclical 
peak) were high in London and low in the industrial regions (Table A7). 
This pattern persisted in the early post-war period, but in the severe 
recession of 1920-22, unemployment rates in the industrial regions 
overtook those of Southern England. 
It would seem to be reasonable to assume that background rates of 
unemployment were relatively high in London and low in the urban industrial 
areas throughout the whole period from the 1880s to the early 1920s. 
Since the people who comprised the unemployed, or casually employed, at 
cyclical peaks were, almost by definition, at the t=rgins of the labour 
force, trade union statistics for unemployment, which cover a core 
workforce, would systematically understate background levels of 
unemployment. Unemployment. insurance statistics, available for 1913, 
would provide a more accurate picture of background unemployment, in 
that the national insurance scheme was originally established primarily 
to deal with the problem of-what is here referred to as background 
90 
unemployment. 
The presence of high levels of background unemployment in London 
do not automatically mean that unemployment in London increased faster 
than elsewhere during recessions. In fact, the converse is more likely; 
if depressions of trade were to hit "basic industries" (capital goods, 
export industries) rather than local consumer industries or services, 
there is an obvious inference that the industrial regions would be more 
severely affected by recession than London, simply as a result of 
differences in industrial structure. Table 9.10 shows, for example, 
that in 1881 London had less than 10% of its employment in the cyclically 
vulnerable "basic industries". whereas the industrial counties had about 
40% of their employment in these sectors. Furthermore, within the "basic 
industries", and more specifically in engineering, London tended to 
concentrate more on repair industries, or manufacture for local demand, 
than did the industrial regions. 
91 
This probably at least partly explains 
why trade union unemployment rates in engineering in recessions tended 
92 
to be lower in London than elsewhere, a feature noted by Southall (1986)0 
To establish whether, during the troughs of recession, unemployment 
rates were higher in London than in other urban areas, it is necessary 
to consider whether differences in the background rate of unemployment 
(high in London, low elsewhere) outweigh differences in the increases of 
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unemployment through industrial recession (relatively low in London, high 
elsewhere. Southall's (1983,1986) method of ignoring background 
unemployment and considering only cyclical increases in unemployment, is 
inadequate, and systematically understates levels of unemployment in 
London and rural areas, relative to those in industrial areas. 
The difficulty of estimating background unemployment in London 
prior to 1913 makes it impossible to compare directly regional levels 
of unemployment during pre-1914 recessions. For the period between 1918 
and 1922, such an exercise is, however, possible, and there seems to be 
no reason why the general'results should not be applicable to earlier 
business cycles. Discussion in chapter 4.2 has shown that unemployment 
rates between 1918 and 1920 were higher in Southern Englandq and in 
London especially, than in the industrial regions, a continuation of 
pre-war background conditions. In the 1920-22 recession, however, 
unemployment increased much more sharply in the industrial regions than 
in Southern England, so that by late 1922 the industrial regions-had 
slightly higher unemployment rates than Southern England. If it takes 
an exceptionaZZy severe recession to push unemployment rates in the 
industrial areas higher than those in Southern England, it would appear 
to be unlikely that unemployment rates in the industrial regions, taken 
as a whole, were significantly higher than in London during pre-1914 
recessions, and quite probably were slightly lower during most recessions. 
The likely situation concerning late 19th century urban unemployment was 
thus that throughout most of the period unemployment rates were higher in 
London than in the industrial regions taken as a whole, but that this gap 
narrowed considerably during periods of industrial recession. It is not 
certain how far back this can be traced. Probably the glutting of the 
London labour market was a long term process, with the London labour 
market in the early 19th century not being especially overburdened. 
Figures for able-bodied pauperism in 1802-1803, reproduced in Williams 
(1981 pp. 149-150) suggest that poverty at this stage was concentrated in 
rural areas, while being relatively moderate in London, and in the 
industrial centres. 
The next question to consider is that of why background levels of 
unemployment came to be higher in London than el. sewhere. The answer is 
not to be found in regional differences in the rate of urban economic 
growth; indeed it seems highly likely that the London economy was growing 
faster than the peripheral industrial economy in the decades before the' 
Great War. The question of geographical labour market structure is more 
critical. The rural areas of Britain and Ireland generated considerable 
labour surpluses during the 19th century, which, through migration and 
other displacement effectsq'increased urban unemployment. The increases 
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in urban unemployment which resulted can be explained in terms of the 
incompleteness of the absorption of unemployment in certain areas; 
migration could, be absorbed, but at less than full employment. 
Consider the patterns of migration shown in Tables 9.2 and 9.3, 
and in particular the differences between the 1870s and the slump decade 
of the 1880s. The impact of recession on the industrial areas is strongly 
marked; net immigration into the industrial areas (excluding the 
specialised colliery districts) totalled 263,200 between 1871 and 1881, 
but in the following decade there was a net emigration from these areas 
of 69,400, reflecting the downturn in urban employment opportunities. 
In London., however, very substantial net immigration continued despite 
the slump. Net immigration totalled 307,300 between 1871 and 1881, and 
168,900 between 1881 and 1891; it is probable that the drop in net 
immigration into London reflects not so-much a decline of London's 
economic magnetism, but rather an unprecedentedly high level of net 
migration abroad from England and Wales as. the "white periphery" boomed. 
The reversal of the earlier inflow of population by the industrial 
areas reflects a normal pattern during a period of deep recession. It 
is the continued influx into London, despite the slump, and despite high 
unemployment there, which requires attention. Two features need to be 
considered; firstly the structure of the London labour market, and secondly 
the geography of rural migration. 
The central feature, in this respect, of the London labour market 
was not so much the long-term industrial decline emphasised by Jones 
(1971), but rather the weighting of employment towards those sectors 
which service wealth rather than produce wealth (see section 9.4 above). 
Employment in these industries tended to be intermittent, with considerable 
short-term and seasonal fluctuations in employment levels. The 
seasonality of demand in London was accentuated by the presence of a 
"London season" amongst the fashionable and wealthy, 
93 
and also by a 
marked tendency for industrial production to be undertaken on a workshop 
basis rather than a factory basis. 
94 This tendency was a response both 
to the need to maintain considerable flexibility in production, with the 
possibility of quick switches in response to changes in fashion, and 
also to the high cost of lando which made the establishment of large 
factories prohibitively expensive in inner London. 
95 The "fashionable" 
element of seasonality added a considerable extra seasonality of 
employment to those elements of seasonality which might ordinarily be 
expected in a large city of that time. In addition, a substantial port 
industry imposed an-extra element of irregularity in the demand for 
employment, both on a seasonal level and on a day-to-day level. 
96 
The cumulative effeat is one of considerable short-term irregularity 
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of employment patterns in London. An additional feature in a city of 
great wealth would have been the development of various assorted 
miscellaneous services, including domestic service, as those without 
regular mainstream employment sought 
' 
niches in the economic system. 
Prostitution, a category of employment not normally covered in employment 
statistics, was an obvious manifestation of this tendency, but as Mayhew 
showed in mid-century, there was no lack of street-sellerst ranging from 
near-beggars upwards, chimney sweeps and others. 
97 
The general impression is given of an economy with an extremely 
large number of niches for employment, but that this employment did not 
represent regular employment at high wages. The irregularity of employment 
is a key feature, which helps push annual wages down towards bare 
subsistence level, or below, even though daily wage rates might be high. 
The argument which follows is based largely on that of Beveridge (1910, 
pp. 68-110), but adapted to allow for comparisons with an economy based 
on regular industrial employment. An essential feature to remember is 
the relative ease of entry into employment in London, even if the job 
which is entered is only temporary. 
Consider the situation in which wage rates per day of work are 
identical in an industrial labour market with regular employment, and a 
fragmented economy of irregular employment, such as London. Let these 
wage rates be, for the sake of argument, 25% above the bare subsistence 
level. In the industrial labour market, the size of the workforce will 
be set by the demand for labour; cyclical unemployment may be high, but 
towards the peak of the cycle unemployment will tend to be low, as there 
will be relatively few niches outside regular industrial employment which 
an aspiring migrant can fill temporarily. 
The situation in a labour market of easy entry and short 
engagements is radically different, however. There are plenty of jobs 
available at any given time, but these jobs often tend to be of short or 
seasonal duration. If there is any tendency towards a labour surplus in 
the economy as a whole, the lure of employment will attract migrants and 
retain the resident population. The limit for the size of the workforce 
is set not by the demand for labour but by the number of labourers who 
can subsist at a bare minimum by working at a variety of jobs for a 
certain proportion of the year. If for example wages are 25% above the 
subsistence level, the limiting case is that there will by 125 people in 
the work force for every 100 units of work available, leading to 20% 
unemployment or underemployment in the seasonal and casual branches of 
the workforce (though less among the workforce as a whole) and incomes 
tending towards a bare subsistence level. In such a labour market, 
poverty can exist in extrerde forms. Furthermore, this type of labour 
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market is one which is largely created, directly or indirectly, by the 
final demand patterns of the wealthy; the economic structure of London 
was therefore such that extremes of wealth and of poverty could coexists 
98 
The situation in the 1880s was not, however, one in which rural 
migrants were flooding into inner London, displacing local labour, 
swelling the casual labour market and causing unemployment amongst the 
existing population. Jones (1971) has criticised in detail this 
contemporary perception of the problem. 
99 
Neither, however, was the 
problem simply one of the decline of London's industrial base. Such a 
decline existed, undoubtedly, but industrial decline could take place in 
other places without breeding a large-scale casual labour market. 
The problem is perhaps best seen in terms of the degree of 
ent rapment of the population of inner London within a declining labour 
market. Industrially, the "crisis of the inner industrial perimeter" 
may be regarded as a classic example of the inner city problem. 
Shortages of space, the encroachment of the city centre, high land prices, 
competition from elsewhere, and the development of industrial areas on 
"greenfield sites", notably in the Lea Valley of East Middlesex, all 
contributed to a general running down of the economic base of inner 
London. 
100 In comparable circumstances a century later, one would 
expect a substantial exodus of population, even in a period of relatively 
depressed economic trends. Between 1971 and 1981, for example, the 
population of Inner London fell by 17.7%, with declines of 25.2% in 
Salford, 17.4% in Manchester, 16.4% in Liverpool, 13.4% in Newcastle, 
13.9% in Gateshead, and so on. 
101 
In the 1880s, however, the population 
of the administrative county of London increased by 10.4%. 
102 
Jones 
cites Booth as noting "that while a trade leaves, people stay. " 
103 
Furthermore, Jones notes, "there is also considerable evidence that the 
poorest sections of the population were unable or unwilling to move out 
of the area. In this situation, employers of casualized and sweated 
labour were able to reap the advantages of a captive labour market. " 
104 
This entrapment of the labour force was not due to a lack of job 
opportunities elsewhere; the industrial suburbs were expanding rapidly. 
The population of Middlesex rose from 380,800 in 1881 to 575,000 in 
1891, an increase of 50.9%, with the population increasing by 50,700 in 
Tottenham, 52,500 in the rest of the Edmonton registration district 
(mostly in Hornsey, Edmonton and Enfield) and, further west, by 33,700 
in Willesden. In the West Ham registration district of Essex (Stratford, 
Plaistow, Canning Town, Forest Gate, East Ham, Leyton and Walthamstow) 
the population increased from 201,000 to 365,200, a rise of 45.0%. 
105 
This growth of the "working suburbs" was a conspicuous feature of London 
in the late 19th century, bdt the growth was concentrated along the 
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rivers Lea (Middlesex) and Thames (Essex) with relatively little of the 
growth taking place in Surrey or Kent. 
106 
These new industrial areas 
represented part of the London economy, but they did not necessarily 
draw on London for their population. Table 9.12 compares the places of 
birth in 1881 and 1891 for inhabitants of London, Middlesex and West Ham 
urban sanitary district. 
107 
For London, the great bulk of the population increase took place 
through natural growth. There was a slight increase of "foreign-born" 
people in London's population, this being accounted for mostly by 
immigration from abroad, rather than internal migration. The general 
impression is one of migratory balance; it should be noted that the 
figures shown in Table 9.. 2, which show substantial net immigration into 
London, refer to the built up area of 1911, and include the Middlesex 
and Essex suburbs; the "London" defined in Table 9.12 was a smaller 
entity. 
In those parts of Londonts industrial suburbs indicated in Table 
9.12, the number of London-born inhabitants increased by 99,200. The 
number of locally born inhabitants increased by perhaps 74,000, if one 
argues that of the increase of 33,000 in the Essex-born population in 
West Ham urban sanitary district, 13,000 would represent natural increase 
and 20,000 would represent migration'from other, more rural, parts of 
Essex. On this basis of calculation, the industrial suburbs listed 
absorbed about 73,000 natives of the extra-metropolitan South between 
1881 and 1891. A pro rata adjustment to take into account the fact that 
West Ham urban sanitary district represented only part of suburban Essex 
(Leyton and the rest of West Ham registration district also have to 
be considered) would suggest that the industrial suburbs as a whole 
absorbed about 130,000 of London's population and 110,000 from the 
extra-metropolitan South. 
The pressure of rural migration on inner London's labour market 
was severe, but indirect. Had it not been for the chronic tendency in 
rural areas for the natural rate of increase of population to outpace 
employment growth by a substantial margin, and had the migratory balance 
of the rural areas with London been neutral, rather than perpetually in 
favour of London and its suburbs, the total population of a Greater London 
area would have expanded by perhaps 100,000 less than was actually the 
case. This lower degree of expansion would have relieved pressure on 
the inner London Labour market considerably. A major problem was that 
the shift to the suburbs by the population of inner London was impeded 
by rural migration to the expanding parts of the economy. Smith (1904 
pp. 129-141) examines the question of rural migration from the point of 
view of the agricultural feeder districts and finds that much of the 
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migration was of young people, using a network of family and other village 
contacts, to take up firm offers of employment. "of 202 cases. of migration 
which I have been able definitely to track (from a small group of villages 
in Hertfordshire and South Cambridgeshire), 102, or almost exactly 
one-half, showed that the migrant had definitely secured or was practically 
sure of a place in town before leaving the country .... Of the remaining 
100, a very large number were doubtless pretty sure at the outset of 
being able to better themselves. " 
108 
Those trapped in the casual labour 
market in inner London, who represented the labour surplus of London, 
tended to have lower levels of informal access to information on job 
vacancies in the expanding areas, and indeed were often confined in their 
search for day-to-day jobs to highly localised labour markets. 
109 
Furthermore, the people trapped in the margins of London's labour market 
were often not young, having gone through a series of jobs and having 
found themselves at a dead end, 
110 
whereas the surplus population of rural 
areas tended to be weighted much more strongly to young people unable 
to find employment locally. This, perhaps more than any other factor, 
helps explain why rural labour could displace urban labour in the 
industrial suburbs. 
Although the problem has been discussed as though it were a problem 
of the 1880s, the 1870s was also a decade of economic depression, 
especially keenly felt in agriculture. Shannon (1935 pp. 84-85) notes 
a sharp increase of migration from South Eastern England into London 
during the 1870s, with the figure rising from 117,000 between 1861 and 
1871 to 212,000 between 1871 and 1881. This would undoubtedly have 
placed considerable extra pressure on the London labour market. 
The London economy, defined broadly, was a great magnet for rural 
migration, partly because of the ability of the London economy to absorb 
surplus population, even if at less than full employment, partly because 
of the extensiveness of the rural South, with relatively few alternative 
destinations in the domestic economy available for migrants, and partly 
because rural wage structures pointed migrants towards London, rather 
than away from London. Agricultural wages were generally much higher 
in areas surrounding major cities than elsewhere. Thus in 1869-70, 
agricultural labourers in the UK were paid 14s 31d on average, but 17s 3d 
on average (unweighted) in Kent* Middlesex and Surrey, 17s 6d in each of 
the ridings of Yorkshire, 17s 9d in Lancashire, 18s 6d in Cumberland and 
Westmorland and as high as 20s in Durham; 
ill these counties all had large 
urban labour markets either within or nedrby. Therb was a high degree of 
urbanisation in the South, as in the North, but it was concentrated in 
one city, London, rather than dispersed across large coalfield areas. 
Wages in agriculture fell as one moved further away from London, into 
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the rural South, due to the relative lack of large urban centres to boost 
local agricultural demand; along one transect, agricultural wages in 
1867-70 fell from 17s 6d in Surrey, 14s in Hampshire, 13s in Wiltshire 
to as low as lls 6d in Dorset, and between 12s and Us in the Outer South 
West. 112 Such sharp local differentials in wage rates under conditions 
of chronic labour surplus gave particular incentive to migrate, either 
to towns or to more prosperous rural areas. The most favourable paths 
of migration would of course be along transects leading to London. 
Ravenstein (1885) suggested that a process of step-wise migration 
was dominant in this period, with long-journey migration, of people "who 
leave their homes in order to settle in a distant part of the country 
1,113 (being) the exception, not the rule . He suggested that such 
long-distance internal migration probably constituted less than a quarter 
of all migrants, but did not explicitly consider migration abroad, which 
was such an important feature of the 1880s. Ravenstein suggested that 
"It often happens that a migrant in search of work wanders 
from parish to parish, settling down at each place for a time, 
until on the day when the census is taken he finds himself far 
away from the place in which he originally started. There can be 
no doubt, for instance,, that many if not most of the natives of 
Ireland to be found in London-did not travel from their homes in 
Ireland direct to their present place of residence, but reached it 
by stages 00000., (Perhaps the most voluminous stream) passed 
through Plymouth, Hampshire and Surrey 1,114' 
Once London had been reached, there were few places left in the 
domestic economy which could represent favourable destinations for a 
subsequent stage of migration. 
Baqkground unemployment tended to be high in rural areas, and in 
towns set in predominantly rural areas, a feature which is shown in the 
high unemployment rates in Southern England outside London in 1913 
(Table A7). Background unemployment tended to be higher still in London. 
Booth conducted an extremely detailed survey of the London population 
between 1887 and 1889, a period of cyclical upswing and lower than 
average unemployment. 37,000 inhabitants were grouped in class A ("the 
lowest class of occasional labourers, loafers, and semi-criminals") and 
316,800 grouped in class B ("casual earnings - very poor"), amounting to a 
total of 8.2% of London's population. 
115 Another 938,500 were classified 
under groups C and D ("intermittent earnings; small regular earnings, 
together the "poor" "), but without similarly detailed surveys of other 
large cities it is very difficult to determine to what extent this 
represents the poverty which was widespread in Victorian cities, and to 
what extent it represents a, specifically "London" component. Frustratingly, 
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Booth tends to band groups C and D together in most of his analysii, 
but in his detailed survey of East London, he suggests that there were 
74,200 East Londoners in households with irregular earnings (group C) and 
129,000 with very low but regular earnings (group D). Any attempt to 
convert these figures into an estimate of the degree of surplus labour 
is hazardous, but it is unquestionable that the surplus was large in 
London terms, and even in national terms. Maybe a background unemployment 
rate of between 5% and 10%, with higher rates of unemployment during 
recessions, is a reasonable estimate. 
Booth's work has been criticised for the extent to which he 
"attributed the unemployment he observZd to a surfeit of people not to 
116 
a shortage of jobs" . There is little doubt that Booth's work is 
theoretically crude in many respects, and yet the demographic factor 
was perhaps more important than is given credit for by modern writers. 
As a result of an unusually high natural rate of growth of population, 
Victorian Britain was running a permanent labour surplus, but various 
features of the Victorian economy combined to ensure that the degree of 
labour surplus in London was proportionately greater than in other cities. 
The importance of the long term demographic factor in this, as opposed to 
the short-term problems of job loss in an expanding economy, is shown by 
the extent to which London had a high background rate of unemployment 
on the eve of the Great War, nearly thirty years after the slump of the 
1880s. This was despite very considerable expansion in the London 
economy. 
London, in the decades up to 1914, was Britain's dominant centre 
of wealth, economic expansion and also persistent urban poverty. Other 
cities and industrial towns may have been recession-prone, but probably 
without developing large permanent classes of "occasional labourers, 
loafers and semi-criminals" and of those with "casual earning - very 
poor. " In the 1920s, two major new features were to emerge whith were to 
change this geography of unemployment permanently. Firstly, the severe 
recessions of the 1920s had a sufficiently large cumulative effect as to 
leave the peripheral industrial regions with high background rates of 
unemployment, as well as the pre-existing high degree of sensitivity to 
recession. Secondly, the major post-war downturn in population growth 
rates greatly reduced net migration from rural to urban areas, and thus 
eliminated a large part of the mechanism by which high background rates 
of unemployment in London were maintained. London, as before, remained a 
zone of fast economic growth, and the reduction of demographic pressure 
on London ensured that this high growth was combined with, in the context 
of the time, low unemployment rates. In 1929, for example, at a cyclical 
peak, unemployment rates weie substantially lower in London and Southern 
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England than elsewhere. 
Inevitably the discussion on pre-1914 unemployment has to be 
conducted in a highly roundabout way, given the absence of any comprehensive 
unemployment statistics. It would be a serious mistake, for example, to 
assume that any regional disaggregation of trade union unemployment 
statistics would provide a reliable picture of regional patterns of 
unemployment, given the total exclusion of rural unemployment, and of 
urban unemployment outside the industrial sector; this point will be 
discussed further in the next subsection. Whereas for post-1914 data 
the problem is one of examining the published unemployment statistics 
and trying to untangle patterns of causality, for pre-1914 data., the 
problem is one of trying to untangle patterns of causality from 
fragmentary evidence and then trying to infer what the underlying patterns 
of unemployment would have been. 
The basic presumption is that unemployment would have been 
generally higher in rural areas than in urban areas, as rural areas would 
have had a static. or declining employment base (especially if small towns 
in a rural setting are excluded from analysis), combined with a high rate 
of natural increase of population. The heavy migration flows from rural 
areas supports this contention, although urban-rural migration would also 
have the effect of reducing urban-ru'ral unemployment differentials. It 
is unclear without much closer analysis whether unemployment differences 
between rural and urban areas would have been large or small, but there 
is a strong likelihood that regions with a high proportion of population 
living'in rural agricultural areas would have, under normal circumstancesq 
higher unemployment rates than more urbanised areas. 
Urban areas, as well as having high rates of natural increase of 
population, were also centres with substantial net inward migration 
(Tables 9.2,9.5). The level of unemployment in such urban areas 
depends not only on the performance of the local economy, but also on 
whether the local labour market is structured in such a way as to allow 
for a high degree of migration with respect to the number of jobs 
available, and thus a chronic glutting of labour. London was a centre 
with particular problems in this respect, with an unusually large rural 
hinterland, certainly when compared with Northern cities, and an 
employment structure which allowed easy entry into temporary jobs, but 
rather less prospect for permanent employment for the less favoured. It 
seems probable, although more detailed research is required, that the 
degree of glutting was relatively slight in the Northern industrial areas, 
with smaller rural hinterlands and an employment structure based on 
regular jobs, without a large casual fringe. The situation in port 
cities may well have been different, though. 
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How Not to Study pre-1914 Unemployment Rates; A Recent 
Case Study 
The material required for even an outline analysis of regional 
patterns of unemployment, and of regional fluctuations in unemployment, 
is irretrievably lacking; quite simply, most unemployment was not 
recorded. Partial sources exist, but these provide only a partial 
picture; there is no legitimate way, for example, in which it is possible 
to present regional patterns of unemployment amongst skilled engineering 
workers in trade unions as representative of overall regional patterns of 
unemployment. Thus, trade union statistics would tend to emphasise the 
experience of industrial workers in the industrial regions, and the 
impact of cyclical downswings on employment levels, but completely ignore 
the experience of workers outside the main basic industries, workers who 
form the vast majority of the working population in London and the rural 
areas. This is not a minor problem, as the following table shows: 
Sector Unemployment concentrated in: 
North South 
Industrial labour 
Rural labour * (rural areas) 
Urban casual labour * (London) 
This is the highly probable pattern, but because of the data 
problems noted above, complete certainty is not possible. What can 
clearly be seen, though, is that any attempt to gain a representative 
picture of overall patterns of unemployment will require an attempt to 
estimate the relative magnitudes of each of the three components noted 
above. Southall (1983,1986,1988) performs a useful service in 
calculating regional unemployment rates for the members of one particular 
union (the Amalgamated Society of Engineers), but negates this by arguing 
that rural unemployment did not exist and that unemploymbnt in the 
secondary labour markets of London did not exist, leaving industrial 
unemployment as the only form of unemployment existing in pre-1914 
Britain. Such assumptions are necessary if one is to assert that trade 
union unemployment figures accurately represent regional unemployment 
patterns, but these assumptions are wrong. Instead of conducting the 
painstaking work required to supplement figures for industrial 
unemployment, instead even of admitting that the problem exists, Southall 
takes the simpler short cut of ignoring the problem and thus provides an 
interpretation of pre-1914 unemployment which leaves out any consideration 
of th e details of Victorian and Edwardian labour market structure. This 
is then compounded, notably in Southall (1988), by an interpretation of 
the inter-war years which relies on Southall's interpretation of earlier 
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years,. but-is almost wholly erroneous, both in its broad thrust and in 
its grasp of detail. This Section attempts to provide a refutation of 
Southall's analysis. 
Southall's first task is to prove that unemployment in London did 
not exist, despite the contrary indications given both by contemporaries 
and by the detailed historical analysis by Stedman Jones (1971)0 
117 
His main approach is simply to define unemployment in London as not 
exi6ting, and calling it "underemployment" instead. He supports this 
approach by attempting to discredit the opinions of. contemporary 
observers, an easy task in historical analysis as the dead are unable 
to answer back. Thus Southall (1983 p. 239) notes that "middle class 
observers" were concentrated in London and "consequently, the abundant 
references to the special problems of unemployment in the metropolis 
cannot be taken at face value. " Yet Southall (1988 p. 242) notes that 
these self-same middle class observers, this time described as "informed 
contemporaries" (note the use of emotive language), were unable to 
detect any sign of unemployment being higher in London than elsewhere. 
This would seem to imply merely proper caution-given the rudimentary 
, 118 state, of official statistics at the time, Southall (1988 p. 242) also 
claims that Beveridge (1909) made no reference to spatial disparities 
in unemployment. This is incorrect; Beveridge (1910 edition, p. 95) 
noted very clearly that unemployment tended to be concentrated in port 
cities (London especially, also Southampton, Bristol, Hull, Glasgow, 
Liverpool) rather than in manufacturing districts, and that this pattern 
also applied in Germany. Out of context, Southall's error here might 
appear trivial, yet it is a major component of his argument that 
Beveridge, who popularised the idea that unemployment was higher in London 
than elsewhere before 1914, had absolutely no notion at the time that 
London might have had high unemployment. 
The use of two diametrically opposed interpretations of the same 
writers to produce identical conclusions is unimpressive, 
119 but it is 
the removal of unemployment by calling it underemployment that is the 
key issue. Southall (1983 pp. 238-239) suggests that those "lacking 
regular employment" were "underemployed as much as unemployed and 
concentrated into the casual labour markets of the great cities, 
particularly London. " Even more strongly Southall (1988 p. 236) notes 
that "the casual sector formed a secondary labour market, providing 
minimal economic niches so that many might starve yet not be, strictly, 
'unemployed'. " In each case it is clearly admitted that there were 
substantial casual labour markets in London and. especially in other cities, 
and that within these markets work was scarce in comparison with the 
number seeking work, yet cofisiderable effort is spent in attempting to 
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demonstrate that this involved little or no unemployment. In each case 
the definition of unemployment used is unsatisfactory. 
The first quotation illustrates what might be termed the 
"labelling fallacy", the notion that one can measure unemp. loyment, a 
socio-economic phenomenon, by labelling individuals as fully employed, 
as underemployed, or as unemployed, and comparing the ratios. 
120 
This 
would give a much lower figure for unemployment than any count of the 
numbers unemployed on any particuZar day since most of the people out of 
work on any particular day would be counted as "underemployed" rather 
than "unemployed". As an illustration, suppose that of a group of 20 
workers 10 are "fully employed", 9 are "underemployed" working two-thirds 
of the time and a solitary worker is "fully unemployed". On an average 
day, 16 wI ill be in work and 4 out of work, giving an unemployment rate of 
20%; on Southall's definitions, this shrinks to 5%. Southall's basic 
response to the question of unemployment amongst casual workers is thus 
simply to deny that casual workers can ever by unemployed; if they work 
on a Tuesday they cannot be unemployed on a Wednesday. Yet the whole 
point of a casual labour market is that the demand for labour is irregular 
and lower than the supply of labour; unemployment is endemic to any 
casual labour market, and this was indeed shown by numerous 19th century 
and early 20th century studies. 
121 
The second quotation involves a contentious interpretation of the 
"unemployed beggar" paradox; if someone who is unemployed begs for money9 
this means that he or she is no longer unemployed, but rather is employed 
as a professional beggar. At the heart of any pardox is an element of 
definition which may be exposed as absurd, and here the absurdity lies 
in the notion that anyone who is unemployed by definition indulges in no 
economic activity whatsoever. Yet there are undoubtedly various forms of 
economic activity (begging, selling matches on the streets, etc. ) which 
are no more than disguised unemployment; Southall prefers to see the 
disguise, not the unemployment. 
The problem of defining unemployment is particularly acute when 
there is no comprehensive unemployment insurance scheme, and this problem 
is continually encountered in contemporary third world economies 
122 
and 
in pre-1914 Britain. Perhaps the most satisfactory solution is to adopt 
a three-tier model of the labour market. 
123 
(1) The primary labour force - engaged in regular employment at 
industrial wages. 
(2) The secondary labour market - characterised by lower wages and 
irregular employment. The size of the workforce in secondary 
(and lower) markets is set by the gap between demand for primary 
labour and the size of the total workforce. 
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(3) The tertiary labour market; unemployment and disguised unemployment. 
There is no guarantee of full employment in the secondary market; 
the supply of labour might well be in excess of the demand for 
labour. This would leave large numbers of people unable to secure 
employment in the secondary labour market. Such people would be 
classed as unemployed had there been a comprehensive unemployment 
insurance scheme, and ought to be regarded as unemployed even if 
there is no unemployment insurance scheme. This definition removes 
the absurdity that people can be classed as unemployed only if 
there is an unemployment insurance scheme. 
Without the benefits of unemployment insurance, someone 
who is unemployed has various options, depending on his or her 
situation: 
(a) If such unemployment is regarded as only temporary (if for 
example a dock worker fails to find employment on a particular 
day but hopes to find employment later in the week) the worker can 
rely on savings from previous periods of employment, meagre though 
these savings might be. 
(b) If unemployment is prolonged, a worker might, given the lack 
of unemployment benefits, be forced into tertiary activity 
(begging, scavenging, various forms of street-selling, etc. ). 
(c) The worker might be forced to rely on the Poor Law, or various 
forms of charity. The Poor Laws were so framed as to provide a 
considerable disincentive for the able-bodied unemployed to apply 
for relief, 
124 
yet unemployment amongst the able-bodied could also 
quickly be reflected in demands for relief amongst dependents. 
Southall neglects all this and uses an anachronistic definition 
of unemployment by which someone in effect is classed as unemployed only 
if that person receives unemployment benefit, that is, is paid for not 
working and being engaged in no labour market activity other than 
looking for work. 
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Since unemployment insurance schemes were, for most 
of his study period, confined to trade unions, only trade unionists could 
be counted as unemployed under Southall's definitions. Presumably before 
trade unions existed there would have been no unemployment! It is a very 
serious weakness in Southall's approach that the work experiences of the 
most marginal members of the workforce are ignored, while attention 
concentrates on skilled industrial workers; 
126 
this, in a study on 
unemployment. 
The assertion that unemployment did not exist, except perhaps on a 
very small scale, in London before the Great War is thus based on a 
highly misleading definition of unemployment in which the most vulnerable 
sections of the London workforce could be regarded as by definition never 
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unemployed. Similar tactics are used to deal with the question of 
rural unemployment. Southall (1982 p. 239) notes that English pauperism 
rates tended to be high in rural counties in the South and East Anglia 
and low in the industrial North, a tendency which was very persistent 
through time. Astonishingly Southall relates this not to the state of 
the labour market but to administrative circumstances. It is as though 
someone who wanted to prove that in the 1980s unemployment was no higher 
in the North than. in the South were to dismiss 60 years of official 
unemployment figures because they were administrative in origin. 
- On any realistic appraisal of the state of the labour market in 
Victorian and Edwardian Britain, one would expect'unemployment rates to 
be high in the rural South, including towns within the rural South, and 
low in the industrial North. A combination of high rates of natural 
demographic growth, static employment and high emigration very clearly 
signals a. high unemployment economy. Furthermore, rural areas were far 
more extensive in the South than in the North, with relatively few large 
urban areas to drain off surplus labour. There was London, but London 
itself was also generating a large labour surplus because of the 
difficulties of absorbing rural migration. 
Direct analysis of regional patterns of unemployment in 
agriculture is scarce because of data problems. The following quotations 
from two agricultural historians (Orwin and Whetham 1971) should be 
noted. 
127 Of the 1840s (and note that Orwin and Whetham do not include 
Ireland in their account) "the lot of the labourers in the south and south 
Midlands of England was probably hardest of all during-this period .... 
There were fewer alternative occupations open to farm labour, and periods 
of unemployment were almost inevitable", while in Essex "unemployed and 
half-starved men were asking for work at almost any wage" (although 
conditions eased in the 1850s). "Unemployment, or under-employment of 
agricultural workers was a chronic problem, at any rate in the South of 
EngZand" (emphasis added). Orwin and Whetham cite an 1867 Royal 
Commission. "The picture that emerges of conditions in the northern 
counties is altogether much brighter than in the rest"; "The general 
picture of farm labour in Wales is on the whole happier than that in 
England. There was no spectre of unemployment. " Ando discussing the 
same period, "In Wales and in Scotland the farmers were competing for 
the best workers, whilst in southern England the workers were competing 
for places .... the spectre of being out of work was always with (Dorset 
workers). " It would also be . possible to cite other sources, 
128 
noting 
for example how agricultural wages tended to be high in the North and low 
in the South, reflecting patterns of demand for labour, or that the 
Great Agricultural Depressij'ýn from the 1870s tended to have very severe 
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dffettson the arable areas of Eastern England. Furthermore the experiences 
of Ireland, rural like much of Southern England, could also be stressed. 
Enough has already been cited, though, to suggest that Southall is wrong 
in assuming that there was no problem of rural unemployment in Southern 
England, and wrong in assuming that rural unemployment can be ignored. 
Pauperism figures give the best available surrogate for spatial 
variations in unemployment across the whole population, so long as it is 
understood that pauperism is not identical to unemployment. There is a 
strong expectation that pauperism rates will be positively correlated with 
unemployment rates. 
121 In this context it is worth noting that Matthews, 
Feinstein and Odling-Smee (1982 p. 629) quote contemporary figures to 
show that in 1907 pauperism rates averaged 2.9% in wholly rural areas, 
2.6% in partially rural (less than 75% urban) areas, 2.6% in London, 
2.0% in the wholly urban areas and 1.9% in mainly urban (more than 75%) 
areas. MacKinnon (1986) uses a longer time series and shows that 
labour market conditions in the South tended to improve through time 
while labour market conditions in the North tended to deteriorate, implying 
that the South-North gap would have been greater in, for example, the 
middle half of the 19th century than in the period just before the First 
World War. In addition, MacKinnon notes that pauperism rates tended to be 
iýore cyclicallyvulnerable in the North than in the South. 
130 one can add 
also that early unemployment statistics (Table A7) show unemployment as 
being much higher in London, the South and Ireland than in Northern 
England, Scotland or Wales. All this provides a reasonably consistent 
picture of the pre-1914 labour market, with base unemployment (the 
minimum of unemployment at the peak of the business cycle) reflecting 
demographic pressures originating in rural areas, and spreading 
unemployment to towns and cities with a large rural hinterland; with the 
balance of economic advantage gradually tilting southwards in the late 
19th century; and with industrial employment in the North vulnerable to 
the trade cycle. If one were able to chart unemployment in the 19th 
century, the most likely picture would be of unemployment much higher in 
the South (plus Ireland) than in the North for most of the time, but with 
the gap narrowing considerably towards the trough of recessions. 
The interpretation noted above is, as far as the present author 
is able to determine, consistent with all the presently available 
evidence, including the trade union unemployment series. Southall's 
interpretation is consistent with trade union unemployment figures but 
almost wholly inconsistent with other information; as a result he has to 
spend a lot of effort trying to find reasons why other sources of evidence 
should be dismissed outright (see especially Southall 1983). Had his 
basic interpretation been correct, then other sources would have 
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provided supporting evidence; this is not the case., 
Southall (1983) notes that early National Insurance figures show 
that unemployment was high in Londong Southern England and Ireland, but 
low in the industrial areas. Instead of examining the meaning of these 
figures in the context of labour market conditions, he argues that the 
figures can be ignored, on grounds which are at best flimsy. He notes 
that the data come from a very early stage of the operation of the 
National Insurance system, with the implication that they are unreliable, 
and yet unemployment rates of the first few years after the Great War 
also show the same pattern of unemployment being low in the North and 
high in the South. He also suggests that the unemployment rates should 
be ignored because they were taken at a cyclical peak, yet in many ways 
the most important questions of labour market theory concern what is 
131 happening at cyclical peaks rather than troughs. To ignore what is 
happening at the peaks is to slip into pre-Keynesian orthodoxy, to 
produce an implicit model of the economy in which the economy tends 
towards a full employment equilibrium, with unemployment being merely a 
cyclical feature associated with structural change in key sectors. 
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This does not present an adequate picture of the labour market. 
Southall (1988) tries to link his analysis of pre-war unemployment 
to a study of the origin of the depressed areas, and in doing so magnifies 
many of his misconceptions. His knowledge of the literature of the 
period is almost non-existent; to assert that the Barlow Commission which 
reported in 1940 "is often cited as the first expression of official 
concern with the 'regional problems' 11 shows lack of acquaintance 
firstly with the numerous Board of Trade studies on the depressed areas 
(Board of Trade 1932a-e, 1934), secondly with the Special Areas Act of 
1934, and thirdly with the basic texts on regional policy in Britain 
(McCrone 1969, McCallum 1979, Parsons 1986, etc. ), which all note the 
importance of the Special Areas Act, Even more serious than this, though, 
is that while Southall (1988 p. 256) claims that "the focus of this paper 
.... centres on a relatively short period before and after the First 
World War" it is in fact very clear that Southall has not taken the 
trouble to look up regional unemployment figures for the years just after 
the First World War and instead relies on a guess, which happens to be 
wrong. Up to about 1921, unemployment rates tended to be higher in the 
South than in the North (chapter 4.2(i), Tables 4.4,4.5), the reverse of 
the result assumed by Southall. 
It is true-that the critical 1918-21 period has been neglected by 
earlier writers on the British regional system, leading to various false 
claims that the First World War marked a reversal in regional patterns 
of unemployment. 
133 Southail is correct in attacking these claims, but 
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does so for the wrong reason, not having examined the appropriate data, 
There undoubtedly was continuity of patterns of unemployment across either 
side of the First World War, but it was not the continuity of a pattern 
in which the North had higher unemployment rates than the South. Instead, 
it is strongly indicated that both before and just after the First World 
War the South had higher background unemployment rates than the North, 
but that the North was more vulnerable to recession. Thus during the 
post-War boom the North had low unemployment rates, but unemployment 
increased much faster in the North than in the South during the severe 
recession starting in 1920. Even at the trough of the recession, 
unemployment rates were only slightly higher in the North than in the 
South. The real reversal of polarity came not during the First World 
War but during the 1920s, when demographic pressure on the Southern labour 
market was fading, when the South was consolidating its economic dominance 
by developing new industries, and, perhaps most importantly of all, when 
the cyclical recovery in the industrial areas was thrown into a very 
severe reverse in 1925 by the collapse of prices in the coal industry. 
Since then the North has always had higher unemployment rates than the 
South, both during cyclical peaks and troughs; there is no need to 
disregard cyclical peaks to demonstrate the point. 
It is unfortunate that this review of Southall's work has 
necessarily been destructive, but there has been little choice given the 
strong claims made, and the biased treatment of evidence. Perhaps the 
basic weakness in Southall's argument is encapsulated in his rhetorical 
question, "if industrial unemployment was the crucial measure in 1920 or 
1930, why should we assess the economy of 1900 or 1910 so differently? " 
The basic point is simple; there is no need to deny the existence of 
non-industrial forms of unemployment to show that unemployment in 1930 
(though not in 1920) was concentrated in the industrial areas; in order 
to argue that unemployment was concentrated in industrial areas before 
1914 Southall has to go to considerable lengths to deny the existence of 
non --industrial forms of unemployment. This attempt to massage away the 
greater part of Victorian and Edwardian unemployment is not valid. 
4 
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9.6 Coal; Unblanced Expansion of a Key Industry 
Whatever the problems of the London economy at the turn of the 
century, the economic structures were present to enable London and the 
South East to share fully in, and indeed to dominate, economic growth in 
20th century conditions. A combination of high employment levels in 
the expanding professional, administrative and financial service sectors, 
along with a lack of commitment to older industries which were liable to 
decline, provided the basis of a high income regional economy with stable 
employment. There were highly conspicuous pockets of poverty in late 
19th century London, but a reduction in levels of migration from rural to 
urban areas would tend to bring labour demand and labour supply more 
closely into balance in London. 
By the start of the First World War, long term economic prospects 
for the South East could be said to be reasonably brightq with clearly 
identifiable growth sectors being present. In the industrial areas, much 
depended on what happened to the industrial base; in comparison with the 
South East, there were relatively few possibilities for major sustained 
growth in the higher order services. -- 
In the post-war period, Britains'older industrial base came to be 
in substantial decline, as detailed in chapter 4 above. The catastrophic 
and often highly regionally specific patterns of employment decline need 
to be related to changes in particular industries, rather than to any 
generalised patterns of regional prosperity. The one industry whose 
decline had the greatest impact on regional patterns of employment change 
after the War was coal-mining; this has been a consistent theme in the 
analysis presented in chapter 4. This earlier analysis needs to be 
extended in order to understand what features there were about coal mining 
expansion before 1914 which led to such an unstable surplus of employment 
in coal mining in later years. An early attempt to link coal mining 
employment expansion before 1914 to the inter-war regional problem stated 
that 
"A large part of the depressed area problem is due to the fact that 
the number of coal miners in Great Britain suddenly tripled between 18819 
when it was less than half-a-million (31 per cent of the working 
population) and 1921, when miners formed nearly 7 per cent of a much 
larger occupied population. No sooner had the peak employment of nearly 
11 millions been reached than an even more rapid contraction set in and 
since 1934 there have never been as many as 800,000 at work in this 
industry. " 134 
This passage captures some of the most important issues, although 
one wonders whether something can "suddenly" triple in 40 years (a 
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compound growth rate of less than 3% per annum). The emphasis on the 
increasing proportion of the working population employed in coal mining 
is certainly appropriate, but unfortunately the analysis was not extended 
by considering in depth the relationship between employment and output. 
Table 9.13 shows that the rate of growth of output was 2.0% per 
annum, the same growth rate as in manufacturing industry. This comparison 
suggests that output changes do not explain why coal mining employment, 
as a percentage of total employment, doubled from 31% to 7%. 
There would seem to be a considerable imbalance between output 
and employment trends in coal mining, with productivity trends in this 
sector falling behind productivity in the rest of the economy; indeed, 
productivity in coal mining was declining substantially in the period of 
analysis, from 318 tons per man per year in 1883 to 254 tons per man per 
year in 1913 (Table 9.13). Pasinetti (1981 p. 141) suggests that in a 
growing economic system costs of production broadly determine relative 
prices, while consumers' decisions broadly determine relative quantities. 
Applying this principle to the question under consideration, one can 
deduce that the relative price of coal was probably rising substantially 
during the period, a relationship which may be seen by comparing the 
level of coal prices with Rousse=t1sgeneral price index in Fig 9.2, and 
one can also deduce that the underlying level of demand for coal was on 
a sharply upward trend if the growth in physical production was faster 
than average in an industry of falling productivity. It is possible 
therefore to point to a "long boom! ' in the world coal industry before 
1913, even though the rates of output growth in Britain were relatively 
modest. A very large number of jobs depended on the continuance of this 
long boom, but trends turned sharply against the coal industry in 
post-war conditions, and much of the employment generated during the 
boom was quickly lost during the crash, with job loss being especially 
severe between 1924 and 1928 (chapter 4.2(ii)) as world overcapacity 
became acute. 
In assessing the long-term significance of the pre-1914 coal boom, 
two central points need to be borne in mind. Firstly, the growth of 
markets for coal was brought about primarily by the growth in industrial 
production at a world scale, coal at this stage being by far the most 
important source of industrial energy. 
135 After the 1870s, the growth 
of industrial output in the UK was relatively slow, a point much 
emphasised in the economic history literature, but European industrial 
growth started to become rapid, 
136 
allowing a sustained expansion in 
markets for coal. Furthermore, the continental coalfields were relatively 
undeveloped at the start of the period; in 1871, the output of hard coal 
in the UK stood at 120 million metric tonst compared with only 29 million 
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tons in Germany, the main continental producer. ' By 1913 this relative 
gap had been reduced substantially, with production in the UK standing 
at 292 million tons, compared with 190 million tons (plus 87 million 
tons of a lower grade "brown coal") in Germany. 
137 The UK had a "mature" 
coal industry throughout the 1870-1913 period, with the implication of 
a continued high level of productivity by international standards. The 
initial relative lack of development of the continental coalfields 
implied a low level of productivity at the start of the period, but as 
these coalfields became more fully developed, productivity rose, eroding 
much, but not all, of the substantial competitive advantage of the 
British coal industry. Buxton (1978 p. 97) notes that between 1874 and 
1878, output per man year in the UK coal industry averaged 270 tons, 
compared with 209 tons in Germany and 154 tons in France (1876-78). By 
1894-98, output per head had risen to 287 tons in the UK, compared with 
262 tons in Germany and 208 tons in France, a much reduced gap, but one 
still favouring the UK. For reasons which will be discussed shortly, 
productivity then declined up to the First World War, but more rapidly 
in the UK than elsewhere, so that by 1913 the productivity gap between 
the UK and Germany had been virtually eliminated. The inland coalfields 
of the USA had levels of productivity about twice as high as in the UK, 
but transport difficulties (lack of access to the sea, distance from 
European markets) ensured that American coal did not dominate world 
markets. 
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The basic structures of expansion of the British coal industry in 
the decades up to 1914 revolved around the exports of coal from the 
relatively high productivity British coalfields to industrialising areas 
throughout the world. As Table 9.13 shows, the growth in production for 
domestic use was slow, at less than 2% per annum, while exports expanded 
by about 41% per annum. 
The second key issue which needs to be considered is that of 
productivity. There is a fundamental distinction to be made between 
manufacturing industry and extractive industry when productivity trends 
are being considered. In manufacturing industry there is no particular 
reason why a large scale expansion of output at the industry level should 
result in a decline in productivity, or even a downward shift in the rate 
of growth of productivity; there is no reason why a new factory should 
operate any less efficiently than an already existing one, provided that 
certain "teething troubles" can be overcome. Indeed, the expectation is 
in the opposite direction; a faster rate of growth of output is likely to 
lead to accelerated productivity increases through the operation of 
dynamic economies of scale. 
139 
With extractive industries, as with 
agriculture, there are physical barriers to expanding production smoothly, 
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caused by the extent of the resource base being a limiting factor. One 
source of diminishing returns, emphasised by Taylor (1968 p. 48), is that 
the tendency for easily worked coal (thick seams, exposed coalfields) 
to be extracted first means that later extraction has to concentrate on 
less easily won coal. This, howev 
' 
er, is a very long term process. In 
the medium term, such an effect need not be strong so long as output 
remains fairly steady; particular seams in an existing pit are worked 
steadily, while the opening up of new pits is a gradual process. If 
however output expands rapidly, the problem of diminishing returns is 
felt more acutely. Possibilities for raising output by more intensive 
working on seams which are already being used are limited, implying that 
acceZeration of production from a particular pit would tend to require 
the working of thinner or less accessible seams. This reduces average 
levels of productivity. 
140 
Table 9.13 shows that productivity was increasing up to the 1880S 
and declining thereafter. There was a sharp increase in both output and 
productivity in the 1879-83 cyclical upswing; output increased from 134 
million tons to 163 million tons, while output per man year increased 
from 280 to 318 tons. Productivity in 1883 was at a maximum, but annual 
output per head remained over 300 tons until 1889, before the downward 
trend in productivity set in. Fig 9.2 graphs output and productivity 
levels for the decades before 1914 and seems to suggest quite clearly 
that under the technical conditions of the time, any level of output 
beyond 170 million tons per year could be achieved only with a serious 
loss of productivity. The sharply rising price levels for coal, from 
5s 71d per ton in 1882 to 6s 4d in 1889 and 7s 3d in 1892,141 ensured 
that production continued to expand substantially, and along with rising 
profits, despite adverse productivity trends. 
The 170 million ton threshold of diminishing returns seems clear. 
As a point of later comparison, a more technically advanced coal industry 
produced on average about 220 million tons per year in the later 1930s, 
falling to about 120 million tons per year in the 1980s. 
142 Under the 
conditions prevailing before 1914, and given a low rate of investment and 
innovation in machinery 
143 
an "equilibrium! ' output of abour 170 million 
tons and a workforce of about 550,000 would appear to be appropriate. 
Instead, markets continued to expand, physical productivity continued to 
fall and labour was sucked into the coal mining industry, labour which 
was liable to be shed very quickly if markets ceased to expand. By 
1913,1,130,000 were employed in the coal mining industry, but this 
employment was vulnerable; as outlined in chapter 4,400,000 jobs were 
lost in the industry between 1924 and 1932. 
f 
- 238 - 
The fall in productivity in the late 1880s and 1890s would 
appear to result from an overloading of capacity. Some perverse 
statistical results could be noted in later cyclical upswings. For 
example, the price of coal rose sharply between 1898 and 1900. In 1898 
total employment stood at 706,900, while output stood at 202.1m tons, 
each ton of coal raising on average 6s 4d. In 1899 prices rose to 7s 7d 
per ton, with output jumping by 8.9% to 220.1m tons to meet increased 
demand, while employment increased by only 3.1% to 729,000. This high 
level of productivity proved impossible to sustain, so that in the 
following year, despite an increase in prices of 42.2% and an increase in 
employment of 7.0%, output rose by a mere 2.3%. A similar pattern may be 
noted a business cycle later, when in 1906-7 employment jumped from 
882,300 to 940,600 (+6.6%) and prices jumped by 23.5%. output in millions 
of tons increased by 6.7%, from-251,100 to 267,800. This might appear a 
very satisfactory performance, but in the next few years output remained 
merely steady (+1.5% between 1907 and 1911) while employment rose sharply 
(by 127,000 or 13.5% in the same period). 
144 As Taylor (1968 p. 47) 
notes, these major drops in productivity when coal was in heavy demand 
were not recovered during subsequent recessions. The state of demand is 
measured here in terms of prices, rather than in terms of output. 
The cyclical pattern of productivity change in coal mining is of 
some interest, but for present purposes the longer term nature of the 
decline in productivity after the 1880s is perhaps of more importance. 
Mitchell (1984 pp. 321-324) attributes this primarily to the increasing 
average age of mines, which increased the length of travel underground, 
cutting the effective length of the working shift. In 1894, for example, 
Mitchell notes that each major coalfield had more than 40% of its men 
in collieries which were less than 30 years old, and this figure reached 
86% in South Wales and 78% in Nottinghamshire. By 1913, a figure of 20% 
(40% in Nottinghamshire and South Wales) was more usual. Coal output 
almost doubled between 1886 and 1913, but it seems that this expansion 
took place largely through the extension of existing pits rather than 
through the development of new pits, if not in the early part of this 
period, then certainly in the later part. In some of the older coalfields, 
the decline in productivity through the ageing of pits was extremely 
severe, especially if demand was still rising rapidly. 
Table 9.14 provides a summary of output and productivity trends in 
each of the major coalfields. It may readily be seen that the productivity 
decline of the late 1880s and early 1890s affected every major coalfield; 
nowhere was it easy to expand capacity to meet unprecedented levels of 
demand. Productivity was stable across the 1895-1904 business cycle 
when taken as a whole; there was a minor drop in productivity in the 
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declining Lancashire coalfield, but elsewhere productivity was steady or 
gently expanding. Across the 1904-1911 business cycle, however, 
productivity fell, but regional experiences were highly divergent. 
Productivity continued to increase in the Yorkshire and Midland (Notts., 
Leics., Derby, Warks. ) coalfields and output trends were extremely 
favourable, an early indication of the extent to which production in the 
concealed but productive inland coalfields would tend to dominate aspects 
of growth in the British coal industry in the 20th century. The economic 
performance of these inland coalfields, which had previously been 
relatively lightly exploited, provided a sharp contrast with the exporting 
coalfields of South Wales and North East England. 
The North East coalfield was undoubtedly Britain's dominant coal 
producing area up to the late 19th century as a result of there being a 
substantial exposed coalfield, and access to the coast to allow exports 
both to London and abroad. Mitchell (1984 p. 317) indicates that output 
per man year reached 400 tons in the North East in the early 1860s as 
a result of the ease with which coal was gained. From this high point, 
representing a much higher level of productivity than reached by any 
other coalfield before 1914, productivity declined sharplyo almost halving 
by the start of the First World War. The main problem was the progressive 
depletion of coal reserves in the inland exposed coalfield. While coal 
prices were high, before 1914, the problems of declining productivity in 
the exposed part of the North East coalfield could be counteracted. In 
the changed conditions after 1918, however, the impact of declining export 
markets and low prices was felt strongly in the North East, and in the 
exposed West Durham coalfield especially. 
The decline of productivity in coal mining in South Wales between 
1904 and 1911 was even more severe, but for different reasonse Again, 
like the North East, this coalfield was strongly geared to export, but 
this export trade was built not so much on high productivity extraction, 
but rather on the extraction of high quality "steam coal". The particular 
advantage of this coal was that it had a high energy value per unit of 
weight, and this, combined with the accessibility of South Wales to major 
shipping routes, enabled South Wales to dominate long distance world 
trade in coal. 
145 The main disadvantage of Welsh coal was that it was 
difficult to extract as a result of unfavourable geological structures; 
the whole of the South Wales coalfield is heavily faulted so that coal 
seams tend to be discontinuous, and therefore cannot be worked continuously 
for long time spans. 
146 As a result, diminishing returns set in at an 
early stage; the level of production in 1873, the year of maximum 
productivity, was only 16.2 million tons, compared with 29.7 million tons 
in the North East coalfield. * By 1913, output in South Wales had increased 
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to 56.8 million tons, but at the cost of productivity falling by a third. 
For slightly different reasonss therefore, productivity was sharply 
declining in the main exporting coalfields of South Wales and North East 
England, and also in Lancashire where a relatively small coalfield had 
passed its peak. The two exporting coalfields were later to undergo 
severe decline as a result of falling prices and low productivity. The 
inland coalfields of Yorkshire and the Midlands, in contrast, were showing 
relatively healthy production trends with output rising by over 4% per 
annum and productivity increasing, against national trends, in the decade 
before the First World Wari- 
In the long term, low productivity in the coastal coalfields 
meant a severe competitive weakness when compared with coalfields in 
which productivity was stable or rising. In the shorter term, the 
declining productivity in coal mining, especially in the exporting 
coalfields and Lancashire, drew in substantial quantities of labour. In 
that this extra employment was created on the basis of declining 
productivity as much as on output growth, a vulnerable surplus of 
employment could be said to have been created. Before 1914, the only 
sense in which productivity in coal mining could be said to be increasing 
was in the revenue sense. On the basis of the monetary value of coal 
produced per head, productivity was rising by 1.2% per annum, once 
changes in the general price level have been allowed for, compared with 
0.9% per annum in industrial production as a whole. This increased 
revenue productivity represented the economic basis for the rapid 
expansion of coal production up to 1914, yet any downward shift in 
prices, as a result of world overproduction or declining markets, would 
reveal the situation in terms of employment as being highly unstable. 
It is possible to give a rough estimate of the "surplus" element 
in coal mining employment by comparing actual employment levels in 1913 
with what the levels would have been if physical productivity in coal 
mining had risen by the same rate as in manufacturing. Table 9.15 shows 
that employment increased substantially in all the major coalfields 
between 1886 and 1913, and that the decline of employment in the inter-war 
recession was of approximately the same order of magnitude in each 
coalfield as the pre-1913 increases. It is of interest to see whether 
the'inter-war declines of employment corresponded to the surplus element 
of employment in coal mining in 1913, or whether they cut more deeply. 
At root is the question of whether the recessions of the inter-war years 
reestablished, by means highly disadvantageous to the workforce, an 
economic equilibrium which was seriously unbalanced by the lopsided course 
of expansion in the decades before 1914, or-whether, alternatively, the 
course of recession in the 1920s and 1930s bears little relation to the 
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course of expansion in an earlier period. 
Table 9.16 suggests that the "excessive" increase in employment 
between 1886 and 1913 stood at 350,000 in the six main coalfields, and 
that this closely matches the total of employment lost during the 
subsequent downswing, whether the measurement is taken on an aggregate 
level, or on a coalfield by coalfield basis. There is no wholly 
unambiguous point irom which to measure the downswing of the coal 
industry; production peaked in 1913, while employment was on an increasing 
trend until 1924. The figures for the net changes in employment in the 
downswing given in Table 9.16 are compromise figures, which in effect 
weight the 1924-36 years twice as heavily as the 1913-24 years. 
There would seem to be no theoretical reason to expect a precise 
match between the generation of excess employment in one period and the 
loss of employment in a subsequent recessionary period, but it would seem 
appropriate to expect an approximate match. Table 9.16 demonstrates this 
match, and suggests that the geography of job loss in coal mining in 
the inter-war years closely matches, and is at least partially explained 
by, the geography of the development of excess employment prior to 1913. 
In particular, the heavy job losses on the Northern coalfield in the 
inter-war period may be seen as the counterpart of the development of 
excess employment in an earlier period; the figures match very closely. 
The correspondence appears less close in South Wales, with a fall in 
employment of 100,000 and disguised labour surplus of 80,000 having 
appeared between 1886 and 1913. In South Wales, however, a significant 
degree of excess employment had already built up before 1886, and 
particularly in the early 1880s. Between 1873 and 1886, coal output in 
South Wales grew by 53% (3.3% per annum. ), a very fast rate of growth, 
while in the rest of the UK output grew by only 18% (1.3%) per annum. 
The increase in output in South Wales was achieved at the expense of 
falling productivity; in South Wales output per man year fell from 356 
tons in 1873 to 291 tons in 1886, whereas in the UK as a whole output 
per man year rose from 250 tons to 303 tons. Had output per head in 
South Wales remained merely stable between 1873 and 1886, coal mining 
employment would have risen from 45,500 to 69,700 rather than to 85,100. 
Thus, an element of earlier excess employment, unrecorded in Table 9.16 
should be allowed for when considering the Welsh position after 1914. 
It would seem that here, as well as in North East England, the exceptionally 
high rate of job loss in coal mining in the inter-war period is cZosely 
explained by the degree of excess employment generated earlier. 
The lower rates of job loss in coal mining in the inland coalfields 
of Yorkshire and the Midlands can be explained in terms of a much lower 
degree of excess employment by 1913. Tables 9.15 and 9.16 show that there 
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was considerable expansion of employment between 1886 and 1913, but that 
most of this expansion was "justified" by a high rate of increase in 
output, along with rising productivity. These two coalfields were 
therefore in a much better position than the North East, Lancashire, and 
South Wales to retain the employment in coal mining generated at the 
turn of the century. 
In chapter 4 it was established that declining employment in coal 
mining was by far the single most important factor in explaining the 
massive differences in unemployment between North and South between the 
wars, and also in explaining the differences between various parts of 
the periphery, for example between Yorkshire and the North East (although 
the decline in cotton employment in the North West represented another 
important component). It was suggested in this earlier chapter that the 
examination of the previous growth performance of the coal industry might 
hold the key to understanding the extreme intensity of Britain's inter-war 
regional problem. 
A combination of a moderate rise in coal output from a high base, 
and falling productivity, a combination possible only with buoyant 
markets, led to employment in coal mining in 1913 being over a third of 
a million higher than one would expect from overall trends in productivity 
in the economy. This surplus developed in less than 30 years; over half 
the net addition to coal mining employment in this period could be 
regarded as structurally highly unstable. Furthermore the excess of 
employment was extremely unevenly divided between regions with half the 
total excess being concentrated in the two major exporting coal regions 
of South Wales and North East England. It was South Wales and North 
East England that were the two regions most severely affected by the 
inter-war depressions. 
Much of the intensity of the inter-war regional problem may be 
attributed ultimately to the extremely unstable path of expansion in 
coal industry between the 1880s and 1914; any subsequent problems in 
the industry would then lead to extremely rapid falls in employment. 
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9.7 Summary 
It is both very important and very difficult to establish the 
outlines of Britain's 19th century economic geography in endeavouring 
to understand fully the economic geography of 20th century Britain. The 
difficulties of understanding what was happening in the 19th century 
result not so much from the period being in a remote historical past, 
and hence beyond direct observation or personal recollection, but rather 
that there is an irretrievable shortage of reliable and comprehensive 
statistical information for the period, and also that the patterns of 
change were themselves exceptionally complicated. 
Three questions would appear to be centrally important in the 
light of the earlier discussion, although it has to be admitted that none 
of these questions has been resolved fully to the author's satisfaction. 
Further analysis will therefore be required at some stage. These 
questions are 
(1) To what extent, if at all, the growth of the peripheral 
regions dominated the growth of the core regions during the Industrial 
Revolution and after 
(2) To what extent the events of the 1870s and 1880s (deep 
industrial recession; large-scale capital exports) represented a decisive 
set-back to the peripheral industrial regions and a major long-term boost 
to the core regions, thus creating the background of the development of 
the modern regional problem 
(3) The question of the structure of 19th century labour markets. 
It seems highly unlikely that the periphery dondnated the core 
during the Industrial Revolution. To have the South clearly economically 
dominant up to the late 18th century and in the 20th century, but the 
North dominant in the intervening period, it would be necessary to 
postulate two major reversals of economic polarity. This does not seem 
to be acceptable; it is more natural to assume first a weakening and then 
a strengthening of the dominance of the South rather than an outright 
reversal of patterns of dominance, itself later to be reversed. At the 
same time, it would be dangerous, perhaps even more dangerous, to suggest 
that the Industrial Revolution of the North was merely a superficial 
phenomenon with little autonomous effect on the structure of the economy. 
It is perhaps best to see the problem not in terms of North and 
South, but rather in terms of core and periphery. There is a general 
tendency for a core economy to specialise in higher order' economic 
functions, such as finance, professional services and high order 
administration, and for the peripheral economy to concentrate on lower 
order economic functions, sdch as agriculture, mining and quarrying, and 
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manufacturing. This is not to deny the significance of, for example, 
manufacturing in a core economy, or finance in a peripheral economy, 
but rather to suggest a set of broad distinctions. 
In the long term, this spatial division of economic functions will 
tend to lead to economic growth being substantially faster in the core than 
in the periphery. In the shorter term, however, there are various reasons 
why the periphery might at times grow faster than the core. The most 
important reason is likely to be the presence of a substantial natural 
resource base, which not only sets up possibilities of large scale 
expansion in primary activities, but also, in certain circumstances, 
lowers the cost of manufacturing activity enough to allow substantial 
industrial development, possibly at the expense of development elsewhere. 
Or. to put the point another way, if an "Industrial Revolution" is 
imminent, under conditions in which raw materials And energy sources are 
costly to transport, such a revolution is more likely to take place in 
an area with a rich resource base, with the presence or absence of coal 
being especially important, than in a naturally less well-endowed area, 
even one which is better placed to serve national markets. 
It is likely that were it possible for early 19th century growth 
rates to be calculated on a regional basis, they would show the gross 
product of the North growing faster than that of the South. Great care 
must be taken not to exaggerate the differences; it is extremely unlikely 
that London was economically stagnant during this period, even though 
Northern manufacturing industries outcompeted Southern industries. For 
such a gap in growth in favour of the North to be anything other than 
termporary, it would be necessary either for expansion in industry to 
outrun expansion in higher order services, which in the long run is 
unlikely, or for the manufacturing regions to generate a complex of 
higher order economic functions on level terms with London. Neither of 
these possibilities is likely in the long run. At times of crisis, 
industries decay, and the limited economic base of the periphery is 
exposed. Furthermore, to the extent that a peripheral area's development 
of higher order economic functions is dependent on the development of 
its industrial base, there is likely to be an increased concentration of 
higher order functions within the core during a major industrial downturn. 
Thus the relative advantages of the peripheral regions would seem to have 
been largely confined to periods of economic upturn; no industrial upturn 
lasts for ever, though. The periphery during the Industrial Revolution 
was therefore fast-growing rather than economically dominant. 
It would seem that from the 1870s onwards, the South was not only 
economically dominanto but also faster growing than the North. The 
industrial depressions of thle 1870s and 1880s were severe, and as. such 
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had a severe effect on the industrial areas. Industrial recovery after 
the "great depression" was relatively weak, however, despite a price-led 
boom in coal mining. The post-slump recovery of the 1880s was marked by 
a major expansion of investment in the resource-rich economies of the - 
"white periphery", with Britain being a dominant foreign source of this 
investment. Such investment, it seems, at least partially crowded out 
domestic industrial investment, except during the years of uncertainty 
in the 1890s, and led to a retardation of industrial growth in the 
peripheral regions. The combination of economically strong core and 
economically weak periphery probably dates from the 1870s or 1880s rather 
than the 1920s, although an unstable "long bood' in the coal industry 
largely concealed this relationship. 
The structure of the 19th , century 
labour market is complex and 
poorly documented, and requires considerable further investigation. 
Dogmatic pronouncements by Southall (1983,1986,1988) that systematic 
unemployment in London and rural areas did not exist, and that only 
industrial unemployment at times of depression should be considered, 
obscure rather than clarify the issues. Given the considerable gaps in 
pre-1914 labour market data, one can suggest only what is probably 
true; it is not possible to deal with proven fact. It would seem that 
there were two dominant components behind pre-1914 unemployment. These 
were, firstly, job losses during recession, and secondly the permanent 
mismatch between supply and demand of labour caused by an unusually high 
rate of population growth. It is little more than a statement of the 
obvious that unemployment through industrial job loss was concentrated 
in industrial areas, and that, given the high amplitude of 19th century 
business cycles, such unemployment could be severe. Trade union figures, 
as presented by Southall (1986,1988) indicate the problems faced by 
industriai workers during recession, but the problems of estimating levels 
of unemployment amongst non-industrial workers are immense. The most 
promising approach would appear to be to establish what can and what 
cannot be achieved by the study of pauperism statistics; MacKinnon (1986) 
provides a useful start, but there is still much work to be done. 
Without recapitulating in detail the arguments of section 9.59 it 
would appear that there is a considerable demographic element to 
unemployment before 1914. Matthews 
147 
notes that "when one reads the 
accounts of unemployment in those times one is irresistably reminded of 
the characteristics of urban unemployment in underdeveloped countries at 
the present time"; certainly such features as heavy rural-urban migration, 
and the strong segmentation of urban labour into a primary labour force 
and a casual labour force "who rarely succeeded in getting a full week's 
work in periods of general prosperi tyl, 
14 8 
accentuates this similarity. 
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Matthews interpreted this in terms of an inadequate supply of capital. 
If-one considers the massive capital exports of the 1880s and 1900s this 
case sounds plausible, but perhaps a slight shift of perspective can 
sharpen understanding of the situation; capital was short in reZation to 
the popuZation seeking enployment., as a result of a rate of population 
increase that would have placed strains even on the post-1945 British 
economy. Chronic third world unemployment generally results from a 
combination of fast population growth and inadequate capital development; 
19th century Britain undoubtedly had fast population growth, but whether 
or not the dual labour market resulted from inadequacies in capital 
development is open to debate. Had population growth been slower one 
might well have expected to find a situation in which unemployment in 
London and the rural South was low, with unemployment concentrated in the 
industrial North during recessions. 
The linkages between the pre-1914 economy and the post-1918 
economy are complex, and claims that what was happening was a simple 
reversal of patterns of prosperity, or alternatively claims that inter-war 
problems were merely a continuation of pre-war problems, are both 
over-simplified. 
Discussion of the pre-1914 period would normally cease here, but 
an important addendum to chapter 2, concerning 19th century climate, needs 
to be incorporated; the problem addressed was noticed only after chapter 
2 had already been typed. 
I 
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9.8 Climatic Change and 19th Century Economic History 
In any truly dynamic research project, it is quite possible and 
indeed likely that even at a very latc stage new information may come to 
light which may require a substantial modification of earlier conclusions. 
This presents both problems and opportunities. It takes both time and 
effort to resolve the problems and take up the new opportunities; failing 
that, all that it is possible to do is to present an interim report and 
suggest directions for possible further research. 
Chapter 2 above can ýe faulted for not taking into account climatic 
change, and for using an inappropriate implicit model of climate. This 
fault is common to perhaps the bulk of writings on economic history, and 
on long cycle theory, leading to various problems of interpretation. Any 
competent economic historian will be fully aware that the level of 
prosperity in particular years may be heavily affected by unusual weather 
conditions in such years, the effect being especially strong in a 
predominantly agricultural economy in which the size of the harvest is 
largely dependent on the weather through the growing season. The question 
of clirmtic change, as opposed to quasi-random variations of weather 
within an assumedly stable climatic regime, has often been neglected, 
though. 
Lamb notes that climatic change has been neglected even by 
meteorologists until relatively recently. "Not so very long ago - 
between the wars in fact - climate was widely regarded as something 
static, except on the geological time scale *so@ (It was regarded) that 
if only a long enough series of observations could be amassed, this would 
produce an average - described as the 'normal' - value of each element 
to which, in the climate of any given place, the element would always 
tend to return. Climate was described as 'average weather'* , 
149 Laub 
proceeds to note, however, that climate is changing continuously. The 
question that needs to be answered here is whether climatic change can be 
invoked to explain various of the shifts in the "economic climate" which 
were interpreted in terms of an endogenous economic dynamic in chapter 2* 
By chance, the author happened to glance at a diagram of 
temperature changes in central England from 1680 to 1960, in Manley (1964)9 
reproduced as Fig 9.3 below. This particular diagram is also given in 
a number of other sources, but derives from Manley's research. The 
results give particular cause for concern to any long cycle theorist, 
especially where the 19th century is concerned. There appears to have 
been a sharp climatic upswing from the late 1810s to about 1830, then an 
equally sharp downswing until about the mid-1840s, then a gradual upswing 
until about the early 1870s, -then another sharp downswing, more strongly 
- )/. a 
marked in the Winter, Spring and Summer than in the Autumn, until the 
1890s, and then a prolonged 20th century upswing. This mirrors very 
closely the assumed phases of the long cycle indicated in chapter 2, 
although Manley's use of a ten year moving average makes it difficult to 
establish the precise degree of match between the two series, particularly 
insofar as turning points are concerned. 
This raises major problems of interpretation. It is very easy to 
think of ways in which climatic change could affect economic change, but 
rather more difficult to see ways in which economic fluctuations, under 
19th century levels of economic development, could affect climatic 
change. 
150 Thus it is extremely unlikely that 19th century climatic 
fluctuations are economically determined, but quite possible at this 
stage of analysis that economic fluctuations are climatically determined. 
Indeed the question raised in chapter 2.9, of whether it is possible to 
identify an endogenous 300 year long cycle can now be answered quite 
firmly in the negative; the A-phases have predominantly been periods of 
improving climate (1100-1300,1450-1600) while the B-phases have 
predominantly been periods of deteriorating climate (1300-1450,1600- 
1750). 
151 The extensiveness of agriculture would seem to have reached 
its limits at certain phases not as a result of endogenous economic 
problems, but rather as the result of climatic deterioration, making once 
cultivable lands uncultivable. 
Braudel (1981 pp. 47-51) examines the question from a slightly 
different perspective, emphasising that the question of economic development 
was not simply one of successions of faster and slower economic and 
population growth in Europe, but of synchronised successions of faster and 
slower growth. It is this simultaneity, across several weakly connected 
economic systems which Braudel regards as the critical question, concluding 
that "one can only imagine one single general answer to this almost 
complete coincidence: changes in climate. " Braudel adds a cautionary 
note, pointing out that most historical studies relating economic decline 
to climatic shifts have related to climatically marginal areas such as 
Scandinavia. He notes that "if one seeks to argue that serious 
consequences resulted from a deterioration of the climate, one has to 
prove first that such deterioration occurred in the countries of the 
temperate zone, the most densely populated and in the past 'the most 
important for Western Europe's food supply'. " The English evidencet 
carefully collected by Lamb, Manley and others, shows very clearly that 
important climatic shifts did in fact take place in the temperate zone 
at the critical times (Fig 9.4). climatic deterioration would tend to 
lower the upper limits of cultivation in upland areas and reduce average 
yields (and possibly also make necessary changes in crops) in lowland 
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areas, The 300 year "cycle" is seen, therefore, as essentially 
climatically driven; it is a genuine cycle only if there is a genuine 
300 year climatic cycle; examination of this particular point falls well 
outside the scope of the current thesis. Attention now returns to recent 
50 year economic long cycles. 
Examination of Fig 9.3 shows that while, importantly, there is no 
sign of climatic deterioration in the downswings of the 20th century 
long cycles, there is a strong visual indication of a high degree of 
correspondence between the phases of the long cycle and climatic phases 
in the 19th century. It is upon the 19th century that attention needs to 
be concentrated. To attempt to discredit the long cycle theory insofar 
as the 19th century is concerned, 
152 it is not necessary to indicate the 
presence of regular climatic cycles with a 50 year periodicity; it is 
merely necessary to indicate that there are definite long swings in the 
climatic record which dominate swings in the economy and, by coincidences 
of timing, give a false impression of fairly regular long cycles in the 
economic record. There is evidence that volcanic activity was particularly 
intense at certain stages of the 19th century, and that the high levels 
of volcanic dust circulating in the atmosphere materially reduced average 
temperatures. One must investigate, therefore, the possibility that 19th 
century "long cycle downswings" represent little more than the side-effects 
of volcanic activity around Java! 
Graphs using 10 year moving averages might appear to give 
impressively smooth curves, but this particular representation of data 
should be treated with caution. 
153 One cannot tell, for example, whether 
the smooth curves produced represent genuine upswings and downswings in 
the climate, or whether they are the indirect effects of particularly 
warm or particularly cold years happening to be located at certain critical 
junctures. If the latter is the case, it is of some importance to 
identify precisely which years have unusual weather conditionst and to 
correlate these conditions with shifts of conjuncture in the economic 
time series. For serious analysis. attention needs to be given to the 
raw data on which Fig 9.3 is based, the month by month average 
temperatures and the annual temperatures from 1659 onwards listed by 
Manley (1974). This is a data source to which economic historians ought 
to pay extremely close attention. 
Fig 9.5 graphs annual average temperatures in central England from 
1800 to 1939, and also 2-, 3- and 4-year moving averages. Short-term 
moving averages are presented in order to avoid the dangers of 
over-smoothing. As an illustration of why this is necessary, consider 
the period from 1870 to 1900. The ten year moving averages, which have 
often been cited, show a vet)r pronounced downswing in average 
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temperatures from about 1868-? -B (peak) to about 1885-95 (trough) 
(Fig 9.3). A closer examination, however, 'shows that this apparent trend, 
was the result of an exceptionally cold year in 1879 (according to the 
statistics in Manley 1974,1695 was the only colder year between 1659 
and 1973), followed by a period of warmer temperatures, typical of those 
in the years before 1879, then a prolonged period of unusually cold 
weather lasting from 1885 to 1892, with another poor year in 1895. 
This detailed information would seem to suggest not that there was a 
continuously-falling trend in air temperatures in central England (and 
to whatever area these figures can be generalised to), but rather that 
there were two distinct spells of unusually cold weather which need 
explaining. Lamb (1972 pp. 410-433) discusses the question of volcanic 
activity and climate, and points out that dust from major eruptions may 
often be carried into the stratosphere, and that fine dust can often 
remain in the stratosphere for a few years. It is very noticeable, Lamb 
points out, that the strength of direct solar radiation at the Earth's 
surface.. falls sharply after a major eruption, even in latitudes a long 
way from the original eruption (as dust circulates along air currents). 
Lamb (1970,1972 pp. 434-435) has attempted to construct a Dust Veil Index 
for major volcanic eruptions between 1680 and 1970. This index was 
constructed so as to provide an indication of the climatic effects of 
major eruptions, calibrated so that Krakatau 1883 is given a score of 
1000.154 
The main cold spells of the 19th century can all be related to 
unusually high levels of volcanic activity, levels of activity which have 
generally been lacking in the warmer 20th century. Thus, 
155 
Cold spell Major eruptions (and DVI) 
(1) Late 1810s 1815 Tambora, Sumbawa (nr. Java) 3000 
(total veil, 1811-1818, of 44oo) 
(2) Late 1830s, early 1840s 1835 Coseguina, Nicaragua 4000 
(3) Late 1870s 1880s 1878 Ghaie, New Ireland (nr. New Guinea)1250 
(1879; 1885-1890) 1883 Krakatau (nr. Java) 1000 
(total veil, 1883-1890, of 1500) 
(4) Early 1900s 1902 Three eruptions in Caribbea n and 1000 
Central America 
No eruption with a DVI of greater than 1000 was recorded between 
1912 and 1963. Not surprisingly, given the values of the DVI noted aboveg 
the cold spells of the early 19th century were more intense than those of 
the late 19th century. 
The evidence seems fairly clear that, certainly since the 
seventeenth century, particularly cold phases in the world climate can be 
linked primarily to unusually high levels of volcanic activity. Earlier 
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cold spells, including the 1690s, also fit into this pattern. 
156 Since 
the volcanic eruptions involved took place at widely scattered locationst 
it would be hard to conceive of any regular volcanic cycle being involved; 
the timing of cold spells would appear to be random. This would seem to 
dispose of the argument that there was a regular climatic cycle in the 
19th century, and that this drove the economic long cycle, which could 
then be regarded as merely a reflection of the climatic cycle. The 19th 
century climatic record reflects incidents, with often far-reaching 
effects, rather than cycles. The next question which needs to be asked 
is whether phase shifts in the long cycle were triggered off not by 
the endogenous tensions and pressures of the economy, but rather by 
physical environmental factors. 
In an agricultural economy, the surplus available for investment 
is given by the gap between production and consumption, with the level of 
production depending crucially on the size of the harvest, and thus on 
climatic factors and the amount invested in this year's harvest from the 
previous year. The level of consumption is basically set by physiological 
needs, with the variation in the level of consumption from year to year 
being relatively small, unless extreme poverty sets in. The implication 
is that when production fluctuates, investment fluctuated far more sharply 
than consumption. Thus, following a bad harvest, investment in the next 
year's harvest will be low. A series of poor harvests may quickly lead 
to famine. This basic model is well known, both for pre-industrial 
Britain and for present-day third world countries. 
157 A version can also 
be applied to industrialised economies, perhaps, in which a poor harvest 
or a series of poor harvests will lead to considerable distress in 
agricultural areas, and drag down the total level of effective demand 
for industrial products, resulting in a general depression. Thusp on 
this model, a few years with poor weather might be expected to initiate a 
depressive downswing in the whole economy. 
The climatic record does not support the hypothesis implied here 
that long cycle downswings are initiated by unusually poor weather in 
certain years; the timing is wrong. In chapter 2 the long cycle downswings 
of the 19th century were identified as starting around 1825 and 1873. 
Reference to Fig 9.5 shows that these years, and the years which 
followed, were generally fairly warm-years. The climatic deteriorations,, 
which at first appear to have dominated the long cycle downswings, in fact 
start only about halfway through each downswing (Fig 9.5). There is little 
sign that the sequence climatic deterioration -i agricultural depression 
industrial depression was responsible for the start of either long cycle 
downswing, and indeed even as early as the post-Napoleonic period there 
was a high level of independence between industrial and agricultural 
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trends. (Smart 1910,1917, cited in chapter 2 above). 
The apparent coincidence in timing between the downswings of the 
long cycle and periods of climatic deterioration is largely illusory. 
Closer examination shows that the first half of each 19th century downswing 
had "normal" climatic conditions, while the second half of each downswing 
had, by chance, predominantly poor weather conditions. This added 
considerable economic problems as the slump was approachedt and helps 
explain why agricultural conditions continued to be depressed in the 
years after the slump, but cannot be used as an explanation of how the 
downswing started. The record of the 1870s shows this point clearly; the 
years from 1872 to 1878 were unusually depressed even without the 
intervention of climatic change. 
The discussion in this section strays somewhat from the main theme 
in this chapter, but is necessary in order to anticipate some objections 
which might otherwise have quite reasonably been made to the argument 
in chapter 2. On the specific question of the relationship between the 
economic long cycle and climatic change, it would seem that the 50 year 
cycle is a genuinely "economic" cycle, while the 300 year "cycle" (or 
"logistic") is climatically driven. There is scope for further discussiont 
however, and in any case the general point can be made that an awareness 
of climatic change is important in economic historical research, even if 
only to prove that certain key phenomena cannot be interpreted or 
explained by climatic factors. 
4 
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Table 9.1 Population of the Main Urbanised Areas of Great 
Britain, 1801-1881 
Population (000s) Change 
1801 1881 (000s) per annum) 
Greater London 1117 4770 +3653 +1.8 
London County 1088 3881 +2793ý +1.6 
Lancashire 673 3454 +2781 +2.1 
&nchesterlSalford 96 678 + 582 +2.5 
LiverpooZ 86 627 + 541 +2.5 
OZdham 12 ill + 99 +2.8 
BoZton 18 105 + 87 +2.2 
Yorkshire, W. Riding 591 2237 +1646 +1.7 
Leeds 53 309 + 256 +2.2 
SheffieZd 46 285 + 239 +2.3 
Bradford 13 183 + 170 +3.4 
Staffs/Warks 450 1718 +1268 +1.7 
Birmingh= 82 546 + 464 +2.4 
Durham/Northumb. 317 1301 + 984 +1.8 
NewcastZelGateshead 42 211 + 169 +2.0 
GZapgow - 84 673 + 589 +2.6 
Source: Mitchell and Deane (1962 pp. 19-27), based on Census data. 
Some 1801 figures, where they concern environs of cities later incorporated, 
are estimates. Any errors thus incurred are minor, perhaps mostly 
within 3,000. 
Note the differences between the numericaZ growth of London's 
population and corresponding growth in other major cities; 3,000,000 
compared with 500,000. 
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Notes (continued): - 
(3) Northern cities are as follows: Birmingham, Hull, Leeds, Leicester, 
Liverpool, Manchester, Nottingham, Sheffield. 
(4) A correction has been made for the 1841-1851 figures for total migration, 
which add up to +299137, rather than +294121 as given by Cairncross. 
This affects the grand total, where a similar correction has also 
been made. . 
Table 9.3 Major Changes in Net Migration Patterns Between 1871-81 
and 1881-91, England and Wales 
Gains of population through Change (000s) 
net migration (000s) 
1871-1881 1881-1891 
Rural residues -837.4 -845.4 -8. o 
London +307.3 +168.9 -138.4 
(Northern cities +187.8 421.4 -166.4) 
(Northern industrial -6.0 -88.6 -82.6) 
(non-textile) 
(Northern textile +92.9 +3.7 -89.2) 
(Colliery districts, +72.3 +3.1 -69.2) 
excluding South Wales) 
Total Northern industrial +346.9 -60.4 -407.3 
Southern industrial -11.4 -5.9 +5.4 
Northern non-industrial 436.4 +4.6 -31.8 
Southern non-industrial -2.4 +33.6 +36.0 
Non-industrial towns, total +34.0 +38.2 +4.2 
South Wales coalfield +12.2 +87.2 +75.0 
Total, England and Wales -148.3 -617.4 
Source: Cairncross 1953, p. 70 and p. 80. 
-469.1 
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Table 9.4 Net Migration to Colliery Districts, England and 
Wales, 1841-1911 
Net gain of population (1000s) through migration 
1841-51 1851-61 1861-71 1871-81 1881-91 1891-01 1901-11 
Durham group +49.9 +63.4 +84.3 +31.6 +8.2 +23.4 -23.8 
Glamorgan group +52.1 +39.6 +11.0 +12.2 +87.2 +40.3 +129.3 
Wigan group +3.2 +9.0 +2.9 +15.7 +5.1 -12.6 -29.8 
Chesterfield gp -8.8 -5.4 +0.1 +15.9 -1.3 +22.2 +26.9 
Barnsley group -6.6 +2.0 +2.2 +11.2 -1.0 +5.7 +11.3 
Wrexham -o. 2 +2.7 -2. o -1.9 -1.1 -o. 6 -2.9 
Nuneaton +0.4 -3.6 -7.3 -2.0 +0.0 +7.7 +8.4 
Cannock -o. 8 -o. 3 +2.0 +5.7 -3.3 -1.3 -2.8 
Ashby-de-la-Zouch -2.2 +1.7 -2.4 -4. o -3.3 +o. 4 -2.5 
Total +82.3 +103.5 +90.9 +84.5 +90.3 +85.2 +114.0 
Total in England 
(1) according to +61 +82 +74 +4 +46 -12 
Cairncross 
(2) according to +63 +82 +63 -3o +18 +35 
Thomas 
Sources: Cairncross (1953 p. 80); Thomas (1973 p. 457). 
The statistics given by Thomas are for areas more closely 
restricted to coal mining than statistics given by Cairncross. 
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Table 9.5 Net Cains of Population by Migration in Eight Large 
Northern and Midland Cities, 1841-1911 
Net gain in migration (000s) 
1841-51 1851-61 1861-71 1871-81 1881-91 1891-1901 1901-11 
Manchester +73.0 +33.8 +35.5 +51.4 +17.3 +31.6 +4.7 
Liverpool +107.1 +68.7 +56.9 +49.0 -15.1 +22.8 -11.8 
Birmingham +37.8 +46.9 +15.0 +20.0 -lo. 2 +42.6 -23.5 
Leeds +4.3 +11.1 +20.7 +6.8 +15.5 +13.8 -29.5 
Sheffield +8.8 +26.1 +26.6 +4.4 +2.2 +15.3 -19.0 
Leicester +0.4 -5.3 +12.6 +17.6 +10.1 +9.9 -10.5 
Hull +14.5 +3.1 +13.3 +16.8 +7.2 +9.6 +4.0 
Nottingham +3.4 +11.3 +5.1 +22.0 -5.5 -2. o -4.5 
Western Group +217.9 
Eastern Group +31.4 
Total +249.3 
Source: Cairni 
Western Group: 
Eastern Group: 
+149.4 +107.5 +120.4 -8. o +97.0 -30.6 
+46.1 +78.1 +67.8 +29.4 +46.6 -59.5 
+195.5 +185.6 +187.8 +21.4 +143.6 -90.0 
cross (1953 p. 80). See also Table 9.2 above 
Manchester, Liverpool, Birmingham. 
Leeds, Sheffield, Leicester, Hull, Nottingham. 
Table 9.6 Landed Wealth-Holders by Date of Death, 1809-1939 
1809-1858 1858-79 1880-1899 1900-1919 1920-1939 
Millionaires 181 (72)* 118 36 33 29 
Half-millionaires 351 (140)* 162 138 107 62 
Total 532 (212)* 280 174 140 91 
* 20 year rate 
Source: Rubinstein (1981, p. 60; Tables 3.1,3.2). based on 
probate data with corrections made to include the capital value 
of land. 
6 
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Table 9.7 The Occupational Distribution of Non-Landed Millionaires 
and Half-Millionaires by Date of Death, 1809-1939 
Sector Number of millionaires and half-millionaires 
(n umber of millionaires italic ised) 
180 9-59 1860-79 1880-99 1900-19 1920 -39 
Manufacturing 4 18 12 44 23 82 27 124 44 153 
Commerce/Finance 4 36 16 71 23 94 54 179 61 228 
Food/drink/tobacco 0 3 1 3 14 36 19 48 4 61 
Publishing 0 1 0 2 0 4 0 5 6 12 
Professions 1 5 0 5 0 4 0 4 1 2 
Miscellaneous 1 1 0 0 0 3 1 1 1 2 
TOTAL 10 64 29 125 60 223 101 361 117 458 
Source: Rubinstein (1981 p. 67, Tables 3.6 and 3.7). 
There is obviously a time lag between date at which fortune was 
made and date of death. 
Table 9.8 The Ratio Between the Number of Manufacturing Wealth 
Holders and Other Types of Wealth Holder, by Date of 
Death, 1809-1939 
Manufacturing Comercial/Financial Landed 
1809-1859 1 2.00 30.1 
1860-1879 1 1.61 5.8 
1880-1899 1 1.15 2.1 
1900-1919 1 1.44 1.1 
1920-1939 1 1.49 n. a. 
Source: Tables 9.6,9.7 above. 
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Table 9.9 Number of Non-Landed Millionaires and 11alf-Millionaires 
by Geographical Origin and Date of Death, 1809- 1939 
1809-58 1859-79 188 0-99 1900-19 1920-39 TOTAL 
Conurbations M M&HM M MUIM M M&HM M MUM M MUM M M&HM 
London 5 30 16 63 21 83 48 129 61 173 151 478 
Greater Manchester 0 1 2 13 2 17 3 19 6 27 13 77 
Merseyside 0 2 1 11 8 16 4 28 15 40 28 97 
West Yorkshire 0 2 2 6 2 5 4 19 11 32 19 64 
South Yorkshire 0 0 0 3 0 3 0 6 1 6 1 18 
West Midlands 0 2 0 2 2 5 3 8 5 19 10 36 
Tyneside 0 0 1 4 1 8 5 22 6 22 13 56 
Clydeside 0 1 2 8 4 15 12 29 12 40 30 103 
Others 
Rest of South 0 1 1 4 2 10 6 13 8 23 17 51 
Rest of Midlands 1 1 1 4 6 15 2 17 8 19 18 56 
Rest of Northern England 1 3 0 2 3 8 3 13 4 26 11 52 
South Wales 1 4 2 4 2 2 2 7 4 9 11 26 
Rest of Scotland 0 0 1 1 0 5 1 11 5 17 7 34 
Ireland 0 0 1 1 1 3 1 6 2 6 5 16 
South 5 31 17 67 23 93 54 142 69 196 168 529 
Midlands & periphery 3 16 13 59 31 102 40 185 79 263 166 625 
Conurbations 5 38 24 110 40 152 79 260 117 359 265 919 
Non-conurbations 3 9 6 16 14 43 15 67 31 100 69 235 
TOTAL 8 47 30 126 54 195 94 327 1d8 459 334 1154 
Source: Based on Rubinstein (1981, pp. 103-104). 
origin given by the location at which fortune was made. 
I 
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Table 9.10 Employment Structure in Major Centres of Urbanisation, 
1881 
Proportion of employment in: London Lancs. Yorksv Durham Staffs S'Clyde GB 
West and and 
Riding Nlhumb Warks 
(1)Ag., for. and fish. M 3.5 6.1 7.2 7.2 6.9 12.5 
(2)Mining and quarrying o. 4 4.7 7.2 18.8 6.7 8.1 4.9 
(3)Food, drink and tobacco 5.6 4.2 4. o 4.1 4.6 5.0 4.7 
(4-12)Metals, chemicals, 6.1 8.4 12.2 15.6 20.7 14.3 8.6 
engineering, vehicles 
(13)Textiles 2.3 29.8 27.8 1.3 3.3 13.3 10.2 
(14-15)Clothing. footwear 13.0 6.5 6.9 6.3 8.3 8.0 8.8 
(16-19)Other manufacturing 8.4 3.7 3.3 3.6 9.9 4.6 4.5 
(20-21)Const. & utilities 8.1 6.1 6.5 6.9 7. o 6.9 7.1 
(22)Transport and comm. 9.9 7.4 4.5 7.7 4.8 6.8 6.2 
(24,25,27)Prof., fin. & govt. 8.3 3.8 3.6 4. o 3.9 3.9 5.7 
(23,26)Dist. and misc. 26.0 12.7 11.3 14.6 14.6 12.3 18.3 
Not classified 11.2 9.2 6.5 10.1 9.0 10.2 8.7 
"Basic industries" 8.8 42.9 47.2 35.7 36.2 35.7 23.7 
Consumer industries 27.0 14.4 14.2 14.0 17.3 17.6 18.0 
High order services 8.3 3.8 3.6 4. o 3.9 3.9 5.7 
Lower order services 55.2 35.4 28.8 39.3 35.4 36.2 40.3 
Basic industries; Orders (2), (4-13) 
Consumer industries (3), (14-19) 
High order services (24,25,27) 
Lower order services etc. (20-23,26, Not classified) 
(Except that in Staffordshire, 40,000 of the pottery workers have 
been classified under "basic industries" rather than consumer 
industries). 
Source: Lee (1979). Bracketed figures represent 1968 sIC orders. 
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Table 9.11 Employment in Miscellaneous Services by Region, 
1881 and 1911 
As percentage of total Change in 
populat ion numbers employed, 1881-1911 
1881 19ii (000) (7. ) (% per annum) 
SE 10.5 10.2 +365.8 +44.0 +1.2 
EA 7.9 8.5 +15.6 +19.1 +0.6 
Sw 8.7 8.7 +31.5 +15.3 +0.5 
wM 6.6 6. o +30.6 +18.4 +0.6 
EM 6.5 5.7 +29.6 +23.9 +0.7 
NW 5.8 5.4 +71.8 +30.2 +0.9 
YH 5. o 5. o +47.6 +37.0 +1.1 
N 5.9 5.3 +34.3 +30.0 +0.9 
Wa 6.9 5.5 +25.8 +23.9 +0.7 
Sc 5.4 5. o +36.6 +18.2 +0.6 
GB 7.4 7.1 +689.2 +31.3 +0.9 
Source: Lee (1984 pp. 149-150) for first two colu=s; Lee (1979). 
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Table 9.12 The Place of Birth of the Populations of London and 
Main Extra-Metropolitan Suburbs, 1881 and 1891 
Number of natives (000s) of 
London Middlesex Rest of Rest of Total 
(extra-met. ) Southern UK population 
England 
Enumerated in London 
1881 2402.0 99.7 814.8 381.2 3816.5 
1891 2759.4 72.6 824.1 386.8 4211.7 
Change +357.4 -25.1 +9.3 +5.6 +395.2 
Enumerated in Middlesex (extra-metropolitan) 
1881 94.8 132.1 99.3 32.4 369.9 
1891 169.2 185.7 141.6 51.1 564.4 
Change +74.3 +53.7 +42.3 +18.7 +194.5 
Enume ratecti:: in West Ham Urban Sanitary District 
1881 38.5 49.5 25.1 12.6 129.0 
1891 63.3 82.6 36.5 19.2 204.9 
Change +24.9 +33.1 +11.5 +6.6 +76.0 
Source: Census of England and Wales, 1881,1891 
Those born in England, but with no county of birth stated, are 
excluded from all but the "total population" column. 
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Table 9.13 Coal Production and Exports in the UK, 1873-1913 
Year Output Export Production for Output 
(Million tons) (Million tons) domestic use per head 
(Million tons) (Tons per 
man year) 
1873 128.7 12.1 116.6 250.3 
1879 133.7 15.7 118.0 280.4 
1883 163.7 21.7 142.0 317.9 
1886 157.5 22.1 133.4 302.9 
1891 185.5 29.5 156.0 277.7 
1895 189.7 31.7 158.0 270.9 
1900 225.2 44.1 181.1 288.7 
1904 232.4 46.3 186.1 274.2 
1907 267.8 63.6 204.2 284.7 
1911 271.9 64.6 207.3 254.8 
1913 287.4 73.4 214.0 254.8 
Percentage change per annum 
Output Exports Production for Output 
domestic use per head 
Coal mining (Manufacturing) 
1879-1886 +2.4 +2.2 +5.0 +1.8 +1.1 
1886-1895 +2.1 +3.1 +4.1 +1.9 -1.2 
1895-1904 +2.3 +1.7 +4.3 +1.8 +0.1 
1904-1911 +2.3 +2.5 +4.9 +1.6 -1.0 
1873-1913 +2.0 +2.0 +4.6 +1.5 +0.0 
Source: Based on Mitchell and Deane (1962, pp. 115-116 for outputs 
p. 121 for exports, pp. 118-119 for employment, which is required to 
calculate output per head). 
Buxton (1978 p. 86) uses a slightly different set of definitions, 
and includes fuel shipped for the use of steamers engaged in foreign 
trade under "coal shipments abroad" rather than under domestic 
consumption. This gives export figures of 98.3 million tons in 19130 
rather than 73.4 million tons. 
Figures for change in manufacturing output from Feinstein (1972 
pp. Tlll-112). 
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Table 9.14 Productivity in Main UK Coalfields, 1873-1913 
Year Productivity (Tons per man year) 
North East S. Wales Yorks. Midland Lancashire Scotland UK 
1879 290 268 270 275 259 262 280 
1886 308 291 295 305 273 323 303 
1895 267 265 257 269 225 306 271 
1904 267 269 257 290 222 315 274 
1911 238 227 264 294 201 301 255 
Change per annum in productivity (%) 
North East S. Wales Yorks. Midland Lancashire Scotland UK 
1879-86 +0.9 +1.2 +1.3 +1.5 +0.7 +3.0 +1.1 
1886-95 -1.6 -1.0 -1.5 -1.4 -2.1 -0.6 -1.2 
1895-1904 -0.0 +0.2 +0.0 +0.8 -0.2 +0.3 +0.1 
1904-11 -1.1 -2.4 +0.4 +0.2 -1.4 -o. 6 -1.0 
Change per annum in output 
1879-86 +2.7 +4.9 +2.6 +2.6 +1.5 +2.2 +2.4 
1886-95 +1.5 +3.2 +1.8 +2.8 +0.8 +3.9 +2.1 
1895-1904 +2.2 +3.2 +2.6 +2.6 +0.6 +2.4 +2.3 
1904-11 +2.2 +2.0 +4.5 +4.5 +0.2 +2.3 +2.3 
Source: Mitchell and Deane, 1962, pp. 115-119. 
The productivity figures for the North East and Lancashire are 
estimates, since officially published statistics for output and 
for employment covered different areas. These estimates have been 
produced by scaling down according to the precentage of 1913 output 
in the Northern coalfields accounted for by Cumberland, and the 
percentage of the Lancashire and North Wales coalfield accounted 
for by North Wales. 
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Table 9.15 Employment in Coal Mines in Major Coalfields, 1886, 
1913,1924 and 1936 
Employment in '000s 
Coalfield Date 
1886 1913 Change, 1886-1913 1924 1936 Change 
('000s) (7. ) (000s) 
Northern 108.5 237.8 +129.3 +119.1% 251.7 151.1 -100.6 
Yorkshire 65.7 161.2 +95.5 +145.3% 195.3 144.5 -50.8 
Midland 55.1 130.6 +75.5 +137.0% 160.2 122.2 -38.0 
Lancashire/N. Wales 76.4 123.9 +47.5 +62.2% 124.7 76.9 -58.7 
South Wales 85.1 233.1 +148.0 +173.9% 250.1 142.9 -107.9 
Scotland 63.1 147.5 +84.6 +133.8% 141.8 81.6 -6o. 2 
Major coalfields 453.9 1034.1 +580.2 +127.8% 1123.8 719.2 -404.6 
Total, U. K. 520.0 1127.9 +607.9 +116.9% 1213.7 767.1 -446.6 
Source: Mitchell and Deane (1962, pp. 118-119). 
Notes: Northern: Northumberland, Durham, Cumberland 
Midland: Derbyshire, Leicestershire, Nottinghamshire, 
Warwickshire 
Lancashire, etc.: Lancashire, Cheshire, Denbighshire, 
Flintshire (i. e. Clwyd) 
A percentage rate increase of 100% in 27 years represents a compound 
growth rate of 2.6% per annum; +150% represents +3.5% per annum; and 
+175% a growth rate of 3.8% per annum. 
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Table 9.16 The Creation of Surplus Employment in the Coalfields, 
1886-1913 
Employment 1913 (000s) 
Actual Theoretical "Justified" "Excessive" Net change in 
increase in increase in employment, 
employment, employment, average of 
1886-1913 1886-1913 1913-36 and 
1924-36 
Northern 237.8 137.9 +29.4 +99.9 -93.9 
Yorkshire 161.2 116.0 +50.3 +45.2 -33.8 
Midland 130.6 99.8 +44.7 +30.8 -23.2 
Lancashire 123.9 70.7 -5.7 +53.2 -52.9 
South Wales 233.1 152.8 +67.7 +80.3 -99.1 
Scotland 147.5 103.1 +40.0 +44.4 -61.6 
+226.4 +353.8 -358.3 
Sources: Mitchell and Deane (1962, pp. 115-119), 
Feinstein (1972 pp. Tlll-112 and T131). 
Method of calculation 
(Theoretical employment 1913)=(Employment 1886)x(Coal output 1913) 
*;. (Coal output 1886)-*(Index of 
productivity in manufacturing in 1913; 
1886=1) 
The index of productivity in manufacturing in 1913, standing at 
1.27556, is an estimate based on the change in productivity between 
the Census dates of 1881 and 1911, and assuming no excessive 
fluctuations in productivity change within the period. The highest 
decennial increase in productivity was between 1891 and 1901 
(+12.0%, or 1.1% per annum) and the lowest was between 1901 and 1911 
(+6.9%, or 0.7% per annum); this range is not felt to be 
sufficiently large to prevent a rough estimate of excess employment 
in coal-mining to be made. 
The theoretical level of employment in coal mining is the 
level of employment that would have existed had productivity 
increases in coal matched productivity increases in manufacturing. 
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Notes to Chapter 9 
1. See Chapter 4 note 8. 
2. Brown and Burrows (1977) provide an outline discussion of 
the various characteristi&s of different types of problem region 
(agricultural problem regions, coal mining problem regions, depressed 
manufacturing regions; also congested regions) which is useful, 
but does not consider in depth the implications of structuration into 
core and periphery. 
3. For the woollen industry, see Gregory (1982 pp. 68-74); for the 
cctton industry see Chapman (1971). Up to about the 1820s water power 
was at the very least competitive with coal-based steam power, and 
areas with fast running streams, such as Lancashire, Yorkshire and 
Scotland, had a natural advantage over areas with slow running 
streams and low gradients such as the English Midlands. The problem 
with water power was not that it was in any way technologically 
inferior, but rather that capacity constraints, resulting from the 
naturally given limits to water power, were soon met during the 
expansion of production. Heavily urbanised centres of the textile 
industry thus found themselves forced to diversify on a large scale 
into steam power, and the availability of coal started to become a 
far more critical locational factor, allowing textile based 
urbanisation in Northern England to outstrip that of Southern 
England; see for example von Tunzelmann (1978 pp. 62-67). 
The most detailed recent discussion on the early diffusion of 
steam power, and its relationship to water power, is von Tunzelmann 
(1978). 
4. Marshall (1938 pp. 10-27) notes that there were various 
experiments with "waggonways" in North East England from about 1620 
onwards, in an attempt to ease the transport of coal towards 
navigable rivers such as the Tyne and the Wear. In the early 
stages, the waggons were drawn by horses along wooden rails. See 
also Dýos and Aldcroft (1971 pp. 111-118) and Bagwell (1974 pp. 88-97). 
It was not until the 1830s and 1840s that the railways became 
passenger transporters as well as industrial transporters. 
5. Weber (1909), also Hamilton (1967). 
The basic point about weight loss is that if raw materials 
are considerably heavier and/or bulkier than finished products, 
then it is far cheaper to transport finished products over long 
distances than to transport raw materials over long distances; this 
will tend to make industrial production in such industries gravitate 
towards the localities of raw materials rather than the localities 
of the markets. The case of coal, particularly when used solely as 
a form of energy, is especially important in this respect; coal is 
brought into the factory, but not taken out. 
The significance of sporadic occurence is that it means that 
particuZar locations are favoured. 
6. Figures taken from Buxton (1978 p-79). 
7. For the "deindustrialisation" of London, which has perhaps 
been overstated, see Jones (1971 pp. 19-32), much of which develops 
Hall (1962). The deindustrialisation. of Southern England outside 
London can be seen clearly in the concentration of the woollen 
industry in West Yorkshire and its near disappearance elsewhere# 
described by for examplh Gregory (1982 pp. 26-79). Coleman (1962) 
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notes the decline of the East Anglian industrial base during the 
Industrial Revolution. 
The word "deindustrialisation" was first used in the 1940s to 
describe the situation in India in the 19th century when emergent 
British industrialism was pushing the Indian industrial base aside; 
it was from these sources that Singh resurrected the term in his 
1977 paper. Ironically, thoughg Thorner (1960) has suggested that 
the original thesis of deindustrialisation depended on a misreading 
of Indian Census data, and a failure to recognise major changes in 
classification. Thorner suggests that what was happening was not so 
much a decline in industrial employment, but rather "that 
agricultural production was reported as virtually constant, and the 
industrial structure of the economy as practically stationary, during 
a half century when India's population rose by nearly one hundred 
million" (Thorner 1961 p.. 226; see also, Charlesworth 1982 pp. 32-39). 
By these standards any "deindustrialisation" in 19th century London 
was very slight, and, given that manufacturing employment was 
increasing in London, there was "deindustrialisation" only in 
relative terms, in the context of fast industrial growth in the North. 
In fact, as examination of Lee (1979) will show, 19th century 
industrial retardation was much more severe in the less urbanised 
counties of Southern England than in London. There is scope for 
further study on this question. 
8. Unfortunately the first Census, in 1801, was conducted too 
late to trace the late 18th century growth of the textile towns, 
although some of these towns showed very quick growth from a 
relatively small base in the first half of the 19th century; most 
notably the population of Bradford increased from 13,000 in 1801 to 
104,000 in 1851. At a slightly later stage, the population of the 
iron town of Middlesbrough grew from 8,000 in 1851 to 40,000 in 
1871 (Mitchell and Deane 1962 pp. 24-27). It should be noted, however, 
that during the early phases of the Industrial Revolution in the 
late 18th century much of the expansion of the textile industry was 
to be found in semi-rural locations; the growth of the major urban 
agglomerations, which required significant non-industriaZ investment, 
came later (note 9 below). 
9. The question of the financing of the Industrial Revolution 
has still yet to be fully resolved, although Cottrell (1980) 
clarifies many of the key issues. Cottrell (p. 4) notes that 
"generally in the early stages of. growth the biggest demands for 
capital arise from urbanisation and the development of transport 
systems. The demand of manufacturing industry is normally small and 
a high proportion of its share of investment consists of inventories. " 
This suggests certain complexities in the relationship between 
urbanisation (taken to include the development of the urban and 
inter-urban transport infrastructure) and industrialisation. At one 
level of analysis, industrial employment growth was the spur to 
urbanisation, yet if the degree of capital investment in the 
urbanisation process is so much higher than that involved in industrial 
development, then the question is raised of how urban development 
was financed. Logically, since the development of the land was 
involved, and since land ownership was at this stage the dominant 
source of wealth (Rubinstein 1981)9 one would expect a major 
involvement of aristocratic landowners in the urbanisation process 
in the industrial areas; Cannadine (1980 pp. 41-45) provides examples. 
Cardiff, Belfast and Huddersfield were, as cities, largely the 
creation of single families, but other industrial cities had more 
complex land ownership structures. 
As far as industry itself is concerned, it is not clear that 
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agriculture or the landed interest represented major direct sources 
of funding (Cottrell 1980 pp. 11-13). Landowners tended to 
concentrate on the development of their own estates and while they 
played a major role in the development of the coal industry, their 
influence on the textile industry was much smaller (Cottrell pp. 12, 
28-30). In cotton the expenses of setting up in business were 
relatively small, and the sources of finance various. Personal and 
kinship contacts were often important, while merchants and the newly 
evolving country banks were also major sources of credit, the latter 
implying some degree of inter-regional mobility of capital. 
Cottrell (pp. 19-28) emphasises, however, that much of the finance 
needed for development was internally generated, with retained 
profits being used to finance expansion within the enterprise, and 
new enterprises borrowing from existing ones. 
Thus there would seem to be an important dualism in patterns 
of finance for the development of industrial urbanisation, with 
industry relying on relatively small scale borrowing, often from the 
local area, and use of retained profits, and the more generalised 
process of urban development . 
(housing, roads, etc. ) appearing in 
effect as a form of land improvement, promoted by landowners. 
Furthermore, these landowners would have been far more closely tied 
in to "gentlemanly capitalism! ' (the term used by Cain and Hopkins 
1986) than industrialists would have been, and thus would have had 
close access to London money markets in order to raise the capital 
for lucrative urban development. 
The whole question of the economics of urban development in 
the late 18th and 19th centuries needs to be reopened. Too often 
the question of urbanisation has been subsumed under the questions of 
industrial and financial development. The author, in the main text, 
is culpable in this regard; the present note is regarded as a 
substantial modification to the main argument; urban rent needs to 
be considered as well as merchant profit. Deane (1979) also pays 
little regard to the independent dynamics of urbanisation (is it 
possible to speak of an "urban revolution"? ) while even Cain and 
Hopkins (1986,1987), who emphasise the distinction between -. - 
gentlemanly capitalism and industrial capitalism, and who emphasise 
the links between the landed interest and other gentlemanly 
capitalists, virtually ignore urbanisation. The only mention they 
make is when they remark that "capitalists could remain (or become) 
gentlemen if they derived incomes from agricultural or urban property 
or if they were rentiers drawing on other types of investment, 
whether public or private" (Cain and Hopkins 1986 p. 506). Histories 
of the landed interest, such as Thompson (1963), have tended to 
concentrate primarily on the rural question, although Cannadine 
(1980) has done much to redress the balance. 
If Cottrell (1980 p. 248) is correct in arguing that "a 
considerable proportion of manufacturing concerns during the 
nineteenth century relied on private and internal sources of finance" 
even after the liberalisation of company law, and thus could remain 
largely independent of London financial markets, and if he is also 
correct (p. 4) in arguing that "the biggest demands for capital arise 
from urbanisation and the development of transport systems", and if 
the broad thrust of the argument above is correct, various important 
implications arise for the development of the British regional 
system. The growth of the Northern towns and cities, especially 
prominent in the first half of the 19th century, was a highly 
spectacular process. Industry and trade made this development 
possible, but not in a wholly mechanical way.. Industrial development 
was largely tied to local sources of capital, with relatively little 
access to wider capital markets; this ultimately placed an important 
brake on industrial development in the coalfield industrial areas. 
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Urban non-industrial development would appear to have been linked, 
via the local landowning interests, far more closely to metropolitan 
capital. Where peripheral land booms are concerned (and perhaps 
any boom in the periphery is to a large extent a land boom), then 
metropolitan capital flows in readily while there are opportunities 
for genuine economic development, but starts to dry up when 
conditions are less favourable. As discussion in the text shows, 
there were clear signs of the Northern urbanisation process slowing 
down sharply in the 1880s, while attention was devoted to developing 
the lands of the white periphery, and while domestic urbanisation 
was concentrated more on the London area, the core region of capital. 
10. Perhaps the strongest recent statement of this type is 
Hobsbawm (1968 p. 1). "The Industrial Revolution marks the most 
fundamental transformation of human life in the history of the world 
recorded in written documents. For a brief period it coincided with 
the history of a single country, Great Britain. " more recently, 
economic historians have tended to see the Industrial Revolution not 
so much as a sudden breakthrough in the last quarter of the 18th 
century, but rather as a more gradual, but still decisive, shift 
(note 49 below). The question of what structures were transformed, 
and what structures were merely modified, is complex. 
11. For example, Blackaby (1979), Pollard (1982), Kirby (1981). 
The situation as of 1913 was that "Britain stood at the centre 
of the international economy, the world's greatest trading nation 
providing, through the City of London, sophisticated financial and 
commercial services which underpinned the structure of world trade" 
(Kirby 1981 p. 1). There were, as Kirby proceeded to point out, 
various incipient weaknesses surfacing even before 1913, with the USA 
and Germany taking over Britain's previous role as industrial 
pace-setter. 
Britain's economic decline since 1913 has of course been 
relative rather than absolute; standards of living are far higher in 
the 1980s than before 1914, and even the economic condition of the 
unemployed in the 1980s is better than that of the unemployed in 
the 1930s or the 19th century casual labourer. The relative decline 
has taken two main forms; firstly, in the political-economic sense 
Britain is no longer at the centre of the international economy, 
but is one of the secondary centres, and secondly, that the British 
economy has developed less effectively than other economies which 
have had, at various stages, broadly comparable economic structures. 
Thus Britain's relative decline has been in respect to other 
industrialised countries such as the USA, Germany, France and Japan, 
rather than to less developed countries. 
12. Pollard (1985 p. 494), who notes that a wide range of 
contemporary opinion "considered it to be self-evident that it was 
better to use capital at home, employing British labour and 
developing the home economy, rather than do the same for our 
competitors. " Thus the problem of capital takes on two forms: 
(1) In the short-term the geographical distribution of 
investment which maximises returns on investment is not the 
same as the geographical distribution of investment which 
maximises national income. Home investment creates workers' 
income as well as capitalists' income while foreign investment 
creates, in purely British terms, merely capitalists' income 
(leaving aside the question on the ramifications of reduced 
food prices on workers' incomes). 
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(2) In the longer term, excessive investment abroad, and the 
institutional biases in the British economy which led to 
foreign investment being preferred over domestic investment, 
might lead to a retardation of industrial development in 
Britain. 
00 The question is one of balance. It would not be tenable to 
argue that there should have been no foreign investment in the period 
before 1914; the point being made, though, is that there is a strong 
possibility that the direction of investment was overbalanced towards 
foreign projects, leaving British industry to rely, in contrast with 
German industry, on raising capital at a local or regional scale 
(see Pollard 1985 p. 500). 
Such an interpretation of Britain's relative industrial 
failure before 1914 does not assume any widespread "entrepreneurial 
failure" in British industry, and does not even assume inefficiency 
in capital markets. Capital markets were efficient in their own 
terms,, but were not structured to provide the optimum conditions 
for the growth of British industry. The conflict of interests between 
the City and industry, rather than any alleged weakness of either 
City or industry, seems to be central. 
The debate on entrepreneurial failure has a long history, 
with for example Levine (1967) arguing strongly that industrial 
entrepreneurship was weak. Payne (1974 pp. 45-46) suggests that 
while it is of course possible to demonstrate in a few cases that 
entrepreneurs were inefficient, there is little real evidence that 
entrepreneurs as a whole were inefficient; the problem lay more in 
the economic environment. For example, Payne (pp. 53-54) notes that 
comment was often passed (see also note 38 below) that German and 
American industrial firms were often far more vigorous than British 
firms in sending commercial travellers abroad; this, argues Payne, 
was not so much a sign of entrepreneurial failure, but rather that 
British firms were characteristically much smaller than German or 
American firms. 
13. Pollard (1985 p. 495). McCloskey (1970) has, put the 
neo-classical case in perhaps its clearest form. He bases his 
argument on the case that "most of the supporters of the hypothesis 
of immiseration by capital exports have accepted the assumption that 
the enlightened self-interest of investors in perfect capital markets 
maximises national income" (p. 451) and that accordingly any criticism 
of the role of foreign investment is necessarily on the theme that 
either investors were not enlightened or that capital markets. were 
not perfect. 
The present author does not accept the neo-classical case 
presented above that the optimum for capitalists is the optimum for 
the whole economy; on the contrary the two optima are held to lie at 
radically different points. See note 12 above. Neither is it 
accepted (McCloskey 1970 p. 455) that there was full employment in 
late Victorian Britain, and that the potential efficiency of 
domestic investment was thus constrained by labour shortages. 
14. For example Pollard (1985 pp. 501-502) notes a case in which a 
Lincolnshire bicycle factory, founded in 1896, expanded rapidly, 
was technologically innovative having diversified into motor cycless 
and profitable, yet was consistently hampered by difficulties in 
raising capital for expansion, and went into liquidation in 1913. 
There was certainly an element of "fashionability", with the 
implication that markets were not as perfect as the neo-classicists 
would like to believe, in investment abroad. Pollard (p. 499) thus 
notes the existence of bandwagon effects. 
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15. McCloskey (1979 p. 539). 
16. The literature on late 19th century and early 20th century 
British foreign investment is enormous; see especially Cairncross 
(1953), Imlah (1958), Cottrell (1975), Edelstein (1981,1982) and 
the papers in Hall (1968 ed). A cautionary note needs to be added in 
that Platt (1980,1986) has strongly argued that these foreign 
investments, although important, have been quantitatively 
over-estimated; sed note 44 below. 
17. See for example Payne (1974 pp. 24-25) and references cited 
therein, notably Perkin (1969 pp. 80-87). Perkin notes that early 
industrialisation was greatly facilitated by "the wide diffusion of 
modest-wealth" (p. 80) and also by the fact that in the new industries 
there was relatively little need for large masses of pre-accumulated 
capital. Some degree of prosperity was desirable if starting out in 
manufacturing, while those with greater wealth might well have been 
repelled by the need to work hard and long in risky new ventures. 
Kinship and personal connection often proved vital in raising credit 
for new ventures and for expansion. 
It is not clear how far down the social scale it was possible 
for industrialists to emerge. The more successful and dominant 
industrialists might well have been recruited largely from the 
"lower levels of the middle ranks" (Perkin p. 82), yet as Payne 
(1974 p. 24) points out many of the less successful industrialists 
who ultimately failed, perhaps through difficulties in raising 
credit, might well have come from even more modest backgrounds. 
18. The use of the terms "visible geography" and "invisible 
geography" parallels the distinction in trade theory between visible 
trade (the trade of material goods) and invisible trade (the trade 
of services, etc. ). 
19. See for example Perry (1975), in which after a preliminary 
discussion of urbanisation, migration and population growth the 
geography of 19th century Britain is described in terms of patterns 
of change in individual manufacturing and extractive industries. 
Langton and Morris (ed. 1986) provide a similar sort of treatment, 
though with slightly more coverage of services. 
The problem is not of course that 19th century industrial 
geography has been explored in detail, but rather that the 
geographical structure of change in the service sector has been 
relatively neglected, Lee (1984) being an exception. It seems that 
many of the critical questions of 19th century regional structure 
depend precisely on what is happening in the service sector, and 
more specifically in the "core" service sector. 
A recent debate between Gregory (1988a, b) and Langton (1988) 
touches on many of the key issues raised in this chapter. Langton 
concentrates squarely on the "V'Isible geography" of the Industrial 
Revolution, on "the distribution of natural resources, labour and 
capitalists with particular cultural characteristics, and patterns 
of movement of goods and people" and argues that "neither capital 
nor information is, in fact, material" (p. 172). In concentrating 
on the "material" and ignoring "non-material" forces, Langton 
reproduces the traditional picture in which the industrial areas$ 
the-newly developing industrial regions, are at the core of the 
Industrial Revolution. Gregory's argument is more*in line with that 
of the present text, noting in particular the crucial importance of 
London as a centre of capital in non-commodity forms and as a centre 
of commercial intelligence; this Gregory (1988a p. 55) suggests, 
implies that "London's international hegemony may well have cast a 
- 273 - 
long shadow over the domestic space-economy of late Georgian 
England" as well as Victorian England (emphasis in original). This 
"long shadow" is seen mainly in the form of industrial crises. 
Gregory argues, tssentially, for the continuous historical 
dominance of London, while Langton argues that this dominance was 
overturned for a while during the early Industrial Revolution. In 
such arguments, fine shades of meaning are often critical. It seems 
highly probable that overall control of the direction of economic 
change, and thus dominance persisted in London throughout, but that 
economic growth was faster in the urban North than in the urban 
South. The distinction becomes clearer if one makes an analogy; 
if one considers an Anglo-Argentine economy in the 1880s, then the 
Argentine may well have shown much faster economic growth than 
England, but it would clearly be inappropriate to suggest anything 
other than that England economically dominated Argentina. 
2o. Urbanisation was so central to 19th century experience that 
no history of the period can ignore urbanisation, and indeed "the 
study of nineteenth-century cities has been one of the most rapidly 
expanding areas of British historical research in recent years" 
(Johnson and Pooley 1982 p. 3). It seems fair to suggest that the 
bulk of the recent research (for example all the papers in Johnson 
and Pooley 1982ed. ) concentrates on untangling the internal structure 
of the growing Victorian city, with its patterns of class conflict 
and geographical segregation, and its changing economic, political 
and demographic profile. Stedman Jones's (1971) study of late 
Victorian London, discussed in section 9.5 is a classic in this 
particular genre. Relatively little attention has gone, however, 
on explaining why British urbanisation was so rapid, and in exploring 
the links between patterns of industrialisation and urbanisation. 
Robson (1973) has attempted to examine patterns of urban 
growth, in both time and space, in England and Wales in the 19th 
century, but his approach suffers from being too closely tied to 
the orthodoxies of late 1960s quantitative geography; there are 
plenty of abstact models of urban growth and simulations of urban 
growth, but recognition of basic historical points, as that the 
growth of Bradford was closely tied in with the growth of the wool 
textile industry, are conspicuously lacking. Robson (p. 111) assumes 
that he has gone beyond this approach, yet the opposite seems to 
have been the case; to reduce historical economic geography to 
abstract human geography is a ret: rograde step, reducing historical 
explanation to abstract explanation. The whole question of the 
basic patterns of 19th century urban growth is open to further 
examination, with concrete economics and history brought back into 
the picture. The edited volume by Gordon (1986) explicitly 
concentrates on the period from 1890 to 1980, although touches on 
earlier developments; there is scope to focus attention on a rather 
earlier period. Briggs (1963) provides useful essays on particular 
Victorian cities, although his study is designed more to provide a 
historian's panorama than to explain in detail the processes of 
growth. More recently Waller (1983) has also attempted a very broad 
description of Victorian urbanisation and urban society. 
21. Beveridge (1944 pp. 72-75), also Table A7. Beveridge (p. 74) 
described London in 1913 as the "least prosperous" part of the 
country; it is argued in later sections that this makes'sense only 
if a clear distinction is drawn between "wealth" and "prosperity". 
22. These, and following figurest taken from Ravenstein (1885 
pp. 185-186). 
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23. At this time the North Wales coalfield was economically 
small, although coal mining may have significantly altered local 
migration patterns. The Kent coalfield was not yet in production. 
24. Census 1981, Key Statistics for Locat Authorities, Great 
Britain., Table 1, based on population present on Census night and 
increase other than that due to natural increase. 
25. Weber (1899 pp. 144-145) shows that the proportion of population 
in England and Wales living in cities of over 20,000 population 
increased from 16.9% in 1800 to 35.0% in 1850 and 53.9% in 1891. 
Comparable 1890s figures for other countries are 42.4% in Scotland 
(1891), 38.8% in Australia (1891), 29.3% in the Netherlands (1889), 
21.9% in Germany (1890), 21.1% in France (1891), 23.8% in the USA 
(1890), and 15.3% in Ireland (1891). 
26. Lawton (1968 p. 60). 
27. See especially Lawton (1959). In 1841,417,000 of the 
population of Britain was Irish-born, while by 1861 this number had 
increased to 806,000, not including British-born descendents of 
Irish-born: "Liverpool, Glasgow and Bristol were besieged by 
destitute Irish" (Lawton p. 38). Liverpool however was the most 
important final centre of migration, and also an intermediate 
staging post for migration elsewhere, either to urban Britain or to 
the white periphery. 
That the Irish displaced British rural migration is clearly 
implied in Table 9.2; despite very depressed agricultural conditions 
in the 1840s and an agricultural upturn thereafter, British rural 
emigration was unusually low in the 1840s. 
28. See especially the discussions of chapters 4.4 and 5.4 above. 
29. See especially Giffen (1885,1886) and other reports in this 
annual series, also Li6gard, ' (1884) for an European/American 
perspective. 
3o. Thomas (1973) is by far the most detailed study. 
31. See chapter 2.6(ii), and chapter 2 note 96. The "Kuznets 
cycle" had a wavelength of about 20 years, with upswings in the 
periphery (USA, Australia, etc. ) tending to coincide with downswings 
in the core (UK, etc. ) as the wide variety of investment opportunities 
in the periphery diverted both capital and labour away from the 
core. Whenever signs of economic crisis began to appear in the 
periphery the exports of capital and labour slowed down considerably, 
allowing investment in the core economies to swing upwards. 
An interesting sidelight on these inverse swings is given by 
Fenoaltea(1988) in a study on Italy. Fenoaltea shows that during the 
"peripheral" phase of the Kuznets cycle emigration from Italy was 
high. This of itself is a fairly well known result (e. g. Thomas 
1973), but Fenoaltea also shows that construction activity was high 
during the peripheral phase of the Kuznets cycle, in contrast with 
the pattern in England. This shows that construction activity is 
related to investment conditions and not, as some previous writers 
have suggested in the American context, to'demographic change. It 
also shows that in terms of labour markets Italy might well have been 
a core European country, but in terms of investment she was part of 
the periphery. At a slightly more detailed level of spatial analysis, 
migration from Europe tended to originate ultimately from the rural 
periphery of the European core, rather than from the hard core itself. 
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It makes sense therefore to regard 19th century Italy not as part-coret 
part-periphery but rather as part of the periphery of Europe. 
32. See for example Cottrell (1975 p. 39). "Taken together the 
Baring crisis, the Wall Street panic (of 1893), the end of the land 
boom in Australia and the collapse of the banking system in 1893 
were sufficient to shake confidence in all foreign securities and 
consequently overseas investment fell to a low ebb during the 1890s. " 
The main exception was that there was an upsurge in investment in 
gold mining in South Africa and Western Australia during the 1890s 
(Cottrell P. 40). 
33. See chapter 2 note 107, also Cairncross (1953) and Thomas 
(1973). 
34. See for example Cottrell (1975 p. 53). 
35. Cairncross (1953 p. 69). 
36. The most detailed recent account of the Great Depression in 
agriculture is Perry (1973); see also Orwin and Whetham (1964 pp. 
240-288), Perry (1975 ed), especially Fletcher (1961/1975), and 
Hall (1973a pp. 679-695). Agricultural depression was most intense 
in the arable east, with East Anglia, including Essex, being 
particularly severely affected, but was relatively moderate in the 
pastoral west. In addition, farms close to large urban markets 
were better placed than more distant farms, while farms on poor soil 
tended to fare worse than farms on less marginal soil (Perry 1973 
p. 21). 
Perry (1973) concentrates his attention on long-term trends 
in the agricultural economy, and notes in particular the growing 
competition, intensified by advances in transport technology, from 
the white periphery. He repeatedly discounts the importance of a 
run of poor seasons, a factor much noted by contemporaries, as a 
cause of agricultural depression. From the point of view of cyclical 
analysis this argument is flawed; a long-term downward trend 
does not cause a depression, but rather helps determine how strong 
the depression will be. A series of bad harvests would be quite 
sufficient to trigger off an agricultural depression, but the 
intensity of depression is likely to be set by longer term factors. 
There can be little doubt that the Summers of the mid and late 1870s 
were unusually cool, with 1879 being an exceptionally bad year (see 
Manley 1974 p. 396). Furthermore the post-1873 years were industrially 
depressed, possibly both reinforcing and being reinforced by the 
agricultural depression. 
It would seem therefore that there was a considerable 
agricultural depression in the 1870s triggered off by poor harvests. 
In a relatively closed economy agricultural prices would tend to 
rise during a poor season; the. main immediate significance of 
increased foreign competition in this respect is that is prevented 
the normal rise in prices (as noted by Perry 1973 p. 59), thus 
ensuring that the burden of the poor harvest fell on the producer 
rather than the consumer. 
Certainly there appeared to be a very deep agricultural 
depression in the late 1870s. It would however take a detailed 
cyclical analysis to determine to what extent the changes taking 
place thereafter were due specifically to depression and to what 
extent they were due to longer term structural changes working 
themselves out. 
Perry argues that financially the landowners and farmers were 
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worst affected by these agricultural changes, and that. the 
labourer was relatively lightly affected, with wages remaining high. 
There were, however, considerable reductions in employment, though 
Perry contends that migration to higher paid urban jobs offset this 
problem fairly efficiently. Perry (p. 130) argues that "the evidence 
suggests that the depression never generated more than ephemeral 
or localised rural unemployment excepi among some classes of casual 
workers. " No quantitative evidence is supplied however, and one is 
left wondering whether this ephemeral, localised and casual 
unemployment averaged 2%, 5%, 10%, or more. Taken out of context 
. gn 
5% unemployment in a rural area might appear as 'insft ificant -a 
few "unemployables", slack times in the winter, etc. - but in 
terms of broader labour market structure a 5%+-. rural unemployment 
is still unemployment, and it is unlikely that full employment 
existed in rural areas, particularly in the South, in the 1870s, 
1880s or 1890s. 
37. Calculated by summing "Northern industrial" and "Northern 
non-industrial". 
38. Some preliminary comments, based on the final reports of the 
RoyaZ Commission on the Depression of Trade and Industry may be 
made. Some splicing of majority and minority reports is involved 
in the following. Various of the minority reports suggested that 
the majority report had understated the degree of depression. 
The general outline was that producing interests, in both 
agriculture and industry, were suffering severely from a prolonged 
regime of low prices, which led to a significant reduction in 
profits for both * 
farmer and manufacturer. Labour was affected not 
so much through a fall in wages, but rather through increased 
irregularity of employment. In the meantime "the classes who enjoy 
fixed incomes, or incomes derived from foreign investments, or 
from property not connected with productive industries, appear to 
have little ground for complaint; on the contrary, they profit by 
the remarkable cheapness of "commodities" (Dunraven, Ecroyd, Muntz 
and Lubbock, para 33). 
Within the productive industries, agriculture was showing a 
severe decline in production, employment and income, even though 
the very bad seasons of the late 1870s were by this time in the past. 
Increased foreign competition, particularly from America, was of 
course highly significant in this respect (see also note 36). Sir 
James Caird (evidence, para 7778) suggested a form of ratchet effect 
in which the poor European harvests of the 1870s stimulated an 
acceleration of production, enabled by the spread of the railway, 
in America, and that when harvests improved America retained her 
grip on the European market, keeping European producers depressed. 
It should not be forgotten, though, that even in the 1880s falling 
prices caused distress in the more marginal areas-of American 
agricultural production, particularly in the drier West (evidencel 
para 7777). Within the British'Isles, the problems faced by the 
arable East of England are well known (note 36 and references 
therein), but the situation in Ireland was, not surprisingly, 
probably even worse (O'Connor, para 8a). 
The industrial situation was unclear as, in contrast with 
agriculture, output was still increasing for any but selected short 
time periods. This increasing output enabled the majority report 
to suggest that the depression was not as severe as has been stated 
in many quarters. Profits were low, but this was nothing unusualt 
merely "the fall in the rate of profit which it is the natural 
tendency of the accumulation of capital to effect" (majority report, 
para 93). Concern was expressed, however, about increased foreign 
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competition, particularly from Germany. The normal grumbles about 
protectionism werý- expressed (majority report, p)aras. 66,67,74), 
mixed with an uneasy awareness that competitors were becoming 
genuinely more efficient, with a more acute awareness of the needs 
of local markets (para 75), and a superior system of technical and 
commercial education, combined with knowledge of foreign languages 
(para 97). The suggestion was. made, but rejected, that British 
diplomatic staff should play a commercial role, collating intelligence 
and making contacts (paras 98-100): "Such action must, we think, 
tend to lower the reputation of the country and to diminish the 
usefulness of the officer concerned. " (para 99). The majority report 
indicates some of the tensions involved in a free market view at 
a time when various foreign states were taking a more direct stance, 
encouraging industrialisation so as to be able to compete with 
Britain. "ProtectionisDP was held as a cause of the long depression 
(paras 66,67), yet no evidence is offered to suggest that a more 
interventionist industrial policy was doing anything other than 
making Germany's industry more efficient; if through the invisible 
hand the advantage of one is the advantage of all, it is difficult 
to see why German development should cause British depression. 
In terms of maintaining employment in Britain, the industrial 
problem was not that output was declining, but rather that checks 
were operating such that industrial output increased by less than 
the Harrod natural rate (measured in terms of productivity growth 
plus natural demographic growth), so that the share of industrial 
employment amongst the total population was declining. This 
happened, it must be remembered, at a time when agricultural 
employment was falling particularly sharply. Thus industry could 
not at this stage effectively absorb surplus rural labour, or the 
rapid demographic increase in the labour force, and was prone 
itself to potentially severe lapses in employment during cyclical 
downturns. Dunraven, Ecroyd, Muntz and Lubbock (paras 54-57) make 
essentially this point, and note also the problems of foreign 
protectionism, but note that this protectionism was more the result 
of the difficulties of increasing production than the cause of the 
difficulties. 
Dunraven et al touch on what, it seems in retrospect, is a 
critical aspect of the contrast between "open" and "protected" 
economies: "An important effect ... is to discourage and 
lessen 
the investment of capital in the development of our own agriculture 
and manufactures, and to stimulate and increase its investment in 
foreign land and securities, and foreign industrial enterprizes ... 
This directly operates to limit the employment of labour in our 
country. " (Dunraven et al, para 59). Yet "the healthy and 
continuous growth of our industries, not only in productivenessf 
but in power to afford full and well reminerated employment to the 
population, is therefore the question of supreme importance; for 
upon that must ultimately depend ... the prosperity and social well being of every class of the community" (Dunraven et al, para 57). 
As far as details of industrial change are concerned, 
undoubtedly there is much to be learned from the close sifting of 
evidence to the Royal Commission, to be supplemented by . -6thers independent sources. Further investigation also needs to be made of 
the extent to which agricultural depression induced industrial 
recession. There was, however, a general consensus of opinion among 
chambers of commerce, manufacturers' associations and trades unions 
that conditions were becoming progressively worse from the early 
1870s onwards, although not surprisingly there were exceptions. A 
survey of unemployment at the end of 1885 in trades union local 
branches showed that high unemployment rates among engineering 
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workers, iron moulders, shipbuilders, etc., were to be found in the 
specialised industrial areas, with low rates elsewhere, but that 
unemployment in the building industry, which might be expected to 
attract considerable numbers of rural migrants, was high everywhere 
with no immediately obvious North-South distinctions. 
In so many respects the 1880s was, in both downswing and 
upswing, a pivotal decade in the evolution of the modern world 
economy, and thus deserves very close attention in both national 
and international aspects. During the long depression to 1886, 
Britilsh (and Irish) agriculture was in very severe decline, with 
foreign competition particularly vigorous, while industry was 
gradually falling behind in competitiveness as other countries 
started to generate their own industrial revolutions. British 
capital's solution, in a free trade economy, was to invest heavily in 
competitor economies, particularly in the new agricultural economies 
of the "white periphery". There is at least a possibility, given 
the timing of the major waves of British foreign investment, that 
such investment was to a large extent a direct result of Britain's 
emerging problems in productive industries. In the long term, heavy 
exports of capital probably exacerbated this problem. 
39. Cottrell (1975 pp. 38-40); Flamant and Singer-KSrel (1970 
pp. 38-42). 
4o. See for example Coppock (1973 pp. 661-673) and Hall (1973a 
pp. 736-746). Pelling's (1967) study of the electoral geography of 
the period throws some interesting light on the sub-regional social 
geography of the time. 
41. Weber (1909/1929). 
It is now fashio * nable 
to regard Weber as hopelessly old- 
fashioned; Gregory (1981) has noted however that such critiques 
are generally made from the ahistorical perspective of (neo-classical) 
location theory, and neglect the intellectual framework in which 
Weber set his own theory. Weber is thus seen among location 
theorists as an imperfect neo-classicist rather than a German 
historical economist. 
Maybe the present author too regards Weber through 
inappropriate paradigmatic spectacles, yet it seems that Weber's 
work provides, far more than any other early writer, the nucleus 
of an economic explanation of the growth of the industrial city in 
the 19th century, and of why such growth was concentrated in large 
industrial towns, rather than spatially dispersed. 
42. The basic point is that in an industry in declinep or one of 
restricted growth, existing plant generally provides sufficient, 
or near-sufficient, capacity to meet demand, requiring little new 
factory building. 
43. Cairncross (1953 p. 76). 
44. Calculated from Feinstein (1972 pp. T4-T5), "net property 
income from abroad. " Clearly for figures to be of that magnitude, 
or even the lower magnitude suggested by Platt (1986), more than 
simply interest payments are involved; rents and profits also enter 
the picture. 
Attention needs to be drawn, though, to a recent work by 
Platt (1986) which suggests that the level of British investment 
abroad before 1914 had consistently been overstated by earlier 
writers. Feinstein's figures, largely based on an earlier work by 
Imlah (1958), use a balance of payments approach to estimate net 
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investment abroad. This is theoretically a soundly based approach, 
although it says little about the actual location of foreign 
investment; the problem is, though, that the data sources available 
are simply not of a high enough quality to make a reliable estimate 
on total foreign investment (Platt 1986 pp. 19-21). Platt's main 
attention, though, focuses on the "direct" method of calculating 
investment, derived essentially from Paish (1909), in which foreign 
investment is calculated by summing securities bought and sold on 
the Stock Exchange. The basic weakness, as Platt (1986 pp. 31-40) 
emphasises, is that foreign purchases of overseas securities on 
the London Stock Exchange have been included in the sum of British 
foreign investment; London, however, was an important enough 
financial centre to act as an outlet for savings at the European 
scale. This has implications both for the stock of investment (Platt 
suggests that a 1913 figure of E2.6 billion is more appropriate than 
the EM billion usually quoted) and for the flow of investment; Platt 
(pp. 79-85) argues that the very high figures for British foreign 
investment just before the First World War are probably exaggerated. 
Maybe therefore the figure in the text is exaggerated, but 
it would have had to have been exaggerated to an extent far beyond 
the degree suggested by Platt to disprove the basic contention that 
a powerful rentier economy was developing in Southern England prior 
to 1914. 
45. See especially Hunt (1973). The higher wage rates in the 
North apply within occupations, and do not relate simply to differences 
in the sectoral employment structure. 
46. See for example Thompson (1963). Rubinstein (1981). 
47. The general principle is stated by Sayers (1967 p. 87) when he 
notes that "to own land under which coal was worked was one of the 
quickest ways of getting rich in the 19th century. " To own land on 
which city centre, urban development was taking place would of course 
be an even quicker method. 
Since the text was written, the author has come to place even 
greater stress on the importance of urban landed wealth; see note 9 
above. 
48. Mantoux (1928/1961 pp. 105-112). See also Marriner (1982 
especially pp. 30-69). A complex trading economy was in place on 
Merseyside before the ascent of the cotton industry. 
49. Flinn (1966 pp. 1-18) traces the shift of perception on the 
Industrial Revolution, noting the "dramatic interpretation" of the 
turn of the century, and the modification and weakening of this 
dramatic interpretation through the 20th century. Ironically a 
Frenchman (Mantoux 1928; published in French in 1906) was well in 
advance of British writers in his assessment of the British Industrial 
Revolution (Flinn 1968 p. 4). See also chapter 1, note 34. It 
perhaps ought to be noted in passing that the "dramatic interpretation" 
represented a hardening of the concepts presented in Toynbee (1884), 
rather than a mere continuation. 
The mid-century view of early modern industrialisation in 
Britain has tended to concentrate more on the antecedents of the 
Industrial Revolution, and in particular the speeding up of 
demographic growth and output growth in the middle decades of the 18th 
century, with further acceleration, combined with structural change, 
during the final quarter of the century. Various strands of economic 
growth, various "revolutions", may be noted in the run-up to the 
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"Industrial Revolution"; Deane (1979), following Deane and Cole 
(1962), notes a "demographic revolution", an "agricultural 
revolution". a "commercial revolution" and a "transport revolution"; 
Flinn (1966) adopts a broadly similar outline. 
More recent analysis by Crafts (1983,1985) has tended to 
undermine even further the concept of a separate Industrial Revolution. 
Crafts follows closely the analysis of Deane and Cole (1962) and 
Deane (1979), and generally concurs with the notion of a mid-18th 
century acceleration of economic growth, but argues that growth was 
still, during the late 18th century, slow by later standardst and 
that industrial output growth did not reach 3% per annum until about 
the 1820s (Crafts 1983 p. 194). The problem of assessing industrial 
output growth results not just from the obvious difficulty of 
incomplete data, but also by a severe version of the index number 
problem (see also chapter 2.5(i)). If an industrial growth rate is 
calculated on 1770 weights, a growth of 1.60% per annum between 1780 
and 1790 is given; if however 1801 weights are used, a growth rate of 
3.68% per annum is indicated (Crafts 1983 p. 183; 1985 p. 26). Crafts 
uses compromise estimates of 2.40% per annum between 1780 and 1790, 
1.83% between 1790 and 1801,2.72% between 1801 and 1811,2.63% 
between 1811 and 1821 and 3.65% between 1821 and 1831. This rate of 
industrial growth is still quick, by earlier standards, but by 
Crafts's implication less than "revolutionary". 
For gross national product, Crafts (1985 p. 45) notes growth 
rates of 0.69% per annum, in the period 1700-60, and 0.70% in 1760-80, 
closely corresponding with Deane and Cole's estimates. After 1780, 
the two series diverge considerably, with Crafts giving 1.32% for 
1780-1801 and 1.97% for 1801-31, compared with 2.06% and 3.06% 
according to Deane and Cole. For purposes of long cycle theory 
it would have been interesting to have had estimates by Crafts for 
the 1830s; the sources used in Table 2.1 indicate a growth rate of 
1.30% per annum, between 1831 and 1843, a deceleration on either 
count. 
Quite clearly the question of economic growth during the late 
18th century and the early 19th century is not yet fully resolved; 
Crafts has made an important contribution, though, removing some 
accidental upward bias in earlier estimates of late 18th century 
growth. The theoretical background to this chapter and chapter 2 
were developed before Crafts's estimates became available, raising 
the question of what revisions need to be made to the text in the 
light of the new estimates. As far as long cycle theory is concerned, 
it would still appear to be perfectly feasible to detect a long 
cycle upswing starting in the mid-1770s and continuing to the mid- 
1820s or thereabouts, given that Crafts still shows a significant 
acceleration of growth at the start of the period; the amplitude of 
the long cycle is however reduced, when compared with the Deane and 
Cole estimates. As far as the present chapter is concerned, the 
new material actually makes it easier to sustain the case that 
industrial development was not the all-important totally dominant 
facet of early 19th century economic life that is implicit in the 
idea of a sharply delineated "Industrial Revolution". 
5o. As presented in volume 1 of CapitaZ. Of course once wealth 
finds its way into the hands of the industrial capitalist it does 
not remain idle. A substantial proportion is reinvested, or 
reconverted into capital, in order to generate more surplus value. 
Thus over a period of time the extraction of surplus value becomes 
the accumulation of capital. 
Marx had his attention focused on mid-19th century England 
and on the question of the development of industriaZ society; 
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accordingly domestic industrial production and capitalist accumulation 
were seen as very closely linked. Even for the early 19th century 
it is open to question as to whether the industrial capitalist was 
economically as domihant a figure as Marx implied, but in the late 
19th century the increasing complexity of the international economy 
made clear the need to broaden the theoretical picture of capital 
accumulation. The new industrialism in Europe, heavily backed by 
financial institutions, and imperialism and capital exports each 
posed new theoretical problems which were taken up by a later 
generation of Marxist theorists, notably Hilferding (1910/1981) and 
Luxemburg (1913/1951). The question is not so much that of how 
industrial capital accumulates, but rather than of how capital 
accumulates in all its various forms and how industrialism fits into 
the picture. 
51. To some extent the implication in this model of a clean split 
between manufacture and merchandising is a convenient 
oversimplification; after all, if the large profits are to be made 
in buying and selling to the outside market rather than in producing, 
there is an obvious incentive for the cotton manufacturer to 
diversify. Certainly such a process was operative in the late 18th 
and early 19th centuries (Chapman 1984 pp. 5-9), but the Napoleonic 
Wars introduced multiple hazards into international trade, leading 
to the ruin of many of the older merchants and the withdrawal of 
manufacturers from overseas marketing; from the 1820s onwards, the 
specialised merchant, backed up by financial support from London, 
was the norm (Chapman 1984 pp. 9-15). Later in the 19th century 
merchanting tended to give way to "pure" finance (Chapman 1984 
pp. 126-149), in part as a result of the uncertainties of the trade 
cycle and foreign war, notably the American Civil War. 
From the perspective of the cotton industry, the generally 
small scale of the individual enterprise in the earlier years meant 
that vertically integrated firms were exceptional, and indeed 
specialisation rather than vertical integration was the main direction 
of organisational change (Chapman 1972, especially pp. 43-52). 
52. Thus it is assumed that while there is some tendency for rates 
of profit to equalise in various sectors, equalisation in a dynamic 
economy is never complete. A dynamic economy is One in which 
technological development, structural change and uncertainty have 
important roles; the "friction of distance" resulting from 
geographical separation is also an important factor, not so much in 
terms of transport costs, but rather in terms of uncertainty (about 
the state of distant markets, about the supply of raw materials, etc. ) 
and unequal access to information. Generally a merchant is in a 
much better position to play the market than a manufacturer. 
53. For example the Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Depression of Trade and Industry (Great Britain 1886), Williams 
(1896), Shadwell (1905) (though, alas, one has to note with irony the 
claim in the preface to the first edition that "the growing pressure 
of international competition in industry ... is evidently going to 
be the warfare of the future"). Questions of free trade and 
protectionism, "fair" and "unfair" trade, were hotly discussed in 
the media of the time; see also Tomlinson (1981 pp. 47-61). 
54. The partition of Africa was one of the most conspicuous 
political features of the 1880s, with the European powers, most 
notably Britain and France3, taking almost complete territorial power 
over Africa (see for example Munro 1976 pp. 64-85, Wickins 1986 
pp. 1-101). While much of the motivation for partition was directly 
or indirectly economicp Africa was ultimately of less importance to 
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Europe than the temperate lands of the white periphery. Wickens 
(1986 p. 101) notes that there was relatively little productive 
investment in the colonies, and even this limited investment was 
vulnerable to cyclical downswings; much of the colonial budget was 
swallowed in administration and policing. 
Clearly there was a major power vacuum in Africa and Asia in 
the late 19th century which the European powers were ready and 
willing to fill. In the short term this may have helped defuse 
internal European political tensions, but in the long term 
inter-imperialist tensions probably made European politics far more 
volatile; it is at least arguable (e. g. Hobsbawm 1987 pp. 302-327) that 
imperialist conflicts of interest served as a significant causal 
factor behind the outbreak of the Great War. Clearly there is no 
monocausal explanation of the outbreak of war in 1914; this is a 
large part of the reason why the run-up to 1914 is such a perpetual 
source of fascination for historians. The "long peace" from the 
early 1870s appears to have been based on a delicate balance of 
diplomacy and shifting patterns of alliances among the major 
European nations, such that no nation could gain by instigating war. 
If all the major European powers were strong enough not to crumble 
at the first sign of aggression, and strong enough to be a credible 
alliance partner, then the balance of power could be maintained. Yet 
this balance of power started to break down in the early 20th 
century. The Ottoman Empire particularly, and also the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire, showed signs of weakness leaving the possibility 
of a power vacuum. Abroad, inter-imperialist frictions in areas of 
relatively weak political control could not so easily be defused by 
balance of power diplomacy. Meanwhile, in Europe the wish by 
Germany to assert itself was becoming very disruptive. Germany was 
industrially strong but her political power did not match her 
economic power; the German colonial empire for example was relatively 
small. In part this derived from the lateness of the unification 
of Germany, and in part it derived from a deliberate underplaying 
of-political demands by Bismarck in order to maintain balance. In 
the early 20th century, though, various imperialist jealousies 
showed through, and Germany started a major armaments drive. 
The increasingly fragile balance of European and imperial power 
shattered'in 1914. A terrorist attack triggered off the march to 
war, but naturally deeper causes have to be sought for the underlying 
origin of war. It certainly makes a neat theoretical package, 
especially from a Marxian point of view, to produce the "inevitable" 
historical sequence industrialisation -o imperialism -* war 4 
revolution, yet one should always be healthily sceptical about a 
straightforward stages-of-change model. Concrete historical analysis 
is required to sort out causal links, yet concrete analysis is not 
so much the way to conclude the debate, rather the way to perpetuate 
the debate as observers from different theoretical backgrounds will 
have different presuppositions about what is concrete and relevant. 
In a thesis of the current scope it is impossible to ignore the 
question of the First World War altogether, yet it would be foolhardy 
to pretend that the scope is broad enough to sort out the origins of 
this war. What can be said with relatively little fear of 
contradiction was that there was a major European scramble for 
colonial territory in the 1880s, that this developing imperialism 
created various conflicts of interest among the European powersq 
that the imperial grip tightened after the 1880s, and that the First 
World War broke. out when European imperialism appeared to have been 
approaching its natural limits (although this last clause is open to 
debate). Quite what inference can be drawn from this juxtaposition 
is far from clear. 
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55. See Marx (1859/1971). 
The base/superstructure question has been argued about so 
often, and frequently at a tangent, that it is useful to reconsider 
what Marx actually wrote (or at least its translation into English). 
"My inquiry led me to the conclusion that neither legal 
relations nor political forms could be comprehended whether by 
themselves or on the basis of a so-called general development 
of the human mind, but that on the contrary they originate in 
the material conditions of life, the totality of which ... 
(is embraced) ... within the term "civil society"; that the 
anatomy of this civil society, however, has to be sought in 
political economy. " 
"In the social production of their existence, men inevitably 
enter into definite relations, which are independent of their 
will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given 
stage in the development of their material forces of production. 
The totality of these relations of production constitutes 
the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on 
which there arises a legal and political superstructure and 
to which-correspond definite forms of social consciousness. 
The mode of production of material life conditions the general 
process of social, political and intellectual life. " 
In many ways serious social science begins here. 
Marx finds unsatisfactory the idealist interpretations, 6f 
law and politics in which the structures of law and politics emerge 
naturally from the human mind. Weither, though, can politics be 
discussed simply as politics, derived from politics, and independent 
of society; the same can be said of law. So how are politics and 
law rooted in human society? The answer is that they reflect the 
material conditions of life. There is an important asymmetry; it 
is possible to have material conditions for life without law or 
politics, but it is not possible to have law or politics without 
the material conditions for life. Thus material conditions are 
fundamental. The material conditions for human life imply however 
particular forms of organisation of human society; human society 
inevitably has some form of economic organisation, whether implicit 
or explicit, which pervades the whole social structure. The starting 
point, though not necessarily the finishing point, of any satisfactory 
analysis of human society has to be sought in political economy (a 
category which may be extended to cover economic anthropology). 
The present author is in strong agreement with this basic 
argument, as is hoped is clear throughout this thesis. Thus mass 
unemploymentý although it can be interpreted in "social" terms, can 
only be explained in economic terms. Two problems with modern social 
science may readily be diagnosed; firstly the sociologisation of 
Marx in which researchers no longer pay much attention to questions of 
economic theory, but instead reduce their analysis of the material 
base of society to elaborations on Marx's own verbal formulations, 
and secondly the retreat in economics from any discussion of social 
structure. 
The base/superstructure distinction is important, and 
indicates that material structure underlies social structure (or at 
the very least sets limits to what social structures are possible). 
Problems occur, however, when the concept is over-extended, and 
events (as opposed to structures) are dogmatically reduced to economic 
causes, or when particular conjunctions of economic conditions are 
held to completely determine future events. To suggest however that 
19th century British imperial culture was the reflection of imperial 
economic interests (as argued in the text), and not merely a form of 
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rural nostalgia, does not overstretch the base/superstructure 
notion. 
56. Wiener (1981 pp. 55-58). 
57. See Rubinstein (1981 pp. 193-226). Rubinstein emphasises 
(pp. 213-222) that there was relatively little large-scale purchase 
of land by non-landed wealth-holders, contrary to received opinion; 
thus the distinction between landed wealth and non-landed wealth 
was preserved. While there were obviously possibilities for landowners 
to diversify their economic interests, Rubinstein (p. 219) suggests 
that there is probably no case of a major nineteenth century landlord 
receiving more than half his income from non-landed sources; given 
the extensiveness uf landed wealth, though, even a minority source 
of income could be very substantial. Cannadine (1977) notes that it 
was far from infrequent for landowners, their creditworthiness 
secured by the capital value of land, to borrow money to invest in 
major non-agricultural projects. 
58. The capital value of land is itself calculated by multiplying 
annual income from the land by a suitable multiplier (Rubinstein 
1981 p. 193). 
59. See Rubinstein (pp. 68-69). 
Such an argument might appear slightly hazy, but is probably 
tenable if one notes that the "traditional" food, drink and tobacco 
industry draws its raw materials from British agriculture and from 
well established trading partners abroad, and sells primarily on 
the home market. Furthermore, while new technological conditions, 
and particularly improvements in transport, might well considerably 
assist such industries, it is not so obvious that these were 
"revolutionised" by the Industrial Revolution and by new energy 
technology in the production process. 
Quite obviously the internal markets for food, drink and 
tobacco were already substantial before the 19th century, giving the 
possibility for substantial wealth accumulation, while rising 
population and rising real incomes accentuated the process in the 
19th century. 
6o. Rubinstein (p. 68). 
61. Rubinstein (1981 pp. 82-86); see also Rubinstein (1977 p. 612). 
62. Rubinstein (1981 p. 107). 
63. Checkland (1964 p. 116). 
64. Checkland (1964 p. 120). Chapman (1972 p. 29) notes that even 
during the period of the French Wars, the structure of the cotton 
industry was highly polarised, "characterised by a few giants and 
many small men dependent on the credit of merchants or merchant- 
manufacturers. " As time went on, the small men tended to be competed 
out of business if they were unable to expand, while factories were 
operated on a larger scale, and the "giants" increased in size. 
65. Matthews (1954 pp. 127-151) provides a detailed study of the 
economics of change in the cotton industry from the mid-1820s to 
the early 1840s. 
66. Checkland (1964 p. 121). 
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67. Checkland (1964 pp. 121-122). 
68. Rubinstein (1981 p. 61). 
69. Rubinstein (p. 106). 
7o. Rubinstein (1977; 1981 pp. 105,108-110). 
71. Fugures from Rubinstein (1981 p. 105). 
72. Definition of social class is always more difficult "on the 
ground" than in an economic model of income distribution, especially 
when there is a high degree of social mobility; see for example 
Hobsbawm (1987 pp. 165-191). Marx's notion of an ever widening gulf 
between large capitalist and proletarian, with the destruction of 
intermediate classes, is not borne out by events. Firstly the 
increased size and complexity of organisations under capitalism 
created the need for various intermediate technical and managerial 
functions. Secondly the expansion of the economy created new niches 
for small scale enterprise, in professional and other fields. Thus 
was created a substantial new middle class. Boundaries are imprecise, 
but one can perhaps distinguish between an upper middle class of 
major capitalists, a new "middle middle class" on the ascendant 
and an old lower middle class (Hobsbawm p. 171) based on independent 
artisans, small shopkeepers, etc. The likelihood would appear to be 
that the new middle class, which at its upper end merges into the 
upper middle class, was concentrated in and around London. 
73. Rubinstein (1977 p. 619; 1981 p. 110). 
74. The population of Greater London was 1,117,000 in 1801, and 
7,256,000 in 1911 (Mitchell and Deane 1962 p. 19, based on 1951 
Census; figures given, as nearly as possible, for the 20th century 
area of the conurbation). 
75. It is of course a convenient simplification to assume that 
workers do not save, but Pasinetti (1962/1974) points out that little 
is changed macroeconomically if workers' savings are brought back 
into the picture. Workers' savings affect the distribution of 
income, but do not affect the rate of profit, or even the total level 
of savings, according to Pasinetti. Neither does it affect the 
basic point that the capitalist class reproduces itself through 
saving and investment. 
76. Smith (1776/1976 p. 330). 
77. Marx (1861-63/1968 part 1, pp. 152-300). Marx draws heavily 
on Smith, but notes an ambiguous duality in Smith's approach, given 
the use both of the "physical" definition of productive and 
unproductive labour (see text) and the view of productive labour as 
that which is exchanged for capital rather than revenue. Marx takes 
the latter approach; only if money is paid out of capital to labour 
with the aim of generating further capital is labour said to be 
"productive". The criterion here is how the worker is paid, not 
how the consumer decides to spend his money. To modify slightly 
(Marx p. 160), if an independent workman is paid by a consumer to 
build a piano, that is unproductive labour as capital does not 
accumulate as a result, while if a firm employs someone to build a 
piano for purchase by the same consumer this counts as productive 
labour as the firm pays the worker out of capital with the hope of 
accumulating capital. Even this definition raises problems; should 
a self-employed piano maker be regarded as a precapitalist, 
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a capitalist or a worker, or something of each? If for example the 
piano maker saves some of his revenue and reinvests it, then he 
acts, at least partially, as a capitalist. 
Marx, when he says productive, means productive for capitaZ. 
This is not of course the same as socially productive. For example, 
1980s style privatisation of publicly owned utilities is a measure 
which almost certainly has no economic benefit, and is very unlikely 
to make such utilities run more efficiently, but brings these 
industries into the arena of capital and makes them productive for 
capitaZ. It is only from a highly limited perspective that such a 
switch of ownership could be regarded as making the economy more 
"productive"; Marx sees numerous ironies inherent in the capitalist 
definition of productiveness, but Mrs. Thatcher fails to see the 
point. 
The author's own implict definitions rest on the question of 
what elements of capitalist expenditure may be regarded as socially 
productive. Capitalist expenditure may be subdivided into savings/ 
investment, taxes and consumption. The saving/investment nexus is 
to be regarded as productive under any count; money is expended in 
order to make further monetary gains. Without trying to enter into 
value judgements on the usefulness of particular public sector 
services, money extracted as taxes may be regarded as socially 
productive. Cases have to be decided on their merits; there are 
insufficient grounds for either blanket condemnation or blanket 
support for the whole range of publicly funded economic activity. The 
critical question, where unproductive labour is concerned, is that 
of capitalist consumption. It seems appropriate to argue that all 
working class consumption may be regarded as productive consumption, 
in that it relates to the level of income required to reproduce 
the labour force at a socially accepted standard of living. Part 
of the consumption of capitalists may also be regarded as productive. 
Where unproductive consumption enters the picture is where there is 
a level of expenditure clearly beyond the reach of the average 
citizen, in short, Zuxury expenditure. Luxury expenditure is 
regarded here as unproductive, irrespective of whether money passes 
through a firm or is paid direct to the worker, whether an employee 
of the capitalist or self-employed. Obviously employment is created 
through this expenditure, but there is a strong case for arguing 
that this employment is socially unproductive. Luxury expenditure 
does not help reproduce the economy, but merely drains off some of 
the surplus. Such expenditure is doubly unproductive in that even in 
terms of the utilitarian calculusq and leaving aside special pleading 
concerning the allegedly more refined tastes of the wealthyv a more 
optimal result would be obtained if there were some mechanism to 
transfer income spent on luxuries to workers and unemployed people 
and let them spend the money. 
78. The sentence in the text refers to Marx's view, rather than to 
the present author's view (note 77 above). What Marx implies is 
here taken as explicit and central to the question of unproductive 
labour. 
79. It was wondered whether, on reflection, the comment made in 
the text is an exaggeration, based on too hasty a reading of Marx's 
discussion (in Theories of SurpZus VaZue, volume 1) of productive 
and unproductive labour. There is no doubt, however, that Marx made 
some extremely derogatory remarks about the middle class professions 
and also, as Luxemburg (1913/1951 pp. 134-135) points out, that Marx 
wished to eliminate from analysis all "third persons" who were neither 
capitalists nor wage labourers. Thus both from a polemical point of 
view and an analytical point of view the bulk of the professional 
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classes are treated as-unproductive labour, paid out of týe revenue 
of those who buy their services. The polemic is sharpened if priest 
and. professor are grouped '-together with, and thus regarded as no 
better than, soldier and prostitute. Such a linkage is never made 
fully explicit in Theories of SurpZus VaZue, but Luxemburg (1913/1951 
p. 135) cites an example of this connection being made unambiguously 
in volume 2 of CapitaZ. 
80. See for example various discussions of the service sector in 
chapters 6.9 and 8.3(ii). The classic case of passive (unproductive) 
service sector labour in the 19th century was the domestic servant. 
A large number of domestic servants in a locality indicates firstly 
that wealth was being accumulated in order to pay domestic servants, 
and secondly that there was a persistent labour surplus in the 
economy. 
81. See for example the RoyaZ Commission on the Depression of 
Trade and Industry (Great Britain 1885,1886), Booth's Life and 
Labour in London., the RoyaZ Commission on the Poor Laws (Great 
Britain 1909), Drage (1894), Beveridge (1909). For more recent 
discussions of the questions of pre-1914 unemployment, poverty and 
policy, see Gilbert (1966), Harris (1972), Hay (1975), Treble (1979); 
these works contain more comprehensive bibliographies of the 
contemporary material. Attention tended to concentrate, particularly 
in the early 20th century, on industry and the rapidly expanding 
urban labour market, rather than on agriculture and the static 
rural labour market, although it would appear that "the poor" made 
up a higher proportion of the population in rural areas than in 
urban areas (e. g. Great Britain 1909 vol I pp. 52-56). While 
pauperism rates may have been over twice as high in Norfolk and 
Dorset as in Lancashire or the West Riding, it is difficult to 
determine the extent to which this represents an undermining of the 
local economy through unemployment, or an increase in the rural 
dependency ratio as a result of migration of people of working age. 
Clearly both processes were operative. 
82. See chapters 4.4(ii), 5.49 7.2. The strongest currents of 
net migration are from areas of low wages, low growth and high 
unemployment to areas of high wages, high growth and low unemployment. 
Urban areas before 1914 undoubtedly had higher wages than rural 
areas (e. g. Hunt 1973), and higher rates of economic growth; it is 
also likely, but not conclusively proven, that given the intensity of 
19th century rural-urban migration, unemployment was chronically 
higher in rural areas than in urban areas, but it cannot be totally 
discounted that these migration flows were sufficient to eliminate 
unemployment differentials. 
83. Between 1948 and 1966 employment in the UK increased by 16.4%, 
or 0.8% per annum. (Table A4; Historical Abstract pp. 242-243). This 
represented a major sustained boom with full employment and only 
weak recessions. Between 1881 and 1911 the population of Great 
Britain grew by 1.1% per annum. Thus the rate of growth of 
employment sufficient to maintain full employment after 1945 would 
have failed to maintain stable levels of unemployment at the turn of 
the century. 
It is possible that in the post-war boom investment would have 
been expanded to cover even a rate of population growth at 19th 
century levels; thus shortage of labour would have been a constraining 
factor. There seems to be little reason to believe the converse$ 
though, that 19th century demographic growth created an investment 
long boom of post-1945 intensity; on the contrary the indicators are 
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that Britain's population boom was outstripping the growth of 
productive capacity, and that if the post-1886 boom was constrained 
anywhere by labour shortages it was in the white periphery, and not 
in Britain which was a source of migrant labour. 
If population growth outstrips the capacity of the economy 
to provide primary employment (in dual labour market terms), then 
the implication is that the secondary labour market would have had 
to expand to fill the vacuum in the labour market. Almost certainly 
the rate of growth in the number of people in employment in fact 
matched the rate of growth of population, but much of this employment 
was at the margins of the economy, with problems of casualisation, 
low pay and irregularity of employment being critical. The amount 
of work probably increased rather less quickly than the number of 
workers. Furthermore, irregularity of employment is itself a source 
of concealed unemployment which has to be taken into account in 
estimating the severity of pre-1914 unemployment. 
It is perhaps only with very long hindsight, including 
knowledge of the structures of the mid-20th century long boom, that 
it can be appreciated that demographic growth was placing a 
considerable strain on the labour market in the late 19th and early 
20th centuries. As the degree of urbanisation increased, so "in 
popular political economy fear of 'over-production' tended to replace 
fear of overpopulation" (Harris 1972 p. 7), and urban problems came 
to be more intensely studied than. the problems of the rural 
backwaters. Overpopulation is an obvious threat in rural areas$ 
but when production is divorced from the land, problems of unemployment 
tended to be seen more in terms of problems of industry and 
disorganisation of the labour market, rather than in terms of 
demographic stress. The demographic factor did not so much cause 
unemployment but rather made unemployment very difficult to 
eradicate. 
84. Jones (1971 p. v). 
85. Booth (1902-1904). The dates refer to the second edition. 
The works of the first edition, based on research started in the 
1880s, were published at intervals in the previous 20 years. 
86. Drage's (1894) survey of day-to-day employment levels in 
the London docks in the 1891-92 winter help to indicate the scale 
of the problem; see note 96 below. 
See also Treble (1979) for an attempt to outline causes of 
irregularity of employment, unemployment and poverty on a broader 
spatial scale; many contemporary references are cited. 
87. The term "inner industrial perimeter", as used by Jones (1971 
pp. 152-156) seems more precise, if less concise, than the more 
commonly used "inner city", which tends to obscure the important 
distinction between the central business district and the surrounding 
zone. See also chapter 6 notes 60 and 102. 
88. Jones (1971 p. 150). It should not be forgotten, though, that 
despite the problems of the inner industrial perimeter, London's 
industrial suburbs along the Lea and the Thames were developing 
rapidly. Also, in an intra-regional context, London's industrial 
development was more rapid than that of the rest of Southern England 
(note 7 above). In an inter-regional context, however, the major 
expansion of the inner industrial areas of the Northern cities, and 
the relative lack of expansion in inner industrial London makes a 
significant contrast; both types of inner city area were prone to 
1. ndustrial recession, however. 
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89. For example, in June 19329 Greater London had an insured 
unemployment rate of 12.5%, with rates of 14.6% in Essex, 9.0% in 
Hertfordshire, 11.1% in Middlesex and 13.7% in Kent, even though 
each of these counties had substantlal increases in employment 
during the slump, except for London where employment was merely 
stable (Beck 1951, Tables 18,19). While these figures have to be 
reduced by perhaps a quarter to show the overall unemployment rate, 
as opposed to the insured unemployment rate (Chapter 3.5 above), 
significant concentrations of unemployment are indicated. It would 
be remarkable indeed if London did not also have significant 
concentrations of unemployment during the slump of the mid-1880s. 
90. Perhaps more accurately, background unemployment exacerbated 
by recession. 
The background to the Liberal reforms and to the start of 
Unemployment Insurance is complex, the resultant of several forces; 
see for example Gilbert (1966 pp. 233-288), Brown (1971). Harris 
(1972), Hay (1975). It must not be forgotten, however, that 
unemployment in urban areas was an exceptionally serious problem in 
the second half of the 1900s, probably even more severe than during 
the 1880s slump'(Table A9), as a result of the paradoxical situation 
in which the international long cycle upswing tended to divert capital 
away from Britain, rather than to build up the domestic production 
economy. 
Attention tended to focus rather earlier on London, and 
particularly on the East End, rather than on the industrial regions 
(see for example Gilbert 1966 pp. 237-242). Unemployment in London 
was undoubtedly serious, and the structure of the London labour market 
in many ways set the paradigm of the labour market which was the 
basis for official action. In part this was because of the highly 
fragmented structure of the London labour market which indicated 
the need for state involvement; in the industrial areas greater 
possibilities of self-help, through the medium of trade union 
unemployment insurance schemes, existed. 
91. See Jones (1971 p. 21), Booth (1903, Industry, vol 1, p. 294). 
92. Booth (1903,, Industry., vol 1, pp. 289-305) provides some 
interesting insights on this question, noting (pp. 294-295) that a 
relatively small proportion of London's engineering employment was 
in "general contract work", which may be regarded as cyclically 
vulnerable. Engineering in London was orientated either to repair 
work or to highly specialised forms of production which were often 
only slightly affected by recession. The London engineering industry 
thus escaped many of the problems faced by counterparts in the 
industrial towns and cities, where an industrial downturn would 
sharply reduce demand for capital equipment. Another point to note 
is that London, with its large consumer markets and relatively small 
industrial base, probably provided far better bpportunities for 
skilled mechanics to take temporary repair jobs (Booth p. 304) than 
in the industrial towns where more engineers would be chasing fewer 
jobs. 
93. Jones (1971 pp. 34-35). 
94. Jones (1971 pp. 19-23), Hall (1962). 
95. Jones (pp. 33-51). 
96. This 
irregularity 
component of 
factor was much empbasised 
of demand in the docks was 
urban unemployment by for 
by contemporaries, and the 
noted as a substantial 
example the RoyaZ Comission 
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on the Poor Laws (Great Britain. 1909 Vol 1 pp. 450-459) and Beveridge 
(1910 p. 95). 
Estimating levels of unemployment in the docks is hampered 
by lack of information. Drage (1894 pp. 121-138) attempts to show 
fluctuation in the level of employment in the London docks in the 
early 1890s. On a daily basis, between October 1891 and March 
1892, employment in the London and St. Katherine's Docks reached a 
maximum of 4,000 in early February and a minimum of 1,500 in mid- 
October. For perhaps a quarter of the time employment was below 
half its peak level, implying unemployment of over 2,000 on those 
particular days. On a broader study covering all the London docks, 
"the number of men regularly competing for employment, exclusive of 
those who drift in occasionally from other trades, is estimated at 
20,000. "Good work" appears to be available for 16,000" (Drage 
1894 p. 132). An unemployment rate of 20-30% is thus implied. In 
London-wide terms this might appear relatively slight, about 1% of 
the total London labour force, yet the high levels of unemployment 
in the dock industry clearly imply a lack of full employment elsewhere 
in the London economy, otherwise the dockland surplus labour would 
disperse. 
97. Mayhew's London Labour and the London Poor was first 
published in 1851, following a series of articles in the Abrning 
ChronicZe. Selections from the newspaper articles are presented in 
Thompson and Yeo (1971); various abridged editions of London Labour 
have been published. Mayhew paid great attention to the "London 
street-folk", dividing them into street-sellers, street-buyers 
(purchasers of old clothes, broken metal, rags, waste paper, etce)p 
street-finders (e. g. those "who collect the refuse pieces of smoked 
cigars from the gutters, and having dried them, sell them as tobacco 
to the very poor"), street-performers, street-artisans, and street- 
labourers (cleansers, street advertisers, etc. ). This wide range of 
occupations reflects in part the slowness of the development of 
shops in 19th century cities (see, for example papers in Johnson 
and Pooley 1982), but also a chronic surplus of labour, swollen as 
Mayhew notes by destitute migrants from Ireland. 
98. Such a labour market, in which any increase in the size of 
the labour force tends to depress incomes towards subsistence level, 
could be termed, perhaps slightly mischievously, "Ricardian" 
(Ricardo 1817/1951 pp. 97-105). It is not, however, changes in the 
birth rate which push wages toward their subsistence levels, but 
rather migration into a fragmented local labour market. 
99. Several passages from Booth's Life and Labour in London indicate 
a modified form of this perception. Llewellyn Smith, in his chapters 
on migration (Smith 1904 pp. 58-164) starts by mentioning the 
popular belief that rural migrants, seeking work in the great city 
and finding none, swelled the ranks of the unemployed, then notes 
that often the situation would appear to a London workman as one in 
which the immigrant displaced the native, who then "went to the 
wall". Smith himself saw the problem partly in terms of the structure 
of urban and rural labour markets, and the relationship between 
population and demand in each type of locality, although his analysis 
was at times clouded with various notions of social Darwinian 
competition between town and country labour. Jones (1971 pp. 127-144) 
quite properly criticises the social Darwinian streak in Smith's 
article, but in concentrating his attention primarily on the inner 
industrial perimeter largely neglects the question of the wider-scale 
spatial structure of labour markets raised by Smith. 
100. See especially Jones (1971 pp. 152-155). 
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101. Census of England and Wales 1981, PreZiminary Report for Towns. 
102. Lee (1979), based on the 1891 Census. 
103. Jones (1971 p. 154); Booth (1902, Poverty vol. 4, p. 340). 
Jones simplifies the quotation to "that Trades leave, people stay. " 
1N. Jones (1971 p. 154). 
105. All figures based on the 1891 Census of England and Wales. 
lo6. Ashworth (1964) discusses the process of suburbanisation of 
south-west Essex, effectively the area from the Lea to the Thames, 
and notes three main phases. Firstly there was an industrial phase 
in which "industry and trade on the spot accounted for most of the 
rise in West Ham's population from 12,738 in 1841 to 204,903 in 
189111 (Ashworth p. 65). Secondly, and overlapping with the later 
stages of the first phase, was the growth of residential districts 
(Ilford, Leyton, etc. ) which housed workers in the metropolis and 
the industrial suburbs. Both processes were active at the time 
being discussed in the text. Only thirdly did suburbanisation of 
the inter-war type take off, when residential London spread outwards 
in all directions, with the uptake of mass commuting. The conmuting 
suburbs of north-west London were relatively undeveloped at this 
time (Coppock 1973 pp. 667-669). Suburbia was growing (Hall 1973a 
pp. 736-746), but not concentrically. 
107. The West Ham Urban Sanitary District, a considerably smaller 
unit than the West Ham Registration District, was the only unit in 
the new Essex suburbs for which the relevant data are available for 
both Census dates. 
lo8. Smith (1904 p. 135). 
109. Jones (1971 pp. 81-83) indicates some of the forces keeping 
casual labour geographically immobile. Institutionalised bribery 
of foremen, especially in public houses, was comm n, while 
employment was more likely to be gained on the day if the casual 
worker both knew and was on good terms with the foreman, rather than 
if the casual worker was a stranger. Even skilled labourers were 
relatively immobile before the cheapening and extension of public 
transportin the 1880s (Hobsbawm 1964 p. 7); the situation was still 
worse for the casual worker as even cheap transport is a major 
expense if no job is to be found at the end of the journey. 
110. Jones (1971 pp. 67-98) provides a more detailed discussion, 
differentiating between a juvenile casual labour market and an 
adult casual labour market. 
ill. Hunt (1973 pp. 62-64). 
112. Hunt (1973 p. 62). 
113. Ravenstein (1885 p. 113). 
114. Ravenstein (1885 P. 183). 
115. These figures are taken from Booth (1902, Poverty, vol 20 
Appendix p. 60). In this appendix, Booth tabulated data on a street- 
by-street basis, and then aggregated his results. Such an 
enterprise naturally required a large research team, even though much 
of the statistical information was based on official sources. 
- 292 - 
116. Garraty (1978 p. 113); Stedman Jones argues in similar terms. 
117. Notably Booth, in Life and Labour, Drage (1894). 
118. For example, the Minority Report to the Poor Law Commission 
(Great Britain 1909) reports (pp. 570-571) that "There are no 
statistics available which enable us to computeg even within 
hundreds of thousands, how many persons are at any one time 
simultaneously in distress from Unemployment" and that any estimate 
of the severity of unemployment has to be collated from several 
sources, including trade unions, Distress Committees, and the case 
papers of the Board of Guardians. Even this gives only a general 
idea of the problem, though. Furthermore, short spells of 
unemployment, lasting perhaps a few days, would not show on most of 
the available statistics, leading to various problems of estimation. 
It is difficult to see, even in retrospect, ways in which levels of 
unemployment, and the geographical distribution of unemployment, 
could be calculated in the absence of a comprehensive unemployment 
insurance scheme. 
The urgent questions of poverty and unemployment up to and 
during the 1900s, and the weakness of the statistical base on which 
the dimensions of the problem could be comprehended, led to a 
considerable upsurge of interest in measuring poverty (see Hennock 
1987 for a review). One of the most important technical developments 
was the introduction by A. L. Bowley of the sample survey (Maunder 
1972, Darnell 1981) in contrast to the more heavy-handed methods of 
Booth (Life and Labour) and Rowntree (1901) covering London and York 
respectively. Bowley's method made it possible to produce 
inter-urban comparisons of poverty for the first time. Bowley and 
Burnett-Hurst (1915), in a much reproduced table (e. g. Hennock 1987 
p. 225) note that a high proportion (23%) of working class households 
fell below the poverty line in Reading, while very low proportions 
of such households fell below the poverty line in Bolton (8%) and 
the Durham mining town of Stanley (6%). Warrington (13%) and 
Northampton (9%) were intermediate. Unfortunately the present author 
has not been able to examine Bowley and Burnett-Hurst (1915)0 
although the contrast implicitly depicted between prosperous North 
and less prosperous South is clear. Hennock (1987 p. 225) cites 
Bowley as suggesting that insufficient wages for the labourer in 
employment represented the primary cause of poverty in four of the 
five towns studied; this, it should be remembered, was at a time 
in which family sizes were by current standards large. A critical 
re-examination of this work, and if necessary and possible, of the 
original data manuscripts, would undoubtedly help untangle some of 
the complex regional labour market structures of pre-1914 Britain. 
119. ! fhere is of course nothing wrong with changing one's mind 
abouta particular topic, and indeed this is often the only 
appropriate response to new information. When an identicaZ 
conclusion (there was no unemployment in London) is reached by two 
directly opposed and mutually incompatible chains of argumentp then 
one suspects that the author is searching for rhetorical devices to 
reach a pre-determined conclusion, rather than searching for 
evidence and using the evidence to reach a reasoned conclusion. 
120. A more sophisticated version of the labelling fallacy is to 
divide those on the unemployment register on a particular day between 
the "genuine" unemployed and those who are "not unemployed, merely 
changing jobs". Any increase in unemployment is then defined not 
in terms of falling demand for labour, but rather in terms of people 
spending more time changing jobs, being more choosy about selecting 
new jobs. 
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121. For example, Drage (1894), Beveridge (1909). 
Both the Majority and Minority Reports of the 1909 Royal 
Commission on the Poor Laws recognised, and indeed emphasised, 
this point, (Great Britain 1909, Majority Report vol 1 pp. 427-437, 
462-463; Minority Report pp. 588-605). 
Various differences of opinion existed as to how to deal with 
the problem of surplus labour and unemployment in the casual sector. 
The Minority Report, dominated by Mrs. Webb, argued strongly for a 
"social" solution to the problem with major state intervention in 
preventing the demoralisation of, and starting the retraining of, 
casual workers in distress. Beveridge also advocated intervention 
in the labour exchanges and a system of unemployment insurance to 
make the labour market function more efficiently. Behind this view 
was a belief that so long as the labour market was well organised, 
demand deficiency Clunderconsumption") would not be a problem (Harris 
1972 p. 120). There may have been differences of emphasis between 
Beveridge and the Webbs, and thus 'a certain hmount of incompatibility 
of priorities and policies, yet there was a fundamental agreement 
that the problem of unemployment was best dealt with by a restructuring 
of the labour force. 
The idea that unemployment, particularly among the casual 
fringes, could best be dispersed by means of social policy, was 
prominent in the debate of the 1900s. It was only much later that 
the macroeconomic conception of employment became dominant, such that 
economic policy held the key to unemployment. Keynes was central 
to this shift in perception, but the works of Hobson (1896/1911, 
1922) provided an important forerunner. Hobson (1896/1911) was 
critical of various "palliatives" of unemployment, such as proposals 
for establishing labour colonies or labour bureaux, which fail to 
address themselves to the problem of inadequate demand. 
122. See for example the discussion by Godfrey (1986 pp. 1-30), 
which draws heavily on Sen (1975). The critical point is that modern 
international definitions of unemployment usually decree that to be 
unemployed a person must be both out of work and seeking work. Yet 
as Godfrey (1986 p. 7) points out, "in the absence of a social security 
system most people cannot afford to be both not working and seeking 
work. Most of those who are seeking work have to find some way of 
keeping themselves alive which may place them outside of the ranks of 
the unemployed on the standard definition. " As a result of this 
problem of definition, ýhird world unemployment statistics tend to 
imply that rural areas have "virtually no unemployment problem at 
all" (Godfrey p. 5) despite the general consensus that such areas have 
a massive labour surplus. 
Similar problems may be noted for assessing British 
unemployment patterns before 1914, given the incompleteness- of 
unemployment insurance schemes, essentially confined to relatively 
limited groups of skilled industrial workers, and given also the 
similarity of labour market structure between pre-1914 Britain and 
contemporary less developed countries (Matthews 1968 pp. 564-568). 
Components of such a labour market structure include high rates of 
natural demographic growth in rural areas, heavy rural-urban 
migration, surplus labour in urban labour markets and the development 
of an urban casual fringe. There is no simple answer to the question 
of the evaluation of levels of unemployment in such circumstances$ 
Full account must be taken of the days in which casual or semi-casual 
workers fail to find employment, while there is a strong case for 
arguing that if someone who fails to gain mainstream employment is 
forced to undertake paid work of very low productivity then this 
should not be accounted for as "work" in evaluating the employment/ 
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unemployment balance (chapter 6 note 132). There is no clear line 
between unemployment and poverty due to low wages in the absence of 
a comprehensive unemployment insurance scheme. 
123. This section extends the discussion in chapter 6.9 and 
chapter 6 note 132. 
Compare also the classification of the various types of 
unemployment in the Minority Report to the RoyaZ Conmission on the 
Poor Laws (Great Britain 1909), pp. 570-634. Four main types of those 
in distress from unemployment are listed (p. 571). 
(I) "Those who have lately been in definite situations of 
presumed permanency; for instance, an engine-driver, 
cotton-spinner 
(II) "Those who normally, in their own trades shift from job 
to job, .... with more or less interval between jobs, but 
each lasting for weeks, and perhaps for months" 
(III) "Those who normally earn a bare subsistence by casual jobs, 
lasting only a few hours each, or a day or two. " 
(IV) "Those who have been ousted, or have wilfully withdrawn 
themselves from the ranks of the workers; for instance, 
the man broken down by some infirmity or by advancing 
age. 11 
Thus a definitely hierarchical structure of the labour market 
is indicated, with also the possibility of the worker sinking down 
the ranks of the hierarchy and eventually joining the "unemployables". 
The Minority Report is very clear in arguingg in contrast with 
Southall (1983,1988), that workers in all the above groups should 
be regarded as unemployed if out of work. Furthermore, the Minority 
Report argues that the bulk of unemployment comes under category 
(III). "At least half the task of the Distress Committees has been 
to relieve, not the Unemployed of our Class I, for whom the 
Unemployed Workmen Act was designed; nor yet the unemployed of our 
Class II, who need only be tided over an unusually prolonged interval 
between two engagements of some duration; but to supply the claimant 
wants of the Unemployed of our Class III - men whose chronic 
condition is one of partial destitution tempered by odd jobs .... 
We have discovered, on quite irrefragable testimonyl that it is from 
the same class that is directly drawn at least two-thirds of all the 
pauperism, other than that of old-age, sickness, widowhood and 
orphanage; and probably, if we include indirect results, at least as 
large a proportion also of those part of pauperism. " (Minority 
Report, pp. 596-597). 
The present author had not read the relevant sections of the 
Minority Report when the main text was prepared, yet the similarity 
of approach is clearly evident. Chronic unemployment is assumed in 
each case. This is in major contrast with the interpretations both 
of Southall (1983,1986,1988) and also of Harris (1972) who assumes 
full employment outside cyclical depressions (p. 150), and also that 
the Poor Laws had long since ceased to relieve unemployment (pp. 148- 
150). The Poor Laws were not framed with the purpose of dealing with 
unemployment, yet there were undoubtedly several ways, both direct 
and indirect (e. g. relief for dependents), in which the Poor Laws in 
effect provided unemployment relief. 
124. The Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834 introduced the principle 
of "less eligibility" in which outdoor payments to the able-bodied 
were abolished, leaving indoor relief (maintenance inside the 
workhouse) as the only option of. relief. Regimentation inside the 
workhouse was designed so as to be unattractive to the able-bodied. 
The effect was that the able-bodied unemployed would tend to apply 
for relief only when they had reached the point of destitution 
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(Rose 1972 p. 8), with the strong implication that pauperism rates 
for the able-bodied would considerably understate the true 
unemployment rate. It is noticeable, though, that during times of 
depression between 1848 and 1859 Lancashire had about half the 
national total of able-bodied male paupers (Dessauer 1940), although 
various problems of interpretation remain; it is likely that the 
number of male adult paupers in Lancashire was greatly swollen by 
Irish immigration. The total number of able-bodied male paupers in 
England and Wales fluctuated from 1,000 in July 1853 to 18,000 in 
July 1848. 
The principle of less eligibility remained, although towards 
the end of the 19th century and in the early 20th century, "English 
welfare services were developed largely as a result of attempts to 
remove various classes of the poor from dependence on poor relief" 
(Rose 1972 p. 41). Thus a new institutional framework developed to 
deal with problems of pauperism, poverty in a wider sense, and 
unemployment. 
125. Thus, even in the early trade union insurance scheme, 
applicants for unemployment benefit had to sign on every day to 
show that they were not working, had to be actively searching for 
work, and had to be willing to apply for, or accept, any job offered 
(Boyer 1988 p. 323). One way of looking at the situation is to 
suggest that the job search process for insured unemployed union 
members was subsidised, while job search for others was unsubsidised. 
It would be naive to assume that the labour market behaviour for 
both sets of workers would be identical; the latter group would have 
far more need to search around for any low paid temporary job that 
was on offer, with brief spells of employment alternating with brief 
spells of unemployment. One can legitimately call this 
"underemployment", provided one does not assume that it involves 
no unemployment. 
In current circumstances, with a centrally funded unemployment 
benefits scheme, it seems strangely anachronistic that those 
receiving unemployment benefit should be debarred from aZI 
financially gainful economic activity. The only people who are not 
allowed to take on small "odd jobs" are those who most need to be 
able to do so. It seems unnecessarily petty that an unemployed 
person should not have the chance to work, say, eight hours a week, 
and would indeed be open to accusations of criminal fraud if he or 
she did so. When senior Conservative politicians rhetorically ask 
that if 3,000,000 unemployed people really want work, why is it so 
difficult to find someone to paint the front gate, there is a failure 
to recognise that the problem lies not with the unemployed but with 
the benefits system; it would be "fraud" to paint the front gate! 
Maybe some reform in this area would be a step forward. 
126. MacKinnon (1986 pp. 209-302) notes a more general tendency 
for studies of labour market conditions to concentrate on the 
experiences of relatively well paid workers to the neglect of the 
"virtually invisible" submerged tenth. 
127. Quotations are from pp. 80-81,126,187,210,213,226-227 
of Orwin and Whetham 1964. 
128. On regional patterns of agricultural wages see especially 
Hunt (1973). See note 36 above for discussion of the Great 
Agricultural Depression, plus sources. 
129. Southall (1983) evades this pointq making merely the obvious 
comment that pauperism rates measure poverty and not unemployment. 
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Yet in his argument that 
pauperism statistics should be dismissed out of hand there are the 
implications firstly that pauperism rates are negatively correlated 
or uncorrelated with trade union unemployment rates (otherwise 
Southall would quite properly have quoted pauperism rates in support 
of his argument), and secondly, given that therels a negative 
correlation, that patterns of poverty are inverseZy related with 
patterns of 6employment. Southall gives no theoretical justification 
for his implicit belief, and certainly no counter-argument to the 
proposition that poverty is often largely the result of lack of 
employment or irregularity of employment (see also Treble 1979 p. 53 
and note 123 above). 
13o. As noted also by Crouch (1982b). 
Southall (1983) attacks the brief comments on the pre-1914 
period by the present author in the above paper, without understanding 
the basic points being made. Unfortunately I was unaware of 
Southall's paper until a long time after publication, which precluded 
any possibility of replying in the same journal. It is perhaps 
appropriate to clarify my position-as of 1982, which in most important 
respects is virtually identical to the position currently being 
argued, the main difference being that the relative importance placed 
on rural labour markets has increased in the intervening years. 
What Southall (1983) refers to as a "serious mistake" was in reality 
a refusal to fall into the same trap that Southall failed to avoid. 
Existing theory, up to 1981, suggested that there had been a 
simple reversal of regional patterns of unemployment across either 
side of the First World War. This seemed unlikely, given the events 
of 1918-22, discussed in the main text. It seemed that while 
generally unemployment rates prior to 1914 were higher in the South 
than in the North, during recession unemployment would have increased 
faster in the North than in the South. In the absence of any 
comprehensive unemployment rates, pauperism figures were used, as a 
second-best alternative, to make the basic point. 
The situation was complicated by Gillespie and Owen (1982b) 
citing Brown (1972 p. 120) as noting that trade union unemployment 
rates were higher in the South than in the North. Suspiciously, 
Brown made no reference to detailed sources; it seemed at the time 
that Brown. had confused trade union unemployment figures with 
Unemployment Insurance figures, and that Gillespie and Owen had 
followed the well-worn academic habit of regarding someone else's 
mistake as authoritative. It seemed in fact very unlikely that trade 
union figures would have shown higher unemployment in the South than 
in the North, precisely because of the cyclical component of 
unemployment. That Southall (1983) could produce a map of trade 
union unemployment at a cyclical trough showing trade union 
unemployment as concentrated in the North is a refutation of 
assertions by Gillespie and Owen, but far from being a refutation 
of Crouch, was merely the expected result. 
The point is, however, that trade union statistics do not, 
and could never, provide an accurate or representative indication 
of totaZ unemployment, as all non-industrial forms of unemployment$ 
particularly important before 19149 are excluded. In writing a 
reply to Gillespie and Owen, a dilemma was created. It seemed that 
Brown (1972) was wrong in his assertion about trade union - 
unemploymentv but to state without backing evidence that Brown was 
wrong, and that trade union figures would probably show high 
unemployment rates in the industrial areas, but that these figures 
should be disregarded when determining total unemployment ratest 
would represent a very complicated chain of argument for a brief 
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paper. Obviously, before trade union rates had actually been 
published (in Southall 1986), there was no way in which this claim 
could be empirically backed, while the chain of argument on which 
such a claim could be made would require several pages. It seemed 
simplest to note that unemployment probably increased faster in the 
North than in the South during recessions, and merely to imply that 
there is no way, given the irretrievable lack of information, that 
reliable unemployment rates could be calculated for any but the 
briefest period before the First World War. Southall missed the 
point and tried to promote the interpretation that Crouch was unaware 
of the existence of trade union unemployment rates. Such an 
interpretation is absurd since Gillespie and Owen (1982a) had already 
introduced trade union unemployment rates into the debate. Maybe 
Southall would have done better to have asked himself what sort of 
assumptions about. the labour market it would have been necessary to 
make, without having access to (at that time) unpublished trade 
union unemployment statistics, in order to make the claim that 
unemployment increased faster in the North than in the South during 
recessions. 
131. It would be an inaccurate caricature to suggest that 
pre-Keynesian economists, however "orthodox", assumed that 
unemployment was impossible in a free market economy. Rather, the 
prevailing theory of unemployment, as expressed in for example the 
earlier works of Pigou (1913,1933), was based on a stitching 
together of abstract equilibrium theory, which suggested that the 
free market economy naturally tended towards full employment, and a 
large number of empirical studies of the business cycle, which 
demonstrated that high unemployment often came into being during 
recessions. The hybrid theory which developed was that unemployment 
was caused by "structural change" during recessions, but that once 
unemployment had come into being the mismatch between labour supply 
and labour demand would again match, recreating the full employment 
equilibrium. on this viewpoint, unemployment should not persist, 
and if it does it is because wages are too high. Such a form of 
explanation of mass unemployment, which argues that unemployment is 
caused both by job loss and by wages being too high, has recently 
been resurrected by Casson (1983). 
The basic point of disagreement between Keynes (1936) and 
the "classics", and indeed the most important point of controversy 
in labour market economics, is that Keynes argued that even once the 
recession was out of the way (and much of the analysis in the 
GeneraZ Theory implicitly assumes the pre-existence of mass 
unemployment), the equilibrium to which the economy returns was one 
of Zess than full employment. The level of employment is set not by 
workers but by capitalists, and capitalists base their employment 
decisions not primarily on the level of real wages, but rather on 
expectations of the level of demand. If effective demand is too low, 
then the result will be unemployment rather than low wages. In the 
Keynesian system, furthermore, there is nothing to guarantee that 
the level of effective demand at the peak of the business cycle will 
be sufficient to create full employment. In the Pigovian view, in 
contrast, the state of effective demand is irrelevant to the question 
of unemployment, while the rate of change in the level of demand is 
temporarily important; such temporary effects soon disperse, though, 
according to the basic assumption. 
Quite clearly there is agreement between Keynes and Pigou (and 
for that matter between Crouch and Southall) that industrial recession 
can create large-scale unemployment* Where Keynes (and Crouch) 
differ with Pigou (and Southall) is in arguing that unemployment is 
not confined to "depression" unemployment, plus a small amount of 
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frictional unemployment associated with obstructions to real wage 
flexibility, but rather that mass unemployment can persist 
throughout the business cycle, and indeed through several business 
cycles. To gain an appropriate statistical picture of unemployment 
it is as necessary to examine the peak of the business cycle as 
well as the trough. For the pre-1914 period this naturally 
concentrates attention on rural areas and on the fringes of the urban 
labour market. 
It must of course be added that this debate is not simply 
Keynes v. Pigou, although these two economists gave clearest 
expression to the basic difference in theoretical outlook. Modern 
mainstream labour market theory makes much use of the concepts of 
the "natural" rate of unemployment (that supposedly consistent with 
stable prices) and the non-accelerating inflation rate of unemployment 
(NAIRU), but instead of admitting the implication that capitalism 
can equilibriate at less than full employment, redefines "full 
employment" such that it equals the natural rate or the NAIRU! 
132. See above note. It is unclear whether Southall has fully 
thought through the theoretical implications of the form of analysis 
he uses, but in that he concludes his 1988 paper with a citation from 
Pigou (1913), and in that there is nothing in his paper which cannot 
be fitted into a Pigovian framework, but plenty that is incompatible 
with a Keynesian framework, it does not seem unfair to regard 
Southall's implicit labour market assumptions as pre-Keynesian. 
133. For example, Southall (1988 p. 237) cites von Tunzelmann (1981 
pp. 247-248) as saying that "the familiar division between Inner and 
Outer Britain dated only from the First World War. .... The very 
abruptness of the turn-around ... coupled with its intensity, helps 
account for the length of the shadow cast over interwar Britain. " 
This however is not the full quotation; von Tunzelmann (p. 247) also 
notes that "to take only one extreme example, unemployment in the 
Welsh town of Merthyr was 1.4 per cent of its labour force in 1913, 
whilst even at the cyclical peak of 1937 it was as much as 41.6 per 
cent of the town. " 
The "mistake" here is not in the assumption of a-reversal of 
polarity, but rather in the dating of the reversal of polarity; the 
problems of Outer Britain surfaced not as a result of the First 
World War but rather as the result of industrial decline after the 
First World War. Undoubtedly the First World War itself would have 
led to considerable labour market changes; with about 750,000 UK 
servicemen killed it could hardly have been otherwise. There is no 
evidence, however, that the First World War led to a reversal of 
regional patterns of working class prosperity. 
134. Political and Economic Planning (1939 p. 199). 
135. See Buxton (1978 pp. 91-98), who notes that the tonnage of 
coal shipped abroad rose almost twenty-fold between 1855 and 19132, and 
that "the principal causal factor at work was industrialisation 
abroad" (p. 91). Mitchell (1984 pp. 10-39) notes the changing 
structure of demand through time for coal from individual coalfields. 
The main markets for British coal were in Europe, especially northern 
Europe, a point emphasised in Church (1986 pp. 34-35). 
136. For recent texts on European industrialisation at this stage 
see Milward and Saul (1977), Pollard (1981 pp. 219-277) and 
Trebilcock (1981). German industrialisation was the most spectacular, 
and caused the most concern in Britaint but as Pollard emphasises, 
there was significant industrialisation throughout much of Europe. 
The pattern tended to be not so much that a whole country 
- 299 - 
industrialised at a particular time, but rather that parts of the 
country industrialised, leaving behind a relatively undeveloped 
rural periphery in many cases. 
137. Figures taken from Mitchell (1975 pp. 360-370). 
I 
138. Thus Buxton (1978 p. 94), following ievons (1915), notes that 
at the end of the period steaur-coal could be carried more cheaply 
from Cardiff to Buenos Aires than from the United States coalfields, 
where some overland travel was involved, to Buenos Aires. 
Furthermore, technological changes in the shipping industry had 
more than halved shipping rates since the mid-19th century, 
considerably enhancing the possibilities for development in the 
export industry. 
139. The "Verdoorn effect", as noted by Kaldor (1966). 
140. The argument is thus based on capacity constraints leading 
to diminishing marginal returns (each additional worker after a 
certain point finds it more difficult to have access to the coal 
face, or must open up an inferior seam) rather than the more 
comm nly cited factor (e. g. Mitchell 1984 pp. 321-323) of increasing 
distance to the coal face in ageing pits, which does not explain 
the cYcZicaZ dynamic of productivity. of course, with investment 
and the sinking of new pits it is possible to increase effective 
capacity although not instantly. Long term trends in productivity$ 
as opposed to shorter term cyclical fluctuations, depend on the 
extent to which it is possible to create new capacity, and thus 
ultimately on the stage of the "life cycle" of a particular 
coalfield. 
Recent work by Church (1986 pp. 471-496,546-549) suggests 
that more refined calculations than used in the text, taking into 
account the effects of fluctuations in the length of the. working 
week, indicate a rather slower downturn in productivity than has 
been given in previous assessments. While therefore the magnitudes 
of change, as indicated in the text, are open to correction, the 
general direction of change would appear in most cases to have been 
correctly indicated. Data for output per man shift (Church p. 473) 
indicate however that increases in productivity in the 1879-83 
upswing were much less than suggested in Table 8.13, perhaps 8% 
rather than 14%. On any calculations productivity fell sharply in 
the late 1880s. The directions of cyclical shifts in productivity 
in individual years in post-1898 cycles appears to have been 
indicated correctly (compare Church p. 476), although output per man 
hour fluctuated, according to Churchq within the range of 0.130 
tons to 0.141 tons, again a smaller range than implied in the text. 
Regional figures for output per man hour (Church p. 476) indicate 
the standard picture of rising productivity in the East Midlands 
and generally falling productivity elsewhere, especially in 
Lancashire, the North East and South Wales. Productivity in 
Scotland remained relatively stable in the longer term, although 
productivity in Yorkshire is shown as being on a falling trend after 
1906, contrary to the impression given in the text. 
Clearly it would be possible to construct a revised version of 
Table 9.16 in order to take into account Church's calculations, It 
seems likely, though, that the basic conclusion would still remain 
that regional patterns of job loss in the coal industry after 1918 
closely match regional patterns of creation of "excess" employment 
before 1914. 
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141. Calculated from Mitchell and Deane (1962 p. 115). 5a 71d 
-. roughly corresporfdbp in "decimal currency, to 28p, while 6s 4d and 
7s 3d correspond to 311p and 36p respectively. 
142. Mitchell and Deane (1962 pp. 115-117) give figures for coal 
output from 1854 to 1945. For later years, see Mitchell (1975 
p. 368), covering the period to 1969, and the relevant issues of 
Annual Abstract of Statistics. 
143. The question has been debated of whether the low rate of 
investment in machine cutters before the First World War was 
"rational", a response to objective technical conditions of 
production, or a sign of "entrepreneurial failure", of management 
conservatism holding back technical advance. Figures for the 
diffusion of mechanical cutting equipment are readily available 
(Mitchell and Deane 1962 p. 123), and show that 1% of coal was cut 
by machine in 1900, rising to 5% by 1907,9% by 1914, and 20% by 
1925, rising rapidly as the inter-war profits crisis intensified the 
problem of reducing costs, and reaching 59% by 1938. 
Taylor (1968 p. 60) suggests that while under existing 
demand-led conditions of profitability the gains to be made through 
the wider diffusion of mechanical cutting equipment were relatively 
slight, the main significance of the slow uptake of mechanical cutting 
equipment was that it was symptomatic of a more general conservatism 
of management in the coal industry, which had potentially far- 
reaching effects. Mitchell (1984 p. 84) disputes this interpretation 
on neo-classical grounds arguing that "free entry" into the 
industry meant that a state of pure competition was approached, 
and that accordingly neither mass economic irrationality nor 
individual economic irrationality could survive. This line of 
argument seems highly questionable; the survival of sub-optimal 
producers was guaranteed, or at least strongly facilitated, by the 
high level of demand for coal, a factor which was notably absent 
when coal mines were closing in large numbers in the 1920s. 
Church (1986 pp. 344-364) emphasised the more practical 
question of the relatively limited set of conditions which at that 
time would have made mechanised cutting more efficient than 
traditional methods, with geological conditions often being 
unsuitable, with large mines being required to make the process 
economic, with electrical fires underground being a perceived 
danger, and with the machinery at that time simply not being as 
efficient as later generations of machinery. Much of the emphasis 
in technical development was concentrated not so much on winning 
coal at the face more efficiently, but rather on transporting coal 
to the pithead more efficiently, an increasing problem given the 
gradual extension of underground working. 
Whether or not it can be said that colliery owners were 
underinvesting in machinery, mechanisation was certainly not strong 
enough to maintain pre-existing productivity levels in the late 19th 
and early 20th century. 
144. All figures from Mitchell and Deane (1962 pp. 115-119). 
145. See for example Buxton (1978 p. 94). The fact that Welsh 
coal production was strongly tied to inter-continental trade and 
exports has the unusual implication that the Welsh economy prospered 
during the peripheraZ phases of the Kuznets cycle, rather than during 
the core phases. This contrast between the Welsh experience and 
the English and Scottish experiences is explored further by Thomas 
(1959,1973 pp. 290-295). 
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146. See for example Moore (1954 pp. 101-105). Moore emphasises 
--- -- --(p-105)-that-"tho-ddtAil-6-d--stru-ctu-res encountered in mining are 
fr; quently more complicated than a surface examination would 
indicate. " At the time Moore wrote, the question of the origin of 
high quality anthracite coal had not been fully resolved (Moore 
1954 p. 121); the present author is unaware of the current state of 
research. If however, as is plausible, anthracite developed as a 
result of pressure and heat on bituminous coal during the process 
of earth movement, then the high quality of coal in South Wales is 
to some extent expZained by the complexity of the local patterns of 
faulting and folding. 
147. Matthews (1968 p. 564). 
Also: "The rural labour surplus moved to the towns, and part 
of it became urban surplus labour. The urban surplus, especially 
in London, was in this way continuously replenished ... Unemployment 
was being-increasingly transferred away from agriculture, where it 
was not measured, to the towns, where it was measured to a greater 
extent. This has, of course, been characteristic of many countries 
in the process of development. " (Matthews 1968 p. 566). 
148. Matthews (1968 p. 565). 
149. See Lamb (1966 p. 1). 
150. The question of the effects of man's activities on the climate 
is here opened up. There has been much scientific discussion and 
media attention given recently to the question of the alleged 
"greenhouse effect", created by an accumulation of carbon dioxide in 
the atmosphere as a result of the large-scale burning of fossil fuel 
in the industrial era, combined with widespread burning of forestso 
and resulting in a hindrance to long-wave radiation sent out from 
the Earth, but not to short-wave radiation arriving from the Sun. 
The ultimate effect would be to cause the Earth's atmosphere to 
warm up, leading to widespread local shifts in climatic regime and, 
perhaps most seriously of all, endangering the polar ice caps in 
the long run, with the possibility of substantial rises in sea 
level. Other economic activities are also, how, capable of 
significantly altering the balance of the atmosphere. 
It would be presumptuous for the present author to sayl without 
research experience in the subject and without a closely relevant 
specialisation, whether or not the greenhouse effect is as serious 
as has often been suggested. Recent issues of any relevant journal 
(e. g. Mimatic Change) will carry various technical articles. For 
present purposes it is enough to note that it is possible to 
conceive of a level and direction of economic activity such that 
human activity is capable of causing major climatic shifts at a 
world scale. It can remain a matter of debate whether this 
threshold has already been reached or is being closely approached. 
What is considered very unlikely, however, is that climatic records 
before the 20th century show large-scale climatic fluctuations which 
are economically derived, although of course local effects may well 
have been important. 
Man's economic activity has always changed the physical 
environment; to clear woodland to create fields for cultivation is 
an example of such a change. The problem comes not when the 
environment is changed but rather when the environment is 
destabiZised. Such destabilisation tends to be manageable in 
temperate climates, but in more environmentally sensitive climates 
major deforestation can lead either to desertification or to major 
problems of increased runoff, rapid erosion and downstream flooding. 
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Environmental catastrophes of this type have become increasingly 
prominent during the 1980s. Changes in the atmosphere as a result of 
industrial activity have far more than a local or regional effect, 
but have potentially a world-wide effect; a climatically-led 
world-wide environmental catastrophe is possible. If this is the 
case then there is a pressing need for examination of the way 
economic change can lead to environmental disaster. It does not 
seem unlikely that in the 21st century and beyond, environmental 
crises will be central to any economic crises which may build up. 
151. A-phases and B-phases derived from Wallerstein (1979). 
"For a few centuries in the Middle Ages the climate in most 
parts of the world regained something approaching the warmth of 
the warmest postglacial times ... In most of Europe the warmest 
period seems to have been between 1150 and about 1300. " (Lamb 1977 
p. 435). The A-phase of economic expansion lasted from about 1100 to 
1300 according to Wallerstein. 
From then onwards the general tendency until the 18th century 
was towards deteriorating climate, a "Little Ice Age". Lamb (1977 
pp. 449-473) notes a significant deterioration of the climate up to 
about 1460, with conditions in the 1310s, the 1430s and 1450s being 
particularly severe; "the 1430s seem to have brought a possibly 
unparalleled run of severe winters, or winters which included severe 
spells, in most parts of Europe" (Lamb p. 457). The B-phase of 
stagnation is given by Wallerstein as lasting from about 1300 to 
about 1450; Lamb notes that this was also the main phase of village 
desertion in Europe. 
In the late 15th century, the climate stabilised and became 
less severe, with a definite return to a warmer climate following 
in the early 16th century (Lamb p. 461). This marked part of the 
economic A-phase. The climate deteriorated sharply in the second 
half of the century, however, marking the start of the second, more 
serious, phase of the "Little Ice Age". "It is reasonable to regard 
the time from about 1550 to 1700 as the main phase for most parts of 
the world and probable that the lowest values of 50-year, 100-year 
and 150-year mean surface air temperatures in most places fell 
within that time" (Lamb p. 463). The start of the 18th century showed 
a very noticeable amelioration of climate; the late 20th century is 
still in a warm phase. 
It should be remembered that the A- and B-phases of economic 
development, as given by Wallerstein (1979) are to some extent 
approximations, and that other researchers might. well want to modify 
boundary dates. It is still remarkable, though, that in a period of 
650 years the only periods in which climatic phases and economic 
phases appear not to correspond are 1550-1600 (economic A-phase; 
climatic B-phase) and 1700-1750 (economic B-phase; climatic A-phase). 
Laub himself argues strongly that climatic change had a major 
influence on the pace of economic life, and the presence or absence 
of economic crises, particularly in agriculture, during the period 
under consideration. 
152. It should be added that there is no question of 20th century 
long cycles being climatically driven. In Britain there was a gradual 
warming of mean temperatures from about 1900 to 1950, followed by a 
phase of falling mean temperatures into the late 1960s (based on 
Manley 1974), clearly not conforming with long cycle phases. In the 
eastern United States, the early 20th century amelioration is again 
clearly identifiable, but with average temperatures peaking at 
precisely the time of the slump (1930-33). A gradual cooling down 
into the late 1960s followed (Lamb 1977 pp. 578-579; the data source 
stops at 1968). The phasing of US climatic cycles is the complete 
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reverse of what would be expected if climatic cycles drove 20th 
century economic long cycles. 
153. There is an irony here in that the Slutzky-Yule effect 
(Slutzky 1937, Yule 1921, Lewis 1979, chapter 2 note 52) was 
originally analysed, in Slutzky's case, in order to-throw doubt on 
Kondratieff's concept of the economic long cycle. Kondratieff's 
data was presented primarily in the form of nine year moving 
averages (a practice followed also by Glismann, Rodemer and Wolter 
1984), but as Slutzky, Yule and various others have pointed out the 
use of rwving averages, even on random numbers, can produce a 
spurious impression of both long and short cycles. It is especially 
easy to imagine this happening if one deliberately introduces the 
occasional extreme value into a random number series. It should be 
emphasised yet again that the analysis of the long cycle in chapter 
2 depends on the precise evaluation of turning points, and in no 
sense relies on the interpretation of moving averages. 
The problem being faced in the text is that ten year moving 
averages of British temperatures appear to show a 50 year long cycle 
in conformity with the Kondratieff cycle (upswings matching upswings, 
and downswings matching downswings). To demonstrate that the 
Kondratieff long cycle is economic in origin it is necessary to show 
firstly that the apparent climatic long cycle in reality results 
from a Slutzky-Yule effect, and secondly that the commencements of 
runs of years with consistently worse than average or better than 
average weather do not precisely coincide with independently 
determined turning points in the economic long cycle. The critical 
test is the matching of turning points and extreme values, not the 
matching of cycles generated by moving averages* 
154. Krakatau was a particularly well reported volcanic eruptionj 
and one which had world-wide effect on air conditions, typically 
leaving the sky a bright red colour as a result of volcanic dust. 
Such phenomena were reported in detail in Symons (1888). although 
without any mention being made of a lowering of temperatures. 
Lamb (1970,1972), using the Krakatau eruption for calibration, 
constructs a Dust Veil Index in three separate ways: 
DVI 0 97 : Rd max. E max. t DVI 5ý. 5 .d max. E max. t DVI 4.4 q. E max. t 
Where Emax is the greatest proportion of the Earth at some timeo 
covered by the dust veil (1 for eruptions between 20 N 
and 20OS; 0.7 for eruptions between latitudes 20 and 350, 
0.5 for latitudes 35-42 0,0.3 for latitudes greater 
than 420). 
t is the time in months between the eruption and the last 
detectable temperature and radiation effects in middle 
latitudes. 
Rdmax is the greatest percentage depletion of the direct solar 
beam shown by monthly averages in middle latitudes. 
T dmax is the estimated lowering of average temperatures for 
the most affected following year in middle latitudes. 
q is the estimated volume of solid matter dispersed as 
dust in the atmosphere. 
More recent research (Bradley 1988 and references therein) has 
attempted to refine Lamb's analysis, attempting to assess the severity 
of eruption in more strictly volcanological terms and trying to 
avoid the potential circularity of argument in which the severity 
of eruption is measured in terms of the temperature drop, and the 
temperature drop is measured in terms of the severity of eruption. 
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Self, Rampino and Barbera (1981) in particular note that in 
volcanological terms the Coseguina eruption of 1835 was not nearly 
as severe as implied by Lamb, despite the large drop in 
temperature it created. Another point to note is that zonal effects 
on temperatures might well be substantial in cases of high latitude 
eruptions with relatively little world-wide effects; for example 
Icelandic eruptions might have a substantial effect on Scandinavian 
and British temperatures. 
Bradley (1988) attempts to examine more closely the timing 
of climatic responses to major volcanic eruptions, and notes 
firstly that the effect on temperature is at its strongest during 
the Summer and Autumn months, and secondly that low temperatures 
tend to recur in later Summers and Autumns, up to threL years after 
the eruption. In the case of Britain it would appear (using the 
data in Manley 1974) that the main drop in Summer and Autumn 
temperatures often occurs perhaps two years after the eruption. 
For example, after Krakatau (August 1883), 1884 was actually a warmer 
year than 1883, while there was a sharp drop in temperatures in 0 the Summer 
0 and 
Autumn of 1885 (average of 13 .8C. May to October 
1884; 12.1 C, May to October 1885). 
The correlation between major volcanic eruptions and years 
of anomalously cold Summer temperatures in Britain would seem to 
exist, but there is much detail that needs to be explored. 
155. Extracted from a much longer list in Lamb (1972 pp. 434-435). 
156. Lamb (1972 p. 434) estimates a total DVI for 1694-98 of 
perhaps 3000, even though the eruptions he cites total only half 
this amount. There is the problem that, particularly at this 
early stage when large parts of the world were unexplored, 
significant eruptions may have been missed. This is an acknowledged 
problem in volcanological research. 
157. The "bad years" starting in 1314, provide a clear example 
of how a poor harvest, followed by other poor harvests, can trigger 
a severe economic crisis. Contemporary Third World examples are 
numerous; the path to famine is often even more indirect in that 
hot areas, whether wet or dry, are far more vulnerable than temperate 
areas to severe ecological disruption which itself reduces 
agricultural productivity. 
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Fig 9.1 Net Emigration From the UK, 1855-1938 
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Kingdom ports and extra-European countries only; 
thus European migration is not included. 
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Fig 9.2 Measures of Price, Physical Productivity and Revenue 
Productivity in the British Coal Industry, 1880-1913 
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Fig 9.3 Average Temperatures in Central England, 1680 to 1960 
(from Manley 1964). 
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Fig 9.4 Longer Term Climatic Changes in the UK 
10 
t-i 
Z: 
Year 
Source: Manley (1966 p. 186) for temperature series (slightly 
simplified here). 
Economic phases according to Wallerstein (1979). 
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Fig 9.5 Annual Average Temperatures in Central England, 
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Chapter 10 Conclusions 
10.1 On the Methodology of Conclusions 
In many respects it is very difficult to write conclusions, to 
summarise what has been demonstrated in a piece of research work. More 
often than not, conclusions in existing works seem to refer not so much 
to what has been proven (proof is logically very difficult), but rather 
to the assumptions made once preliminary investigations have taken 
place. One starts on a research task with naive theoretical assumptions, 
then gradually builds up a series of preliminary investigations, 
overturning some of the older assumptions, but creating results which 
can be used to construct a more sophisticated set of theoretical 
assumptions. When this stage has been reached the research task is 
far from over; there is still the problem of "filling in the boxes", of 
applying these theoretical assumptions to detailed data, in part to test 
whether the basic theoretical approach is justified, and in part to build 
up a detailed understanding of the basic data being studied. Typically 
one moves from small-scale data at the "naive assumption" stage, to 
large-scale data of the "sophisticated assumption" stage, then back to 
small-scale data at the "filling in" stage. In the present work the shift 
was from data on factory closures and local month-by-month unemployment 
change, through to data on national income, unemployment, migration, etcep 
when the basic theoretical background was being constructed, and then back 
to detailed work on the Census of Employment, and on local and regional 
unemployment statistics. 
Very little '. 'naive" research, based on earliest assumptions, remains 
in the final dissertation, not because the early research has been 
abandoned but rather because it has been transformed. As one moved away 
from naive assumptions, questions of whether slumps themselves could be 
fitted into a broader framework became more important; if one could 
understand the phenomenon of slump itself, the task of examining the 
geography of slump-would be simplified to one of filling in empirical 
details. Furthermore, in that it soon became clear that a theory of 
slump was also a theory of the long cycle, the question of broad long-run 
changes in the regional economy came to be of increasing importance. A 
"naive" comparison of what was happening in 1980 with what was happening 
in 1930 and in the years thereafter soon came to have considerable 
theoretical ramifications. 
Chapter 2, outlining a theory of the long cycle, thus belongs 
essentially to a relatively early part of the research, and indeed was 
the core of the research work in years two and three (1981,1982). 
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Modifications have been made since then, but these have been relatively 
minor. Any conclusion written up to about 1984 would have concentrated 
on chapter 2, on the theory of slump which was being developed. Yet at 
the present -stage chapter 2 is best taken as background material for the 
more detailed work on the British regional system in other chapters. 
The British regional system has been analysed in terms of changes taking 
place through various long cyclical phases of slump, post-slump recovery, 
upswing, downswing (with recessions dominant) and slump again. Most of 
this analysis took place after 1984, using the earlier analysis of the long 
cycle to provide a framework in which to analyse recent changes in the 
British regional system. There is little to suggest that the basic long 
cycle theory outlined in chapter 2 should not stand, although naturally 
all results are open to modification. 
Less obviously perhaps, chapters 4 (on the inter-war years) and 9 
(on the pre-1914 years) belong largely to the same early stage of analysis. 
The basic point of chapter 2 however was to set slump in a longer-term 
context, but as of 1981 no post-slump context was available for the 1980s, 
so examination of any post-slump years had to concentrate on the 1930s. 
It was found that clear distinctions could be drawn between pre-slump 
years, slump, and post-slump years, and also that regional patterns of 
employment change were far more uneven, at the expense of the periphery, 
in the long cycle downswing (pre-slump and slump) than in the post-slump 
recovery. 
Work on chapter 9 was based on two main themes. Firstly, it is 
rather too narrow to base a theory of the long cycle solely on events from 
1914 to the early 1980s, and the attempt must therefore be made to study 
the structure of the long cycle before 1914. Secondly, the apparent 
"reversal of polarity" in 1921 posed a considerable problem. Labour 
market statistics (population, employmentv unemployment) unambiguously 
point to a South-facing economy from 1921 onwards, whereas up to 1921 a 
North-facing economy was evident, though with somewhat more ambiguity$ 
from the early 19th century onwards. There was the obvious implication 
that many of the "19th century" economic structures of the coalfield 
industrial regions were decaying in the 20th century, and that dominant 
patterns of new economic growth were bypassing the older industrial areas. 
This is certainly a basic theme, and has been much used in later detailed 
research, and yet there is still the problem of whether the coalfield 
regions were, in fact, economically dominant in the 19th century. If they 
were dominant, this creates two reversals of geographical polarity, as 
before the Industrial Revolution the South was economically dominant. It 
is just about possible to imagine one major reversal of polarity, but to 
conceive of two major reversals of polarity goes beyond what is 
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theoretically plausible. A more likely scenario, argued in chapter 9, 
is that the South maintained its underlying economic dominance even during 
the 19th century, but that this dominance was expressed more in terms of 
the wealth of the bourgeoisie than in terms of expansion of employment 
and industry. In effect the London economy was an extremely efficient 
accumulator of surplus value produced elsewhere; London was a "core 
economy", but was generating only a relatively small industrial working 
class. All this, at a time when the coalfields were industrialising 
very quickly, presents an extremely confused labour market picture, 
especially when given high rates of population growth, and consequent 
heavy rural unemployment and migration, and massive net emigration abroad 
as the "white periphery" (Australia, Argentina, Canada, the USA frontier, 
etc. ) was opened up. 
As far as study of 20th century patterns of regional employment 
change is concerned, the two main points to be noted from a study of the 
pre-1914 British economy are, firstly, that London was economically 
dominant even before the major rounds of job losses in industrial areas 
starting in the 1920s, and secondly that industrial economic structures 
were being built up very quickly in the periphery without a sufficiently 
diversified economy to make these structures viable in the long run. 
London's economic dominance was starting to become very clear in the 1880s, 
despite all the contemporary concerns about unemployment in London, and 
by the First World War a highly prosperous rentier economy, based to no 
small extent on foreign development projects, was Coming into being. At 
the same time, signs of slow industrial development were beginning to 
show in the coalfield regions, while the rapid expansion of employment 
in coal mining was based on falling productivity and rapidly rising 
prices, a set of circumstances liable to lead to an extremely severe fall 
in employment if coal prices should drop. Indeed the geography of 
unemployment between the wars was dominated by the incidence of job losses 
in coal mining. 
These were the main themes developed during the early years of 
research work, up to about 1983. At this stage relatively little 
detailed work had been undertaken on the geography of employment change 
during the slump, largely because results of the 1981 Census of 
Employment, the basic source material, were not yet available. The 
research in chapters 5 to 8 took place predominantly after 1983p but using 
themes and analyses developed earlier. Conclusions to the research work 
taken as a whole should concentrate mainly on these later chapters. 
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10.2 Changes in the British Regional System 
The starting point of the whole of the analysis in this thesis lay 
in the question of regional patterns of deindustrialisation in the 
British economy of the late 1970s. When work started in late 1979 much 
concern was being expressed about Britain's industrial decline (Bacon 
and Eltis 1976,1978; Singh 1977; Blackaby 1979; the Cambridge Economic 
PoLicy Review, etc. ) but the slump had not set in. Moreover, it was 
becoming clear from examining FinanciaZ Times press statements that 
within multi-plant firms major job losses and factory closures were more 
frequent in the coalfield regions than in Southern England. 
Soon after this research started, the pace of industrial job loss 
increased dramatically and unemployment increased in line. This connection 
was strong and immediate and needs emphasis as in the neo-classical labour 
market theories of the mid and late 1980s mass unemployment has been 
attributed to almost anything except mass industrial job loss, mostly 
reducing either to the argument that -it is the fault of the workers and 
"excessive" wages (e. g. Minford 1983) or to the circular argument that 
unemployment is high because the equilibrium rate of unemployment is 
high (e. g. Layard and Nickell 1987b). A detailed statement about the 
unfortunate state of current British labour market theory can be left 
for another work; suffice it to say that in 1980 the present writer had 
absolutely no reason to doubt that industrial job losses lay behind the 
massive and apparently uncontrollable increases in uTiemploymentg and that 
the links could be detected at a local level as well as the national level. 
Furthermore, it was established beyond reasonable doubt that industrial 
job losses and increases in unemployment were concentrated in Northern 
England, Wales, Scotland, Northern Ireland and the West Midlands, and 
were relatively slight in Southern England. This was seen as a major 
intensification of what was happening in the late 1970s. 
During the "naive" phase of research much attention was given to 
comparisons between the 1980s slump and the 1930s slump. In 1930 
unemployment had increased particularly quickly in Wales, North East 
England (also the industrial Cumbrian coast), the North West and Northern 
Ireland, moderately quickly (in the context of the time) in other industrial 
regions and relatively slowly in Southern England. In 1980 unemployment 
had increased particularly quickly in the West Midlands, Wales, North East 
England, the North West and Northern Ireland,. moderately quickly (in 
the context of the time) in other industrial regions and relatively slowly 
in Southern England. This is ar emarkable degree of similarity, even 
though the degree of divergence between more favoured regions and less 
favoured regions was much narrower in 1980 than in 1930. A basic research 
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question is opened up: why should there be such conspicuous similarities 
between the geographies of two slumps, 50 years apart? 
In attempting to answer this question, due recognition has to be 
given to the wide range of economic experiences of intervening years, 
to the long phase of full employment after 1945 and to the continuous 
operation of a regional policy designed to avoid a repeat of the problems 
of the 1920s and 1930s, as well as to the more specific experiences of 
long cycle downswing in the 1920s and early 1930s, and the late 1960s, 
1970s and early 1980s. At a preliminary level this question can be 
answered relatively straightforwardly, Table A6 shows that in certain 
years of major job loss up to 1932 regional differences in rates of 
employment change were extremely sharp. After the slump more even 
regional patterns of employment change ensued, with on average the South 
plus Midlands increasing their employment by a percentage point per annum 
more quickly than the North. There were of course year-to-year fluctuations 
in this "annual gap", but these were fluctuations around a clear meanp 
without any long term trend towards convergence or divergence. In the 
1960s this gap noticeably narrowed as a result of the strengthening of 
regional policy, and indeed there was a brief spell during the mid-1970s 
in which employment trends were more favourable in the periphery than in 
the core. In the late 1970s the older 1% per annum differential 
reasserted itself, while during the slump the annual gap became somewhat 
wider, averaging 2% per annum (compared with about 6% per annum, in the 
early 1930s). It is not difficult to interpret this in terms of a 
cumulative causation model with the core regions managing to maintain 
their prosperity even during the 1930s slump, to expand steadily and 
attract growth in modern industries during the upswing of the long cycle, 
and to maintain a relatively stable employment base during the long 
cycle downswing. In the periphery, in contrast, the 1920s and 1930s 
recessions destroyed a major part of the industrial base, leaving local 
demand depressed, yet still leaving enough of the older industries 
remaining to act as a potential source of job losses in later years. The 
combination of these factors meant that in the South and Midlands 
employment expanded steadily throughout the long cycle upswing while in 
the periphery "new" growth and job loss in older industries broadly 
cancelled each other out, leaving employment trends static, apart from a 
brief post-slump burst of employment increase in the mid-1930s (Tables 
A4, A5, A6). 
Thus the post-war boom cured the unemployment problems of the 
periphery, but it did so indirectly rather than directly. It was the high 
pressure of demand for labour in the fast-expanding South and Midlands 
which cured unemployment in the North, and not the growth of the North 
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itself. The basic post-war economic history of the North can be 
summarised very briefly: 
(1) 1945-1966 static employment, low unemployment 
(2) 1966-1983 falling employment, rising unemployment 
(3) 1983- ? static employment, high unemployment. 
Clearly this is a deeply unsatisfactory situation from a Northern 
point of view. This poor employment performance has persisted despite 
a long period of regional policy. In the long run, the major effect of 
regional policy has been not so much to create a transformation in the 
economic structure of the periphery but rather to ameliorate the effects 
of continuing job losses in the still vulnerable older industries. 
Certainly, economic conditions in the periphery in the late 1960s and 
earlier 1970s were better than they would have been otherwise, as new 
factories replaced redundant coal mines, shipyards and textile mills, 
but seen in the context of the 1980s the benefits of regional policy 
seem slight. The main problem is that the factories introduced to the 
peripheral regions through regional policy themselves tended to be highly 
vulnerable to recession in that they generally represented centres of 
routine production of low strategic importance to the firm, and liable to 
be replaced by new factories using cheaper labour in the newly 
industrialising countries. In effect, regional policy improved the 
employment performance of the periphery up to 1973, while thereafter a 
shortage of new regional policy factories and a'high rate of closure in 
existing factories meant that a deterioration in the employment performance 
of the periphery resulted from the workings of regional policy. It is 
a sad commentary that current unemployment rates in North East England, 
Wales and Scotland are almost certainly no higher than they would have 
been if post-war regional policy had never developed. 
This point needs to be amplified if the search for a more 
successful form of regional policy is to be fruitful. Detailed analysis 
of the geographical structure of 20th century labour markets in Britain 
has shown that labour markets react quite strongly to changes in the 
geography of employment, so that net migration from areas of labour surplus 
to areas of relative labour shortage is substantial. Thus, although a 
severe round of job losses may push unemployment in a particular town to 
unusual heights the spontaneous processes of labour migration will tend, 
even in the absence of significant new job creation in the area, to reduce 
unemployment to more normal levels. This process is at its most 
efficient during periods of low unemployment nationally, and during 
cyclical upswings (implying a time lag between period of job loss and 
period of maximum efficiency of migration), but can also be observed 
during the less favourable labour market conditions of the 1970s and 1980s. 
- 316 - 
In the conditions of the late 1960s, however, major job losses in coal 
mining would tend in time to be fairly effectively absorbed locally by 
selective migration, keeping the local economy at fairly close to full 
employment. The effects of job creation through regional policy have 
tended to be more to speed up the reduction of unemployment rather than 
to reduce the ultimate level to which unemployment will return to 
subsequent to a major round of job losses. The Zong-term effects of 
regional policy has thus been to increase levels of employment in the 
assisted regions, and to reduce net emigration, rather than to reduce 
unemployment. Thus if a regional policy factory employs 200 a few 
years after it has been built, its effect on the local labour market would 
not have been to reduce unemployment by 200 but rather to have increased 
the local population (or slowed the decrease of the local population) by 
close to 200 workers plus their families. Job creation through regional 
policy reduces local unemployment, but not by as much as is commonly 
thought. 
If now one takes an even longer-term perspective and considers 
what might happen to regional policy factories in a later severe 
recession (1974-76,1979-82) then much depends on how recession-prone 
these new factories are. Experience shows that employment in such 
industries is often highly vulnerable to recession; a concentration of 
employment at the start of a period of recession will thus tend to 
accentuate local increases in unemployment during that recession. 
Furthermore, at a time of mass unemployment localised pools of unusually 
high unemployment tend to disperse much more slowly than under full 
employment, so that the effects on unemployment of a job loss event of a 
particular size tend to be more persistent. It would appear to be the 
case that from the perspective of a post-slump year the increases in 
local unemployment attributable to job losses in regional policy 
factories at least equal the decreases in local unemployment resulting 
from earlier employment growth in regional policy factories. Thus at 
present North East England undoubtedly has higher levels of unemployment 
and population than it would have done in the absence of regional policy, 
but it is highly unlikely that unemployment rates are significantly higher 
than they would have been without regional policy. - 
This does not mean that regional policy was irrelevant or a 
mistake, but it does suggest that regional policy as it has traditionally 
operated is not the critical strategic response to create a revival in 
the North sufficient to deal with the problems of heavy unemployment. 
Neither is urban policy the solution. A far broader approach to the 
restructuring of the British economy is required such that the whole of 
the British industrial economy is far more securely based than has been 
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the case hitherto, and such that today's employment growth is not simply 
the prelude to tomorrow's job loss. 
Ultimately the key to mass unemployment lies in the decline of 
industrial employment, while the concentration of unemployment in 
particular parts of the country results from the concentration of 
industrial job losses in the localities concerned. The main test of the 
effectiveness of the regeneration of the economy is whether low and stable 
rates of unemployment are achieved or, in the shorter term, are 
realistically in prospect. Two diametrically opposed approaches to the 
regeneration of the economy and of employment may be noted. 
(1) The deindustrialisation-reindustrialisation approach which 
argues that a programme of reindustrialisation is urgently required 
to counteract the effects of deindustrialisation, and that 
deindustrialisation has been unmitigated loss. 
(2) The post-industrial approach which argues that the British 
economy has long passed the stage at which industrial production 
has been the main engine of growth, that the service sector is 
the key sector to growth and that it would be folly to attempt to 
concentrate attention on industry, a proven loser. Industrial 
decline is seen as being part of the transformation towards a 
more modern economy. 
The post-industrial interpretation is currently fashionable and 
is framed in such away as to have appeal as an "official" explanation 
in that phenomena which might otherwise be regarded as problems (industrial 
decline, mass unemployment, etc. ) can be presented as, at worst, minor 
accidents on the path of progress. Analytically, however, the 
post-industrial interpretation must be regarded as flawed. Most notably, 
if the record of the last ten years or so is supposed to be one of smooth 
transition to a post-industrial service economy, why is it that industrial 
decline has preceded service sector expansion, rather than following on 
from service sector expansion and being squeezed by the pressure of 
demand for services? If the process of post-industrialisation, a smooth 
transition to a service economy, were to be real one would have expected 
the 1980s to have been a decade of low unemployment. In additions despite 
all the media attention given to the "yuppie" factor, the bulk of service 
sector employment growth in recent years has been in low paid sectors, 
suggesting a partial filling of a labour market vacuum rather than a 
process of the service sector squeezing out the industrial sector. 
Attention therefore returns to the. deindustrialisation thesis, to 
which the present author holds. This argues that Britain's industrial 
decline has largely been self-inflicted, the results of inept economic 
policies, of the overdominance of City interests in the formation of 
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economic policy, of antiproductive national research and development ' 
strategies (and particularly overconcentration, encouraged by Covernment, 
on military projects) and in more general terms the result of poor 
competitiveness derived from the lack of a clearly led Government 
industrial strategy. All these problems have much more severe effects 
during a long cycle downswing than during a world boom. 
Behind all this lies the notion that there is a definite industrial 
problem and that it is potentially soluble, although powerful vested 
interests have to be overcome. Some progress has been made in recent 
years (indeed it would be very surprising if industrial progress were to 
be lacking in a post-slump recovery), but not nearly enough. In 
particular the acute balance of payments problems of the late 1980s 
reflect a situation in which British industrial production is 
unacceptably low in relation to the level of domestic and world demand 
for manufactures. 
If the problem is examined in cyclical terms, one of the major 
underlying structural weaknesses of the British economy is that the growth 
of production tends to follow the growth of consumer demand rather than 
to lead it. The problem is shown in extreme form in the post-slump 
years, although earlier parallels may also be noted. One of the great 
ironies of British economic performance in recent years is that industrial 
investment can be said to have boomed only when a cyclical peak was 
already being approached, with the boom in consumer demand being so far 
out of control as to threaten a serious recession. The severe balance 
of payments problems of, 1988 and 1989 are the result not simply of 
consumer demand being too high but also of industrial production being 
too low, in part as a result of the severity of slump, and in part because 
of the slowness of recovery of industrial investment after the slump. 
Urgent consideration should have been given between about 1983 and 1985 
to devising policies to stimulate major new industrial investment to 
cope with the post-slump upturn in world demand; instead the central 
feature of Government industrial policy during these critical years was 
the provocation of major industrial conflict in the coal mining industry. 
Even so, it was possible during the mid-1980s to make the 
assumption that the Government had learnt from its mistakes of 1979 
and 1980 and had quietly dropped its "monetarist" policies for a more 
pragmatic approach to the economy. The Thatcher Government has never 
lost its ability to surprise, however, and one of the most remarkable 
features of the second half of 1988 has been the way that during a time 
of impending crisis almost exactly the same mistakes are being made as 
in Mrs. Thatcher's first year as Prime Minister. It appears not to have 
permeated the collective consciousness of the Government that a policy 
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of reacting to every new problem by pushing up interest rates and 
exchange rates will severely undermine productive activity and make 
recession more intense. One of the more bizarre political spectacles 
of recent months (late 1988) has been the monthly ritual of the 
announcement of exceptionally severe balance of payments deficits 
followed by the announcement of an increase in interest rates, presented 
as part of the "battle against inflation". These interest rate rises 
squeeze domestic demand, but they also make British products less 
competitive on world markets as a result of the associated exchange 
rate shifts. It is predictable that the end result will not be a 
correction of the underlying imbalance in the economy, but rather the 
persistence of the imbalance between production and consumption at a 
lower level of demand and employment. 
There were dangers of a world recession after the international 
Stock Market crash of October 1987, but these dangers were much 
exaggerated by commentators with much speculation on the question of 
whether a slump was imminent. At worst a temporary sharp setback to 
the process of smooth growth seemed likely to the author. In the event 
the exaggerated nature of the warnings about slump led paradoxically to 
market behaviour directed towards intensifying the boom. Thus instead 
of the much predicted recession came further smooth growth, even 
accelerated growth. This was a moderate surprise to the author, but a 
far greater surprise would have been if the much predicted slump had 
taken place. As of late 1988 and 1989 the dangers of world recession 
are far more considerable. Two major industrialised countriess the USA 
and the UK, are presently running unsustainable balance of payments 
deficits as a result of a consumer boom not fully matched by a production 
boom. Eventually these deficits will require powerful corrective action, 
with the likelihood of domestic recession resulting; the longer such 
actions are delayed the more severe the recession is likely to be. This 
however implies the reduction of the size of world markets for other 
producers, and will thus be a source of recession throughout the 
industrialised world. In most cases the recessions would probably tend 
to be only moderate in scale, with the prospect of later smooth growth, 
but in those countries whose structural imbalances will cause the 
recession it is unlikely that recessionalone, implying a weakening of 
the productive base, will cure the underlying difficulties. 
It is impossible to provide a viable interpretation of what is 
popularly referred to as the North-South divide without examining the 
questions of broader structural change in the British economy and of the 
specific features of particular cyclical phases. Ultimately, though, 
the problems faced by the traditional industrial regions are reflections 
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of the problems faced by British industry, which themselves reflect at 
least in part the traditionally low priority given to industrial 
regeneration and the high priority given to the interests of "the City" 
when British economic policy has been set. The main post-war phases of 
the development of the British North-South divide may briefly be 
summarised. 
(1) 1945-1966. A long boom in the world economy. Smooth expansion of 
the British economy with industrial employment surpassing all 
previous records. New industrial growth concentrates not in the 
traditional coalfield industrial areas of Northern Englandl 
Scotland and Wales, but in and around the main consumer markets 
of Southern England and the Midlands. Some signs of renewed 
employment decline in traditional industries (notably coal, cotton, 
shipbuilding) from the mid-1950s onwards, prompting increased 
attention being given to the regional problem in the early 1960s. 
Full employment nationally, with labour shortages in the 
South, resulting from the rapid expansion in employment, but 
pockets of moderate unemployment in the Nortb. 
(2) 1966-1972. The long boom fades and full employment gradually 
slips away. Industrial employment starts to decline sharply* 
with major job losses in older industries, notably coal and 
textiles, not being matched nationally by employment growth in 
newer industries. Traditional specialised coal mining areas 
(notably North East England and South Wales) protected from the 
worst effects of job loss by incoming employment generated by 
regional policy. Job loss in coal mining slows down considerably 
towards the end of the period. 
Unemployment increasing faster in the North than in the South. 
(3) 1972-73. Major international reflation to counter the effects of 
the 1970-72 recession. Substantial expansion of employment 
throughout the country with the assisted areas in particular 
being favoured. Employment declines sharply in London, howeverg 
as a result of severe overheating of the local economy, expressed 
most starkly in high and sharply rising land costs. In earlier 
phases decentralisation of employment from London to less 
congested areas was seen as highly desirable; now the decline of 
employment in London was severe enough to become a major problem. 
Sharp reduction in inter-regional unemployment 
differentials. 
(4) 1973-76. Severe recession with newer industries (e. g. electrical 
engineering) being more severely hit than older industries (e. g. 
steel, coal). Complicated geography of recession. Heavy job 
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losses in London, though at a slower pace than in 1972-73; 
congestion and high costs still a problem. Major job losses in 
the West Midlands vehicles industry, though more through job 
losses in this sector being spatially concentrated than through 
an exceptionally high national rate of job loss in this industry. 
High rates of job loss in the "branch plant economies" (e. g. 
South Wales, Merseysideq Durham, Northumberland), but, ironically, 
low rates of job loss in the "vulnerable" traditional industries 
such as coal, steel, shipbuilding and chemicals; relatively 
stable employment therefore in Teesside and Tyne and Wear. 
The extent of job loss in London and the West Midlands, 
and the extent to which recession hit "new" sectors such as 
electrical goods and vehicles more than "old" sectors such as 
coal, gives the impression of a weakening North-South divide, 
and a growing intensity of spatial problems at the urban, rather 
than the regional, scale. It has to be added that this impression, 
which dominated late 1970s and early 1980s academic discussion of 
the British space economy (Townsend 1983 excepted), relates only 
to a relatively brief phase. . 
(5) 1977-79. Economic upswing, most marked in Southern England. 
Signs beginning to appear, especially in North East England, and 
on Merseyside, of impetus being lost in regional policy as major 
job losses continue locally even during a cyclical upswing. 
(6) 1979-82. Slump. Very severe industrial job losses and sharp 
increases in unemployment. Geography of slump strongly resembles 
that of 1929-33 slump, with job losses concentrated in the 
coalfield industrial areas and net employme nt growth taking place 
over much of Southern England. London's employment declining 
during the 1979-82 slump, but at a much slower pace than in the 
1970s. Major problems in the car industry led to severe job 
losses in the West Midlands, which temporarily "joined" the list 
of depressed regions. 
(7) 1982-88. Strong post-slump upswing in financial and other 
services, although industrial performance less satisfactory in 
manufacturing. Southern England booms, and the Midlands (both 
East and West) share in strong upturn, but Northern England and 
Scotland have relatively static post-slump employment levels. 
Problems of extreme congestion in South, shown in house prices 
and in strains upon transport networks, but unemployment still 
very high in North. Much media attention given to the North-South 
divide, but no effective Government policy. 
(8) 1988-? Cyclical downturn. 
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It is unclear what the geography of the first post-slump 
recession will be like, although it is probable that it will be more 
like the 1974-76 recession, both in terms of severity and geographical 
impact, than the 1979-82 slump. In particular it is expected that 
London could well become a major focus of job loss, both because of the 
fading of the financial services boom, already leading to major City 
redundancies, and because of the costs of congestion. The rest of 
Southern England might well still prosper. The major question, though, 
is still the potential degree of severity of industrial recession. Some 
financial analysts hav& suggested that the recent-upturn in industrial 
investment has been strong enough to enable industry to survive the next 
recession fairly comfortably, and that the main impact of recession will 
be in the South. This is perhaps too optimistic; undoubtedly British 
industry is currently, at the start of 1989, more resilient than it was in 
1979, and yet it is hard to forsee anything other than a severe squeeze 
on industry in the next year or so, especially if the Government persists 
with its present policies. To the present author, it seems more likely 
that industrial recession will be moderate to moderately severe, 
concentrated in Northern England and Scotland rather than the Midlands 
or Wales, and will lead to further substantial increases in unemployment 
in the industrial areas which can only be partially concealed by changes 
in the method of calculating unemployment. The labour market situation in 
the peripheral industrial regions is not one which gives much cause for 
optimism, either in the short term or in the long term. Such problems 
are potentially soluble, or potentially nearly soluble, but only with 
a major reorientation of Government policy. 
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10.3 Future Directions For Research 
Perhaps the most positive research feature of the present work, 
notwithstanding any major or minor errors which still stand, is the 
demonstration that it is possible to use detailed labour market 
statistics to build a coherent picture of the UK's economic geography. 
Earlier research has tended to make only relatively limited use of 
labour market data, to test relatively limited general hypotheses 
concerning change in the space economy, yet one result which emerges 
clearly from the present analysis is the enormous complexity of patterns 
of employment change. Year-to-year shifts in the economic climate are 
seen to lead to considerable variations in the geography of employment 
change, with reversals of earlier patterns being not uncommon, for 
example the change in the fortunes of London between the 1970s and the 
1980s. The patterns of change are too complex for the simple 
hypothesis-testing approach to be of much explanatory value; instead one 
must wade into a complicated data set, identify any peculiarities, and 
interpret and attempt to explain such peculiarities. If one really 
wants to understand Britain's changing economic geography, one needs to 
know what happened where, when and why. Quite often in geographical 
research the "when" question has been neglected, making it difficult to 
answer the "why" question. 
While seemingly endless pages of Census of Employment statistics 
and unemployment data present the researcher with an apparently forbidding 
task, it is in fact humanly possible to bring the data to order. To 
provide a detailed comparison between two Censuses of Employment would 
represent perhaps slightly more than a year's research work and would 
provide invaluable information, on which policy formulation could be 
based, concerning shifting patterns of employment and prosperity. Since 
the Census of Employment is at present taken only once every three yearst 
a far longer interval than it takes to analyse the data properly, 
analysis of each Census of Employment as it ýt is completed would make 
a fully viable and highly useful long-term research project. 
It may well be that the economic record of the next twenty or so 
years will not stimulate much research into the contemporary long 
cycle. The likelihood, suggested by long cycle theory itself, is that 
the economy will be on a continuous upswing with only relatively mild 
recessions, so that long cycle theory, an important and distinctive 
tool for analysing the complex trends and counter-trends of the 1960st 
1970s and 1980s, may well add relatively little to the analysis of the 
1990s or 2000s. However, two points, bearing in mind the lessons of 
the 1960s, should be borne in mind. Firstly, the presence and 
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continuance of upswing is a fundamental part of the dynamics of the 
capitalist economy, and is largely independent of policy, so that the 
presence of a long boom does not necessarily imply that the economic 
policies being followed are correct; the relevance of this in the 
context of the late 1980s is obvious. Secondly, once any substantial 
departure from the long boom takes place, as happened in the late 1960s, 
there is a great danger that recessionary forces will accumulate, 
leading to a long cycle downswing and eventually to slump. Policy 
makers around the year 2010 would do Well to heed these points in order 
to avoid a rerun of the 1970s. 
As far as long cycle research is concerned, the most interesting 
unaccomplished tasks involve the examination of the 19th century long 
cycles. In chapter 2 above it was found essential to sketch the main 
cyclical features of the 19th century in order to develop the theory of 
the long cycle, but one is fully conscious that only the preliminaries 
have been accomplished. In particular, insofar as the long cycle theory 
as developed here is also a theory of slump, a much closer analysis of 
the slump decades of the 1840s and the 1880s is required, charting the 
period before slump, the slump itself and the form of the post-slump 
upswing. There is a major additional complication in studying the 
1880s in that a major expansion of investment in the "white periphery" 
was a central feature of the post-slump upswing, creating an intense 
boom in the late 1880s in the white periphery, but leading to a secondary 
slump in the early 1890s, perhaps even more severe than that of the 1880s, 
in the periphery and the USA. It is perhaps partly because of this 
early 1890s experience that most authorities place the lower turning 
point of the long cycle in the mid-1890s rather than the mid-1880s, 
although in the present theoretical perspective what is involved is a 
collapse of a post-slump boom, as seen also in 1847,1937 and arguably 
1987 (the Stock Market crash) rather than a long cyclical slump. For 
the analysis of the "imperial" long cycle, perhaps more than for any 
other long cycle, a close understanding of the propagation of international 
economic impulses is required. One must add that the question of why 
primary producing Third World countries have significantly later dates 
for post-slump recovery than advanced industrial economies also needs 
attention. 
Another important project, at the interface of natural and social 
science, would be to examine in more detail relationships between 
climatic shifts and business cycles of various lengths, particularly 
in the context of 19th century Britain. After chapter 2 had been 
completed, the author became aware of the possibility that the assumed 
long cyclical shifts of the 19th century might in fact be little more 
- 325 - 
than reflections of climatic change. Preliminary research in chapter 
9.8 above appears to show that cyclical turning points in the 19th 
century economic series tend to lead rather than to lag climatic shifts, 
indicating that the 19th century economic long cycle is not climatically 
determined. There is perhaps scope for more detailed examination of 
this point. Also, given the increased awareness of the possibility of 
a major global climatic warming, broader examination of the links between 
climatic change and economic change would appear to be a fruitful field 
of research. 
Moving on to the economic history of Britain after 1918, 
possibly the most interesting lead for further research in chapter 4 
concerns the post-1932 years, and the economic geography of recovery. 
There are obvious comparisons to be drawn between the 1930s and the 
1980s and yet in the 1930s the industrial economy responded more 
vigorously to the post-slump upturn than in the 1980s with the result 
that even the traditional and depressed industrial areas showed 
substantial increases in employment. In the present thesis it has not 
proven possible to penetrate far beneath the surface patterns of 
industrial change in the mid-1930s; possibly the most promising approach 
for further work would be a comparative business history approach, 
using archive material to attempt to reconstruct ' 
the detailed influences 
leading to a rapid expansion in industrial activity after the 1930s 
slump. 
As far as chapter 5 is concerned, perhaps the interesting questions 
for future research concern not so much the general regional patterns 
of economic change which have been discussed, but rather the comparisons 
and contrasts between the operation of labour markets at full employment 
and the operation of labour markets at less than full employment. 
Quite clearly it would not be possible to conduct analysis of labour 
markets at full employment without engaging in historical analysis. 
The disappearance of full employment since the mid-1960s has of 
course been the central research theme of this thesis, around which all 
else revolves. Careful study of year-by-year, and occasionally 
month-by-month, statistics on industrial employment change, total 
employment change and unemployment has shown conclusively (it is hoped) 
that the main reason for the existence of mass unemployment in Britain 
has been the loss of industrial jobs starting in the 1960s, accelerating 
through the 1970s and reaching its maximum severity in 1980 and 1981. 
Spatial patterns of unemployment largely reflect spatial patterns of 
employment change, although the functioning of spatial lab. our markets$ 
involving a spatial redistribution of labour in response to patterns of 
employment opportunity, modifies this basic pattern. This may sound 
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almost too obvious to be a conclusion, with little being said here 
that could not have been said in 1981, but it is the filling in of 
detail, the making comprehensible what would otherwise have been 
background noise, that is important. 
Quite possibly the current work has implications for the way 
industrial geography should be studied; too often there seems to be a 
major gap in the level of analysis between interview work covering in 
detail what is happening semi-contemporaneously, and historical work 
which makes comparisons of levels of employment at intervals of perhaps 
five or ten years, but says little of detailed patterns of change within 
such an interval. In historical analysis the most fruitful approach seems 
to be to study each arm of each business cycle, rather than to study a 
simple before and after pattern. 
The geography of unemployment is a subject which has received 
virtually no proper attention, an astonishing state of affairs given the 
well-recognised extent of the North-South divide. As far as the author 
knows, the current work is the only recent work which (a) relates 
patterns of unemployment change to patterns of employment change, 
(b) recognises the elementary statistical point that one needs to examine 
percentage point changes in unemployment rather than percentage changes in 
unemployment to gain an unbiased picture of what is happening, and W 
studies patterns of unemployment change across short time intervals. Much 
more research is needed to fill this very basic gap in the literature; 
the present work is only a beginning, with little attention paid to 
regional patterns of unemployment change after 1984. 
Yet the analysis needs to be broadened as well as deepened. A 
closer analysis of the structure of the business cycle is required. The 
essential problem seems to be to understand what is happening on each 
arm of the business cycle, and on various points of each arm of the 
business cycle. An attempt has been made, to examine what has been 
happening to the labour market at various stages of the business cycle) 
but quite clearly there are pressures building up in the productive and 
financial economy long before any overt labour market effects are felt. 
What the author has in mind is not simply another set of abstract 
theoretical models, involving lagged relationships or differential 
equations, to mimic empirically observed cyclical movements in the 
economy, nor even the construction of a series of reference cycles 
(O'Dea 1974; Economic Trends, various) to show how a composite cycle can 
be constructed from a large number of statistical series with various 
leads and lags. The problem is rather to build up the structure of the 
business cycle from the day-to-day and. week-to-week working of the 
economy, noting how pressures build up and how they disperse. Quite 
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clearly, close scrutiny of the financial press is required, and quite 
clearly it will be impossible to study more than a few business cycles in 
the detail required. Perhaps some of the most interesting cycles to 
examine in this context are those of the 1960s, since the very important 
question of how the long boom disintegrates is still unanswered, or at 
best half-answered. Obviously analysis of the slump could be extended 
still further, although given that the slump is an extremely atypical 
business cycle and that it is unlikely that there will be another slump 
in the next three decades, then the slump is not the best cycle or 
recession to study if one wants to develop practical suggestions for 
economic policy formation. There is more to be learnt from the 1960s, 
when the problems of maintaining a 3% growth rate over a long period of 
time became apparent. 
Such historical studies would be, in a sense, relatively 
straightforward in that the researcher, although working with irretrievably 
incomplete material, always has the benefit of hindsight. A more 
exciting option is the study Of a recession, or a full cycle, as it 
actually takes place. As these words are written, at the beginning of 
1989, there can be little doubt that the downswing of the business 
cycle is imminent. What is not clear is whether the economy is headed 
for, in the current jargon, a "hard landing" or a "soft landing"; long 
cycle theory suggests a relatively soft landing while examination of 
Government'economic policies and priorities suggests a hard landing. To 
attempt to track down all the options and possibilities before they harden 
into historical fact, and to see a given outcome as one of a range of 
possibilities, is a highly important exercise. The present author tried 
it in 1980 but much to his regret the written work was not completed 
until 1989. A repeat, with much less historical background to be 
researched, would, it is hoped, be ready much quicker with no need to 
write the equivalents of chapters 2,3,4,5,6 and 9 in the present 
work. 
There is potentially an enormous amount which can be learnt about 
economic structure in this way, whether one is dealing with the historical 
rqcord or contemporary events. One of the present writer's central 
methodological beliefs is that the most appropriate way to tackle 
complex economic questions is to examine the detailed chronological 
structure of events; only in this way does it seem possible to infer 
with confidence the nature of causal relationships in the historical 
record. 
This takes discussion back to the terra incognita of the 19th 
century. Even the basics of labour market structure are obscured 
through lack of statistical information. For employment data one has to 
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rely on the Census of Population, but this merely gives a snap-shot at 
ten-yearly intervals, and thus is useless at indicating short-term changes 
in the labour market; furthermore no clear distinction between employment 
and unemployment is made in the early Censuses. For unemployment the 
information available is incomplete and heavily filteredt with different 
data sources suggesting radically different 
' 
interpretations; there is hope, 
however, that significant advances can be made in understanding 
patterns of 19th century unemployment and concealed unemployment if 
critical use is made both of pauperism data and of trade union unemployment 
data. 
There is also the problem that while such themes as the export 
of capital have been well covered in the literature, there is a 
noticeable absence of any account which gives a more general view of 
the detailed chronology of economic change in late 19th century Britain. 
Ironically the first half of the 19th century is much better covered in 
this respect, in works such as Smart (1910,1917). Matthews (1954) and 
Boot (1984). The apparent lack of detailed work covering the structures 
of economic change over short periods in the downswing from the early 
1870s to the mid-1880s is deeply felt. There have been numerous academic 
debates on whether there was a "Great Depression", whether foreign 
investment was good or bad for Britain, and so on, but there has been 
little discussion of year-by-year patterns of economic change in what 
was undoubtedly one of the most crucial phases in the development of the 
modern capitalist economy. This, surely, can be remedied. 
This section has concentrated mainly on how the current research 
could be extended. Quite clearly these suggestions, as well as the text 
of the thesis, reflect the intellectual temperament of the author, with 
a preference for detailed analysis of complex data sets in order to unravel 
complexity. No doubt others would wish to develop themes in different 
directions. For example, much emphasis has been given to displacement 
effects in the labour market, in which it is often not so much the skilled 
industrial workers affected by redundancy who bear the chief burden of 
unemployment, but more likely the teenager denied opportunity to work 
because the job that he or she would otherwise have filled is occupied by 
a skilled ex-industrial worker or someone whose opportunities for 
advancement have been blocked by the re-entry of. the redundant industrial 
worker on the labour market. Such a process clearly exists, and is 
responsible for unemployment being concentrated among younger age groups. 
This process has been assumeds and dealt with in statistical terms; 
another researcher with a different intellectual temperament might see 
scope for a detailed local research interview programme here. These 
approaches are of course complementary; there is no question of one 
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approach being "right" and the other "wrong". The present author does, 
however, have strong doubts about the validity of another general 
approach which appears under more specific forms as applied neo-classical 
economics, cliometrics, or quantitative human geography. The issue 
at stake is not quantification as such, but rather how statistical material 
is analysed. The "quantitative" approach is based essentially on the 
testing, by means of inferential statistics, of a series of true/false 
hypotheses on a historical data set. This approach at best oversimplifies 
and at worst badly distorts. The chief use of statistical material in 
the present thesis is to provide a more precise form of description 
than is possible with unquantified material alone. Once one has reached 
a sufficiently sophisticated level of description, the process of 
explanation can be placed on a much firmer footing. 
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10.5 Full Employment in a Free Society? 
If social science research is not to be an inward-looking activity, 
perhaps doing little more than acting as part of the acculturation Of 
the next generation of the middle class as research results become 
disseminated via text-books and lectures, then practical and political 
implications need to be considered. Regrettably, under current political 
circumstances there are diminished possibilities for reputable social 
science being used as an input into Government policy now or in the 
forseeable future. Furthermore it hardly accords with principles of 
scientific honesty to distort one's analysis, dilute one's conclusions 
or reverse one's policy recommendations to such an extent that the 
Government would see it as possible to implement the policies recommended. 
Such a conjunction of circumstances is of course highly frustrating to 
the author; one would dearly wish to offer practical solutions to the 
problem of mass unemployment, but no solution is truly practical unless 
it has a chance of being put into practice. 
The framing of policy recommendations is therefore no easy task. 
There is a temptation, which must be resisted, to withdraw into an 
impotent "radicalism" which suggests that since the capitalist state 
will not, especially under present circumstances, carry out policies in 
favour of the working class, then debate on policy is meaningless. A 
more impressive option is to attempt to develop a set of genuinely 
workable alternative policies, to explain what these policies are intended 
to accomplish, and to focus more clearly on the political reasons why 
the Government in power would not wish to follow such policies. The 
intention is thus to stir up debate, to work towards changing the climate 
of political opinion, rather than to attempt to offer any direct 
contribution towards the framing of Conservative economic policy. While 
the beneficiary of the desired shift in political opinion would be the 
Labour Party, as being the party most likely to be politically sympathetic 
towards the aims and analysis presented here, it should be noted that 
the author is neither a spokesman for, a member of, nor even an uncritical 
supporter of, the Labour Party. Indeed some of the most important changes 
of political ideas would have to take place within the Labour Party. 
Above all a sharpening of policy is required to present radical solutions 
to real and persistent problems; the trap of reacting to prolonged 
opposition by diluting policies must be avoided. First of all, then, one 
would desire a more dynamic Labour Party, more receptive to new ideas. 
This would still only ba small step towards the ultimate implementation 
of a policy desig 
ýregain 
full employment; elections still have to 
be won. 
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All that is possible at present is to set up a series of policy 
proposals and objectives which cannot be implemented at present but 
might well be implemented in a modified form at a future date. In 
forming political programmes value judgments are undoubtedly of critical 
importance, and these should be stated explicitly. Such judgments are 
in the form of an assessment of what is morally right and wrong, what is 
fair'and unfair, and not in the form of whether soap powder A or B is 
preferred. The present writer's own basic value judgments, set in the 
context of the British experience of the 1980s, are as follows: 
(1) Mass unemployment is grossly unfair, and wrong. 
(2) The most important political task in the socio-economic sphere 
is to eliminate mass unemployment as soon as is possible. 
(3) Any political programme which does not seek to eliminate mass 
unemployment, or does not place a high priority on eliminating 
mass unemployment, is reactionary and needs to be opposed. 
(2) and (3) above are value judgments, yet they rest analytically 
and historically on the notion that it is technically possible to 
eliminate mass unemployment in current and recent past circumstances, and 
given a reasonable amount of time. In other circumstances, for example 
during the early part of a slump, it would be technically impossible to 
return the economy to full employment, and the priority would be to stem 
the rise in unemployment as much as possible. 
In slightly more general terms, therefore, the desired objectives 
of economic policy should be: 
(a) To ride out any recession with as little structural damage 
as possible. 
(b) To take full advantage of any economic recovery, and, if there 
is substantial unemployment at the start Of that recoveryt to 
remove as much unemployment as possible. 
There do not appear to be any technical reasons, despite the 
present (1988-89) balance of payments crisis, why full employment should 
not be achievable in, say, the lifetime of two Governments cornmitted: to 
full employment, although the task will undoubtedly be difficult. The 
task will be even harder if, as a combined result of structural imbalances 
in the economy and the Government's handling of the economic problem, a 
"hard landing" occurs and unemployment again starts to increase 
substantially. If the eventual elimination of mass unemployment is a 
genuine priority, the effort needed to reduce unemployment would have to 
be intensified significantly. 
one is fully aware that in capitalist terms mass unemployment is 
not a technical problem in that it does not impede the working of the 
capitalist economy, (provided the state takes efforts to keep welfare 
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payments down), and indeed may well enhance the working of the capitalist 
economy by creating downward pressure on wages and by eliminating acute 
labour'shortages. Mass unemployment is of itself not an economic problem 
or a cause of economic decay, but rather a residual of accumulated economic 
difficulties of the past. Economic difficulties cause mass unemployment, 
but mass unemployment does not, on the whole, cause economic difficulties. 
Thus any Government following a purely capitalist logic would give a low 
priority to reducing unemployment, especially if increases of employment 
take place outside the private sector. It would of course be electorally 
unpopular if the Government were seen to be doing nothing about mass 
unemployment, but in the context of a post-slump recovery these electoral 
problems can be averted. Firstly, sustained and rapid growth is normal 
during post-slump recovery leading to spontaneous growth in employment 
and a reduction in unemployment. This of course is a process which is 
independent of Government policy. Scientifically it would be a careless 
mistake to assume that high growth rates have come into being because of 
Government policy in that firstly, rapid growth has been international 
in scope; secondly, high growth rates can be explained reasonably 
elegantly and convincingly in cyclical terms (chapter 2 above); and 
thirdly, that a degree of skill in economic management would have to be 
assumed which was clearly absent before 1982. Of course political 
pronouncements do not have to be rooted in scientific accuracy, and quite 
understandably the Government has not. been reluctant to claim that its 
own policies have been responsible for economic regeneration, rising 
real wages and the start of a reduction in unemployment. One can hardly 
criticise the Government for making such claims, but the Opposition 
parties lay themselves open to considerable criticism for not convincingly 
disputing such claims. All this is merely the normal rough-and-tumble 
of party politics; what is more reprehensible both in terms of political 
honesty and in terms of the welfare of the people directly affectedo 
is the Government's decision to restrict the availability of unemployment 
benefit in order to exaggerate, just before a General Election, the fall 
in unemployment which resulted from the post-slump boom (chapter 7 note 
84). 
Given its own set of economic priorities and class interests, it 
is not wholly surprising that the Government has done little to reduce 
unemployment by an amount greater than that determined by the general 
cyclical upswing in the economy. This is doubly unfortunate in that 
economic conditions between 1983 and 1988 were particularly favourable 
for engineering a major reduction in unemployment, given an international 
economic upswing in the advanced industrial economies, and given that the 
effects of North Sea oil and the expansion of invisible earnings in the 
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insurance industry (chiefly through modernisation in Lloyd's) made it 
possible in Britain for consumer demand to expand unusually quickly 
without (until 1988) running into balance of payments difficulties. 
Economic conditions in future will almost certainly be more difficult 
and the spectre of rising unemployment from a very high base figure will 
again be present. A window of opportunity for dealing with mass 
unemployment will have been passed by. 
Even to conceive of a set of economic policies for eliminating 
mass unemployment requires a much broader perspective on the economy than 
is taken by the Government. What must be-avoided is any notion that what 
is optimal* for the capitalist interest is automatically optimal for 
the national economy. Without investigating too deeply here Keynes's 
theory of effective demand, one can suggest that two central components 
are that the equilibrium position of the economy is determined by capital 
rather than by labour, and that if the position is one of equilibrium 
at less than full employment then this is because capitalist income is 
maximised at less than full employment. It is almost self-evident that 
the optimum position for workers as. a class-is that of full employment. 
The author intends to develop this line of argument in a later work. 
To put the basic propositions less formally, the rich have nothing 
to gain, and probably a lot to lose, from a policy of full employment, 
while ordinary people can hardly fail to gain from a full employment 
policy, whether through gaining jobs or through broadening their range of 
employment opportunities. If the gains and losses are added, and results 
expressed at the national level rather than at a class level, the UK as 
a whole would gain rather than lose from a full employment policy, as 
with increased employment total production, and hence total income, would 
increase. 
All this may sound unrealistically "radical" in the context of 
the late 1980s, yet in substance is little different from the prevailing 
approach of the late 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, when it was generally 
accepted that the free market (or, less euphemistically, the capitalist 
interest), when left to itself, would not create optional economic 
conditions for the mass of people, and that it was a primary duty of 
the state, and of elected Governments, to intervene in the economy to 
create more socially acceptable economic conditions. This basic principle 
may be supported without necessarily giving support to the specific 
policy measures which were applied in particular historical circumstances. 
What is important, though, is that an intellectual framework is created 
that is broad enough to encompass the possibility of a full employment 
policy, broad enough to avoid the restrictive assumption of an identity 
of interest between capitalists and the national economy. 
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The intellectual climate changed 
' considerably 
during the economic 
downswing which intensified during the 1970s, and increasingly it came to 
be suggested that Keynesian policieq aggravated, or even were directly 
responsible for, economic stagnation and price inflation. This is largely 
a myth, just as it was a myth that Keynesian policies created the post-war 
long boom, and just as it is a myth that free-market economic policy 
created the upswing after the slump of the early 1980s; these myths all 
attribute to Government policy changes which were in fact caused by 
deeper and more powerful conjunctural shifts in the capitalist economy 
itself. 
The net result of the uncertainty of the 1970s was a return, most 
noticeably in Britain, to a "free market" conception of economic policy, 
in which it is denied that the state has any useful role, other than as 
a monetary authority, in managing the economy, and in which it is argued 
that leaving all important decisions to the free market (capitalist 
interest) will promote the national economic interest most effectively. 
Yet it is precisely the existence and persistence of mass unemployment 
that demonstrates clearly the difference between the capitalist interest 
and the national interest; the capitalist equilibrium provides a level of 
employment below the socially optimal. level of employment. In certain 
circumstances jobs are lost, and unemployment created, because the optimal 
level of employment for the firm is below that which previously existed, 
while in other circumstances unemployment persists because it is not 
worthwhile for the capitalist sector to expand employment sufficiently 
to regain full employment. 
If any progress is to be made towards full employment it is 
necessary to abandon the unduly restrictive assumptions of free market 
economics. It is not enough to suggest, however, that the state has a 
role to play; one must also consider, with rather more attention than in 
the heyday of Keynesian post-war policy, what type of role the state ought 
to play. Much too little attention has been paid in Britain, for example, 
to the possible entrepreneurial role of the state; too often enterprise 
has been assumed to be best left to capitalists, with nationalisation 
representing the transfer of less successful industries from undynamic 
private enterprise to undynamic state ownership. The Enterprise Board 
concept of the late 1970s, continued by various local authorities in the 
1980s, is more promising, but given that the world economic crisis was 
far advanced by the time these initiatives were set up, much of this 
investment was directed to stemming decline rather than promoting 
advance. State enterprise and the state-backed (as opposed to capitalist 
backed) entrepreneur provide, or could provide, important new possibilities 
for expansion. 
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Another problem with the free-market approach is that it does 
little to identify long-term strategic weaknesses in the economy. 
Government is far better placed than the market, with its short-term 
bias, to identify such weaknesses and to deal with them. In par ticular, 
the position of manufacturing in the economy is still a major source of 
weakness, about which almost nothing has been done in the last ten 
years. It may well be objected that manufacturing profits are at present 
(1988-89) at historically very high levels, indicating the opposite of 
an industrial problem, but this would miss the point for two basic. 
reasons. Firstly, profits are cyclically highly variable, and a peak 
in profits is likely to represent a cyclical peak, and furthermore the 
peak of an unusually strong cycle, more than it represents any long-term 
transformation. Secondly, and even more critically, to judge the state 
of manufacturing industry solely by profitability would be to judge the 
situation in purely capitalist terms, rather than in terms of the 
interests of the economy as a whole. 
The problem with Britain's industrial base is that it is currently 
much too small in relation to national economic requirements. Most of 
Britain's current economic difficulties stem from precisely this. The 
central theme of this thesis is that mass unemployment in Britain has 
arisen from mass job loss in industry, with rapid cutbacks of employment 
in times of economic difficulty, and only slow expansion of employment 
(or maybe even a continued slow seepage of labour) during more favourable 
times. In terms of employment policy it is imperative from the national 
point of view to enhance the job-generating ability of industry during 
cyclical upswings and to stem industrial job losses during recessions. 
The former is to be achieved more by "industrial" policy than by "economic" 
policy, while the priority for attaining the latter objective is to 
abstain during periods of financial crisis from measures which place 
undue strain on the industrial sector. 
Another problem directly related to inadequate expansion in the 
industrial sector is of course the balance of payments crisis, which has 
already provoked the Chancellor of the Exchequer into announcing a series 
of interest rate increases designed to dampen down consumer demand, but 
which will also have the effect of squeezing industrial investment both 
by increasing the costs of production and by reducing demand. Such a 
policy treats the balance of payments difficulties as merely a short-term 
problem, requiring nothing more than short-term remedies. Such a point 
of view is seriously mistaken; the balance of payments problem is the 
outward expression of the chronic inability of British manufacturing to 
respond strongly enough to create a balanced national economy. In the 
1970s and early 1980s the problem was seen outwardly largely in terms of 
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industrial job losses and accumulating unemployment; in the later 1980s 
the problem is seen in terms of a major, and new, balance of payments 
deficit in manufactures which completely overturns the traditional 
trading relations on which Britain's external balance relied. 
Traditionally, Britain has been a heavy importer of food and raw materials, 
but has been a major net exporter of manufactures and services. Now, 
services and North Sea oil have to support the large trading deficits in 
manufactures and non-oil primary products. This is an extremely 
precarious balance which relied during the mid-1980s on high production 
and prices in the oil industry. The post-1986 downturn in the oil 
industry has exposed very clearly the underlying problems of the British 
economy (see Table 8.28). Any sensible economic policy in future years 
will have to tackle these underlying problems, which might well be 
expected to become more serious in future years as the support given to 
the inland economy by North Sea oil revenues gradually fades away. 
There have been claims by Government, and in various media 
outlets, that the last few years have seen a favourable transformation 
of the industrial economy, in contrast with the "stagnation" of the 
1970s. Some of these claims are nonsensical; if output in a particular 
sector in 1988 has reached record levels, just surpassing a previous 
peak in, say, 1979, then any economically literate observer would point to 
stagnation rather than to success in the case involved. Other claims 
deserve more attention, for example the claim that faster than usual 
rates of productivity growth, exceeding even those of the early 1960s, 
result from a transformation of industry.. 
Figures for manufacturing investment (Economic Trends, AnnuaZ 
SuppZement 1988, p. 58; Economic Trends various) show investment rising 
sharply through the 1950s and very early 1960s, and then fluctuating 
cyclically with no real tendency to increase in the longer term. After 
1979 investment fell sharply, standing at 62.7% of 1979 levels in 1982. 
The subsequent cyclical increase in investment was slower than the 
initial decline, and in 1987 manufacturing investment was at only 89.7% 
of 1979 levels. By this time a fierce consumer boom was in place, and 
industrial investment expanded sharply, overtaking 1979 levels in 1988. 
It seems almost certain that 1988 represents a cyclical peak, however. 
Comparing cyclical peaks, and disregarding fluctuations within the 
cycle, manufacturing investment has remained static, as has manufacturing 
output (up 1.1% between 1979 and 1987; up 6.9% between 1979 and 1988). 
There is little sign of a major transformation here. 
Where the record appears more impressive is in any series in 
which the number of manufacturing workers appears as the denominator, 
simply because of the intense decline of employment in manufacturing. 
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Thus if manufacturing output is static and employment falls by a third 
in a limited enough time, then the combination of these two highly 
unsatisfactory series is a rise in manufacturing productivity. Even so, 
technical reasons need to be considered as to why the rate of growth of 
productivity is high, when investment is not particularly high. The 
basic point would appear to be that while manufacturing investment is 
low it has not fallen as sharply, from 1979 to 1987, as has manufacturing 
employment. Therefore investment per worker has been very high, with 
the obvious implication being a high rate of growth of productivity. 
Naturally, a high rate of growth of productivity is welcome, but it does 
not of itself indicate that Britain's industrial problems have successfully 
been solved. There is an urgent need to transform the industrial sector 
from one of moderate investment, moderate output growth, high productivity 
growth and static or declining employment to one of high investment, high 
output growth, high productivity growth and rising employment. A 
significant improvement in the balance of payments on manufactures, 
representing a reversal of the major deterioration since 1979, would 
represent a sign that the problems were beginning to be confronted 
successfully. 
Without a close first hand knowledge of the internal workings of 
British industry, it would be presumptious to suggest detailed industrial 
policies at this stage. In any case, strategy must precede tactics, a 
clear understanding of objectives must precede detailed policy statements. 
Some key elements suggest themselves, however: 
(1) A macroeconomic strategy designed to help "industry" rather 
than "the City", with the objectives being cheap money and a 
relatively low exchange rate, rather than dear money and a high 
exchange rate. The destructive mistake of responding to any signs 
of economic difficulty by pushing up the interest rate must be 
avoided. 
Such a policy will doubtless be unpopular with the City, 
and past experience suggests that the City could well try to stage 
a "crisis of confidence". Such pressure needs to be resisted by 
a determined Government. 
(2) Various state enterprise schemes, aimed not so much at 
nationalising existing private sector industry (full employment 
is a much more important goal than state ownership), but rather 
the raising of capital from state resources to accelerate the 
process of new industrial development. The building of reserves 
of industrial expertise within the state apparatus is seen as an 
important part of the development of the "enterprise state". 
(3) The return to a more vigorous regional policy. Here it is 
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necessary to be clear about objectives. One obvious and fully 
acceptable aim of'a renewed regional policy is to absorb at least 
part of the excess unemployment in depressed areas. What regional 
policy cannot do is "solve" the regional problem, give the assisted 
regions extra immunity to future recessions or eliminate 
inter-regional differentials in unemployment. If one is seeking 
to avoid future recessions being particularly severe in the 
industrial areas, the primary task is to stabilise the industrial 
base as a whole, rather than to bring new waves of industry to 
the assisted regions. 
The strategy being considered here represents part of the 
stabilisation process rather than an alternative to it. If one 
examines a time series for fixed investment in manufacturing 
industry (Economic Trends Annual SuppZement, Economic Trends., 
various) it becomes clear that investment in plant and machinery 
is high by previous standards, while investment in new building 
and works is low by previous standards; the implication is that 
while industry is successfully re-equipping itself, it is not 
generating much expansion in floorspace or employment terms. It is 
important to generate such expansion, and one obvious priority 
would be for the state to take the lead in factory building, with 
particular preference being given to medium size towns in areas of 
high unemployment, provided such towns both have space for 
expansion of industry and housing, and are within reasonable daily 
travelling distance of depressed conurbations. Planning major new 
industrial expansion within the cities themselves would go against 
the grain of industrial location trends; it is better to work with 
the grain. The point of locating such advance factories in less 
prosperous regions is not just to absorb local unemployment, but 
also to provide a genuine encouragement to industrial growth by 
locating such factories in areas where industrial labour is readily 
available. 
Regional policy is one aspect of industrial floorspace 
policy; Fothergill, Monk and Perry (1987) examine the question in 
more detail, focussing attention on the quality of industrial 
floorspace, and arguing that qualitative deficiencies in industrial 
premises have impeded industrial expansion. The logic of their 
position is for a policy of renewal of industrial property in 
existing locations, notably the larger cities. These aspects are 
perhaps best regarded as complementary rather than contradictory; 
the objective would be, as far as possible, that no firm, be it 
small, medium or largel, should have its expansion potential 
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blocked by site problems or, at a time of mass unemployment, by 
labour shortages. 
(4) A research and development policy which reduces the excessive 
proportion of national R&D expenditure on military and big 
technology projects, and encourages the development of civilian 
R&D. Recognition needs to be given also to the importance of 
basic scientific research, and semi-applied research, in 
non-industrial institutions as a medium and long term spur to 
industrial growth. 
(5) An attempt to modify corporate taxation structures so that 
maximum profits would tend to be attainable at a higher level of 
output and employment than would otherwise be the case. 
The industrial sector is not the only sector in which expansion 
is strategically important. There is also the need to re-expand public 
sector services, notably health and education, in order to overcome the 
Governmentý-imposed stagnation of. the last decade. The current conjunction 
of underfunded public sector services, a large Budget surplus and record 
balance of payments deficits is, in economic terms, bizarre. Given the 
size of the Budget surplus which developed during the post-slump recovery, 
there is no real excuse for the NHS or education to be underfunded. 
Furthermore a given amount of expenditure on public sector services would 
lead to a considerably smal. Ierleakage from the national economy in terms of 
imports than would a similar amount of consumer expenditure "in the high 
street". There is the implication that an increase in public sector 
spending, and a shift from private consumption to public consumption, 
would ease balance of payments problems less painfully than would a 
simple squeeze on consumption. 
There were times in the 1970s when the cost of financing public 
sector services appeared to strain national resources, but this 
represented a temporary problem at a time of recession, and not evidence 
that public sector services are intrinsically uneconomic. Such services 
do not directly generate profits for capitalists, but it would be a very 
narrow view of the economy to suggest that only that which increases 
capitalist income is economic. Public sector services provide employment 
and, for the most part, genuinely useful employment. Furthermore it 
would be a cardinal mistake to assume that the benefits of health care 
and education go only to those receiving health care and education, and 
that therefore the optimum provision of these services (give or take a 
bit of "charitable" work) should be determined through price, by the 
individual's calculation of cost and benefit. In the long run a healthy, 
dynamic, productive economy with opportunities for all depends on a 
healthy, well educated workforce. Such a dynamic economy could readily 
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afford to pay for good health care for all. There may of course be 
temporary difficulties in funding during times of recession, and this 
may require temporary checks on expansion plans, but the commitment to 
expansion in the longer term is needed and should be made. 
Detailed blueprints for reducing unemployment and for climbing 
back to full employment must wait. Firstly though it is necessary to 
have a Government (or even an Opposition) committed to these objectives. 
For any Government in such a way committed, a basic three point strategy 
is required. 
(1) To encourage the accelerated development of the industrial 
base (and to attempt to cushion industries through any international 
recession). 
(2) To reverse the current decay in the public sector services, and 
to generate significant expansion, and significant new employment, 
in these services. 
(3) To show sufficient resolve to resist any City attempts to 
undermine a national full employment strategy, 
In addition to longer term strategies for eliminating unemployment, 
any incoming Government with a commitment to social justice will need to 
take imediate measures to improve, through more generous social security 
benefits, the financial position of the unemployed, the irregularly or 
casually employed, and others in poverty. This, it is hoped, is so 
obvious as not to require elaboration. 
When such a basic programme for both the short and the long term 
is under way, only then can we speak of a Government with a definite 
commitment to full employment. What is required in the long term is 
not help for the unemployed but the abolition of mass unemployment, not 
help for the poor but the elimination of poverty, not prosperity for most 
but opportunity for all. So far only the easy options have been taken and 
the reduction in unemployment, in relation to what is required, has 
been modest. It is more than overdue to direct ouselves, once again, to 
the creation of full employment in a free society. 
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Appendix Tables 
Table A. 1 Initials used as abbreviations for U. K. regions in 
text of thesis 
(i) Contemporary (post-1974) regions 
SE South East YH 
EA East Anglia NW 
Sw South West N 
WM West Midlands Wa. 
EM East Midlands Sc 
NI 
Yorkshire and Humberside 
North West 
North 
Wales 
Scotland 
Northern Ireland 
Earlier regions with different names but covering broadly similar 
areas as the above are initialled according to the post-1974 names, thus 
London and South East is included under South East 
North Midlands is included under EM 
Midlands (where EM and WM are not amalgamated under a composite 
Midland region) is included under WM 
Eastern is included under EA 
Yorkshire and Lincolnshire is included under YH 
(ii) Regional initials not in durrent use 
L London; S Southern (western part of Outer South East - see 
Table A. 2); M Midland (composite of East Midlands and West Midlands); 
Y (Yorkshire) North Eastern, 1936-1946; East and West Ridings, 1946-1962; 
YNE North Eastern, 1923-1936; Ire Ireland (before creation of Irish 
Free State) 
Table A. 2 below presents a more detailed descriptiont by county 
of regions at any particular point in time. 
I. - 
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Table A. 2 Approximate Composition of Regions, 1923-1985, 
in Department of Employment, etc., Statistics. 
1923-1936 L- Broadly the City of London and Metropolitan Police 
Districts. 
SE - As present SE, but includes East Anglia and excludes 
London and some counties west of London (Berkshire, 
Hampshire, Oxfordshire). 
SW - As present SW, but with addition of Berks., Hants., 
Oxon. 
M- Present EM and WMO plus Huntingdonshire and the Soke 
of Peterborough (now-part of EA). 
YNE - Durham, Northumberland (pre-1974 counties) plus YH 
plus remainder of historic Lincolnshire (apart from 
Stamford district, in M). 
NW - As present NW, plus Cumberland and Westmorland 
(present-day Cumbria). 
Sc - As present, but including Berwick district. 
Wa, NI-As present. 
(Note: Here and below some minor differences between pre-war 
definitions, and post-1974 definitions, due to new county 
boundaries and new counties, have been ignored). 
1936 New region formed: 
N- Broadly as present Northern region, thus 
Northumberland, Durham, Cleveland district of 
Yorkshire (all from previous YNE region) plus 
Cumberland and Westmorland (from NW region). 
NW - Loss of territory to N (see above). 
YH - Loss of territory to N (see above). 
In all three cases, the post-1936 regions correspond 
reasonably closely, at least insofar as major urban areas 
are concerned, with current regions. Care must be taken 
not to confuse YH (then referred to as the North-Eastern 
Division) with the Durham-Northumberland coalfield. 
1937 SE - Expanded to include the bulk of Berkshire (previously 
in SW) and Hunts. and the Soke of Peterborough 
(previously in 14). 
YH - Gained remaining part of Lincolnshire (Stamford 
district) from M. 
M'SW- Changes as described above. 
1939 Considerable subdivision of regions, to correspond with 
provincial organisation for civil defence. 
L London, Middlesex, parts of Essex, Kent, Surrey and 
Herts. 
SE Sussex, plus remainder of Kent. 
EA As present regions, plus Bedfordshire and the 
remainders of Essex and Hertfordshire, but minus 
Soke of Peterborough. 
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1939 S- Broadly the western part of current SE region 
(Oxon, Bucks., Berks., Hants., Isle of Wight, 
remainder of Surrey and easternmost part of Dorset). 
SW - As present, except for slight differences in 
boundaries. 
WM - As present, with minor differences. 
EM - As present, with minor differences. 
Y- East and Weqt Ridings of Yorkshire, plus York CB. 
NW - Broadly as present, plus Cumberland and Westmorland. 
N- As present, along with North Riding of Yorkshire. 
Sc, Wa, NI - As present. 
There were various modifications to these regions during 
the war, the most important being that in January 1940, 
the South-Eastern Division was merged with the Southern 
Division, although the territory involved was transferred 
to the London Division in July of that year. 
1951 to date The regions used have been broadly similar to those 
currently in use. The main changes have been 
(a) The separation of SE and EA regions in 1965. 
(b) The transfer of South Humberside from EM to YH in the 
same year. (c) Various realignments of regional boundaries resulting 
from the 1974 reorganisation of counties. Employment 
data from 1971 to 1974 have been based on post-1974 
regions. 
In calculating employment totals, the Bournemouth/Poole 
area has been regarded as part of SW region throughout. 
Fig A2 shows the composition of regions as they stand at 
present. 
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Fig A. 2 Regions and Counties of Great Britain 
0 
Great Britain : Counties 
North - South 64 
Midland-South 1 Bedfordshire 02 Berkshire 
03 Buckinghamshire 
4 East Sussex 
5 Essex 
6 Hampshire 
7 Herfordshlre 
6a Islo of Wight 
9 Kent 
0 
10 Oxfordshire Scot tan d 11 surrey 12 West Sussex 60 13 Cambridgeshire 
14 Norfolk 
15 Suffolk 
59 16 Greater London 
17 Avon 
18 Cornwall 
19 Devon 
20 Dorset 
SCOI 
'S&6 
3 21 Gloucestershlre 
56 
X6 
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55 
57 45 Northern 
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42 4 
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35 Vorkshire 
North 4o 37 
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17 
23 16 
19' 
22 
20 
6 
12 
11 
49 18 
South East 
South West 
22 Somerset 
23 Wiltshire 
24 Hereford and Worcester 
25 Shropshire 
26 Staffordshire 
27 Warwickshire 
28 West Midlands 
29 Derbyshire 
30 Leicestershire 
31 Lincolnshire 
32 Northamptonshlre 
33 Nottinghamshire 
34 Humberside 
35 North Yorkshire 
36 South Yorkshire 
37 West Yorkshire 
38 Cheshlre 
39 Greater Wnchester 
40 Lancashire 
41 Merseyside 
42 Cumbria 
43 Cleveland 
44 Durham 
45 Northumberland 
46 Tyne and Wear 
47 Clwyd 
48 Dytod 
49 Gwent 
50 Gwynedd 
51 Md Glamorgan 
52 Powys 
53 South Glamorgan 
54 West Glamorgan 
St 55 Borders Region 
56 Central Region 
57 Dumfries & Gallaway Region lia 58 FIfe Region 
aq Grampian Region 
60 Highlands Region 
61 Lothlans Region 
62 Strathelyde Region 
63 Tayside Region 
64 Orkney islands 
65 Shetland Islands 
66 Western Ises 
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Table A. 3 The Distribution of Populatioh'-of Great Britain 
Between Regions, 1701-1981 (percentage figures) 
Date SE SW WM EM YH '-NW ", N Wa Sc "Inner 
Britain) 
1701 23.3 7.5 15.4 7.5 8.5 4.6 4.9 7.0 6.0 15.1 62.2 
1751 22.9 6.5 13.2 7.5 7.5 5.1 5.8 6.? 6.1 16.9 57.6 
1781 23.0 6.3 13.6 8.2 7.7 6.1 6.5 6.6 5.9 16.0 58.8 
1801 24.6 5.8 12.7 8.0 7.4 6.6 8.1 6.2 5.5 15.1 58.5 
1811 24.8 5.5 12.5 8.1 7.4 6.8 8.7 5.5 5.4 14.9 58.3 
1821 24.8 5.5 12.3 7.8 7.3 6.9 9.3 5.6 5.6 14.7 57.7 
1831 24.6 5.4 12.1 7.9 7.2 7.2 10.2 5.4 5.5 14.4 57.2 
1841 24.0 5.1 11.7 8.1 7.1 7.5 11.1 5.5 5.6 14.1 56.0 
1851 24.5 4.9 10.7 8.2 6.9 7.7 12.0 5.6 5.7 13.9 55.2 
1861 25.3 4.3 9.9 8.6 6.6 7.8 12.7 5.9 5.7 13.2 54.7 
1871 26.1 3.9 9.1 8.6 6.3 8.3 13.0 6.3 5.5 12.9 54.0 
1881 26.7 3.5 8.0 8.4 6.4 8.6 13.8 6.6 5.3 12.8 53.0 
1891 27.7 3.2 7.4 8.2 6.4 8.7 14.1 6.7 5.4 12.2 52.9 
1901 28.3 2.9 7.0 8.1 6.5 8.7 14.1 6.8 5.4 12.1 52.8 
1911 28.7 2.8 6.7 8.0 6.6 8.7 14.0 6.9 5.9 11.7 52.8 
1921 28.8 2.7 6.5 8.2 6.6 8.5 13.9 7.1 6.2 11.4 52.8 
1931 30.0 2.6 6.4 8.4 6.7 8.8 13.7 6.8 5.8 10.8 54.1 
1951 30.8 2.7 6.8 9.1 7.1 8.4 13.1 6.4 5.3 10.4 56.5 
1961 31.6 2.7 6.8 9.3 7.2 8.1 12.7 6.3 5.2 10.1 57.6 
1971 31.7 3.1 7.2 9.5 7.3 8.0 12.3 6.1 5.1 9.7 58.8 
1981 31.2 3.5 7.6 9.5 7.6 8.0 11.9 6.0 5.2 9.5 59.4 
Sources: 1701,1751, 1781; D eane and Cole (19 62), p. 103 and p. 6 
(Scotland, b ut 1781 calculated by exponenti al 
interpolatio n), 180 1 onwards; Census data, taken from 
Mitchell and Deane (1962) , and from Lee 
('19 79). Lee's 
regionalisat ion of pre-19 74 counties has be en used 
throughout, and 198 1 figures have be en calc ulated to 
fit accordingly. 
Fig 3.1 and Table 3 .4 are modificati ons of this table. 
A correction has be en made for Lee's figure s for 1 871, 
in which Surrey has been double-coun ted. F igures for 
the South East in L ee '(1979) should read 6, 807,207 (not 
7,172,486) and for Great Britain 26, 072,284 (not 
26,437,563). 
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Table A. 4 Number of insured employees in employment, mid-year 
by region, 1923-1988 
Number of employees ( 1000s) 
L SE Sw M YNE NW Wa Sc NI UK 
1923 1810 698 697 1523 1742 1781 585 1118 214 10168 
1924 1854 740 721 1573 1794 1850 585 1150 218 10485 
1925 1946 780 739 1598 1603 1885 541 1119 201 10412 
1926 1979 810 754 1516 1624 1769 497 1095 207 10251 
1927(a) 1 2049 
----- 
846 
------ 
788 
------- 
1647 
----- 
1761 
---- 
1932 509 1166 
-- 
226 
------- 
10924 
------- 
1927(b)l 1980 819 762 1597 
-- 
1696 
----- 
1881 
------- 
488 
---- 
1148 221 10592 
1928 2041 811 757 1546 1639 1815 450 1115 201 10375 
1929 2114 860 782 1621 1727 1846 467 1128 224 10769 
1930 2088 869 784 1557 1585 1625 425 1055 206 10195 
1931 2083 879 779 1486 1450 1580 410 '979 200 . 
9846 
1932 2067 868 760 1493 1443 1625 381 950 188 9775 
1933 2147 925 781 1582 1536 1676 403 985 198 10233 
1934 2241 964 806 1663 1585 1712 416 1026 207 10620 
1935 2282 1005 836 1725 1612 1730 421 1044 204 10859 
1936(a) 2 2406 1065 914 1827 1742 1791 430 1092 211 11478 
L SE sw M. YH NW N Wa Sc NI UK 
1936(b) 
2 2585 886 914 1827 1198 1737 598 430 1092 211 11478 
1937(a) 
3 2700 
------ 
917 
------ 
931 
-- -- 
1935 
--- 
1261 1836 
- 
651 
---- 
479 
- 
1153 
----- 
229 
------ 
12092 
------- 
1937(b) 
3 2700 996 
- 
876 
--- 
1910 
------ 
1262 
-- ---- 
1836 
- 
651 
----- 
479 
-- 
1153 229 12092 
1938 2679 1002 891 1853 1226 1758 635 444 1164 195 11847 
1939 2758 1037 954 1985 1328 1882 682 514 1248 229 12617 
1940 
4 
------ ------ ----- ------ ------ ------- ----- ------ ------ ------ ------- 
SE EA S SW WM EM Y NW N Wa sc NI UK 
1945 5,6 2849 674 617 695 1370 954 1237 1993 888 657 1442 343 13719 
1946 3323 751 674 764 1437 1042 1366 2163 933 666 1541 339 14999 
1947 7 3462 775 692 776 1490 1059 1385 2219 970 690 1604 364 15486 
1948 718 5073 1043 939 1060 1961 1369 1774 2892 1220 925 2096 470 20820 
1949 
8 5123 1054 927 1058 1955 1390 1772 2891 1222 916 2094 470 20870 
1950 8 5190 1074 941 1068 1975 1407 1800 2917 1243 923 2111 470 21120 
1951(a) 
8 5188 1078 950 1063 2015 1450 1825 2958 1240 915 2108 470 21260 
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Number of employees (1000s)- 
SE Sw wM EM Y NW N Wa Sc NI UK 
1951(b) 
8 7o46 1110 2006 1407 1823 2923 1216 910 2077 443 20961 
1952 7122 1121 2008 1403 1786 2878 1211 912 2060 427 20927 
1953 7182 1126 1996 1419 1779 2879 1223 922 2076 432 21033 
1954 7325 1147 2056 1435 1806 2927 1233 924 2102 442 21398 
1955 7475 1165 2124 1458 1821 2955 1242 933 2112 443 21728 
1956 7591 1174 2135 1478 1847 2956 1267 939 2122 447 21958 
1957 7674 1181 2118 1490 1855 2956 1268 936 2119 447 22046 
1958 7653 1174 2112 1482 1832 2921 1273 921 2074 432 21875 
1959 7720 1196 2122 1482 1821 2894 1263 922 2067 441 21929 
1960 7902 1219 2205 1521 1853 2935 1270 941 2090 453 22390 
1961 8047 1253 2223 1555 1872 2965 1277 953 2104 451 22701 
1962 8198 1271 2254 1568 1884 2953 1274 954 2121 452 22928 
1963(a) 8243 
---- 
1287 
----- 
2255 
------ 
1573 
----- 
1890 
------ 
2930 
-- - 
1257 
----- 
958 
----- 
2091 
---- 
457 
------- 
22942 
------ 
1963(b) 9 8281 1293 2260 1578 1892 
- - 
2938 1260 961 2099 457 23018 
1964(a) 
9 8372 1313 2299 1600 1909 2973 1272 974 2125 464 23300 
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Number of employees in employment (1000s) 
SE EA SW WM EM Yll N14 N Wa Sc NI UK 
1964(b) 10 ( 8420 ) 1320 2311 ( 3468) 2978 1277 979 2121 465 23340 
1965 7962 597 1326 2346 1413 2081 2984 1301 985 2139 475 23622 
1966 8013 609 1339 2375 1426 2094 2999 1309 986 2143 482 23783 
1967 7881 606 1315 2300 1424 2034 2926 1279 952 2100 477 23305 
1968 7856 607 1312 2271 1398 2002 2899 1255 950 2086 480 23125 
1969(a) 11,12 7835 
- -- 
626 
--- - 
1295 
----- 
2271 
---- 
1402 
- 
1997 2883 1253 936 
-- 
2091 
-- 
485 
----- 
23085 
---- 
1969(b)"' 12 7791 632 1304 2278 
- --- 
1395 
---- 
2001 
-- -- 
2892 
---- 
1258 
-- 
942 2098 485 23085 
1970 7698 637 1310 2259 1392 1976 2842 1270 935 2077 487 22891 
1971(a) 13 7616 
----- 
620 
----- 
1308 
---- 
2218 
----- 
1363 
- -- 
1924 2779 1242 930 2018 482 22509 
1971(b)l 3 7242 607 1426 2207 1413 1916 2656 1206 962 2002 473 22110 
1972 7256 622 1447 2172 1425 1913 2636 1206 973 1988 470 22108 
1973 7346 652 1512 2242 1474 1966 2689 1248 1000 2050 479 22658 
1974 7366 665 1519 2247 1483 1991 2701 1245 992 2084 494 22787 
1975 7318. 671 1523 2212 1486 1985 2674 1266 998 2076 494 22703 
1976 7245 669 1514 2186 1497 1968 2638 1255 995 2071 492 22530 
1977 7226 681 1543 2202 1517 1984 2646 1256 998 2070 493 22616 
1978(a) 14 7289 
----- 
680 
---- 
1563 
------ 
2210 
---- 
1533 
------ 
1981 
---- 
2654 
----- 
1240 
---- 
1009 
---- 
2066 
----- 
503 
------ 
22728 
--- -- 
1978(b) 14 2648 1015 
1979 15 7430 707 1587 2226 1557 2004 2680 1248 1031 2106 519 23095 
1980 
15 7453 715 1586 2202 1542 1968 2624 1204 1003 2084 514 22895 
1981(a) 
15 7245 678 1547 2059 1461 1856 2430 1109 935 2001 484 
------ 
21805 
------ 
1981(b) 16 
----- 
7263 
---- 
681 
----- 
1541 
----- 
2051 
----- 
1467 
----- 
1852 
----- 
2466 
----- 
1122 
----- 
939 
--- 7- 
2002 505 21891 
1982 7146 679 1528 1982 1452 1807 2371 1093 906 1950 498 21414 
1983 7082 688 1515 1942 1426 1772 2302 1057 888 1899 495 21067 
1984 7182 704 1542 1965 1443 1768 2289 1059 886 1901 497 21238 
1985 7283 735 1563 1998 1511 1780 2286 1072 877 1904 498 21509 
1986 7351 763 1568 2018 1518 1788 2263 1086 862 1888 489 21594 
1987 7448 796 1594 2052 1528 1803 2263 1090 864 1886 491 21816 
1988 7568 834 1599 2096 1559 1819 2264 1105 874 1888 497 22104 
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Notes: Table A4 
1 1927(a) and earlier: Number of employees in employment aged 16 
and over. 1927(b) and later: Number of employees in employment 
aged 16-64. 
2 Changes in regional definition in 1936. See Table A2. 
3 Minor changes in regions in 1937; see Table A2. 
4 Regional labour force statistics not available for war yearse 
5 Unemployment at July subtracted from June count of insured 
employees, there being no unemployment figures available for 
June 1945. This makes a negligible difference to the employment 
totals. 
6 Y, NW and N figures are estimates, since 1945 unemployment 
figures are available only for pre-1946 regions, rather than for 
for the post-1946 regions presented above. it has been assumed 
for current purposes that the regional proportional distribution 
of unemployment was identical in 1945 and 1946. 
7 Major extension of national insurance scheme in 1948. No 
direct comparisons between 1947 and 1948 figures are possible. 
8 Employment statistics, 1948-1951(b)-taken froDtthe-' 
Gazette in the relevant years; Employment statistics, 1951(b)- 
1963(a) taken from the Gazette, January 1965, pp. 5-9, using the 
series with Dorset taken as part of SW region. This series 
preferred to the series given in the Historical Abstract, as it 
is based on a set of regions more closely resembling current 
regions. 
9 1963(b) and 1964(a) taken from the Gazette, December 1965p 
pp. 534-537. 
10 Statistics from 1964(b) to 1968 taken from the Historical 
Abstract, Table 131. There appear to be no statistics for 
post-1965 regions for the year 1964 in some regions, namely 
ýSE, EA, EM, YH. For the purposes of other tables, notably 
Table 
A5, the following estimates for employment in 1964 (in thousands) 
were used: SE 7837; EA 583; EM 1400; YH 2068. These correspond 
to percentage changes of SE +1.6; EA +2.4; EM +0.9; YH +0.6, 
which would appear to reproduce the approximate levels of 
regional differences in the rate of employment change during 
this period. 
11 Employment statistics 1969-1971 taken from British Labour 
Statistics Yearbook 1971 p. 130. The relevant Yearbooks (1969, 
1970,1971) also provide a more detailed sectoral disiggregation 
of employment. 
12 1969(b) figures incorporate improved information on the location 
of employees in the distributive trades, and are 4#ectly 
comparable with 1970 and 1971 figures. The effect of using 
improved information was to reallocate about 50,000 employees 
from the South East and East Midlands to other regions (Gazettel 
1970, pp. 288-289). 1969(a) figures are directly comparable 
with 1968 and earlier figures. 
13 Change from card count to Census of Employment data (see 
Buxton and MacKay 1977 pp. 64-68). Figures for 1971 to 1978 apply 
to post-1974 regions (Table A. 2), and have been taken from the 
data on the National OnZine Manpower Information System. These 
figures differ from those published in the Gazette and Yearbook 
for 1971,1972 and 1973, which are based on pre-1974 regions. 
Figures for 1974,1975 and 1976 correspond almost exactly to 
those published in the Gazette, the discrepancy always being less 
than 0.1%. 1977 figures show a similar degree of correspondence, 
except for East Anglia, where the Cazette gives a figure of 
681,000 employeesq while NOMIS gives a figure of 679,000 
employees. There are, unfortunately, substantial discrepancies 
for 1978 between the Gazette figures, not cited here, and the 
NOMIS figures; the figures presented in the Gazette are to be 
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regarded as unreliable. In all cases the NOMIS data are to 
be preferred, being the product of a revised examination, rather 
than an initial examination, of Census of Employment data. 
14 Published employment figures for the North West and Wales, and 
figures given by NOMIS (1978(b), in Table A) are not comparable 
with earlier years because of the transfer, through a realignment 
of boundaries, of about 6,000 employees in the Broughton area 
of Clwyd, from Cheshire (North West) to Clwyd (Wales) (Gazette, 
1981 pp. 141). Revised figures (1978(a) in Table A4) are comparable 
with earlier years. 
15 These figures are estimates, based on interpolations between the 
June 1978 and September 1981 Censuses of Employment. It is 
possible (see chapter 8.1 and Table 8.2) that the official 
figures overestimate employment in mid-1979 by perhaps 50,000 
and underestimate employment in mid-1980 by perhaps 30,000; this 
will obviously have implications for regional figures. 
16, -'All employment figures from 1981(b) onwards taken from the 
Gazette., HistoricaZ Supplement. 1981(a) figures are in a 
continuous series from earlier figures; 1981(b) figures are in 
a continuous series with later figures. This break in series 
needs to be kept in mind when calculating percentage changes 
between years (Tables A5, A6). 
T. - 
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Table A. 5 Annual Percentage Employment Change by Region, 
1923-1988 
Year ending L SE sw m YNE NW Wa Sc NI UK 
1924 +2.4 +6.0 +3.4 +3.3 +3.0 +3.9 0.0 +2.9 +1.9 +3.1 
1925 +5.0 +5.4 +2.5 +1.6 -10.6 +1.9 -7.5 -2.7 -7.8 -o. 7 
1926 +1.7 +3.8 +2.0 -5.1 +1.3 -6.2 -8.1 -2.1 +3.0 -1.5 
1927 +3.5 +4.4 +4.5 +8.6 +8.4 +9.2 +2.4 +6.5 +9.2 +6.6 
1928 +3.1 -1.0 -0.7 -3.2 -3.4 -3.5 -7.8 -2.9 -9.0 -2. o 
1929 +3.6 +6.0 +3.3 +4.9 +5.4 +1.7 +3.8 -1.2 +11.4 +3.8 
1930 -1.2 +1.0 +0.3 -3.9 -8.2 -12.0 -9.0 -6.5 -8.0 -5.3 
1931 -0.2 +1.2 -0.6 -4.6 -8.5 -2.8 -3.5 -7.2 -2.9 -3.4 
1932 -0.8 -1.3 -2.4 +0.5 -0.5 +2.8 -7.1 -3.0 -6.0 -o. 7 
1933 +3.9 +6.6 +2.8 +6.0 +6.4 +3.1 +5.8 +3.7 +5.3 +4.7 
1934 +4.3 +4.2 +3.2 +5.1 +3.2 +2.1 +3.2 +4.2 +4.5 +3.8 
1935 +1.8 +4.3 +3.7 +3.7 +1.7 +1.1 +1.2 +1.8 -1.4 +2.3 
1936 +5.4 +6.0 +9.3 +5.9 +8.1 +3.5 +2.1 +4.6 +3.4 +5.7 
L SE sw m YH NW N Wa Sc NI UK 
1937 +4.4 +3.5 +1.9 +5.9 +5.3 +5.7 +8.9 +11.4 +5 .6 +8.5 +5.3 
1938 -0.8 +0.6 +1.7 -3. o -2.9 -4.2 -2.5 -7.3 +1 .0 -14.8 -2.0 
1939 +2.9 +3.5 +7.1 +7.1 +8.3 +7.1 +7.4 +15.8 +7 .2 +17.4 +6.5 
SE EA S SW WM EM Y NW N Wa Sc NI UK 
1947 +4.2 +3.2 +2.7 +1.6 +3.7 +1.6 +1.4 +2.5 +4.0 +3.6 +4.1 +7. 4 +3.2 
(1948 (+34.4): 
1949 +1.0 +1.1 -1.3 -0.2 -0.3 +1.5 -0.1 -0.0 +0.2 -1.0 -0.1 - +0.2 
1950 +1.3 +1.9 +1.5 +0.9 +1,0 +1.2 +1.6 -0.9 +1.7 +0.8 +0.8 - +1.2 
1951 -0.0 +0.4 +1.0 -0.5 +2.0 +3.1 +1.4 +1.4 -0.2 -0.9 -0.1 - +o. 6 
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SE sw wm EM y NW N Wa Sc NI UK 
1952 +1.1 +1.0 +0.1 -0.3 -2.0 -1.5 -0.4 +0.2 -0.8 -3.6 -o. 2 
1953 +0.8 +0.4 -0.6 +1.1 -o. 4 +0.0 +1.0 +1.1 +0.8 +1.2 +0.5 
1954 +2.0 +1.9 +3.0 +1.1 +1-5 +1.7 +0.9 40.2 +1.3 +2.3 +1.7 
1955 +2.0 +1.6 +3.3 +1.6 +0.8 +1.0 +0.8 +1.0 +0.5 +0.2 +1.5 
1956 +1.6 +0.8 +0.5 +1.4 +1.4 +0.0 +2.0 +0.6 +0.5 +0.9 +1.1 
1957 +1.1 +0.6 -0.8 +0.8 +0.4 0.0 +0.1 -0.3 -0.1 0.0 +0.4 
1958 -0.3 -0.6 -0.3 -0.5 -1.2 -1.2 +0.4 -1.6 -2.1 -3.4 -o. 8 
1959 +0.9 +1.9 +0.5 0.0 -0.6 -1.0 -0.8 +0.1 -0.3 +2.1 +0.2 
1960 +2.4 +1.9 +3.9 +2-6 +1.8 +1.4 +0.6 +2.1 +1.1 +1.3 +2.1 
1961 +1.8 +2.8 +0.8 +2.2 +1.0 +1.0 +0.6 +1.3 +0.7 +0.1 +1.4 
1962 +1.9 +1.4 +1.3 +0.8 +0.6 -0.4 -0.2 +0.1 +0.8 +0.4 +1.0 
1963 +0.5 +1.3 +0.0 +0.3 +0.3 -0.8 -1.3 +o. 4 -1.4 +1.4 +0.1 
1964 +1.1 +1.5 +1.7 +1.4 +0.9 +1.2 +1.0 +1.4 +1.2 +1.5 +1.2 
SE EA SW WM EM YH NW N Wa Sc NI UK 
1965 ( +1.7) +0.5 +1.5 ( +0.7) +0.2 +1.9 +0.6 +0.8 +2.2 +1.1 
1966 +0.6 +2.0 +1.0 +1.2 +0.9 +0.6 +0.5 +0.5 +0.1 +0.2 +1.5 +0.7 
1967 -1.6 -0.5 -1.8 -3.2 -0.1 -2.9 -2.4 -2.2 -3.4 -2.0 -1.0 -2. o 
1968 -0.3 +0.2 -0.2 -1.3 -1.8 -1.6 -0.9 -1.9 -0.2 -0.7 +0.6 -0.8 
1969 -0.3 +3.1 -1.3 0.0 +0.3 -0.2 -0.6 -0.2 -1.5 +0.2 +1.0 -o. 2 
1970 -1.2 +0.8 +0.5 -0.8 -0.2 -1.2 -1.7 +1.0 -0.7 -1.0 +0.4 -o. 8 
1971 -1.0 -2.7 -0.2 -1.8 -2.1 -2.6 -2.2 -2.2 -0.5 -2.8 -1.0 -1.7 
1972 +0.2 +2.4 +1.4 -1.6 +0.8 -0.1 -0.8 +0.0 +1.1 -0.7 -0.6 -0.0 
1973 +1.2 +4.8 +4.5 +3.2 +3.5 +2.8 +2.0 +3.5 +2.9 +3.1 +1.9 +2.5 
1974 +0.3 +2.0 +0.5 +0.2 +0.6 +1.3 +0.4 -0.3 -0.8 +1.7 +3.1 +0.6 
1975 -0.7 +1.0 +0.2 -1.5 +0.2 -0.3 -1.0 +1.6 +0.6 -0.4 0.0 -o. 4 
1976 -1.0 -0.2 -0.6 -1.2 +0.8 -0.9 -1.4 -0.9 -0.2 -0.2 -0.4 -0.7 
1977 -0.3 +1.7 +2.0 +0.7 +1.4 +0.8 +0.3 +0.1 +0.2 -0.0 +0.2 +0.3 
1978 +0.9 -0.1 +1.3 +0.3 +1.1 -0.2 +0.3 -1.3 +1.2 -0.2 +2.0 +0.5 
1979 +1.9 +4.0 +1.5 +0.7 +1.6 +1.2 +1.2 +0.6 +1.6 +1.9 +3.2 +1.6 
1980 +0.3 +1.1 -0.1 -1.1 -1.0 -1.8 -2.1 -3.5 -2.7 -1.0 -1.0 -0.9 
1981 -2.8 -5.2 -2.5 -6.5 -5.3 -5.7 -7.4 -7.9 -6.8 -4.0 -5.8 -4.8 
1982 -1.6 -0.3 -0.8 -3.4 -1.0 -2.4 -3.9 -2.6 -3.5 -2.6 -1.4 -2.2 
1983 -0.9 +1.3 -0.9 -2.0 -1.8 -1.9 -2.9 -3.3 -2.0 -2.6 -0.6 -1.6 
1984 +1.4 +2.3 +1.8 +1.2 +1.2 -o. 2 -0.6 +o. 2 -0.2 +0.1 +0.4 +0.8 
1985 +1.4 +4.4 +1.4 +1.7 +4.7 +0.7 -0.1 +1.2 -1.0 +0.2 +0.2 +1.3 
1986 +0.9 +3.8 +0.3 +1.0 +0.5 +o. 4 -1.0 +1.3 -1.7 -0.8 -1.8 +0.4 
1987 +1.3 +4.3 +1.7 +1.7 +0.7 +0.8 +0.0 +0.4 +0.2 -0.1 +0.4 +1.0 
1988 +1.6 +4.8 +0.3 +2.1 +2.0 +0.9 +0.0 +1.4 +1.2 +0.1 +1.2 +1.3 
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Source: calculated from Table A 
In recent years, figures presented here might not be identical 
to figures presented in the text. The present figures are based on 
most recent revisions, as of early 1989, while other figures would 
have been based on earlier estimates. 
Alternative series, 1929-39, based on Beck 1951, Tables 16 and 17. 
Year ending LSE sw m YNE NW Wa Sc NI UK 
1930 0.0 +0.9 -3.5 -5.6 -10.4 -6.9 -4.3 -7.9 -4.1 (-5.3) 
1931 -0.2 -1.4 -5.5 -10.0 -3.1 -6.9 -6.9 -4.3 -4.2 (-3.4) 
1932 -1.2 -1.8 0.0 -0.7 +1.2 -6.3 -2.7 -1.8 -1.0 (-0.7) 
1933 +4.1 +2.5 +5.9 +5.3 +3.4 +5.7 +3.3 +0.9 +4.3 (+4.7) 
1934 +5.1 +3.8 +5.9 +3.3 +2.8 +1.6 +4.7 +7.6 +4.3 (+3.8) 
1935 +2.1 +2.6 +3.6 +1.2 +0.8 +3.0 +2.2 -0.3 +2.0 (+2.3) 
1936 +5.8 +6.3 +5.8 +6.9 +3.1 -0.8 +5.2 +7.5 +5.2 (+5.7) 
1937 +2.6 +5.8 +6.4 +7.0 +13.9 +5.5 +2.9 +6.0 (+5.3) 
1938 +1.9 +4.5 -2.0 -2.5 -3.3 +1.2 -7.6 -0.3 (-2.0) 
1939 +2.4 +6.6 +6.2 +6.8 +11.9 +4.9 +11.4 +5.4 (+6.5) 
t 
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Table A. 6 Annual Percentage Employment Change, North, Midlands 
South, 1923-1984 
Year ending South Midlands North South plus Annual gap UK 
Midlands 
1924 +3.4 +3.3 +2.9 +3.4 +o. 5 +3.1 
1925 +4.5 +1.6 -4.4 +3.6 +8.0 -0.7 
1926 +2.3 -5.1 -2.9 -0.1 +2.8 -1.5 
1927 +4.0 +8.6 +7.7 +5.4 -2.3 +6.6 
1 A. 928 +1.3 -3.2 -3.9 -0.1 +3.8 -2.0 
1929 +4.1 +4.9 +3.3 +4.3 +1.0 +3.8 
1930 -o. 4 -3.9 -9.2 -1.5 +7.7 -5.3 
1931 0.0 -4.6 -5.7 -1.3 +4.4 -3.4 
1932 -1.2 +0.5 -o. 7 -o. 7 0.0 -o. 7 
1933 +4.3 +6.0 +4.6 +4.8 +0.2 +4.7 
1934 +4.1 +5.1 +3.1 +4.4 +1.3 +3.8 
1935 +2.8 +3.7 +1.3 +3.1 +1.8 +2.3 
1936 +6.4 +5.9 +5.1 +6.2 +1.1 +5.7 
1937 +3.7 +5.9 +6.5 +4.4 -2.1 +5.3 
1938 0.0 -3. o -3.4 -0.9 +2.5 -2. o 
1939 +3.9 +7.1 +8.5 +4.8 -3.7 +6.5 
1947 +5.4 +2.8 +3.2 +4.6 +1.4 +3.2 
(1948 
1949 +0.6 +0.5 -0.1 +o. 5 +0.6 +0.2 
1950 +1.4 +1.0 +1.1 +1.3 +0.2 +1.2 
1951 +0.1 +2.5 +0.6 +o. 8 +0.2 +0.6 
1952 +1.1 -0.1 -1.3 +0.7 +2.0 -o. 2 
1953 +0.8 +0.1 +0.4 +0.6 +0.2 +0.5 
1954 +2.0 +2.2 +1.3 +2.0 +0.7 +1.7 
1955 +2.0 +2.6 +0.8 +2.2 +1.4 +1.5 
1956 +1.4 +0.9 +0.8 +1.3 +0.5 +1.1 
1957 +1.0 -0.1 +0.0 +0.7 +0.7 +0.4 
1958 -o. 3 -o. 4 -1.3 -o. 3 +1.0 -o. 8 
1959 +1.0 +0.3 -o. 5 +0.8 +1.3 +0.2 
1960 +2.3 +3.4 +1.5 +2.6 +1.1 +2.1 
1961 +2.0 +1.4 +0.8 +1.8 +1.0 +1.4 
1962 +1.8 +1.2 +0.1 +1.6 +1.5 +1.0 
1963 +o. 6 +0.3 -o. 5 +0.5 +1.0 +0.1 
1964 +1.2 +1.6 +1.1 +1.4 +0.3 +1.2 
1965 +1.5 +1.3 +0.8 +1.4 +0.6 +1.1 
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Year ending South Midlands North South plus Annual gap UK 
Midlands 
1966 +0.8 +1.1 +0.5 +0.9 +0.4 +0.7 
1967 -1.6 -2.0 -2.4 -1.7 +0.7 -2. o 
1968 -o. 3 -1.5 -1.0 -o. 6 +0.4 -o. 8 
1969 -o. 2 +0.1 -o. 3 -0.1 +0.2 -o. 2 
1970 -0.8 -o. 6 -1.0 -o. 8 +0.2 -o. 8 
1971 -1.0 -1.9 -2.2 -1.3 +0.9 -1.7 
1972 +0.5 -o. 7 -o. 3 +0.2 +o. 5 -0.0 
1973 +1.9 +3.4 +2.7 +2.3 -o. 4 +2.5 
1974 +0.4 +0.5 +0.8 +0.4 -o. 4 +0.6 
1975 -o. 4 -0.9 -0.1 -o. 5 -o. 4 -o. 4 
1976 -0.9 -0.4 -0.8 -o. 7 +0.1 -o. 7 
1977 +0.2 +1.0 +0.3 +o. 4 +0.1 +0.3 
1978 +0.9 +0.6 +0.1 +0.8 +0.7 +0.5 
1979 +2.0 +1.1 +1.4 +1.7 +0.3 +1.6 
1980 +0.3 -1.0 -2. o -0.1 +1.9 -0.9 
1981 -2.9 -6. o -6.2 -3.8 +2.4 -4.8 
1982 -1.4 -2.4 -2.9 -1.7 +1.2 -2*. 2 
1983 -o. 7 -1.9 -2.5 -1.0 +1.5 -1.6 
1984 +1.5 +1.2 -0.1 +1.4 +1.5 +0.8 
1985 +1.6 +3.0 +0.2 +2.0 +1.8 +1.3 
1986 +1.1 +0.8 -0.5 +1.0 +1.5 +0.4 
1987 +1.6 +1.2 +0.3 +1.5 +1.2 +1.0 
1988 +1.7 +2.1 +0.6 +1.8 +1.2 +1.3 
Source: calculated from Table A 
See also Fig. 3.2. 
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Table A. 7 Monthly Unemployment Rates by Region, 1912-1988 
Since this is a particularly bulky data series, if presented 
complete, the full monthly series is presented only for selected yearst 
notably those in periods of slump and those for which the available data 
are not widely available. 
The series is subdivided as follows: 
Series (a) 1913-1915 
Monthly, based on Labour Exchange data, and not trade union 
data. Source: Gazette. 
Series (b) 1915-1922 
Figures for August 1921, covering men over 18 only, from Astor 
(1923 p. 16). Unfortunately, the Gazette gave no official 
series for overall regional unemployment rates in the early 
post-war years, although it would doubtless be possible to 
construct such a series. Regional unemployment rates in 
particular sectors are given in Tables 4. , 4. and 4. Series (c) 1922-1929 
Quarterly, Series (i) based on Tables 110,162 of the 
HistoricaZ Abstract, series (ii) based on the Gazette. 
Series (d) 1929-1933 
Monthly, from Gazette. 
Series (e) 1934-1940 
Bimonthly, from Gazette. 
Series (f) 1940-1966 
Annually. 1940-47 from Beck (1951) Table 43; 1948-64 from 
Gazette; 1965-66 HistoricaZ Abstract Table 169. 
Series (g) 1966-1979 
Quarterly. 
Series (h) 1979-1984 
Monthly. 
Series W 1984-1988 
Bimonthly. 
I- 
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Series (a) 
SE Sw wm Y+Em NW Wa Sc+N Ire UK 
1913 J 9.4 4.9 3.6 3.6 3.7 2.4 3.0 8.2 5. o 
F 8.6 4.6 3.3 2.7 2.9 2.6 2.6 8.2 4.4 
m 6. o 4.4 2.7 2.1 2.6 2.6 1.9 8.4 3.5 
A 4.5 3.8 2.3 1.7 1.9 2.3 1.7 7.6 2.8 
m 4.1 4. o 2.4 1.7 2.0 2.7 1.7 6.5 2.7 
1 4.6 4. o 2.2 1.6 1.9 2.2 1.7 5.9 2.8 
1 5.7 4.8 2.6 1.6 2.0 1.7 1.8 5.6 3.1 
A 4.9 4.9 3.1 2. o 2.4 2.1 1.8 5.8 3.1 
S 5.7 5.4 3.6 2.3 2.9 2.8 2.2 6.6 3.7 
0 6. o 4.8 3. o 2.4 2.8 2.3 2.0 6. o 3.6 
N 7.0 5.4 3.2 2.8 3.3 2.0 2.2 7.6 4.1 
D 7.2 5.8 3.6 3.6 4.2 2.6 2.8 9.2 4.6 
L SE Sw wm Y+E M NW Wa N Sc Ire UK 
1914 1 10.5 6.6 6.9 4.3 4.1 4.7 3.0 3.2 3.1 10.6 5.5 
F 8.7 4.4 5.5 3.5 3.3 3.4 4.2 2.2 2.5 2.7 8.2 4.4 
m 6.7 3.3 4.9 3.3 2.7 2.9 3.4 2.1 2.1 2.2 6.9 3.6 
A 5.6 2.7 4.1 3.2 2.8 2.8 3.2 1.8 2.1 2.1 6.5 3.3 
M 5.9 2.4 4.3 3.0 2.5 2.6 3.1 2.7 1.9 2.0 5.7 3.2 
1 7.2 2.6 4.5 3.3 2.5 2.2 3.1 2.4 2.1 2.1 5.7 3.5 
1 7.0 3.1 4.0 3.5 2.4 2.5 3.3 3.5 2.2 2.3 5.3 3.6 
A 9.5 4.8 5.4 7.6 6.0 5.7 7.4 3.6 3.3 4.1 9.5 6.2 
S 10.0 4.4 4.8 5.5 4.2 4.9 6.3 2.8 2.9 3.4 8.6 5.4 
0 8.1 3.2 3.9 3.5 3.1 3.4 5.0 2.1 2.4 2.5 7.0 4.2 
N 7.6 3.3 5.5 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.8 2.0 1.8 2.3 6.3 3.7 
D 5.8 3.0 3.2 2.8 2.6 3. o 3.4 2.2 1.5 2.0 6.9 3.3 
1915 1 4.7 2.8 2.2 2.0 2.4 2.5 2.5 1.6 1.0 1.5 6.3 2.6 
F 3.9 2.3 1.8 1.4 1.6 1.9 1.7 1.4 0.8 1.2 6.2 2.0 
M 2.4 1.7 1.5 0.9 0.9 1.4 1.1 1.1 0.6 0.8 5.4 1.4 
A 1.7 1.1 1.2 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.2 0.4 0.6 5.7 1.1 
M 1.7 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.3 4.9 0.9 
1 1.9 0.8 0.9 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.3 4.9 0.9 
J 2.4 1.2 1.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.8 0.3 0.5 4.2 1.0 
Series (b) 1915-1922 
L SE Sw m YNE NW Wa Sc NI UK 
1921 Au g 13 12 15 18 18 16 12 21 25 16 
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Series (c) 1922-1929 
(i) HistoricaZ Abstract 
L SE Sw m YNE NW Wa Sc NI UK 
1922 Dec 11.1 12.1 12.7 12.8 13.3 16.2 8.9 16.0 22.0 13.4 
1923 Mar 10.2 10.1 11.0 9.7 10.7 13.6 7.2 13.9 18.0 11.2 
Jun 9.5 8.2 9.4 9.3 10.8 14.3 5.8 13.0 15.1 10.7 
Sep 9.3 8.5 9.8 10.0 12.2 14.5 5.8 13.6 15.4 11.2 
Dec 9.4 9.8 10.2 9.5 11.7 15.3 5.6 13.0 15.3 11.2 
1924 Mar 8.6 7.2 8.9 7.1 8.7 12.1 5.0 11.2 13.8 9.1 
Jun 7.6 5.4 7.3 7.5 8.9 11.5 6.0 10.8 15.1 8.7 
Sep 8.3 6.9 8.5 8.7 11.6 12.5 12.1 12.2 16.1 10.3 
Dec 8.8 8.0 9.9 9.9 13.2 12.0 14.3 14.2 17.6 11.3 
1925 Mar 8.2 6.3 8.3 7.8 13.9 10.2 14.4 14.1 20.6 10.5 
Jun 6.7 4.5 7.2 10.8 16.5 11.5 16.2 15.6 24.0 11.5 
Sep 6.3 4.8 7.9 9.0 15.8 12.5 26.3 15.1 24.4 11.8 
Dec 5.7 5.3 7.8 7.0 13.6 9.7 13.2 14.8 24.0 9.8 
(ii) Gazette 
1925 Sep 6.9 4.9 8.2 9.8 16.5 12.9 20.7 15.5 24.5 12.0 
Dec 6.5 5.8 8.4 7.7 14.1 10.3 13.4 15.4 25.7 10.5 
1926 Mar 6.5 5.1 8.0 6.9 12.5 10.9 12.8 13.4 23.6 9.8 
Jun 7.3 5.9 8.4 14.8 19.9 18.3 21.7 17.9 25.5 14.6 
Sep 6.7 4.8 7.7 13.2 19.6 17.3 20.6 17.3 22.1 13.9 
Dec 6.5 5.7 8.6 9.9 17.0 13.0 17.6 16.0 19.9 11.9 
1927 Mar 6.4 5.3 7.3 8.2 14.6 9.7 16.5 11.7 14.6 9.9 
Jun 5.2 3.9 6.2 8.3 12.4 9.6 18.1 9.7 11.5 8.9 
Sep 5.3 4.7 7.0 7.8 13.1 10.6 22.2 8.9 10.6 9.4 
Dec 5.6 6.2 8.4 8.0 12.8 11.0 23.3 10.2 11.6 9.8 
1928 Mar 5.4 5.4 7.9 7.8 12.9 10.7 20.7 10.7 12.8 9.6 
Jun 5.2 4.4 7.4 11.1 15.2 12.3 21.3 11.1 19.4 10.8 
Sep 5.5 5.1 7.9 10.9 16.2 13.8 22.7 11.7 20.3 11.5 
Dec 5.7 6.2 8.6 9.6 15.5 12.8 22.8 13.2 17.2 11.2 
1929 Mar 6. o 5.7 8.1 8.3 13.3 11.9 18.2 12.3 15.3 10.1 
Jun 5. o 4.0 7.0 9.4 12.7 12.8 17.9 11.1 14.2 9.8 
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Series (d) 1929-1933 
L SE Sw m YNE NW Wa Sc NI UK 
1929 Jul 4.9 4.0 7.0 9.8 12.7 12.9 18.5 11.2 14.7 9.9 
Aug 4.9 4.3 7.1 9.5 12.8 14.2 17.3 11.3 14.9 10.1 
Sep 5.0 4.8 7.6 9.0 12.7 13.6 19.6 11.3 15.0 10.1 
Oct 5.4 5.5 8.2 8.8 13.4 13.6 19.7 11.6 14.8 10.4 
Nov 5.9 6.6 9.2 8.8 14.0 14.2 20.8 12.5 15.2 11.0 
Dec 5.9 6.9 9.2 9.1 14.1 14.4 20.7 12.9 15.2 11.1 
1930 Jan 7.4 8.2 9.9 10.8 15.9 16.6 19.7 14.0 17.2 12.6 
Feb 7.5 8.2 9.7 11.1 16.3 18.2 20.9 14.6 17.4 13.1 
Mar 7.4 7.7 9.6 12.6 16.7 19.5 23.9 17.0 20.4 14.0 
Apr 7.3 7.5 9.7 13.6 17.7 20.7 24.6 16.8 21.9 14.6 
May 7.3 7.0 9.3 13.8 18.3 23.5 27.7 17.4 22.9 15.3 
Jun 7.3 6.4 9.0 15.3 19.3 24.6 25.5 17.7 23.6 15.8 
Jul 7.8 6.9 9.5 16.6 21.9 26.2 26.9 18.9 26.4 17.1 
Aug 8. o 7.3 9.9 16.4 22.3 27.6 25.7 19.7 27.1 17.5 
Sep 8.4 8.1 10.6 16.5 23.0 27.7 27.7 20.7 27.7 18.1 
Oct 9.2 8.9 12.1 16.2 24.2 27.4 30.3 21.4 27.3 18.7 
Nov 10.0 10.3 13.3 16.4 24.0 27.6 28.6 22.7 28.1 19.1 
Dec 9.8 11.1 13.2 18.6 24.5 29.3 31.2 23.5 33.4 20.2 
1931 Jan 12.2 13.1 15.1 19.4 26.0 29.7 30.6 25.7 30.9 21.5 
Feb 12.4 12.9 14.7 19.8 26.7 29.5 32.2 26.4 30.0 21.7 
Mar 12.0 12.1 14.4 20.8 27.8 27.4 31.5 26.4 29.7 21.5 
Apr 11.6 11.1 13.7 20.0 26.5 27.4 31.2 26.0 29.1 20.9 
May 11.4 10.8 13.1 19.6 25.7 27.2 34.1 26.9 28.5 20.8 
Jun 11.6 10.2 13.4 22.0 29.6 28.2 32.5 26.2 27.8 21.8 
Jul 12.1 10.6 13.5 22.3 30.6 29.5 32.8 28.2 27.9 22.6 
Aug 12.4 11.1 13.8 21.9 30.1 30.0 33.5 27.8 . 28.4 22.7 
Sep 12.9 12.3 14.6 21.8 30.1 31.3 34.4 28.2 29.0 23.2 
Oct 13.4 13.3 16.1 19.8 27.0 28.2 33.3 27.0 26.0 21.9 
Nov 13.6 14.0 16.5 19.1 26.1 26.4 33.7 27.0 25.2 21.4 
Dec 13.1 14.4 16.4 19.3 25.2 25.2 31.7 26.9 25.5 20.9 
1932 Jan 15.0 16.5 18.1 20.3 26.4 26.3 35.1 27.9 26.1 22.4 
Feb 14.7 16.2 18.0 19.7 26.7 25.4 34.9 27.5 25.0 22.0 
Mar 14.0 14.9 16.8 18.4 25.8 23.4 33.1 26.9 24.1 20.8 
Apr 13.5 14.4 16.6 19.6 27.6 24.0 34.9 26.9 24.1 21.4 
May 13.5 13.9 16.8 20.1 28.9 26.7 34.3 27.1 25.2 22.1 
Jun 13.2 13.0 16.0 21.5 29.9 25.6 38.2 26.6 26.9 22.3 
Jul 13.2 13.4 16.6 21.6 30.7 25.9 38.8 28.8 30.2 22.9 
Aug 13.0 13.2 16.5 21.6 31.0 27.5 39.9 27.7 29.8 23.1 
Sep 13.2 14.2 17.1 21.4 30.0 27.4 38.2 27.9 28.3 22.9 
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L : SE Sw m YNE NW Wa Sc NI UK 
1932 Oct 13.0 14.1 17.9 19.0 28.6 25.5 38.3 27.7 27.7 21.9 
Nov 13.2 14.8 18.3 18.9 29.2 25.6 38.3 28.2 28.5 22.2 
Dec 12.9 14.5 17.8 18.7 27.6 24.8 37.2 28.4 28.6 21.7 
1933 Jan 14.8 16.4 19.3 20.6 29.0 25.7 37.2 29.6 29.7 23.1 
Feb 14.8 15.7 18.5 20.4 29.1 25.6 35.4 28.7 29.6 22.8 
Mar 13.9 14.1 17.5 19.8 28.2 25.4 35.6 27.7 29.2 22.0 
Apr 12.9 12.5 16.4 19.6 27.4 25.1 35.9 27.1 28.8 21.4 
May 12.1 11.2 15.1 18.3 27.5 24.0 34.9 26.2 27.8 20.5 
Jun 11.4 9.6 14.3 17.8 25.9 23.1 34.3 24.8 25.9 19.5 
Jul 11.1 9.7 14.3 17.7 25.7 23.4 34.6 25.9 26.2 19.6 
Aug lo. 6 9.1 13.8 17.7 26.0 23.2 33.6 24.5 25.1 19.2 
Sep 10.5 9.4 14.1 15.9 24.5 22.4 32.5 24.6 24.5 18.5 
Oct 1-0.2 9.6 14.8 14.6 23.6 21.7 34.6 24.4 24.1 18.1 
Nov 10.1 10.2 14.8 13.7 23.2 21.6 33.4 24.9 24.2 17.9 
Dec 9.9 10.8 15.4 13.2 21.6 20.7 33.6 25.2 24.7 17.6 
Series (e) 1933/4 to 1940 
1934 Feb 10.9 10.9 15.2 13.7 22.5 21.8 33.8 25.3 26.0 18.2 
Apr 9.2 8.6 13.2 12.5 21.2 20.7 33.0 23.5 23.7 16.7 
Jun 8.4 7.0 11.5 13.6 23.4 20.0 33.2 21.7 22.4 16.5 
Aug 8.3 7.2 11.5 14.3 23.2 21.0 30.8 21.5 22.9 16.6 
Oct 8.7 8.4 13.1 12.1 22.0 20.7 32.0 22.0 23.6 16.4 
Dec 8.6 9.1 13.1 11.5 20.6 20.1 31.9 22.9 24.3 16.1 
1935 Feb 10.1 10.4 14.3 12.8 22.8 21.3 33.8 23.6 26.7 17.5 
Apr 8.5 8.3 11.9 11.2 20.3 19.6 32.0 21.7 25.3 15.7 
Jun 8.2 7.0 10.4 11.7 22.2 19.2 30.6 20.1 25.2 15.5 
Aug 7.7 6.6 9.8 11.5 20.3 19.6 29.9 20.0 28.1 15.0 
Oct 7.7 7.6 11.0 9.8 19.1 19.0 30.9 20.1 23.4 14.6 
Dec 7.7 8.4 11.1 9.6 17.9 18.2 29.2 20.5 22.7 14.2 
1936 Feb 9.1 9.9 12.2 10.7 18.8 19.. 1 32.2 21.2 24.4 15.4 
Apr 7.5 7.5 9.8 9.3 17.8 17.5 31.2 19.5 22.6 13.8 
Jun 6.7 5.9 8.0 9.2 18.4 16.5 30.1 17.3 22.6 13.1 
(Jul 6.5 5.6 7.8 9.4 16.6 16.2 28.5 18.0 23.3 12.7 
L SE sw m YH NW N Sc NI UK 
(Jul 6.5 5.6 7.8 9.4 14.2 16.0 21.3 28.5 18.0 23.3 12.7 
Aug 6.3 5.6 7.8 9.1 12.9 16.1 21.4 27.4 17.2 23.1 12.3 
Oct 6.4 6.8 8.8 7.7 11.8 15.9 21.3 28.3 17.0 22.5 12.1 
Dec 6.5 7.8 9.0 7.7 11.6 15.7 21.4 26.3 17.5 24.5 12.2 
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L SE sw m YH NW N Wa Sc NI UK 
1937 Feb 7.3 8.4 9.6 7.6 11.0 15.0 20.3 26.0 17.6 25.1 12.2 
Apr 6.1 6.8 7.9 6.6 10.0 13.5 18.5 23.1 16.2 23.5 10.8 
Jun 5.8 5.2 6.6 6.7 12.3 13.0 16.9 20.7 14.2 22.2 10.3 
Aug 5.6 4.9 6.2 7.1 9.6 13.4 15.9 19.4 14.1 21.8 9.9 
Oct 6.0 6.4 7.3 6.9 9.8 13.0 16.2 21.3 14.5 22.6 10.2 
Dec 7.1 8.1 8.6 8.5 12.7 15.5 18.9 21.9 17.6 27.1 12.2 
1938 Feb 8.6 9.2 9.4 9.6 13.3 17.8 17.6 23.8 17.0 29.5 13.2 
Apr 7.8 7.7 8.1 10.0 12.9 17.7 17.0 25.9 16.8 29.4 12.9 
Jun 7.7 6.9 7.6 11.1 14.0 20.1 18.5 25.8 15.8 28.7 13.4 
Aug 7.4 6.8 6.9 11.7 14.6 18.2 19.2 24.2 15.5 27.7 13.0 
Oct 8.3 8.4 8.5 10.0 13.0 17.1 19.0 23.6 15.6 25.8 12.7 
Dec 8.5 9.3 8.6 9.4 12.8 16.9 19.4 25.3 16.7 26.1 12.9 
1939 Feb 9.1 9.1 9.0 9.5 13.1 17.2 20.1 25.9 17.1 26.9 13.4 
Apr 7.8 7.8 7.2 8.4 11.8 15.2 17.7 21.0 15.4 25.3 11.6 
Jun 6.6 5.7 5.1 7. o 9.9 13.6 14.9 16.8 12.7 21.0 9.7 
Aug 5.8 5.0 4.4 7.7 8.4 11.9 13.3 15.2 11.7 19.9 8.8 
L SE S EA SW WM EM YH NW N Sc Wa NI UK 
1939 Oct 9.6 9.2 6.6 9.0 6.6 6.1 5.6 7.9 11.6 13.7 11.8 15.3 21.2 9.7 
Dec 9.1 8.9 6.1 9.0 6.2 5.3 5.5 7.4 10.3 13.4 10.6 15.8 22.4 9.1 
Sý 
1940 Feb 9.3 8 .7 12.3 6.3 7.2 8.0 9.2 10.7 14.9 11.3 17.5 
23.6 10.2 
Apr 6.9 5 .0 7.1 4.2 3.3 3.8 5.2 6.8 9.9 8.5 13.4 
20.3 6.8 
Jun 5.9 3 .9 5.2 2.9 2.1 2.8 4.2 5.1 7.7 6.8 9.2 20.7 
5.3 
Series M 1940-1966 - June figures (July figures from 1940 to 1945) 
SE EA S sw WM EM Y NW N Wa Sc NI UK 
1940 July 6.1 5.2 6.8 2.8 2.3 3.3 4.2 5.1 9.0 11.3 7.0 21.5 5.8 
1941 Jun 1.5 1.8 1.2 1.7 0.7 1.0 1.7 2.4 2.5 4.2 3.0 12.2 2.1 
1942 1.1 0.9 0.6 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.3 2.0 1.7 4.9 1.1 
1943 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.4 1.3 5.1 0.8 
1944 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 1.0 1.4 1.2 4.3 o. 6 
1945(July) 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.2 0.5 0.6 1.5 3.3 1.6 5.1 0.9 
1946(June) 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.3 1.2 o. 7 1.5 3.1 5.4 9.1 4.6 8.6 2.6 
1947 0.9 
--- 
0.8 
----- 
0.7 
----- 
1.1 
----- 
0.8 
----- 
0.6 
----- 
1.1 
---- 
5.1 
---- 
1.5 
---- 
6.0 
----- 
3.3 
---- 
7.0 
------ 
1.9 
-- - 
1948(july) 0.9 0.7 1.1 1.1 0.6 o. 4 0.8 1.8 2.4 4.3 2.6 5.6 1.5 
1949 0.9 0.7 1.1 1.1 0.6 0.4 0.8 1.5 2.3 3.6 2.5 6.0 1.4 
1950 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.2 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.5 2.6 2.4 2.7 5.6 1.5 
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1951 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.3 0.3 0.6 1.0 1.8 2.2 2.0 5.1 1.0 
1952 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.0 1.1 2.3 4.9 2.3 2.6 3.2 10.6 2.3 
1953 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.0 0.6 1.1 1.8 2.1 2.8 2.7 7.9 1.6 
1954 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.1 0.5 0.5 0.8 1.3 2.0 2.1 2.4 6.3 1.2 
1955 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.7 1.4 1.6 1.6 2.2 6.8 1.1 
1956 o. 6 o. 7 0.7 0.9 1.2 0.5 0.6 1.2 1.3 1.9 2.1 5.9 1.1 
1957 0.8 1.0 0.9 1.3 1.2 1.0 0.8 1.4 1.4 2.1 2.3 6.8 1.3 
1958 1.2 1.4 1.4 1.8 1.5 1.5 1.9 2.6 2.1 3.7 3.5 9.3 2.1 
1959 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.7 2.5 3.0 3.4 3.9 7.6 2. o 
1960 0.8 0.9 1.3 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.8 2.5 2.3 3.2 6.1 1.5 
1961 0.8 o. 8 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.8 1.4 2.0 2.1 2.8 6.9 1.3 
1962 1.1 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.2 1.4 2.3 3.2 2.6 3.3 7.1 1.8 
YH 
1963 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.6 1.7 2.8 4.0 3.0 4.3 7.4 2.2 
1964 0.9 1.0 1.3 0.8 1.2 1.9 3.1 2.4 3.3 6.5 1.5 
SE EA sw WM EM YH NW N Wa Sc NI UK 
1965 0.7 1.0 1.2 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.4 2.1 2.1 2.5 5.8 1.3 
1966 0.7 1.0 1.2 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.2 2.0 2.2 2.4 6.0 1.2 
Series (g) 1966-1979 
1966 Sep 0.9 1.4 1.6 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.5 2.6 2.8 2.8 5.9 1.5 
Dec 1.6 2.1 2.8 3.7 1.7 1.8 2.1 3.6 3.9 3.7 7.4 2.5 
1967 Mar 1.7 2.4 2.7 2.3 1.9 2.0 2.6 3.8 4.1 4.0 8.1 2.6 
Jun 1.5 1.7 2.0 2.2 1.6 1.9 2.3 3.7 3.7 3.5 7.7 2.3 
Sep 1.6 1.8 2.3 2.6 1.7 2.2 2.6 4.2 4.0 3.8 7.5 2.5 
Dec 1.7 2.1 2.8 2.4 1.9 2.5 2.5 4.4 4.2 4.0 7.4 2.6 
1968 Mar 1.8 2.2 2.7 2.4 1.9 2.6 2.5 4.5 4.1 4.0 7.1 2.6 
Jun 1.5 1.8 2.1 2.0 1.7 2.4 2.3 4.3 3.6 3.6 7.0 2.3 
Sep 1.5 1.8 2.3 2.1 1.9 2.6 2.4 4.9 4.0 3.6 6.9 2.5 
Dec 1.6 1.9 2.7 1.9 1.9 2.6 2.3 4.9 4.0 3.7 7.5 2.5 
1969 Mar 1.8 2.3 2.9 2.0 2.1 2.7 2.6 4.9 4.2 3.8 7.5 2.6 
Jun 1.4 1.7 2.3 1.8 1.8 2.3 2.3 4.3 3.6 3.4 6.8 2.2 
Sep 1.5 1.8 2.6 2.4 1.9 2.7 2.5 5.0 4.3 3.6 7.3 2.4 
Dec 1.6 2.1 3.0 1.8 2.1 2.8 2.5 4.9 4.1 3.9 7.1 2.5 
1970 Mar 1.9 2.4 3.1 2.2 2.4 3.0 2.7 4.9 4.1 4.2 7.0 2.7 
Jun 1.5 1.8 2.4 2.4 2.2 2.6 2.5 4.3 3.4 3.9 6.2 2.4 
Sep 1.7 2.0 2.7 3.1 2.4 3.0 2.9 4.8 4.1 4.4 7.3 2.6 
Dec 1.6 2.4 3.0 2.2 2.3 3.2 2.9 4.7 4.0 4.8 7.2 2.7 
1971 Mar 2.0 3.2 3.5 3.2 3.1 3.6 3.7 5.3 4.6 5.7 7.5 3.2 
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1971 Jun 1.8 2.9 2.9 3.2 2.9 3.1 3.6 5.3 4.2 5.7 7.3 3.2 
Sep 2.0 3.2 3.4 5.7 3.3 4.4 4.6 6.4 5.0 6.3 8.8 3.7 
Dec 2.3 3.4 4.1 5.1 3.4 4.6 4.7 6.6 5.3 6.6 8.5 4. o 
1972 Mar 2.5 3.5 3.9 4.0 3.4 4.6 5.1 6.7 5.3 7.0 8.3 4.2 
Jun 1.9 2.5 3.0 3.4 2.8 3.8 4.5 5.7 4.3 6.0 7.7 3.5 
Sep 2.1 2.5 3.1 3.7 3.0 4.3 5.1 6.7 5.0 6.6 8.4 3.9 
Dec 1.9 2.5 3.1 3.0 2.6 3.6 4.4 5.8 4.5 5.9 7.2 3.4 
1973 Mar 1.7 2.3 2.8 2.5 2.3 3.2 4.1 5.1 3.9 5.3 6.8 3.1 
Jun 1.4 1.7 2.1 2.0 1.9 2.6 3.3 4.3 3.1 4.3 6.0 2.5 
Sep 1.3 1.6 2.1 2.1 1.9 2.7 3.3 4.4 3.3 4.1 6.4 2.5 
Dec 1.2 1.6 2.2 1.7 1.7 2.3 2.8 4.0 3.1 3.7 5.4 2.2 
1974 Mar 1.6 2.0 2.6 2.1 2.1 2.7 3.4 4.5 3.8 4.1 5.5 2.7 
Jun 1.4 1.7 2.2 1.9 2.0 2.3 3.0 4.1 3.2 3.6 5.2 2.3 
Sep 1.7 2.0 2.8 2.5 2.4 2.9 3.9 5.3 4.3 4.1 6.8 2.8 
Nov 1.7 2.2 3.2 n. a. 2.3 2.7 3.7 4.8 3.9 4.0 6.1 2.8 
1975 Mar 2.2 3.0 4.1 3.0 3.0 3.3 4.4 5.1 4.6 4.5 6.4 3.4 
Jun 2.4 3.1 4.0 3.6 3.2 3.4 4.8 5.4 4.8 4.6 7.1 3.7 
Sep 3.3 3.9 5.2 5.3 4.2 4.7 6.2 6.8 6.6 5.6 9.1 4.9 
Dec 3.6 4.3 5.9 5.3 4.3 4.9 6.3 6.6 7.0 6.0 9.1 5.1 
1976 Mar 4.0 4.7 6.3 5.5 4.4 5.2 6.5 6.7 7.0 6.6 9.2 5.4 
Jun 4.1 4.8 6.1 5.5 4.7 5.6 7.0 7.7 6.9 6.5 9.9 5.6 
Sep 4.5 4.9 6.5 6.3 5.1 5.8 7.4 8.1 7.7 7.3 11.1 6.1 
1977 Jan 4.6 5.3 7.1 5.6 5.0 5.6 7.2 8.0 8.0 8.4 10.9 6.1 
Mar 4.3 5.3 6.8 5.3 4.8 5.3 6.8 7.6 7.4 7.9 10.1 5.8 
Jun 4.4 5.3 6.6 5.4 5.1 5.6 7.4 7.7 7.4 8.4 10.9 6.1 
Sep 4.9 5.6 7.2 6.6 5.5 6.4 8.2 9.3 8.8 8.5 12.3 6.7 
Dec 4.4 5.3 7.1 5.5 5.0 5.9 7.5 8.7 8.5 8.4 11.2 6.2 
1978 Mar 4.3 5.3 6.9 5.3 5.0 5.8 7.2 8.7 8.3 8.6 11.4 6. o 
Jun 4.1 4.9 6.2 5.3 5.1 5.8 7.5 8.9 7.9 8.3 11.4 6. o 
Sep 4.3 4.8 6.3 6.0 5.2 6.3 7.9 9.1 8.7 7.9 12.5 6.3 
Dec 3.7 4.5 6.1 5.2 4.7 5.6 6.9 8.4 8.0 7.6 10.8 5.6 
1979 Mar 3.8 4.7 6.0 5.3 4.8 5.8 7.0 8.6 8.1 8.0 10.8 5.8 
Jun 3.5 4.2 5.3 5.2 4.6 5.5 7.0 8.6 7.3 8.1 10.9 5.5 
Series (h) 1979-1984 
Jul 3.8 4.3 5.7 6.1 4.9 6.1 7.6 9.3 8.4 8.3 12.4 6.0 
Aug 3.9 4.3 5.7 6.0 4.9 6.1 7.6 9.1 8.4 8.2 12.3 6. o 
Sep 3.7 4.1 5.5 5.8 4.6 5.8 7.3 8.8 8.0 7.8 12.0 5.7 
Oct 3.6 4.1 5.6 5.6 4.6 5.6 7.0 8.6 7.9 7.9 11.2 5.6 
Nov 3.6 4.1 5.6 5.5 4.5 5.5 7.0 8.6 7.9 7.9 10.8 5.6 
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1979 Dec 3.5 4.1 5.6 5.4 4.6 5.6 7.0 8.6 7.9 8.0 10.9 5.6 
1980 Jan 3.9 4.5 5.9 5.7 5.0 6.1 7.6 9.3 8.3 9.0 11.3 6.1 
Feb 3.9 4.6 5.9 5.8 5.1 6.2 7.6 9.5 8.4 9.0 11.4 6.2 
Mar 3.9 4.6 5.8 5.9 5.0 6.2 7.7 9.4 8.4 8.9 11.3 6.1 
Apr 3.9 4.7 5.7 6.2 5.3 6.5 7.9 9.9 8.9 8.9 11.7 6.3 
May 3.9 4.7 5.5 6.3 5.3 6.4 7.9 9.7 8.8 8.7 11.6 6.2 
Jun 4.2 5.0 5.9 6.9 6.1 7.2 8.8 10.7 9.0 9.9 12.5 6.4 
Jul 5.0 5.7 6.7 8.5 6.9 8.4 9.9 11.8 10.7 10.5 14.4 7.8 
Aug 5.4 6.1 7.1 9.1 7.3 8.8 10.4 12.0 11.2 10.7 15.0 8.3 
Sep 5.6 6.2 7.2 9.5 7.4 9.0 10.5 12.1 11.6 10.7 15.2 8.4 
Oct 5.6 6.4 7.5 9.6 7.5 9.0 10.6 12.1 11.8 10.9 15.3 8.5 
Nov 5.9 6.8 8.0 10.1 7.9 9.5 10.9 12.6 12.3 11.3 15.6 8.9 
Dec 6.2 7.2 8.4 10.5 8.2 9.9 11.3 13.2 12.6 11.6 16.0 9.3 
1981 Jan 6.8 7.8 9.0 11.4 8.9 10.7 12.1 14.1 13.3 12.7 16.8 10.1, 
Feb 6.9 8.1 9.1 11.8 9.1 10.8 12.3 14.2 13.4 12.7 16.9 10.3 
Mar 7.1 8.4 9.2 12.2 9.3 11.1 12.5 14.4 13.7 12.9 17.0 10.4 
Apr 7.3 8.4 9.3 12.6 9.5 11.2 12.8 14.5 13.8 12.9 16.9 10.6 
May 7.4 8.5 9.2 12.9 9.6 11.5 13.1 14.6 13.9 12.8 17.3 10.7 
Jun 7.8 8.7 9.5 13.4 10.4 12.1 13.7 15.5 14.0 13.7 17.7 11.2 
Jul 8.4 9.3 10.0 14.4 11.0 12.9 14.6 16.2 15.0 14.3 18.4 11.9 
Aug 8.8 9.3 10.3 15.0 11.1 13.3 15.0 16.6 15.5 14.6 18.5 12.3 
Sep 9.1 9.6 10.5 15.3 11.3 13.6 15.2 16.8 15.8 14.5 19.4 12.6 
Oct 9.1 9.6 10.7 15.3 11.0 13.4 15.1 16.5 15.9 14.6 19.1 12.5 
Nov 9.0 9.5 10.7 15.0 10.7 13.1 15.0 16.5 15.9 14.6 18.6 12.4 
Dec 8.9 9.6 10.7 15.0 10.7 13.1 14.9 16.4 15.8 14.6 18.5 12.3 
1982 Jan 9.3 10.2 11.1 15.5 11.3 13.6 15.4 17.1 16.4 15.5 19.2 12.9 
Feb 9.3 10.2 11.0 15.3 11.1 13.4 15.2 16.7 16.2 15.3 19.0 12.8 
Mar 9.2 10.0 10.8 15.1 10.9 13.2 15.0 16.4 15.8 14.9 18.7 12.5 
Apr 9.2 . 10.0 10.7 15.2 11.0 13.2 15.3 16.7 15.9 
14.8 18.9 12.6 
May 9.1 9.9 10.3 15.0 10.9 13.1 15.1 16.4 15.6 14.5 19.1 12.4 
Jun 9.3 10.0 10.7 15.3 11.5 -13.6 15.7 17.1 15.4 15.3 
19.7 12.8 
Jul 9.7 10.5 11.1 16.2 12.1 14.3 16.2 17.9 16.3 15.6 20.4 13.4 
Aug 10.3 10.8 11.4 16.6 12.3 14.7 16.7 18.3 16.8 15.9 20.8 13.8 
Sep 10.5 10.9 11.6 16.9 12.4 15.0 16.9 18.5 17.2 15.8 21.6 14.0 
Oct(a) 10.4 10.8 11.6 16.6 12.1 14.6 16.6 18.0 17.2 15.8 
-- 
21.0 
------ 
13.8 
----- 
Oct(b) 
---- 
9.2 
----- 
9.9 
------- 
11.0 
----- 
15.6 
----- 
11.4 
----- 
14.0 
----- 
15.3 
---- 
17.6 
---- 
15.9 
--- 
14.6 19.7 12.7 
Nov 9.2 10.1 11.3 15.6 11.5 14.1 15.3 17.6 16.1 14.7 19.4 12.7 
Dec 9.3 10.3 11.5 15.7 11.7 14.3 15.5 17.8 16.3 14.9 19.4 12.8 
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1983 Jan 9.7 10.9 12.0 16.3 12.3 14.8 16.1 18.5 16.9 15.8 20.0 13.4 
Feb 9.7 10.9 11.9 16.2 12.3 14.7 15.9 18.1 16.7 15.6 19.8 13.3 
Mar 9.6 10.8 11.8 16.1 12.2 14.5 15.8 17.9 16.5 15.3 19.6 13.2 
Apr 9.6 10.8 11.5 16.2 12.2 14.6 16.0 18.0 16.5 15.1 20.1 13.2 
May 9.1 10.2 10.8 15.6 11.6 13.9 15.5 17.4 15.7 14.5 19.9 12.7 
Jun 8.9 9.7 10.3 15.3 11.3 13.5 15.3 17.1 15.2 14.4 19.6 12.4 
Jul 9.1 9.6 10.4 15.3 11.4 13.6 15.5 17.1 15.2 14.7 20.2 12.6 
Aug 9.1 9.5 10.4 15.2 11.3 13.5 15.5 17.0 15.1 14.6 20.2 12.5 
Sep: 9.5 10.0 11.1 15.9 11.9 14.5 16.3 18.4 16.3 15.1 21.4 13.2 
Oct 9.4 10.0 11.1 15.4 11.5 13.9 15.8 17.7 15.8 14.8 20.7 12.9 
Nov 9.4 10.0 11.3 15.1 11.5 13.8 15.8 17.6 15.8 14.8 20.7 12.8 
Dec 9.3 10.0 11.4 15.0 11.6 13.8 15.8 17.6 15.8 14.8 20.5 12.8 
1984 Jan 9.7 10.5 11.8 15.4 12.1 14.3 16.2 18.1 16.3 15.7 21.1 13.3 
Feb 9.5 10.6 11.6 15.4 11.8 14.4 16.2 18.1 16.4 15.6 21.1 13.2 
Mar 9.4 10.4 11.4 15.2 12.1 14.1 16.0 17.9 16.1 15.2 20.8 13.0 
Apr 9.3 10.2 11.2 15.1 12.0 14.0 15.7 17.8 15.9 14.9 20.7 12.8 
May 9.2 10.0 10.9 15.1 11.9 14.0 15.7 17.9 15.9 14.7 20.8 12.8 
Jun 9.1 9.6 10.5 14.9 11.7 13.7 15.3 17.7 15.3 14.6 20.5 12.5 
Jul- 9.3 9.8 10.8 15.1 12.0 14.1 15.7 18.0 15.7 14.9 20.9 12.8 
Aug 9.4 9.8 10.9 15.2 12.0 14.1 15.8 18.0 15.7 14.9 20.8 12.9 
Sep 9.9 10.2 11.6 16.0 12.7 15.2 16.5 19.3 17.1 15.5 21.9 13.6 
Oct 9.7 10.1 11.7 15.7 12.5 14.8 16.1 18.8 16.8 15.2 21.0 13.3 
Nov 9.7 10.2 11.9 15.4 12.3 14.8 16.1 18.9 16.9 15.2 20.8 13.3 
Dec 9.7 10.3 12.0 15.4 12.4 14.7 16.1 18.8 16.9 15.2 20.5 13.3 
Series (i) 1985-1988, bimonthly. 
1985 Feb 10.1 11.1 12.5 15.8 13.0 15.1 16.4 18.8 17.3 15.8 21.2 13.6 
Apr 9.9 10.8 12.0 15.5 12.8 15.0 16.2 18.8 16.9 15.7 21.0 13.3 
Jun 9.4 9.7 11.0 14.6 11.6 14.3 16.2 17.9 16.5 15.4 19.6 13.0 
Aug 9.7 9.6 11.3 14.9 11.7 14.5 16.5 18.1 16.7 15.6 19.4 13.2 
Oct 9.8 9.9 11.7 15.0 11.7 14.8 16.6 18.2 17.4 15.7 19.7 13.4 
Dec 9.7 10.2 12.0 14.8 11.8 14.9 16.5 18.2 17.3 15.7 19.6 13.4 
1986 Feb 9.3 10.4 12.4 15.0 12.2 15.3 16.9 18.4 18.2 16.4 20.5 13.6 
Apr 9.1 10.1 11.8 14.8 12.0 15.3 16.8 18.2 17.8 15.9 20.5 13.6 
Jun 8.7 9.6 11.1 14.5 11.8 14.9 16.4 17.9 16.8 15.7 20.5 13.0 
Aug 8.9 9.7 11.4 14.7 11.9 15.0 16.6 17.7 16.8 16.0 21.1 13.2 
Oct 8.6 9.5 11.4 14.6 11.6 14.8 16.2 17.9 16.8 16.2 21.2 13.0 
Dec 8.6 9.7 11.6 14.3 11.6 14.8 16.1 17.3 16.8 16.1 20.9 13.0 
1987 Feb 8.5 9.6 11.6 14.2 11.8 14.9 16.4 17.9 16.9 17.1 21.0 13.0 
Apr 8.0 9.1 10.8 13.6 11.5 14.4 15.9 17.1 16.1 16.3 20.6 12.5 
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1987 Jun 7.2 8.2 9.6 12.9 10.6 13.6 15.0 16.2 14.9 15.3 20.4 11.2 
Aug 7.1 7.9 9.6 12.6 10.4 13.2 14.8 15.7 14.8 15.1 20.6 11.0 
Oct 6.6 7.4 9.3 12.1 9.9 12.8 14.2 15.5 14.6 14.6 20.2 10.6 
Dec 6.3 7.3 9.4 11.7 9.7 12.6 13.9 15.2 14.4 14.6 19.6 10.4 
1988 Feb 6.1 7.3 9.3 11.4 9.8 12.5 13.8 15.1 14.3 14.6 19.4 10.8 
Apr 5.6 6.7 8.4 10.9 9.4 12.1 13.2 14.7 13.8 13.9 19.2 10.3 
Jun 4.9 5.9 7.4 10.1 8.5 11.2 12.4 13.7 12.5 13.0 18.8 9.5 
Aug 4.7 5.5 7.2 9.9 8.4 10.9 12.2 13.3 12.2 12.8 19.1 9.3 
Oct 4.3 5.0 6.8 8.9 7.6 10.1 11.3 12.5 11.6 11.9 17.9 8.6 
Dec 4.0 4.8 6.7 8.4 7.4 9.7 11.0 12.3 11.3 11.8 17.5 8.4 
Notes: 
The need for continual recalculation of the denominator in the 
unemployment rate makes it effectively impossible to produce a definitive 
unemployment rate; different versions, using identical unemployment totalso 
may produce unemployment rates differing by up to 0.5%, and occasionally 
more. Many minor jumps in the unemployment rate indicate no more than 
rebasing. 
A more serious problem is that changing legislation affecting both 
the scope of the national insurance scheme, and the official definition of 
unemployment, might well substantially affect measured unemployment rates. 
Most notably, 
(1) Compared with late 1970s definitions, unemployment rates before 
1948 are overestimates of perhaps a third; for comparability inter-war 
figures should be reduced by about a quarter. To simplify, inter-war 
figures measure working class unemployment rates, while post-1948 figures 
measure total unemployment rates. 
(2) Again compared with late 1970s definitions, unemployment rates 
from late 1982 are significantly understated, the degree of understatement 
increasing through time. From late 1985 onwards, official unemployment 
rates have been published using a denominator including,, for the first time, 
members of HM Forces and an estimate of the self-employed. In the present 
table, the "old" denominator of employed plus unemployed has been used 
instead to provide long term comparability. 
Such a discontinuity is relatively easy to correct for but more 
serious problems occur in attempting to account for the various legislative 
means used to whittle away the unemployment total. There is a significant 
discontinuity in October 1982,, and another in early 1983, involving the 
removal of about 150,000 men over 60 from the unemployment register between 
March and July, while the reduction of unemployment recorded from early 1987 
onwards can only be regarded as grossly exaggerated (chapter 7 note 84). Thus 
the 0.7 point drop in unemployment between August 1988 and October 1988 is 
probably due entirely to legislative changess and the removal of under-18s 
from eligibility for unemployment benefit, while perhaps half of the earlier 
drop in unemployment is due to increasing stringency of tests to determine 
eligibility for benefit. The "real" unemployment rate at the end of 1988 
is perhaps around 101% rather than 81% as recorded in the appendix table or 
the official figure of around 7J%. 
The experience of the early 1980s has shown also that the employment 
prospects. of young people are particularly sensitive to recession, with at 
one stage nearly 400,000 under 18s being registered as unemployed. It seems 
highly likely, therefore, that when the next recession comes, the real 
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increase in unemployment will be greatly understated by the official 
figures, which will ignore increases in unemployment among under 18s. 
It is of course extremely difficult to determine what regionally 
differentiated impacts such measures have. 
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Table A8 Index of Regional Unemployment Inequality, 1912-1988 
Series (a) 1912-1922 
(Regional unemployment figures not available, 1915-1922, 
so no Cn index can be calculated) 
Un Cn Un Un 
1912 Sept 3.7 (December 1918 - 1921 July 17.9 
Dec 5.1 October 1919: no Aug 15.6 
1913 Mar 3.5 1.7 figures available) Sept 14.2 
Jun 2.8 1.3 1919 Dec 6.6 Oct 14.5 
Sept 3.4 1.5 1920 Mar 3.6 Nov 17.2 
Dec 4.6 1.9 Jun 2.6 Dec 18.0 
1914 Mar 3.6 1.2 Sept 3.8 1922 Jan 17.7 
Jun 3.5 1.4 Dec 7.9 Feb 17.1 
Sept 5.4 1.9 ---- ----- Mar 16.0 
Dec 3.3 1.1 1921 Jan 11.2 Apr 15.9 
------- ---- Feb 13.1 May 14.6 
1915 June 0.9 0.8 Mar 15.4 Jun 13.7 
1916 June 0.5 Apr 20.2 ------ ---- 
1917 June 0.7 May 23.4 Sept. 12.7 
1918 June 0.8 Jun 22.4 Dec 12.8 
August 1921: Un 16 Cn = 2.6 
(bas ed on Astor 1923) 
Unemployment rates up to December 1921 incorporate figures for 
the whole of Ireland; fro m January 1922 they exclude the Irish Republic. 
Source: Gazette; HistoricaZ Abstract, Table 160. 
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Intervals: As in Table A 
Un is the UK percentage unemployment rate 
Cn is the weighted mean deviation from the national average 
of regional unemployment rates. 
Series (b) 1922-1929 
Un Cn Un Cn Un Cn 
1922 Dec 13.4 1.9 1925 Mar 10.5 2.7 1927 Jun 8.9 2.6 
1923 Mar 11.2 1.7 Jun 11.5 3.5 Sept 9.4 3.1 
Jun 10.7 1.9 Sept 11.8 4.4 Dec 9.8 2.9 
Sept 11.2 2.2 Dec 9.8 3.3 1928 Mar 9.6 3.0 
Dec 11.2 2.1 1926 Mar 9.8 3.0 Jun 10.8 3.5 
1924 Mar 9.1 1.7 Jun 14.6 4.8 Sept 11.5 3.9 
Jun 8.7 1.7 Sept 13.9 4.7 Dec 11.2 3.7 
Sept 10.3 2.0 Dec 11.9 3.9 1929 Mar 10.1 3.1 
Dec 11.3 2.0 1927 Mar 9.9 2.9 Jun 9.8 3.2 
Series (c) 1929-1933 
Un Cn Un Cn Un Cn 
1929 July 9.9 3.2 1931 Jan 21.5 6.4 1932 July 22.9 6.6 
Aug 10.1 3.4 Feb 21.7 6.6 Aug 23.1 6.8 
Sept 10.1 3.4 Mar 21.5 6.3 Sept 22.9 6.5 
Oct 10.4 3.4 Apr 20.9 6.4 Oct 21.9 6.3 
Nov 11.0 3.5 May 20.8 6.6 Nov 22.2 6.3 
Dec 11.1 3.5 Jun 21.8 6.9 Dec 21.7 6.1 
1930 Jan 12.6 3.6 July 22.6 7.3 1933 Jan 23.1 5.7 
Feb 13.1 4.0 Aug 22.7 7.1 Feb 22.8 5.6 
Mar 14.0 4.6 Sept 23.2 7.3 Mar 22.0 6.0 
Apr 14.6 4.8 Oct 21.9 6.1 Apr 21.4 6.0 
May 15.3 5.7 Nov 21.4 5.6 May 20.5 6.2 
Jun 15.8 5.8 Dec 20.9 5.2 Jun 19.5 6.0 
July 17.1 6.4 1932 Jan 22.4 5.1 July 19.6 6.2 
Aug 17.5 6.6 Feb 22.0 5.1 Aug 19.2 6.2 
Sept 18.1 6.8 Mar 20.8 5.0 Sept 18.5 6.1 
Oct 18.7 6.9 Apr 21.4 5.6 Oct 18.1 6.0 
Nov 19.1 6.5 May 22.1 6.2 Nov 17.9 6.1 
Dec 20.2 6.8 Jun 22.3 6.1 Dec 17.6 5.7 
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Series (d) 1934-1940 
Un Cn Un Cn Un Cn 
1934 Feb 18.2 5.8 1936 Apr 13.8 5.6 1938 Jun 13.4 5.0 
Apr 16.7 6.0 Jun 13.1 5.7 Aug 13.0 4.7 
Jun 16.5 6.3 Aug 12.3 5.2 Oct 12.7 4.1 
Aug 16.6 6.2 Oct 12.1 5.1 Dec 12.9 4.3 
Oct 16.4 6.1 Dec 12.2 5.0 1939 Feb 13.4 4.3 
Dec 16.1 6. o 1937 Feb 12.2 4.7 Apr 11.6 3.9 
1935 Feb 17.5 6.1 Apr 10.8 4.5 Jun 9.7 3.5 
Apr 15.7 6. o Jun 10.3 4.3 Lug 
-- -- 
§. 8 3.0 
Jun 15.5 6.2 Aug 9.9 4.0 Oct 9.7 2.3 
Aug 15.0 6.1 Oct 10.2 3.9 Dec 9.1 2.2 
Oct 14.6 6.1 Dec 12.2 4.5 1940 Feb 10.2 2.1 
Dec 14.2 5.5 1938 Feb 13.2 4.3 Apr 6.8 1.9 
1936 Feb 15.4 5.4 Apr 12.9 4.6 Jun 5.3 1.7 
Series (e) 1945-1966 (June figures, except 1945 (July)) 
Un Cn Un Cn Un Cn 
1945 0.9 o. 6 1953 1.6 0.7 1960 1.5 0.8 
1946 2.6 1.8 1954 1.2 o. 6 1961 1.3 0.7 
1947 1.9 1.6 1955 1.1 o. 7 1962 1.8 0.8 
1948 - - 1956 1.1 o. 5 1963 2.2 1.1 
1949 1.4 o. 8 1957 1.3 o. 5 1964 1.5 0.8 
1950 1.5 0.7 1958 2.1 o. 8 1965 1.3 0.8 
1951 1.0 o. 6 1959 2.0 1.0 1966 1.2 
1952 2.3 1.3 
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Series M 1966-1979 
Un Cn Un Cn Un Cn 
1966 Sept 1.5 0.7 1971 Mar 3.2 1.0 1975 Sept 4.9 1.2 
Dec 2.5 0.9 Jun 3.2 1.1 Dec 5.1 1.2 
1967 Mar 2.6 o. 8 Sept 3.7 1.5 1976 Mar 5.4 1.2 
Jun 2.3 o. 7 Dec 4. o 1.4 Jun 5.6 1.2 
Sept 2.5 0.8 1972 Mar 4.2 1.4 Sept 6.1 1.3 
Dec 2.6 o. 8 Jun 3.5 1.3 1977 Jan 6.1 1.4 
1968 Mar 2.6 o. 8 Sept 3.9 1.5 Mar 5.8 1.3 
Jun 2.3 0.8 Dec 3.4 1.3 Jun 6.1 1.4 
Sept 2.5 0.8 1973 Mar 3.1 1.2 Sept 6.7 1.5 
Dec 2.5 0.9 Jun 2.5 1.0 Dec 6.2 1.6 
1969 Mar 2.6 o. 8 Sept 2.5 1.0 1978 Mar 6. o 1.6 
Jun 2.2 o. 8 Dec 2.2 0.9 Jun 6. o 1.6 
Sept 2.4 0.9 1974 Mar 2.7 Sept 6.3 1.6 
Dec 2.5 0.9 Jun 2.3 o. 8 Dec 5.6 1.5 
1970 Mar 2.7 o. 8 Sept 2.8 1.0 1979 Mar 5.8 1.6 
Jun 2.4 0.7 Nov 2.8 Jun 5.5 1.6 
Sept 2.6 0.9 1975 Mar 3.4 1.0 
Dec 2.7 1.0 Jun 3.7 1.0 
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Series (g) 1979-1984 
Un Cn Un Cn Un Cn 
1979 July 6. o 1.7 1981 May 10.7 2.5 1983 Mar__ 
. 
13.2 2.8 
Aug 6.0 1.7 Jun 11.2 2.6 Apr 13.2 2.9 
Sept 5.7 1.6 July 11.9 2.6 May 12.7 2.9 
Oct 5.6 1.5 Aug 12.3 2.7 Jun 12.4 2.9 
Nov 5.6 1.5 Sept 12.6 2.8 July 12.6 2.9 
Dec 5.6 1.6 Oct 12.5 2.7 Aug 12.5 2.8 
1980 Jan 6.1 1.7 Nov 12.4 2.7 Sept 13.2 3. o 
Feb 6.2 1.7 Dec 12.3 2.7 Oct 12.9 2.8 
Mar 6.1 1.7 1982 Jan 12.9 2.8 Nov 12.8 2.9 
Apr 6.3 1.8 Feb 12.8 2.7 Dec 12.8 2.8 
May 6.2 1.8 Mar 12.5 2.7 1984 Jan 13.3 2.9 
Jun 6.9 2.0 Apr 12.6 2.7 Feb 13.2 2.8 
July 7.8 2.2 May 12.4 2.7 Mar 13.1 2.8 
Aug 8.3 2.2 Jun 12.8 2.8 Apr 12.9 2.8 
Sept 8.4 2.2 July 13.4 2.9 May 12.8 2.8 
Oct 8.5 2.2 Aug 13.8 2.9 Jun 12.6 2.8 
Nov 8.9 2.2 Sept 14.0 2.9 July 12.9 2.8 
Dec 9.3 2.3 Oct 13.8 2.8 Aug 12.9 2.8 
1981 Jan 10.1 2.4 Nov 12.7 2.8 Sept 13.6 3.0 
Feb 10.3 2.5 Dec 12.8 2.9 Oct 13.4 2.8 
Mar 10.4 2.5 1983 Jan 13.4 3.0 Nov 13.4 2.8 
Apr 10.6 2.4 Feb 13.3 2.9 Dec 13.4 2.8 
Series (h) 1985-1988 
Un Cn Un Cn Un Cn 
1985 Feb 13.7 2.8 1986 Jun 13.0 3.3 1987 Oct 10.6 3.3 
Apr 13.5 2.8 Aug 13.2 3.3 Dec 10.4 3.3 
Jun 12.9 2.9 Oct 13.0 3.2 1988 Feb 10.8 3.3 
Aug 13.1 2.9 Dec 13.0 3.2 Apr 10.3 3.3 
Oct 13.3 2.9 1987 Feb 13.0 3.4 Jun 9.5 3.2 
Dec 13.3 2.9 Apr 12.5 3.4 Aug 9.3 3.3 
1986 Feb 13.5 3.2 Jun 11.2 3.4 Oct 8.6 3.0 
Apr 13.5 3.2 Aug 11.0 3.3 Dec 8.4 3.0 
Source: Based on Tables A4, A8. 
The Cn figure is the weighted mean deviation of regional unemployment 
rates from the national unemployment rate; the difference in unemployment 
rates between "average" high unemployment regions and "average" low 
unemployment regions is typically about twice the Cn figure. 
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Table A9 Trade Union Unemployment Rates, 1851-1914 
Year Un Year Un Year Un Year Un Year Un Year Un 
1851 3.9 1862 8.4 1873 1.2 1884 8.1 1895 5.8 1906 3.6 
1852 6.0 1863 6.0 1874 1.7 1885 9.3 1896 3.3 1907 3.7 
1853 1.7 1864 2.7 1875 2.4 1886 10.2 1897 3.3 1908 7.8 
1854 2.9 1865 2.1 1876 3.7 1887 7.6 1898 2.8 1909 7.7 
1855 5.4 1866 3.3 1877 4.7 1888 4.8 1899 2.0 1910 4.7 
1856 4.7 1867 7.4 1878 6.8 1889 2.1 1900 2.5 1911 3.0 
1857 6.0 1868 7.9 1879 11.4 1890 2.1 1901 3.3 1912 3.2 
1858 11.9 1869 6.7 1880 5.5 1891 3.4 1902 4.0 1913 2.1 
1854 3.8 187( 3.9 1881 3.5 1892 6.1 1903 4.7 1914 3.3 
1860 1.9 1871 1.6 1882 2.3 1893 7.5 1904 6.0 
1861 5.2 1872 0.9 1883 2.6 1894 6.9 1905 5.0 
Source: Mitchell and Deane (1962, pp. 64 -65). 
This table gives approximate indications of cyclical movements in 
unemployment, rather than precise figures. Early figures for unemployment in 
recession are much exaggerated compared to later figures, since the earlier 
figures were heavily-weighted towards the cyclically vulnerable engineering, 
metal and shipbuilding unions. The following comparison makes this point 
clearly, showing that the apparent decline in cyclical unemployment peaks 
is largely illusory. 
Year Unemployment 
All unions Engineering, metal 
and shipbuilding 
1858 11.9 12.2 
1879 11.4 15.3 
1886 10.2 13.5 
1 909 7.7 13.0 
I, 
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Table A10 Increases in Unemployment by County, 1976-1985 
Tables A10(i) to AlO(xi) 
Unemployment rates by County ranked according to increases in 
unemployment, 1976-1984 
Table Interval Unemployment rate, U. K. 
U nadjusted Seasonally adjusted 
Start Finish Change Start Finish Change 
of of of of 
Period Period Period Period 
A10(i) June 1976-June 1979 5.6 5.5 -0.1 5.4 5.3 -0.1 
AlO(ii) June 1979-June '1980 5.5 6.9 +1.4 5.3 6.4 +1.1 
A10(iii) June 1980-Sept 1980 6.9 8.4 +1.5 6.4 7.4 +1.0 
A10(iv) Sept 1980-Dec 1980 8.4 9.3 +0.9 7.4 8.8 +1.4 
AlO(v) Dec 1980-Feb 1981 9.3 10.3 +1.0 8.8 9.5 +0.7 
AlO(vi) Feb 1981-June 1981 10.3 11.2 +0.9 9.5 10.6 +1.1 
AlO(vii) June 1981-Dec 1981 11.2 12.3 +1.1 10.6 11.6 +1.0 
A10(viii) Dec 1981-July 1982 12.3 13.4 +1.1 11.6 12.3 +0.7 
AlO(ix) July 1982-Apr 1983 12.0* 13.2* +1.2 
AlO(x) Apr 1983-July 1984 13.2 12.8 
* 
-o. 4 
*- unemployment on post-1982 basis 
In all subsequent tables in this series, 
x after a figure (e. g. -O. lx in Table A10(i)) indicates the 
change in the unemployment rate in the UK as a whole 
and brackets around a county, e. g. (Highlands ..... ), indicates 
a county in which seasonal fluctuations in unemployment are 
extreme and often irregular. 
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(i) June 1976-June 1979 
June June June June +/- 
1976 1979 1976 1979 
1 (Highlands Sc 5.9 8.2 +2.3) 34=Greater London SE(M) 3.8 3.4 -0.4 
2=Cleveland N 8.1 9.8 +1.7 Oxfordshire SE 4.5 4.1 -0.4 
South Glamorgan Wa 5.7 7.4 +1.7 Cambridgeshire SE 4.5 4.1 -0.4 
Strathclyde Sc(M) 7.9 9.6 +1.7 Somerset SW 4.6 4.2 -0.4 
5=West Glamorgan Wa 6.1 7.4 +1.3 Leicestershire EM 4.7 4.3 -0.4 
Tayside Sc 6.3 7.6 +1.3 39=Kent SE 5.4 4.9 -0.5 
7 Clwyd Wa 8.7 9.4 +1.21 West Sussex SE 3.1 2.6 -0.5 
8=Gwent Wa 7.4 8.5 +1.1 West Midlands WM(M) 6.1 5.6 -0.5 
Grampian Sc 3.3 4.4 +1.1 Derbyshire EM 4.7 4.2 -0.5 
10=Fife Sc 6.4 7.3 +0.9 Lancashire NW 6.1 5.6 -0.5 
Lothians Sc 5.5 6.4 +0.9 Borders Sc 3.7 3.2 -0.5 
12=Dyfed Wa 6.8 7.5 +0.7 45 Norfolk EA 5.6 5.0 -0.6 
Central Sc 6.1 0*8 +0.7 46(Cornwall SW 9.6 8.9 -0.7) 
14 Lincolnshire EM 5.6 6.2 +o. 6 47=East Sussex SE 5.6 4.8 -0.8 
Durham N 7.7 8.3 +0.6 Hertfordshire SE 3.1 2.3 -0.8 
Northumberland N 7.0 7.6 +0.6 Wiltshire SW 5.4 4.6 -0.8 
Tyne and Wear N(M) 9.0 9.6 +0.6 Northamptonshire EM 4.5 3.7 -0.8 
Mid Glamorgan Wa 8.5 9.1 +0.6 Powys Wa 5.5 4.7 -0.8 
19 Merseyside NW(M) 10.8 11.3 +0.5 52=Suffolk EA 5.0 4.0 -1.0 
20 Dumf. & Gallowa y Sc 7.4 7.8 +0.4 (Gwynedd Wa 9.1 8.1 -1.0) 
21 Cheshire NW 5.8 6.1 +0.3 54=Berkshire SE 3.6 2.5 -1.1 
22=Nottinghamshire EM 5.1 5.2 +O. l Devonshire SW 7.9 6.8 -1.1 
South Yorks. YH(M) 6.3 6.4 +0.1 Gloucestershire SW 5.3 4.2 -1.1 
24=Staffordshire WM 4.1 4.1 0 57=Bedfordshire SE 5.1 3.9 -1.2 
Cumbria N 5.9 5.9 o Hampshire SE 5.2 4.0 -1.2 
26=Heref. & Worcs. WM 4.6 4.5 -O. lx Surrey SE 3.2 2.0 -1.2 
Salop WM 6.0 5.9 -O. ix 6o Essex SE 6.0 4.6 -1.4 
Humberside YH 6.9 6.8 -O. lx 61(Isle of Wight SE 5.4 3.9 -1.5) 
29=Buckinghamshire SE 3.3 3.1 -0.2 62 Dorset SW 6.2 4.3 -1.9 
Avon SW 5.8 5.6 -0.2 
West Yorks. YH(M) 5.3 5.1 -0.2 (Orkneys Sc 3.4 6.1 +2.7 
North Yorkshire YH 4.0 3.8 -0.2 (Shetlands Sc 3.5 2.7 -0.8 
33 Gt. Manchester NW(M) 5.8 5.5 -0.3 (Western Isles Sc 14.5 11.3 -3.2 
1 taking into account a boundary change in travel to work areas 
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(ii) June 1979-June 1980 
June June +/- June June 
1979 1980 1979 1980 
1 Clwyd Wa 8.5 12.2 +3.7 34-Buckinghamshire SE 3.1 4.1 +1.0 
2 Northamptonshir e EM 3.7 6.3 +2.6 Kent SE 4.9 5.9 +1.0 
3=Strathclyde Sc(M) 9.6 12.1 +2.5 35-Hampshire SE 4.0 4.9 +0.9 
Cleveland N 9.8 12.3 +2.5 Surrey SE 2.0 2.9 +0.9 
5=Salop WM 5.9 8.1 +2.2 38=Cambridgeshire EA 4.1 4.9 +0.8 
Staffordshire WM 4.1 6.3 +2.2 Suffolk EA 4.0 4.8 +0.8 
Fife Sc 7.3 * 9.5 +2.2 Gloucestershire SW 4.2 5.0 +0.8 
8=Gt. Manchester NW(M) 5.5 7.4 +1.9 Wiltshire SW 4.6 5.4 +0.8 
Lancashire NW 5.6 7.5 +1.9 Gwent Wa 8.5 9.3 +0.8 
10=West Yorks. YH(M) 5.1 6.9 +1.8 South Glamorgan Wa 7.4 8.2 +0.8 
Humberside YH 6.8 8.6 +1.8 Borders Sc 3.2 4.0 +0.8 
12=West Midlands WM(M) 5.6 7.3 +1.7 45=Bedfordshire SE 3.9 4.6 +0.7 
Central Sc 6.8 8.5 +1.7 East Sussex SE 4.8 5.5 +0.7 
14=(Isle of Wight SE 3.9 5.5 +1.6) Greater London SE(M) 3.4 4.1 +0.7 
South Yorks. YH(M) 6.4 8.0 +1.6 Oxfordshire SE 4.0 4.7 +0.7 
Merseyside NW(M) 11.3 12.9 +1.6 Norfolk EA 5.0 5.7 +0.7 
Tyne and Wear N(M) 9.6 11.2 +1.6 Devonshire SW 6.8 7.5 +0.7 
Tayside Sc 7.4 9.0 +1.6 Somerset SW 4.2 4.9 +047 
19=Lincolnshire EM 6.2 7.7 +1.5 Grampian Se 4.4 5.1 +0.7 
20=Cheshire NW 6.1 7.5 +1.4x 53=Berkshire SE 3.9 4.4 +0.5 
Mid Glamorgan Wa 9.1 10.5 +1.4x Hertfordshire SE 2.3 2.8 +0.5 
22=Leicestershire EM 4.3 5.6 +1.3 Avon SW 5.6 6.1 +0.5 
Cumbria N 5.9 7.2 +1.3 Dorset SW 4.3 4.8 +0.5 
Durham N 8.3 9.6 +1.3 North Yorkshire YH 3.8 4.3 +0.5 
Dumf. & Galloway Sc 7.8 9.1 +1.3 Dyfed Wa 7.5 8.0 +0.5 
26=Essex SE 4.6 5.8 +1.2 (Gwynedd Wa 8.1 8.6 +0.5) 
Derbyshire EM 4.2 5.4 +1.2 60=(Highlands Sc 8.2 8.6 +0.4) 
Nottinghamshire EM 5.2 6.4 +1.2 West Sussex SE 2.6 3.0 +0.4 
Lothian Sc 6.4 7.6 +1.2 62 (Cornwall SW 8.9 8.9 0 
30=Heref. & Worcs. WM 4.5 5.6 +1.1 
Northumberland N 7.6 8.7 +1.1 (Western Isles Sc 11.3 13.5 +2.2 
Powys Wa 4.7 5.8 +1.1 (Orkneys Sc 6.1 6.6 +0.5 
West Glamorgan Wa 7.4 8.5 +1.1 (Shetlands Sc 3.0 3.3 +0.3 
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(iii) June 1980-September 1980 
June Sept June Sept 
1980 1980 1980 1980 
1 West Glamorgan Wa 8.5 11.7 +3.2 Norfolk EA 5.7 7.1 +1.4 
Gwent Wa 9.3 12.4 +3.1 Somerset SW 4.9 6.3 +1.4 
3 West Midlands WM(M) 7.3 10.1 +2.8 36-Buckinghamshire SE 4.1 5.4 +1.3 
4 Dyfed Wa 8.0 10.6 +2.6 Kent SE 5.9 7.2 +1.3 
5 Heref. & Worcs. WM 5.6 8.1 +2.5 Surrey SE 2.9 4.2 +1.3 
6 Northamptonshire EM 6.3 8.7 +2.4 Dorset SW 4.8 6.1 +1.3 
7=Mid Glamorgan Wa 10.5 12.8 +2.3 Derbyshire EM 5.4 6.7 +1.3 
South Glamorgan Wa 8.2 10.5 +2.3 41=Hampshire SE 4.9 6.1 +1.2 
9=Salop WM 8.1 10.3 +2.2 Avon SW 6.1 7.3 +1.2 
Staffordshire WM 6.3 8.5 +2.2 Devonshire SW 7.5 8.7 +1.2 
ll=West Yorks. YH(M) 6.9 8.9 +2.0 Nottinghamshire EM 6.4 7.6 +1.2 
(Gwynedd Wa 8.6 10.6 +2.0) Tyne and Wear N(M) 11.2 12.4 +1.2 
13 Clwyd Wa 12.2 14.1 +1.9 Tayside Sc 9.0 10.2 +1.2 
14=Essex SE 5.8 7.6 +1.8 47=West Sussex SE 3.0 4.1 +1.1 
Humberside YH 8.6 10.4 +1.8 (Cornwall SW 8.9 10.0 +1.1) 
Gt. Manchester NW(M) 7.4 9.2 +1.8 Cumbria N 7.2 8.3 +1.1 
Cleveland N 12.3 14.1 +1.8 50=(Isle of Wight SE 5.5 6.5 +1.0) 
Powys Wa 5.8 7.6 +1.8 Oxfordshire SE 4.7 5.7 +1.0 
19 Merseyside NW(M) 12.9 14.6 +1.7 Cambridgeshire EA 4.9 5.9 +1.0 
20=Gloucestershire SW 5.0 6.6 +1.6 Strathclyde Sc(M) 12.1 13.1 +1.0 
Wiltshire SW 5.4 7.0 +1.6 54=Hertfordshire SE 2.8 3.6 +0.8 
North Yorkshire YH 4.3 5.9 +1.6 Borders Sc 4.0 4.8 +0.8 
Cheshire NW 7.5 9.1 +1.6 Central Sc 8.5 9.3 +0.8 
Durham N 9.6 11.2 +1.6 57=Dumf. & Galloway Sc 9.1 9.7 +0.6 
Northumberland N 8.7 10.3 +1.6 Lothians Sc 7.6 8.2 +0.6 
26=Berkshire SE 4.4 5.9 +1.5x 59 Grampian Sc 5.1 5.6 +0.5 
Suffolk EA 4.8 6.3 +1.5x 60 Lincolnshire EM 7.7 8.0 +0.3 
Leicestershire EM 5.6 7.1 +1.5x 61=Fife Sc 9.5 9.6 +0.1 
South Yorks. YH(M) 8.0 9.5 +1.5x (Highlands Sc 8.6 8.7 +0.1) 
Lancashire NW 7.5 9.0 +1.5x 
31=Bedfordshire SE 4.6 6. o +1.4 (Orkneys Sc 6.6 7.5 +0.9 
East Sussex SE 5.5 6.9 +1.4 (Western Isles Sc 13.5 14.0 +0.5 
Greater London SE(M) 4.1 5.5 +1.4 (Shetlands Sc 3.3 3.2 -0.1 
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(iv) September 1980-December 1980 
Sept Dec +/- Sept Dec +/- 
1980 1980 1980 1980 
1 (Cornwall SW 10.0 14.0 +4.0 Cambridgeshire EA 5.9 6.7 +0.8 
2 (Isle of Wight SE 6.5 10.0 +3.5) Leicestershire EM 7.1 7.9 +0.8 
3 (Gwynedd Wa 10.6 13.3 +2.7) West Yorks. YH(M) 8.9 9.7 +0.8 
4 Dorset Sw 6.1 8.2 +2.1 Cheshire NW 9.1 9.9 +0-8 
5 (Highlands Sc 8.7 10.7 +2.0) Fife Sc 9.6 10.4 +0.8 
6 Dumf. & Galloway Sc 9.7 11.6 +1.9 Strathclyde Sc(M) 13.1 13.9 +0.8 
7=Devonshire SW 8.7 10.5 +1.8 40=Bedfordshire SE 6.0 6.7 +0.7 
Durham N 11.2 13.0 +1.8 Berkshire SE 5.9 6.6 +0.7 
9=East Sussex SE 6.9 8.4 +1.5 Buckinghamshire SE 5.4 6.1 +0-7 
Norfolk EA 7.1 8.6 +1.5 Hampshire SE 6.1 6.8 +0.7 
Borders Se 4.8 6.3 +1.5 Wiltshire SW 7.0 7.7 +0.7 
12=Cleveland N 14.1 15.5 +1.4 Derbyshire EM 6.7 7.4 +0.7 
Tayside Sc 10.2 11.6 +1.4 Nottinghamshire EM 7.6 8.3 +0.7 
14=Lincolnshire EM 8.0 9.3 +1.3 Gwent Wa 12.4 13.1 +0.7 
Humberside YH 10.4 11.7 +1.3 Grampian Sc 5.6 6.3 +0.7 
Dyfed Wa 10.6 11.9 +1.3 49=Hertfordshire SE 3.6 4.2 +0.6 
18=West Midlands WM(M) 10.1 11.3 +1.2 51=Suffolk EA 6.3 6.8 +0.5 
Clwyd Wa 14.1 15.3 +1.2 Avon SW 7.3 7.8 +0.5 
20=Kent SE 7.2 8.3 +1.1 Northumberland N 10.3 -10.8 +0.5 
Northamp-tonshire EM 8.7 9.8 +1.1 55=Greater London SE(M) 5.5 5.9 +0.4 
North Yorkshire YR 5.9 7.0 +1.1 Somerset SW 6.3 6.7 +0.4 
West Glamorgan Wa 11.7 12.8 +1.1 Merseyside NW(M) 14.6 15.0 +0.4 
25=West Sussex SE 4.1 5.1 +1.0 South Glamorgan Wa 10.5 10.9 +o. 4 
Lancashire NW 9.0 10.0 +1.0 59=Oxfordshire SE 5.7 6.0 +0.3 
Mid Glamorgan Wa 12.8 13.8 +1.0 Gloucestershire SW 6.6 6.9 +0.3 
28=Heref. & Worcs. WM 8.1 9.0 +0.9X Powys Wa 7.6 7.9 +0.3 
Staffordshire WM 8.5 9.4 +0.9x 62 Surrey SE 4.2 4.4 +0.2 
South Yorks. YH(M) 9.5 10.4 +0.9x 
Gt. Manchester NW(M) 9.2 10.1 +O. qX (Western Isles Sc 14.0 17.3 +3.3 
Cumbria N 8.3 9.2 +0.9x (Shetlands Sc 3.2 4.2 +1.0 
33=Essex SE 7.6 8.4 +0.8 (Orkneys Sc 7.5 8.4 +0.9 
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(v) December 1980-February 1981 (March 1981 not available 
because of Civil Servants Dispute) 
Dec Feb +/- Dec Feb 
1980 1980 1980 1980 
1=Powys Wa 7.9 9.4 +1.5 Essex SE 8.4 9.2 +0.8 
Central Sc 10.6 12.1 +1.5 Greater London SE (M) 5.9 6.7 +0-8 
Fife Sc 10.4 11.9 +1.5 Hertfordshire SE 4.2 5.0 +0.8 
4=Lincolnshire EM 9.3 10.7 +1.4 Kent SE 8.3 9.1 +0.8 
Borders Sc 6.3 7.7 +1.4 Suffolk EA 6.8 7.6 +0.8 
6=West Midlands WIWI) 11.3 12.6 +1.3 Avon SW 7.8 8.6 +0.8 
Staffordshire WM 9.4 10.7 +1.3 (Cornwall SW 14.0 14.8 +0.8) 
8=Norfolk EA 
. 
8.6 9.8 +1.2 Devonshire SW 10.5 11.3 +0.8 
Strathclyde Sc(M) 13.9 15.1 +1.2 Dorset SW 8.2 9.0 +0.8 
10=0xfordshire SE 6.0 7.1 +1.1 Derbyshire EM 7.4 8.2 +0.8 
Cambridgeshire EA 6.7 7.8 +1.1 West Yorks. YH(M) 9.7 10.5 +0-8 
Heref. & Worcs. WM 9.0 10.1 +1.1 Merseyside NW(M) 15.0 15.8 +0-8 
Salop WM 11.4 12.5 +1.1 Cheshire NW 9.9 10.7 +0.8 
Gt. Manchester NW(M) 10.1 11.2 +1.1 Cumbria N 9.2 10.0 +0.8 
Cleveland N 15.5 16.6 +1.1 Gwent Wa 13.1 13.9 +0.8 
Grampian Sc 6.3 7.4 +1.1 South Glamorgan Wa 10.9 11.7 +0.8 
Tayside Sc 11.6 12.7 +1.1 50=Berkshire SE 6.6 7.3 +0.7 
18=Leicestershire EM 7.9 8.9 +1. Ox Surrey SE 4.4 5.1 +0.7 
South Yorks. YH(M) 10.4 11.4 +1. Ox Northamptonshire EM 9.8 10.5 +0.7 
Humberside YN 11.7 12.7 +1. Ox Nottinghamshire EM 8.3 9.0 +0.7 
Lancashire NW 10.0 11.0 +1. Ox Dumf. & Galloway Sc 11.6 12.3 +0.7 
Durham N 13.0 14.0 +1. Ox 55=West Sussex SE 5.1 5.7 +0.6 
Northumberland N 10.8 11.8 +1. Ox Gloucestershire SW 6.9 7.5 +0.6 
Lothians Sc 8.7 9.7 +I. Ox Somerset SW 6.7 7.3 +0.6 
25=Buckinghamshire SE 6.1 7.0 +0.9 Wiltshire SW 7.7 8.3 +0.6 
Hampshire SE 6.8 7.7 +0.9 West Glamorgan Wa 12.8 13.4 +0.6 
North Yorkshire YH 7.0 7.9 +0.9 Mid Glamorgan Wa 13.8 14.4 +0.6 
Tyne and Wear N(M) 13.0 13.9 +0.9 (Highlands Sc 10.7 11.3 +0.6) 
Clwyd Wa 15.3 16.2 +0.9 62 (Isle of Wight SE 10.0 10.5 +0.5) 
Dyfed Wa 11.9 12.8 +0.9 
(Gwynedd Wa 13.3 14.2 +0.9) (Western Isles Sc 17.3 19.5 +2.2 
32=Bedfordshire SE 6.7 7.5 +0.8 (Orkneys Sc 8.4 9.4 +1.0 
East Sussex SE 8.4 9.2 +0.8 (Shetlands Sc 4.2 5.2 +1.0 
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February 1981-June 1981 
Feb Jun 
1981 1981 
Feb Jun 
1981 1981 
1 Bedfordshire SE 7.5 9.4 +1.9 Hertfordshire SE 5.0 5.7 +o. 7 
2=West Midlands WM(M) 12.6 14.2 +1.6 Cambridgeshire SE 7.8 8.5 +0.7 
South Yorks. YH(M) 11.4 13.0 +1.6 Gwent Wa 13.9 14.6 +0.7 
Cheshire NW 10.7 12.3 +1.6 Mid Glamorgan Wa 14.4 15.1 +0.7 
5=Staffordshire WH 10.7 12.2 +1.5 Tayside Sc 12.7 13.4 +0.7 
Derbyshire EM 8.2 9.7 +1.5 39-Greater London SE(M) 6.7 7.3 +0.6 
Nottinghamshire EM 9.0 10.5 +1.5 Suffolk EA 7.6 8.2 +0.6 
8 Gt. Manchester NW(M) 11.2 12.6 +1.4 Avon SW 8.6 9.2 +0.6 
9=West Yorks. YH(M) 10.5 11.7 +1.2 Wiltshire SW 8.3 8.9 +0.6 
Merseyside NW(M) 15.8 17.0 +1.2 Cumbria N 10.0 10.6 +0.6 
Cleveland N 16.6 17.8 +1.2 44-Somerset SW 7.3 7.8 +0.5 
12=Salop WM 12.5 13.6 +1.1 Dyfed Wa 12.8 13.3 +0.5 
Lincolnshire EM 10.7 11.8 +1.1 46-Fife Sc 11.9 12.3 +0.4 
Northamptonshire EM 10.5 11.6 +1.1 47-West Sussex SE 5.7 6.0 +0.3 
Tyne and Wear N(M) 13.9 15.0 +1.1 Heref. & Worcs. WM 10.1 10.4 +0.3 
16=Hampshire SE 7.7 8.7 +1.0 Powys Wa 9.4 9.7 +0.3 
Leicestershire EM 8.9 9.9 +1-0 50=South Glamorgan Wa 11.7 11.9 +0.2 
Humberside YH 12.7 13.7 +1.0 Grampian Sc 7.4 7.6 +0.2 
Durham N 14.0 15.0 +1.0 52=East Sussex SE 9.2 9.3 +0.1 
West Glamorgan Wa 13.4 14.4 +1.0 Devonshire SW 11.3 11.4 +0.1 
Central Sc 12.1 13.1 +1.0 Dorset SW 9.0 9.1 +0.1 
Strathclyde Sc(M) 15.1 16.1 +1.0 Borders Sc 7.7 7.8 +0.1 
23=Essex SE 9.2 10.1 +0.9x 56=Norfolk EA 9.8 9.7 -0.1 
Gloucestershire SW 7.5 8.4 +O. gx Clwyd Wa 16.2 16.1 -0.1 
Lancashire NW 11.0 11.9 +0.9x 58 North Yorkshire YH 7.9 7.6 -0.3 
Fife Sc 11.9 12.8 +OAX 59(Highlands Sc 11.3 10.5 -0.8) 
Lothians Sc 9.7 10.6 +0.9x 60(Gwynedd Wa 14.2 13.0 -1.2) 
28=Kent SE 9.1 9.9 +o. 8 61(Cornwall SW 14.8 13.3 -1.5) 
Oxfordshire SE 7.1 7.9 +0.8 62(Isle of Wight SE lo. 5 8.3 -2.2) 
Surrey SE 5.1 5.9 +0.8 
Northumberland N 11.8 12.6 +0.8 (Western Isles Sc 19.5 20.0 +0.5 
32=Berkshire SE 7.3 8.0 +0.7 (Shetlands Sc 5.2 5.6 +0.4 
Buckinghamshire SE 7.0 7.7 +0.7 (Orkneys Sc 9.4 9.0 -0.4 
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(vii) June 1981-December 1981 
June Dec +/- June Dec +/- 
1981 1981 1981 1981 
1 (Isle of Wight SE 8.3 13.6 +5.3) Cheshire NW 12.3 13.4 +1. lx 
2 (Gwynedd Wa 13.0 16.5 +3.5) Gwent Wa 14.6 15.7 +1. lx 
3 (Cornwall SW 13.3 16.6 +3.3) 36=Somerset SW 7.8 8.8 +1.0 
4 (Highlands Sc 10.5 13.0 +2.5) Lancashire NW 12.0 13.0 +1.0 
5 Powys Wa 9.7 12.0 +2.3 38=Hertfordshire SE 6.2 7.1 +0.9 
6 Devonshire SW 11.4 13.5 +2.1 Cleveland N 17.8 18.7 +0.9 
7=Clwyd Ila 16.1 17.9 +1.8 40=Tyne and Wear N (M) 15.0 15.8 +0.8 
Dyfed Wa 13.2 15.0 +1.8 Central Sc 13.1 13.9 +0.8 
9=West Midlands WM(M) 14.2 15.9 +1.7 Grampian Sc 7.6 8.4 +0.8 
Norfolk EA 9.7 11.4 +1.7 Strathclyde Sc (M) 16.1 16.9 +0-8 
South Glamorgan Wa 11.9 13.6 +1.7 44 Berkshire SE 6.6 7.3 +0.7 
12=East Sussex SE 9.3 10.9 +1.6 45=Suffolk EA 8.2 8.8 +0.6 
Heref. & Worcs. WM 10.4 12.0 +1.6 Nottinghamshire EM 10.5 11.1 +0.6 
14 Mid Glamorgan Wa 15.1 16.6 +1.5 North Yorkshire YH 7.6 8.2 +0.6 
15=Dorset SW 9.1 10.5 +1.4 Borders Sc 7.8 8.4 +0.6 
Northumberland N 12.6 14.0 +1.4 49=Hampshire SE 8.7 9.2 +0.5 
West Glamorgan Wa 14.4 15.8 +1.4 Oxfordshire SE 7.9 8.4 +0.5 
Dumf- & Calloway Sc 12.7 14.1 +1.4 Cambridgeshire EA 8.5 9.0 +0.5 
Lothians Sc 10.6 12.0 +1.4 West Yorks. YH (M) 11.7 12.2 +0.5 
20=Bedfordshire SE 9.4 10.7 +1.3 53=Surrey SE 5.9 6.2 +0.3 
Greater London SE(M) 7.3 8.6 +1.3 Durham N 15.0 15.3 +0.3 
Salop WM 13.6 14.9 +1.3 Fife Sc 12.8 13.1 +0.3 
Staffordshire WM 12.2 13.5 +1.3 Tayside Sc 13.4 13.7 +0.3 
South Yorks YH(M) 13.0 14.3 +1.3 57=Derbyshire EM 9.7 9.9 +0.2 
Humberside YH 13.7 15.0 +1.3 Leicestershire EM 9.8 10.0 +0.2 
26=West Sussex -SE 6.0 7.2 +1.2 59=Gloucestershire SW 8.4 8.5 +0.1 
Merseyside NW(M) 16.9 18.1 +1.2 Northamptonshire EM 11.6 11.7 +0.1 
Cumbria N 10.6 11.8 +1.2 61 Lincolnshire EM 11.8 11.8 0 
29=Buckinghamshire SE 7.7 8.8 +J. lx 62 Wiltshire SW 8.9 8.8 -0.1 
Essex SE 10.1 11.2 +1. lx 
Kent SE 9.9 11.0 +1. lx (Orkneys Sc 9.0 11.2 +2.2 
Avon SW 9.2 10.3 +l. lX (Western Isles Sc 20.1 21.1 +1.0 
Gt. Manchester NW(M) 12.6 13.7 +1. lx (Shetlands Sc 5.3 6.2 +0.9 
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(viii) December 1981-July 1982 
Dec July Dec July +/- 
1981 1982 1981 1982 
1 Derbyshire EM 9.9 12.0 +2.1 33=Kent SE 11.0 11.9 +0-9 
2 Humberside YH 15.0 16.7 +1.7 Oxfordshire SE 8.4 9.3 +0.9 
3=Durham N 15.3 16.9 +1.6 36=Hertfordshire SE 7.1 7.9 +0-8 
Gwent Wa 15.7 17.3 +1.6 Avon SW 10.3 11.1 +0-6 
5=Wiltshire Sw 8.8 10.3 +1.5 38=Buckinghamshire SE 8.8 9.5 +0-7 
Shropshire WM 14.9 16.4 +1.5 East Sussex SE 10.9 11.6 +0.7 
Merseyside NW(M) 18.1 19.6 +1.5 Cumbria N 11.8 12.5 +0.7 
Northumberland N 14.0 15.5 +1.5 41=West Sussex SE 7.2 7.8 +0.6 
Tyne and Wear N(M) 15.8 17.3 +1.5 Tayside Sc 13.7 14.3 +0.6 
Central Sc. 13.9 15.4 +1.5 43=Berkshire SE 7.3 7.8 +0.5 
11=Cambridgeshire EA 9.0 10.4 +1.4 Surrey SE. 6.2 6.7 +0.5 
Gt. Manchester NW(M) 13.7 15.1 +1.4 Dyfed Wa 15.0 15.5 +0.5 
Cleveland N 18.7 20.1 +1.4 South Glamorgan Wa 13.6 14.1 +0.5 
14=Essex SE 10.9 12.2 +1.3 47=Norfolk EA 11.4 11.8 +0.4 
Nottinghamshire EM 11.1 12.4 +1.3 Clwyd Wa 17.9 18.3 +0.4 
South Yorks. YH(M) 14.3 15.6 +1.3 Borders Sc 8.4 8.8 +0.4 
Lancashire NW 13.0 14.3 +1.3 Dumf. & Galloway Sc 14.1 14.5 +0-4 
Mid Glamorgan Wa 16.6 17.9 +1.3 51=Devon SW 13.5 13.8 +0.3 
19=Heref. & Worcs. WM 12.0 13.2 +1.2 Somerset SW 8.8 9.1 +0.3 
Staffordshire WM 13.5 14.7 +1.2 West Glamorgan Wa 15.8 16.1 +0.3 
West Yorks. YH(M) 12.2 13.4 +1.2 Grampian Sc 8.4 8.7 +0.3 
Cheshire NW 13.4 14.6 +1.2 55=Bedfordshire SE 10.7 10.9 +0.2 
Fife Sc, 13.1 14.3 +1.2 (Highlands Sc 13.0 13.2 +0.2) 
Strathclyde Sc(M) 16.9 18.1 +1.2 57=Dorset SW 10.5 10.5 0.0 
25=West Midlands WM(M) 15.9 17.0 +I. lx Powys Wa 12.0 12.0 0.0 
Lincolnshire EM 11.8 12.9 +I. lx 59 North Yorkshire YH 9.2 9.1 -0.1 
Northamptonshire EM 11.7 12.8 +1. lx 60 (Gwynedd Wa 16.5 15.1 -1.4) 
Lothians Sc, 12.0 13.1 +l. lX 61 (Cornwall SW 16.6 15.1 -1.5) 
29=Hampshire SE 9.2 10.2 +1.0 62 (Isle of Wight SE 13.6 11.9 -1.7) 
Suffolk EA 8.8 9.8 +1.0 
Gloucestershire SW 8.5 9.5 +1.0 (Western Isles Sc 21.1 24.4 +3.3 
Leicestershire EM 10.0 11.0 +1.0 (Orkneys Sc 11.2 13.1 +1.9 
33=Greater London SE(M) 8.6 9.5 +0.9 (Shetlands Sc 6.2 6.7 +0.5 
Note: Shropshire in this table is identical to Salop in earlier 
tables, the county name having officially been changed at this stage. 
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July 1982-April 1983 
(July 1982 figures on "old" basis; April 1983 figures on "new" 
basis; +/- figures take account of change of basis of calculation) 
July Apr 
1982 1983 
July Mar 
1982 1983 
1 (Isle of Wight SE 11.9 14.5 +3.2) 34-Cambridgeshire EA 10' 04 10.7 +0.9 
2 (Gwynedd Wa 15.1 16.4 +2.7) Suffolk EA 9.8 10.4 +0.9 
3 Dyfed Wa 15.5 16.4 +2.6 Avon SW 11.1 11.0 +0.9 
4 (Cornwall SW 15.1 16.4 +2.5) Durham N 16.9 17.5 +0.9 
5 Powys Wa 12.0 12.4 +2.0 Clwyd Wa 18.3 18.3 +0.9 
6=Norfolk EA 11.8 13.0 +1.8 39=West Yorks. Y11(M) 13.4 13.4 +0.9 
Lincolnshire EM 12.9 13.7 +1.8 40=Berkshire SE 7.8 7.5 +0.7 
8=South Glamorgan Wa 14.1 14.1 +1.7 Gt. Manchester NW(M) 15.1 14.6 +0.7 
West Glamorgan Wa 16.1 15.8 +1.7 42=Devonshire SW 13.8 13.7 +0.6 
10 Heref. & Worcs. WM 13.2 14.0 +1.6 Derbyshire EM 12.0 11.7 +0.6 
11 East Sussex SE 11.6 12.2 +1.5 Tyne and Wear N(M) 17.3 17.1 +0.6 
12=Bedfordshire SE 10.9 11.2 +1.4 Mid Glamorgan Wa 17.9 16.8 +o. 6 
Gloucestershire SW 9.5 10.1 +1.4 46=Buckinghamshire SE 9.5 9.3 +0.5 
West Midlands WM(M) 17.0 17.0 +1.4 Hampshire SE 10.2 9.8 +0.5 
Borders Sc 8.8 10.0 +1.4 Hertfordshire SE 7.9 7.7 +0.5 
16=South Yorks. YH(M) 15.6 16.2 +1.3 Surrey SE 6.7 6.7 +0.5 
(Highlands Sc 13.2 14.2 +1.3) 50=Northamptonshire EM 12.8 12.1 +0.3 
18=Greater London SE(M) 9.5 9.6 +1.2 Nottinghamshire EM 12.4 12.3 +0.3 
Kent SE 11.9 12.2 +1.2 Gwent Wa 17.3 16.8 +0.3 
Dorset SW 10.5 11.2 +1.2 53=West Sussex SE 7.8 7.3 +0.2 
21 Shropshire WM 16.4 15.8 +1.1 Wiltshire SW 10.3 10.2 +0.2 
Leicestershire EM 11.0 10.9 +1.1 Strathclyde Sc(M) 18.1 17.4 +0.2 
North Yorkshire YH 9.1 9.2 +1.1 56=Staffordshire WM 14.7 13.9 +0.1 
Merseyside NW(M) 19.6 19.0 +1.1 Humberside YH 16.7 16.0 +0.1 
Lancashire NW 14.3 14.0 +1.1 Cumbria N 12.5 12.0 +0.1 
Central Sc 15.4 15.5 +1.1 Dumf. & Calloway Sc 14.5 13.7 +0.1 
Grampian Sc 8.7 9.0 +1.1 60 Oxfordshire SE 9.3 8.3 -0.2 
Lothian Sc 13.1 12.4 +1.1 61 Fife Sc 14.3 13.2 -0.6 
Tayside Sc 14.3 14.6 +1.1 62 Northumberland N 15.5 13.5 -1.1 
30=Essex SE 12.5 12.6 +1.0 
Somerset SW 9.1 9.8 +1.0 (Shetlands Sc 6.7 7.3 +2.1 
Cheshire NW 14.6 13.6 +1.0 (Western Isles Sc 24.4 22.5 +1.1 
Cleveland N 20.1 20.5 +1.0 (Orkneys Sc 13.1 12.5 +l. G 
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(x) April 1983-July 1984 
Apr July Mar July +/- 
1983 1984 1983 1984 
1 (Highlands Sc 14.2 15.1 +0.9) 32-Somerset SW 9.8 9.3 -0.5 
2 Fife Sc 13.2 13.7 +0.5 Grampian Sc 9.0 8.5 -0.5 
3=Greater London SE(M) 9.6 10.0 +0.4 36=Dorset SW 11.2 10.6 -o. 6 
Tyne and Wear N(M) 17.1 17.5 +0.4 Lancashire NW 14.0 13.4 -0.6 
5=Cleveland N 20.5 20.7 +0.2 38-Wiltshire SW 10.2 9.5 -0.7 
Lothian Sc 12.4 12.6 +0.2 Northamptonshire EM 12.1 11.4 -0.7 
7=Shropshire WM 15.8 15.9 +0.1 West Yorks. YH(M) 13.4 12.7 -0.7 
Nottinghamshire EM 12.3 12.4 +0.1 Durham N 17.5 16.8 -0.7 
North Yorkshire YH 9.2 9.3 +0.1- West Glamorgan Wa 15.8 15.1 -0.7 
10=Derbyshire EM, 11.7 11.7 0.0 43=West Sussex SE 7.3 6.5 -0.8 
South Glamorgan Wa 14.1 14.1 0.0 Humberside YH 16.0 15.2 -0.8 
Strathclyde Sc(M) 17.4 17.4 0.0 45 Dumf. & Galloway Sc 13.7 12.8 -0.9 
13=Hampshire SE 9.8 9.7 -0.1 46=Surrey SE 6.7 5.7 -1.0 
Avon SW 11.1 11.0 -0.1 Devonshire SW 13.7 12.7 -1.0 
Central Sc 15.5 15.4 -0.1 Heref. & Worcs. WM 14.0 13.0 -1.0 
16=Buckinghamshire SE 9.3 9.1 -0.2 (Gwynedd Wa 16.4 15.4 -1.0) 
Essex SE 12.6 12.4 -0.2 50=Bedfordshire SE 11.2 10.1 -1.1 
Oxfordshire SE 8.3 8.1 -0.2 Lincolnshire EM 13.7 12.6 -1.1 
Leicestershire EM 10.9 10.7 -0.2 52=Suffolk EA 10.4 9.2 -1.2 
Gt. Manchester NW(M) 14.6 14.4 -0.2 West Midlands WM(M) 17.0 15.8 -1.2 
Cheshire NW 13.6 13.4 -0.2 Dyfed Wa 16.4 15.2 -1.2 
22=Berkshire SE 7.5 7.2 -0.3 55 Staffordshire WM. 13.9 12.5 -1.4 
Hertfordshire SE 7.7 7.4 -0.3 56=Norfolk EA 13.0 11.5 -1.5 
Kent SE 12.2 11.9 -0.3 Cumbria N 12.0 10.5 -1.5 
South Yorks. YH(M) 16.2 15.9 -0.3 Gwent Wa 16.8 15.3 -1.5 
Merseyside NW(M) 19.0 18.7 -0.3 Borders Sc 10.0 8.5 -1.5 
Mid Glamorgan Wa 16.8 16.5 -0.3 60 (Cornwall SW 16.4 14.7 -1.7) 
Powys Wa 12.4 12.1 -0.3 61 Clwyd Wa 18.3 16.5 -1.8 
29=Gloucestershire SW 10.1 9.7 -0.4x 62 (Isle of Wight SE 14.5 12.2 -2.3) 
Northumberland N 13.5 13.1 -0.4x 
Tayside Sc 14.6 14.2 -0.4x (Western Isles Sc 22.5 21.5 -1.0 
32=East Sussex SE 12.2 11.7 -0.5 (Orkneys Sc 12.5 10.7 -1.8 
Cambridgeshire EA 10.7 10.2 -0.5 (Shetlands Sc 7.3 5.4 -1.9 
- 385 - 
(xi) September 1984-September 1985 
Sept Sept Sept Sept +/- 
1984 1985 1984 1985 
1 Dyfed Wa 16.7 18.4 +1.7 32=Lancashire NW 14.2 14.5 +0.3 
2 Fife Sc 14.8 15.9 +1.1 36=Gt. Manchester NW (M) 15.5 15.8 +0.3 
3 Northumberland N 15.3 16.3 +1.0 South Glamorgan Wa 14.5 14.8 +0.3 
4=South Yorks. YH(M) 17.5 18.4 +0.9 37=Hampshire SE 9.8 10.0 +0.2 
Clwyd Wa 18.0 18.9 +0.9 (Isle of Wight SE 12.9 13.1 +0.2) 
6=Norfolk EA 11.4 12.2 +0.8 West Sussex SE 7.0 7.2 +0.2 
North Yorkshire YH 10.3 11.1 +0.8 Avon SW 11.6 11.8 +0.2 
8=Somerset SW 10.2 10.9 +0.7 Humberside YH 17.0 17.2 +0.2 
Cumbria N 12.1 12.8 +0.7 Merseyside NW (M) 21.3 21.5 +0.2 
(Gwynedd Wa 17.6 18.3 +0.7) 43=Bedfordshire SE 10.6 10.7 +0.1 
ll=Lincolnshire EM 13.0 13.6 +0.6 Kent SE 12.4 12.5 +0.1 
Powys Wa 12A 13.5 +0.6 West Midlands WM(M) 17.0 17.1 +0.1 
Dumf- & Galloway Sc 13.2 13.8 +0.6 Lothian Sc 12.7 12.8 +0.1 
(Highlands Sc 14.7 15.3 +0.6) 47=Warwickshire WH 13.0 13.0 0.0 
15-East Sussex SE 10.3 10.8 +0.5 West Glamorgan Wa 16.8 16.8 0.0 
(Cornwall SW 16.4 16.9 +0.5) Borders Sc 9.0 9.0 0.0 
Devon SW 13.1 13.6 +0.5 Grampian Sc 7.6 7.6 0.0 
Heref. & Worcs. WM 13.7 14.2 +0.5 52=Berkshire SE 7.5 7.4 -0.1 
Nottinghamshire EM, 13.0 13.5 +0.5 Cheshire NW 14.1 14.0 -0.1 
Gwent Wa 17.5 18.0 +0.5 Central Sc 16.2 16.1 -0.1 
Mid Glamorgan Wa 19.2 19.7 +0.5 55=Buckinghamshire SE 8.6 8.4 -0.2 
23=Suffolk EA 9.2 9.6 +0.4 Essex SE 12.5 12.3 -0.2 
Dorset SW 10.9 11.3 +0.4 Oxfordshire SE 8.3 8.1 -0.2 
Shropshire WM 16.5 16.9 +0.4 Cambridgeshire EA 9.9 9.7 -0.2 
Staffordshire WM 14.1 14.5 +0.4 Leicestershire EM 11.1 10.9 -0.2 
Derbyshire EM 13.7 14.1 +0.4 Northamptonshire EM 12.3 12.1 -0.2 
West Yorks. YH(M) 14.1 14.5 +0.4 61=Hertfordshire SE 7.8 7.4 -0.4 
Tyne and Wear N(M) 20.3 20.7 +0.4 Cleveland N 23.5 23.1 -0.4 
Strathclyde Sc(M) 18.6 19.0 +o. 4 
Tayside Sc 14.6 15.0 +0.4 (Orkneys Sc 10.7 10.7 0.0 
32=Gloucestershire SW 10.4 10.7 +0.3 (Shetlands Sc 5.4 5.1 -0.3 
Wiltshire SW 9.9 10.2 +0.3 (Western Isles Sc 19.3 18.9 -0.4 
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cited in main text. 
UK official publications which are not primarily statistical in 
naturep for example the reports of Royal Commissions, are included in 
bibliography 2(i), under Great Britain. 
I Sources of statistical material 
l(i) UK Government, official labour market statistics. 
The one indispensable source is the Gazette, published by the 
Department of Employment. This publication has been referred to so 
frequently, and has had so many changes of title, that the one word 
abbreviated title seems simplest and most logical. The current title is 
EmpZoyment Gazette; earlier designations are listed below. Other 
publications, which abstract statistical material from the Gazette, are 
also given abbreviated titles; HistoricaZ Abstract; Yearbook. 
These published sources, if used intelligently, can provide a highly 
detailed picture of changes in the state of the labour market. It should 
be emphasised, however, that up-to-date statistical material is presented 
on the basis of the best information available at the time, and that 
revisions are frequently made when new material becomes available. This 
has no real effect on the figures given of the number unemployed, which 
are based on regular monthly counts, but can have a considerable effect on 
figures for the number employed, and by this route on the percentage 
unemployment rate. The general principle adopted has been to use the 
latest revised figures whenever possible. Unfortunately the final figures 
do not always get published, so that for example there are discrepancies 
in the Gazette figures for employment taken from the Census of Employment, 
and the actual Census of Employment figures themselves, held on NOMIS 
(see below). In such circumstances the NOMIS figures are to be regarded 
as more reliable. In addition, NOMIS Census of Employment figures are far 
more detailed, particularly at the sub-regional level, than Gazette 
figures, and this source has been essential in the research work involved 
in preparing chapters 6 and 8. 
(a) Published sources 
Gazette., monthly, 1893 to date. Full titles: Labour Gazette, May 1893- 
January 1905; Board of Trade Labour Gazette., February 1905- 
June 1917; Labour Gazette, July 1917-May 1922; Ministry of 
Labour Gazette, June 1922-May 1968; Employment and Productivity 
Gazette., June 1968-December 1970; Department of Employment 
Gazette, January 1971-December 1979; Employment Gazette4 
January 1980 to date. 
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HistoricaZ Abstract. Full title: Department of Employment and 
Productivity (1971) British Labour Statistics: IliatoricaZ 
Abstract 1886-1968, HMS09 London. 
Yearbook (1969-1976; no longer published). Full title: Britsh Labour 
Statistics: Year Book. 
In addition, twenty-two editions of the Abstract of Labour 
Statistics of the United Kingdom were published at irregular intervals 
from 1894 to 1937. 
In recent years the Gazette has published various HistoricaZ 
SuppZements, giving longer continuous runs of statistics than the main 
body of the Gazette. The most recent issues (as of early 1989) have been 
in February 1987 and October 1987. 
(b) Unpublished sources: 
A variety of unpublished statistical material, at a wide range of 
spatial scales, is available on NOMIS, the National Online Manpower 
Information System. For a brief description, see A, R. Townsend, M. J. 
Blakemore and R. Nelson (1987) 'The NOMIS data base: availability and 
uses for geographers', Area, 19,43-50. 
The only statistical material extracted from this system has 
concerned the Census of Employment, although much information at a very 
local level about, for example, unemployment is also available. There are 
confidentiality constraints on the use of Census of Employment material, 
and I have tried to maintain these as far as reasonably possible. 
obviously, if a reduction in employment from 2,500 to 500 is recorded and 
reported as having taken place in a particular sector in a particular 
location, it should not take too much extra research work to find out 
which firm is involved. In such cases there is a potential conflict 
between the need to protect confidentiality and the need to present 
information which makes local labour market changes intelligible. The 
general policy followed is that it is important to record sharp changes in 
local employment levels, and to record which sectors these changes took 
place in, but relatively unimportant for present purposes to identify 
particular firms involved. No attempt has been made to use Census of 
Employment information to attempt to identify spatial strategies, whether 
implicit or explicit, by any multi-plant corporation. 
It should of course be added that even if a large job loss can 
be traced to a particular firm, no blame necessarily attaches to that 
firm. The central argument of the thesis is, after all, that mass 
unemployment arises, not from industrial firms recklmZy shedding labour, 
but rather from a deteriorating economic environment in which the large 
majority of firms have had no rational economic alternative other than to 
cut back employment. Given the overall context, it is hoped that no 
reasonable observer could conclude that unpublished official statistics 
have been abused to undermine confidentiality on commercially sensitive 
information. 
Census of Employment, annually, 1971-1978, then 1981,1984,1987. 
Unpublished information used includes employment totals, at all 
levels of sectoral disaggregation down to the Minimum List 
Heading, for counties and travel-to-work areas. Published 
information is presented in the Gazette. 
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l(ii) UK Government, other official statistics 
(a) Statistical abstracts 
AnnuaZ Abstract of Statistics 1840 to date (no issues from 1941 to 1947 
inclusive). Earlier title, up to 1940; StatisticaZ Abstract 
for the United Kingdom. 
Economic Trends Monthly, 1953 to date. Also Economic Trends AnnuaZ 
SuppZement 1975 to date. 
Monthty Digest of Statistics 1946 to date. 
Regional Trends., annual, 1965 to date. Earlier titles: Abstract of 
RegionaZ Statisticst 1965-74; RegionaZ Statistics., 1975-1980. 
(b) Specialised sources 
British Business., weekly, 1979 to date. 
Census of Great Britain; Census of England and PaZes; Census of ScotZand, 
decennial, 1801 to date. Shortened in text to Census or to 
Census of Population. 
Census of Production 1907,1924,19300 1935,1948,1951,1954,1958, 
1963,1968, and annually from 1970. 
Housing and Construction Statistics. * quarterly, 1966 to date. Earlier 
title: Housing Statistics: Great Britain., 1966-71. Also annual 
edition, 1979 to date. 
Population and Vital Statistics: local and health authority areas, annual. 
See also OPCS Monitor, Reference PP1 8412 (1984) for annual 
estimates of population from 1971 to 1980, updated to take 
account of the 1981 Census. 
Population Projections, annual, 1971 to date. 
Population Trends., quarterly, 1975 to date. 
Scottish Economic Bulletin, twice a year, 1972 to date. 
united Kingdom Balance of Payments., annual, 1948 to date. 
United Kingdom National Accounts, annual, 1949 to date. Earlier title: 
National Income and Expenditure, 1948-1973. 
(iii) International organisations, official statistics. 
(a) Labour market statistics 
International Labour office, Geneva, BuZZetin of Labour Stati8tic8i 
quarterly, 1965 to date. Prior to this date, the 
Internationat Labour Review (1921 to date) carried regular 
statistical material; this journal is still extant, but no 
longer carries detailed labour market statistics. 
International Labour Office, Geneva, Year-book of Labour Statistics 
1935 to date. 
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(b) Other statistical material 
International Monetary Fund, InternationaZ PinanciaZ Statiatics, monthly, 
1948 to date. 
United Nations, StatisticaZ Yearbook 1948 to date. 
United Nations, National Accounts Statistics 1957 to date. Earlier title: 
. Yearbook of NationaZ Accounts Statistics 1957-1981. 
Other international organisations, for example the EEC and OECD, 
also produce sets of international economic statistics, with the OECD 
regularly producing economic surveys, with statistical material, on each 
member country. 
l(iv) Other major sources of statistical material, usually based 
indirectly on official statistics. 
Abbreviated titles only are presented here; full publication 
details are given in 2(i). 
Beck G. M. (1951) British Employment and UnempZoyment 1927-45. 
Crafts N. F. R. (1985) British Economic Growth During the 1'ndustriaZ 
RevoZution. 
Feinstein C. H. (1972) National. Income, Expenditure and Output, 2855-1965. 
Lee C. H. (1979) Regional Employment Statistics 1841-2971. 
Liesner T. (1985) Economic Statistics 1900-1983 
Maddison A. (1982) Phases of Capitalist DeveZopment. 
Matthews R. C. O., C. H. Feinstein and J. C. Odling-Smee (1982) British 
Economic Growth., 1856-1973. 
Mitchell B. R. (1975) European Historical Statistics 1750-1970. 
Mitchell B. R. (1983) International Historical Statistics: the Americas 
and Australasia. 
Mitchell B. R. (1988) British Historical Statistics (an updated version of 
Mitchell and Deane 1962, and Mitchell and Jones 1971). 
Mitchell B. R. and P. Deane (1962) Abstract of British Historical Statistics. 
Mitchell B. R. and H. G. Jones (1971) Second Abstract of British Historical 
Statistics. 
Thomas B. (1973) Migration and Economic Growth. 
Vaughan W. E. and A. J. Fitzpatrick (1978) Irish Population, 2822-1972. 
willcox W. F. (1929) International Migrations: voZumc 2. statictice. 
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2 Main bibliography 
The following is a list of references cited in the text rather 
than any attempt at an exhaustive bibliography. Even on the "core 
subject" of the thesis the author is aware that much of the potentially 
relevant material has not been cited. On more "peripheral" questions, 
one is aware that the referencing might well seem unduly arbitrary to 
the specialist, with much complicated debate reduced to a few, possibly 
unrepresentativet key references. It is hoped in such cases that those 
references which have been cited provide enough bibliographical leads into 
earlier academic debates. 
No attempt has been made to introduce material into the list of 
references to provide a more complete literature surveye Some important 
recent works, published too late to be discussed in the main text, are 
listed in supplementary bibliography 2(iii). 
Books, periodicals, etc. (named articles) 
Aaronovitch, S. and M. Sawyer (1975), Big Business: theoreticaZ and 
enpiricaZ aspects of concentration and mergers in the United 
Kingdom, Macmillan, London. 
Abercrombie, P. (1945), Greater London Plan 1944., IIMSO, London. 
Abler, R. 9 J. S. Adams and P. R. Gould (1972). Spatial Organization: the 
geographer's view of the world, Prentice-Hall, Englewood 
Cliffs. 
Abramovitz, M. (1961), 'The nature and significance of Kuznets cycles', 
Economic DeveZopment and CuZturaZ Change., 9,225-248. 
Abramovitz, M. (1968), 'The passing of the Kuznets cycle', Economica, 
35,349-367. 
Adams, J. C. and D. A. Kraithman (1986), 'Unemployment in a relatively 
prosperous region: the Hertfordshire experience', in Danson 
1986, pp. 121-135. 
Adams, L. P. (1932/1965), Agricultural, Depression and Farm Relief in 
England, 1813-1852, Cass, London. 
Aldcroft, D. H. (1969), tEconomic progress in Britain in the 1920s', in 
Aldcroft and Richardson 1969, pp. 219-238. First published in 
The Scottish JournaZ of PoZiticaZ Econormj, 1966. 
Aldcroft, D. H. (1970), The Interwar Economy: Britain,, 2929-2939j Batsford, 
London. 
Aldcroft, D. H. (1977), From VersaiNes to P/aZZ Street, 2919-2929.0 Lane, 
London. 
Aldcroft, D. H. (1980). The European Econoimj 1924-2980, Croom Ile1mg London. 
Aldcroft, D. H. (1984), Full Employment: the eZu8ive goal, wheatsheaf, 
Brighton. 
Aldcroft. D. H. (1986). The British Econotmj: 
Wheatsheaf, Brighton. 
the yeara of turrwiZ 1920-1951, 
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Aldcroft, D. H. and II. W. Richardson (1969), The Britich Economy,, 1870-1939, 
Macmillan, London. 
Alden, J. (1977), 'Economic problems facing urban areas in South Wales', 
Regional Studies., 11,373-382. 
Alford, D. W. E. (1972), Depression and Recovery? British economic growth 
1918-1939, Macmillan, London. 
Allen,, G. C. (1929) , The IndustriaZ Development of Birmingham and the 
Black Country 1860-1927., Allen & Unwin, London. 
Allen, K. and D. Yuill (1977), 'The accuracy of pre-1971 local employment 
data (the ER iis)', Regional Studies, 11,253-261. 
Allen, R. G. D. and B. Thomas (1939), 'The supply of engineering labour 
under boom conditions', Economic Journal, 49,259-274. 
Ames, B. (1984), 'Empirical Review of the Financial Crisis in Mexico', 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Discussion 
paper, 10. Geneva. 
Amin, S., G. Arrighi, A. G. Frank and I. Wallerstein (1982), Dynamics of 
Global Crisis, Monthly Review Press, New York. 
Andreano, R. (1967ed), The Economic Impact of the American Civil War, 
(2nd edition; lst edition 1962), Schenkman, Cambridgeg Mass. 
Armstrong, H. and D. Riley (1987), 'The "North-South" controversy, and 
Britain's regional probleml,. LocaZ EcononW,, 2,, 93-105. 
Armstrong, H. and J. Taylor (1985), Regional Economics and Policy, Allan, 
Oxford. 
Ashcroft, B. and J. Taylor (1979). 'The effect of regional policy on 
movement of industry in Great Britain', in Maclennan and Parr, 
1979, pp. 43-64. 
Ashton, D. N. (1986), Unemployment Under Capitalism: the sociology of 
British and American Zabour markets, Wheatsheaf, Brighton. 
Ashworth, W. (1960), An Economic History of England 1870-1939, Methuen, 
London. 
Ashworth, W. (1964), 'Types of social and economic development in suburban 
Essex', in Glass, 1964, pp. 62-87. 
Ashworth, W. (1986), The History of the British Coal Industry. Volume 5 
1946-1982: the nationalised industry, Clarendon Presso 
Oxford. 
Astor, J. J. (1923ed), The Third Winter of Unemployment: the report of 
an enquiry undertaken in the Autwrm of 2922, King, London. 
Avramovic, D. (1987), 'Commodity problem: what next? ',, World Devozopmento 
15,645-655. 
Bacon, R. and W. A. Eltis (1978),, Britain's Economic PývbZem: too few 
producers., Macmillan, London. (second edition; first edition 
1976). 
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Bagwell, P. S. (1974), The Transport Revolution from 2770.0 Bateford, 
London. 
Baker, J. N. L. *, . and E. W. Gilbert 
(1944), 'The doctrine of an axial 
belt of industry in England', The Geographical Journal, 103, 
49-72. 
Baker. R. (1976)9 New and Improved ... inventors and inventions that have changed the modern world, British Museums Publications, 
London. 
Barlow, C. A. M. (1940) - see Great Britain, Royal Commissiong 1940. 
Bassett. K. and P. Haggett (1971), 'Towards Short-Term Forecasting for 
Cyclic Behaviour in a Regional System of Cities', in M. D. I. 
Chisholm, A. E. Prey and P. Haggett, Regional Foreoastingo 
(pp. 389-414), Butterworth, London. 
Bassett,, R. (1958), Nineteen Thirty-One: political crisis, Macmillan,, 
London. 
Beales. H. L. (1934), 'The Great Depression in Industry and Trade', 
Economic History Review, 5,65-75. 
Beard, C. A. and M. R. Beard (1927), The Rise of American Civilisation, 
Macmillan, New York. 
Beaujeu-Garnier, J. (1966), Geography of Populationj Longman,, London. 
Beavon, K. S. O. (1977), Central Place Theory: a reinterpretation, 
Longman, London. 
Beck, G. M. (1951),, A Survey of British EmpZoyment and Unemployment, 
1927-45, Oxford University Institute of Statistics. 
Beckerman, W. (1972ed),, The Labour Government's Economic Record: 
1964-1970, Duckworth, London. 
Beckerman, W. (1979ed), Slow Growth in Britain, Oxford University Press. 
Beenstock, M. and P. Warburton (1986), 'Wages and unemployment in 
interwar Britain', Explorations in Economic History, 23, 
153-172. 
Bell, Daniel (1974), The Coming of Post-Industrial Society, 11cinemann, 
London. 
Bell, David S. (1985ed), The Conservative Government 1979-84: an 
interim report. 0 Croom Helm, London. 
Benjamin, D. and L. Kochin (1979)0 'Searching for an explanation of 
unemployment in inter-war Britain', Journal, of Political 
Economy, 87,441-478. 
Berend, I. T. and K. Borchardt (1986ed), The Impact of the Depression of 
the 1930s and its Relevance for the Contemporary World, (9th 
International Economic History Congress, Berne), Karl Marx 
University of Economics, Budapest. 
Beresford, M. W. (1954), The Lost Villages of England, Lutterworth, London. 
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Berkeley, H. J. (1978) , The Ajth That Will Not Dic: the formation of the 
NationaZ Government, 1931s Croom 11elmq London. 
Berry, B. J. L. (1967), Geography of Market Centers and RataiZ Dintribution., 
Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, 
Berry, F. (1974), Housing: the Great British Failure, Knight, London. 
Best, R. H. (1964), 'New towns in the London regionl, in Coppock and Princep 
1964, pp. 313-332. 
Bevan, A. (1952/1978), In Place of Fearj Quarteto London. 
Beveridge, W. H. (1909), UnempZoyiwnt: a problem of industry, Longmans, 
Green, London. (Second edition, dated 1910). 
Beveridge, W. H. (1936), 'An analysis of unemployment: V, Economica., new 
series, 3,357-386. 
Beveridge, W. H. (1937). 'An analysis of unemployment: II and IIV, 
Economica, new series, 4,1-17,168-183. 
Beveridge, W. H. (1942), Social Insurance and Allied Services, Cmd 6406, 
HKSO. 
Beveridge, W. H. (1944), Full Employment in a Free Society., Allen & Unwin, 
London. 
Beynon, H. (1985ed), Diýging Deeper: issues in the miners' strikei Verso, 
London. 
Beynon, H. and P. McMylor (1985), tDecisive power: the New Tory State 
against the miners', in Beynon, 1985, pp. 29-46. 
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Quarterly Journal of Economicsj 36,343-349. 
Bhaskar, K. (1979), The Future of the UK Motor Industry: an economic and 
financial analysis of the UK motor industry against a rapidly 
changing background for European and worldwide motor 
manufacturers., Kogan Page, London. 
Birch, A. (1967), The Economic History of the British Iron and Steel 
Industry 1784-1879: essays in industrial and economic history 
with special reference to the development of technoZogy., Cass, 
London. 
Black, J. (1979), The Economics of Modern Britain: an introduction to 
macroeconornics., Robertson, Oxford. 
Blackaby, F. T. (1978ed), British Economic Policy 1960-74,,, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Blackaby, F. T. (1979ed), De-industriaZisation., Heinemann, London. 
Bleaney, M. (1983), 'Conservative economic strategy', in 11all and Jacques$ 
1983, pp. 132-147. 
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Investment Before 1914., Princeton Studies in International 
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Board of Trade - see Great Britaint Board of Trade. 
- 394 - 
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